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THE 

HISTORY 



OF 



GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S 

CONQUEST 



OF 



SCINDE. 



BY 

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. F. P. NAPIER. 



DEDICATED 



TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE. 



SECOND EDITION. 



LONDON: 
CHARLES WESTERTON, 

20, ST. GEORGE'S PLACE, HYDE PARK CORNER. 

1867. 



■ N*3 

Its 7 



TRANSFER 



NOV 1 1945 

Serial Record Divisio* 
The Library of Congress 

^PK^MmmHHHIHiu > 



LONDON *. 

PRINTED BY GEORGE PHIPPS, RANELAGH STREET, 
EATON SQUARE. 



NOTICE. 



Some repetitions, and passages having a pro- 
spective reference, will be met with in the first and 
second portions of this work, because they were 
originally published separately, at long intervals. 
They are retained however as indicating the per- 
severing enmity of men in power towards Sir 0. 
Napier. 

Alterations in the original text have also been 
made, touching the character and actions of- Sir 
James Outram and Colonel Jacob of the Scinde 
horse ; because subsequent knowledge has furnished 
proof that the merit attributed to them rested for 
the most part on their own assurances, which are 
not to be credited, inasmuch as both men have since 
shewn themselves to be systematic vaunters. 



LIST OF PLANS* 



No. I.— Central Asia. 

No. II.— Scinde. 

No. III. — Scinde* 

No. IV.— Battle of Meeanee. 

No. V. — Hydrabad and its vicinity. 

No. VI.— Battle of Hydrabad. 



CONQUEST OF SCINDE, 



PAET I. 



CHAPTER I. 

To the British people this work is dedicated. The con- 
quest which it records, and the character of the conqueror, 
belong to the nation, which will not fail to do justice to a 
man who displayed such bravery in war, and such beneficient 
administrative wisdom in peace. But it is necessary to place 
him under the people's protection, because faction has desig- 
nated him as one of a brood always eager to spill blood. It 
is true that he, and another of his name, have toppled down 
thrones and changed the fate of kingdoms. Don Miguel of 
Portugal, and the Egyptian Ibrahim, attest Admiral Napier's 
vigour in war ; while the fallen tyrants of Scinde, clank- 
ing their chains in the ears of sympathizing faction, attest 
that of General Napier. But to benefit mankind by peace- 
able arts has ever been the object of the man who warred so 
sternly at Meeanee. 

In Cephalonia, where he long governed, his true tendencies 
were developed. For there he furrowed the lofty mountains 
with roads, in skilful contrivance equal, in greatness scarcely 
inferior to that of Mount Cenis. There he improved and 
adorned the harbour with fine quays, and light-houses of 
beautiful construction, created fisheries, and advanced agri- 
culture. There he quelled feudal oppression, reformed the 
law courts, upheld justice, and honestly gained the affection 
of the labouring people by unceasing exertions, always evinc- 
ing that benignity of purpose which renders the labours of 
peace glorious. 

His efforts were painfully clogged by the vulgar jealousy 



2 



THE CONQUEST 



of a splenetic man in power the Lord High Commissioner 
Adam— with whom stupid pomp was a vital principle of 
government, and whose narrow intellect led him always to 
obstruct and finally to drive Sir C. Napier from his post 
with an accusation of tyranny ! To this absurd and false 
charge Lord Ripon, the distant authority, listened ; but the 
people, called victims 0/ his misrule, passed their com- 
ment, and it is a precious one for those who honestly strive 
to aid the lowly. Thus it runs. Sir 0. Napier, when 
iniquitously deprived of his command, possessed in Cepha- 
lonia, a piece of land so small that he took no heed of it on 
his departure ; but the grateful Greek peasants voluntarily 
cultivated it and transmitted the value of the produce yearly 
to him, wherever he resided, without his being cognizant of 
their names ! 

Sir F. Adam could only see in the future conqueror of 
Scinde a person to be crushed by the leaden weight of power 
without equity ; he could not comprehend qualities so far 
above his own ; but they were noted by another observer of 
greater authority— one whose youthful genius pervaded the 
world while he lived, and covered it with a pall when he 
died : for to him, mountain and plain, lake and torrent, the 
seas, the skies, the earth, light and darkness yielded their 
poetic secrets, to be told with such harmonious melody that 
listening nations marvelled at the sound, and when it ceased 
they sorrowed. Lord Byron, writing from Cephalonia in 
1823, thus expressed himself. " Of Colonel Napier's mili- 
tary character it were superfluous to speak ; of his personal 
character I can say from my own knowledge, as well as from 
all public rumour, or private report, that it is excellent as 
his military ; in short, a better or a braver man is not easily 
to be found. He is our man to lead a regular force, or to 
organize a national one for the Greeks. Ask the army ; ask 
any one." 

This eulogy, pronounced when Greece, struggling for 
freedom, like her own fabled Enceladus shook the world at 
every throe, had reference to a design formed by Sir C. 
Napier to deliver the bright land of ancient days. Largely 
conceived it was, and many brave enthusiastic men, habitu- 



OF SCINDE. 



3 



ated to war, were ready with their valour, and wealth, which 
was not small, for thej were not mere adventurers, to throw 
themselves, under his guidance, into the Peloponnesus, where 
he was advantageously known by his wise and just govern- 
ment of Cephalonia, and by his benevolence towards the 
dispossessed Suliotes. The enterprise bad fair for success, 
but Byron's recommendation and Napier's proffered services 
were alike disregarded by the Anglo-Greek committee in 
London — a happy neglect, seeing that the acquisition of a 
great kingdom, and the restoration of the British military 
reputation in India, shaken by previous events, were the 
result. 

This purposed descent on Greece was not the only pro- 
ject formed by him against the Turkish power, which he 
abhorred from witnessing the great cruelties exercised on 
the unhappy people of the Archipelago and Peloponnesus. 
He had been previously employed on a secret military mis- 
sion to Ali, Pacha of Yoanina, to whom, when consulted as 
to operations against the Porte, he said, " Give me the 
selection of your troops, and one of the millions in your 
coffers, and in six weeks I will place you in the seraglio, 
Sultan of Constantinople, if you will declare the Christians 
free." The Pacha liked the project, but would not give the 
treasure ! One month afterwards he offered two millions ! 
The reply was : — " Too late, the Turks are in the Etolian 
mountains ! you are lost." And the miser, Ali, gave up 
his life and money together ! 

During his forced retirement from military life, Sir C. 
Napier added the following works to his country's literature, 
— The Roads of Cephalonia ; The Colonies ; Colonization, 
with Remarks upon small farms and overpopulation ; Military 
Law ; An Essay on the State of Ireland ; Notes upon De 
Vigny's Lights and Shadows of Military Life. Finally, a 
Historical Romance, called William the Conqueror, soon to 
be published, and evincing the Author's versatile powers. 

Having become a Major-General, Lord Hill in 1839, at 
the recommendation of Lord Fitzroy Somerset, a man not 
to be swayed by calumny, which was not spared, placed him 
in command of the Northern District of England. It was a 



4 



THE CONQUEST 



troubled period ; but acting as an officer entrusted with the 
preservation of social order, he gained the approbation of 
the Government, without ill-will from the people, who appre- 
ciated his honest desire for their welfare, while he controlled 
them by military force. 

Passing through Egypt, he saw amidst the false glare 
given by interested persons, all the weakness and oppres- 
sion of Mehemet Ali's government, which he thus exposed. 

" A person staying but a short time in a country 
has no right to suppose he can trace causes with certainty : 
he can, however, judge of effects when they are strongly 
marked. Rich land, a variety of produce with a ready mar- 
ket for it in Europe, and a noble people, belong to this 
country. Mehemet Ali has ruled it for forty years, and 
the result is horrible ! I have not seen, nor can I hear of 
any deed of his, nor the result of his deeds, that has not 
the stamp of tyranny, of mischief, of villainy. His mind is 
capable of projecting clever things for his own supposed 
advantage, or pleasure, or renown ; incapable of great works 
for the regeneration of a people, or even for their temporary 
advantage : he does not even leave the means of subsistence 
in their possession ! His only really great work, the Canal 
of Mahmoudie, eighteen feet deep, ninety feet wide, and 
sixty miles long, cost, it is asserted here, the lives of twenty- 
nine thousand persons in one year, out of the hundred and 
fifty thousand employed : they were starved by him, and 
dug the canal with their hands I 

" Take that as a sample of his infernal rule. A great 
man would have given them tools ; he would not, to save 
expense, have slain twenty-nine thousand poor men within 
the year. And when his canal was finished, the commerce 
on it would have proved its use and his greatness ; but no 
boat floats thereon which does not contain the Pacha's pro- 
perty, for no man but himself is a proprietor. This highway 
of two hundred miles through his dominions, for it is one 
with the Nile, exhibits no sign therefore that the barbarian's 
mind is either great or good. What encouragement has he 
given to his people ? None ! He has hired foreign men 
to make all things which he requires for war, and his 



OF SC1NDE. 



5 



establishments are of a size which render his government 
one of devilish oppression ; his monopolies no country could 
support ; he is living on his capital ! 

" To give an illustration of his system. In two districts, 
the rent being alike for each, some accident injures the crop 
on one and it becomes impossible for the people to pay more 
than half rent. The Pacha levies the deficiency on the 
other, and both are ruined ! An Abyssinian, or some mer- 
chant from the interior of Africa, arrives with merchandise, 
and is offered a large sum in cash. He cannot take it ! 
The Pacha seizes the goods and pays, when convenient, with 
articles from the Pacha's own stock of merchandise, to the 
amount of half the value ; and this robbery is so frequent 
as to be the rule, not the exception. - The Pacha then sells 
the goods to the original cash purchaser, and all trade is 
thus checked, except that which is in the hands of English- 
men. The result of all this is a ruined miserable people. 

" The troops are ill equipped, but they are the best 
thing one sees, except the ships of war. The men, both 
soldiers and peasants, are fine strong Arabs with thin faces, 
intellectual to the greatest degree, good-humoured, honest- 
looking, and resolute. The Egyptian I have not been able 
yet to distinguish from the Arab, but all appear fine looking. 
In five days I have seen many beaten severely by men in 
authority, without any apparent cause ; they all seemed 
disposed to resist, but the consequences were too terrible, 
and smothered rage was very clearly depicted. Forty years' 
rule should have produced better fruit, if Mehemet Ali 
were, as we are told, a great man : of that I see no proof, 
no trace ! Ibrahim beat a man to death last week in this 
town (Cairo). The poor fellow did not bring eggs enough ? 
— e How many turkeys have you got ? How much corn 
do they eat ? Do they lay eggs to cover that amount ? ' 
4 Yes ! ' t Then you must bring so many eggs daily.' The 
man failed for two or three days. Ibrahim sent for the 
wretched creature, and with his own hands, using a club, 
beat him to death ! I recollect his doing the like when I 
was in Cephalonia. 

a Ali Pacha's '.vast improvements ,' have been to strengthen 



6 



THE CONQUEST 



his forces, and he has done that, at ten times the cost 
necessary. My conviction is, that his reputation for great- 
ness originates in the opinions and interests of silly English 
adventurers and speculating merchants, incapable of judging 
him, but whose fortunes he makes, and from no other source. 
The man lives upon his capital. How far this may be forced 
upon him I cannot tell." 

Mehemet Ali's faults were not the only objects of ani- 
madversion. From a gentleman living in Egypt, and not 
unwilling to be quoted, Sir C. Napier heard, that the comp- 
trollers of the British Museum bad directed the engineer 
employed to remove objects of ancient art from Egypt, to 
cut the statue of Sesostris into four pieces, that it might be 
sent to England more cheaply ! Obedience was refused. 

Having reached Bombay in 1842, he took command at 
Poona, and in his letters from thence, forcibly depicted the 
vices of Lord Auckland's government, civil and military. His 
observations were laid before a minister of competent know- 
ledge at home and were returned with this remark, " Too 
true a picture drawn by a master hand" But then Lord 
Ellenborough came to rebuke the nepotism of the directors, 
to curb the jobbing tribe, to reduce newspaper editors from 
a governing to a reporting class, and to raise the spirit of 
the army, sinking under insult and the domineering influ- 
ence of a hireling press. India was thus saved. 

At Poona, Sir C. Napier, desirous to exercise himself in 
the handling of troops, a practice necessary for the most 
experienced officer, if he would be a ready captain ; desirous 
also to restore neglected discipline, in what he truly called 
the " noble Indian army" broke the monotony of formal 
parades to work his troops over the neighbouring hills, 
arousing the latent military energies of the officers, and 
making all mindful that they were soldiers, not trainbands. 

He disabused them also of a pernicious error, inculcated 
by the newspapers of India with a pertinacity of falsehood 
peculiarly characteristic. They said, and belief was given to 
them, though worthy only of unbelief, that the matchlock of 
the Afghan and other enemies was superior to the British 
musket in range and precision. Simply to reason against 



OF SCINDE. 



7 



this fallacy, would, he knew, be fruitless. Promulgated 
with a bad motive, it had been accepted as a truth with 
dogged credulity, and could only be refuted practically. 
To draw attention he adopted this device : provoking a warm 
advocate for the matchlock to wage on a matchlock against a 
musket, he selected marksmen, practised with them until 
the best shooter was known, and then daily contended in 
person with that man. The^ were nearly equal : the camp 
became interested, bets were multiplied, and the subject 
occupied the soldiers' thoughts, which was the General's 
object. The stiffened neck of the prejudice was thus bent ; 
for at the end of two months the reputation of the match- 
lock was lost at Poona. Tfcis dexterous management 
indicated the great captain ere the red stamp of battle 
.made him patent; for previous to the trial a feeling was 
prevalent that to encounter the matchlock was to fall in 
useless strife. The sepoy's musket is however cumbrous 
for his, strength, because of that strange economy which 
spares a pound in the expense of a soldier's weapon at the 
cost of the soldier himself ! 

Observing many errors in the organization and discipline 
of the Indian army, Sir C. Napier digested in his own 
mind alterations with respect to the artillery and bag- 
gage, some of which he afterwards effected ; and always 
he was sanguine in these matters, because of the willingness 
to learn which he found in the Company's officers. But the 
follies of the time were great, and one for its supreme 
absurdity merits notice. Every soldier was ordered to have 
a large box, in addition to his usual baggage ; and the 22nd 
regiment, acting under this preposterous regulation, marched 
for Scinde with 1,300 boxes ! A camel could carry but 
four, and thus 300 camels, each occupying five yards in 
theory, in practice ten yards, were added to the other Indian 
impediments of a regiment. Truly the strong hand of Lord 
Ellenborough was wanting to lift the Indian Government 
from such a slough. He came in time, and no man watched 
his government with more anxiety than the General at 
Poona. Nor was this anxiety soon relieved, for, previous to 
the final burst of Nott and Pollock on Cabool, no positive 



8 



THE CONQUEST 



principle of action to guide his judgment, was evinced in the 
operations, and he characterized the war by one expressive 
phrase. " A tragic harlequinade" 

Meanwhile public opinion assigned him a capacity for 
great actions, and a vague prescience of coming glory which 
often foreruns victory, predisposing men to give all their 
energies for its attainment, prevailed in the military com- 
munity. Yet he desired no active command beyond the 
Indus. He disliked the appearance of affairs, and dreaded 
the prevailing shameless system, which, having then no 
experience of Lord Ellenborough's energy, he could not hope 
to see overborne: — upheld as it was by faction and the 
influence of the Court of •Directors in England ; and in 
India by the most vehemently unscrupulous press that ever 
pandered for hire to bad men at the expense of the public 
interest. He had therefore no inclination to become re- 
sponsible, according to his degree, for disasters he could not 
but anticipate from the policy of rulers, who were sure to 
charge their errors on the executive officers: for to make 
bricks without straw, and to be calumniated, is the task and 
fate of British generals. 

An order from the Governor- General soon sent him to 
Scinde. Dated the 26th of August, it gave him the com- 
mand of the troops in that country and in Beloochistan, 
with entire control over all the political agents and civil 
functionaries; and it peremptorily informed him that, "If 
the Ameers, or any one of them, should act hostilely, or evince 
hostile designs against the British forces, it was the Go- 
vernor-General's fixed resolution never to forgive the breach 
of faith, and to exact a penalty which should be a warning 
to every chief in India." 

The fierce tenure of this order, issued at a moment of 
great difficulty, after great disasters, bespoke in Lord Ellen- 
borough a consciousness of danger, but magnanimous resolu- 
tion ; it told the General that a crisis demanding all his 
energy and ability was at hand, that much was expected 
from him, but by a ruler who would neither shrink himself, 
nor fail towards others. Wherefore, with a frame slight 
and meagre, and, though of iron hardness, furrowed by 



OF SCIftDE. 



9 



wounds, he, in his sixty-first year hastened to take command 
as eagerly as a young warrior : bred in camps he had been 
fifty years awaiting this crowning trial. It is rare to see 
great prudence in war tempering the heroic valour and 
confidence of a youthful general; more rare to find the 
sanguine daring of early years untamed by age and its 
infirmities. 

On the 3rd of September, Sir C. Napier embarked 
in the Zenohia steamer for Scinde, thus commencing his 
new career upon Oliver Cromwell's fortunate day, a coinci- 
dence which he noted with satisfaction. The augury was 
good, yet seemed at fault in the commencement ; for 
cholera broke out, and the hideous misery of the voyage he 
thus described : 

" In six bitter days and nights we cast fifty-four dead 
into the sea, just one-fourth of our companions! One 
passenger, it happened, was a surgeon, and he was assisted 
by two native apprentices belonging to the hospitals: for- 
tunately only two of the sailors died, or we should have 
been lost for want of hands. The engineer perished the 
third day, but happily there were amongst the passengers 
two. others going to the steamers on the Indus. Since 
landing ten more soldiers have died, and one captain : 
making sixty-four in all! This pulls down the spirits of 
men. It was the worst description of blue cholera. The 
agonies, the convulsions, the dreadful groans, were heart- 
rending : and then the screams of the poor women who lost 
their husbands and children ! And amidst all this, in the 
darkness of the night, the necessity of throwing the dead 
overboard the instant life was extinct to make room for the 
living ! Then also, added to this scene of human wretched- 
ness, the violent effects of the disease could not be cleaned, 
and extreme filth increased the misery. Well! God be 
praised ! it has ceased, but more troops are on this voyage 
and I dread to hear of similar sufferings, for most of it has 
been caused by neglect. I have made a formal complaint to 
Sir George Arthur, who, I am sure will stir about the 
matter. The Commander of the Zenohia, Mr. Newman, is a 
noble fellow. I believe all that were saved owe their lives to 



10 



THE CONQUEST 



him ; and we, the officers, have given him a gold snuff-box 
in token of our gratitude. On making the land both 
mates got drunk, and such a night scene of confusion I 
never saw. We were nearly as possible on a reef of rocks ; 
we fired guns and rockets, but no help came ; had we struck, 
all must have perished; at least all the sick, eighty in 
number : at last we cast anchor, and luckily on good holding 
ground." 

To provide for the survivors was his first care, and then 
further mishap befell himself. While attending some rocket 
practice, one of the fiery missiles tore the calf of his right 
leg to the bone ; but a life of temperance and a patient 
endurance, were repaid by a surprising cure ; the hurt 
healed by the first intention, and the fifth day saw him 
travelling up the Indus towards Hydrabad. 

Some superstition the human intellect seems always to 
lean towards; many of the greatest minds have rested 
thereon, and those who deal in war seldom reject predestina- 
tion. Sir C. Napier's life encourages this sentiment though 
reason should recoil. In infancy he was snatched at the 
last stage of starvation from a vile nurse ; when a young 
boy, attempting a dangerous leap, he tore the flesh from his 
leg in a frightful manner, and a few years later fractured 
the other leg. At the battle of Coruna, struggling with 
several French soldiers he received five terrible wounds, 
and but for the aid of a generous French drummer would 
there have been killed. At the battle of Busaco a bullet 
struck his face and lodged behind the ear, splintering the 
articulation of the jawbone, and with this dreadful hurt 
he made his way under a fierce sun to Lisbon, more than 
one hundred miles ! Returning from France, after the battle 
of Waterloo, the ship sunk off Flushing and he saved him- 
self by swimming to a pile, to which he clung until a boat 
took him off, half drowned, for the beam was too large 
for climbing and he was overwhelmed by each recurring 
surge. 

Now, escaping cholera, a second shipwreck, and the 
rocket stroke, he was hastening to conduct with match- 
less energy a dangerous war. But how the spare body, 



OF SCINDE. 



11 



shattered in battle and worn by fifty years' service in every 
variety of climate, could suffice to place him amongst the 
famous captains of the world is a mystery. His star was in 
the East ! 

Scinde was politically disturbed. The British disasters 
at Cabool and Ghusni, the frequent checks given to detach- 
ments in the hills of Beloochistan, the recent repulse and 
consequent retreat of Colonel England before an Affghan 
force not more numerous than his own ; even the firm yet 
long isolated position of General Nott at Candahar, had 
abated the fear of British power in Scinde, and the Beloochees 
were, princes chiefs and followers, alike disposed for war. 
Colonel England was retiring from Shawl by the Bolan 
passes, through hostile tribes, having with him the main 
body of the troops destined to form the army in Scinde, and 
the Ameers were keenly watching his progress : had another 
disaster befallen him they would have commenced hostilities ; 
for only four thousand men were then in their country, at 
Sukkur and Kurrachee, four hundred miles apart, and without 
a secure communication. 

This critical state of affairs was met with sagacity and 
energy. " Danger from their warfare I see none" wrote the 
General from Kurrachee. " I can beat all the princes of 
Scinde when England joins me, for I shall then have twelve 
thousand men. No cavalry however, and I should feel the 
want of it if the Ameers attack me ; but I shall have some 
soon. My difficulty will be to act -as chief political agent to 
the Governor-General. I believe his intentions to be just 
and honourable. I know my own are. But Hell is paved 
with good intentions, and both of us may have great diffi- 
culties to encounter. Yet I feel neither diffidence nor 
hesitation. My plan is formed, so is Lord Ellenborough's, 
and I believe they are alike. The hill tribes threaten to fall 
on England's column as it descends the Bolan pass. There 
are however reasons to doubt this, and I have sent to advise 
and authorize the Commander in Upper Scinde to make a 
forward movement towards the pass ; which I hope he will be 
able to do, and thus favour England's retreat by menacing 
the rear of his enemies. He has the mass of my troops with 



12 



THE CONQUEST 



him ; I have only four thousand in Upper Scinde. I ought 
to have been here two months ago. I have now to travel 
two hundred miles up the Indus, with a guard of only fifty 
men, through a hostile country. "This appears foolish, but I 
' must get to my troops. I set off to-morrow, and there will 
be no small interest in threading the windings of the noble 
river Indus.'' 

At Hydrabad he resolved to wait on the Ameers as a 
mark of respect, and to make personal observation of their 
characters. These Princes, barbaric of race and feelings, 
sensual and treacherous, were yet polite of manners, and 
subtile to sound those depths and shallows of the human mind 
formed by crime and passion — they had guides thereto in 
their own dispositions, but for virtues they had no tests and 
looked not for them. They knew, having made diligent 
inquiry, that the General came with all political as well as 
military power, which had not been before even when Lord 
Keane menaced their capital at the head of a great army, 
therefore they hastened to offer suitable respect. Their 
palanquin was sent for his use, and this the highest honour 
of their court was enhanced by the presence of their sons, 
who met him beyond the city gates, bringing camels for his 
retinue. 

Around them clustered the great Sirdars and nobles on 
horseback, with thousands of retainers, chiefs and followers, 
having keen heavy swords girt to their sides and large 
shields thrown over their shoulders. The General was at the 
head of his own guard of the wild horsemen of India. 
Thus they met, the two masses commingling, and being sur- 
rounded by a multitude on foot, shouting and screaming, 
moved altogether with a rushing pace towards the palace. 
A gorgeous disarray ! All were clothed in bright colours, 
their splendid arms gleamed and glittered in the broad 
sunbeams ; and high above the crowd the giant camels 
swayed their huge bodies to and fro with an uneasy motion, 
while the fiery horses, bearing rich housings, neighed and 
bounded with violence from side to side, their swarthy riders 
writhing their bodies convulsively and tossing their sinewy 
hands aloft with frantic energy. And all this time the 



OF SCINDE. 



13 



multitude on foot were no less vehement. Wearing fine 
embroidered caps, which set off their handsome eager faces, 
their piercing eyes, their teeth of snowy whiteness, they 
pressed forwards, fighting and crushing each other to see the 
« General Saib of the Feringees." He, reclining in the open, 
high arched palanquin of crimson and gold, a small dark- 
visaged old man with a falcon's glance, must have dis- 
appointed their expectations, for they knew not then the 
heroic force of mind which was to invalidate their wild 
strength and furious courage on the dreadful field of Meeanee. 
Now, ignorant, proud and fierce', with barbarian pomp they 
passed tumultously along, winding in the deep shadows of 
the ancient massive towers of Hydrabad, their numbers 
increasing at every step, until they reached the embattled 
gate of the fortress, through which the bearers of the palan- 
quin could scarcely struggle to the palace, but when they did 
the hubbub ceased. 

The Ameers, having, as they said, consideration for the 
General's recent hurt, held their Dhurbar in the Court below 
to spare him the ascent of their great staircase. Richly 
they were dressed, and their swords and shields resplendent 
with gold and jewels. None were handsome, but all were 
youthful save Nusseer and another, both being however 
younger than their visitor. Sweetmeats and provisions were 
presented, and compliments exchanged, while each party 
watched keenly for indications of character by which to guide 
their future intercourse. What impression the Englishman 
made cannot be known, but the studied respect, the oriental 
politeness, the princely pomp and display of wild military 
power, by which the Ameers sought to impose on him, failed 
to affect his judgment. Well knowing that with barbarians 
friendship is self-interest and wisdom deceit, he kept his 
mind immoveably intent upon his mission. He was in Scinde, 
not to bandy compliments with Princes but to maintain the 
power and influence and interests of England in all their 
integrity at a moment of danger, when a slight concession 
might prove fatal. With this object diplomatic cajolery had 
no proper connection. His orders were to maintain the cause 
of British India by a fair and just, though stern and un- 



14 



THE CONQUEST 



yielding policy, by force of arms if policy failed. Putting 
their flattering attentions aside, he gave them an austere 
warning that the unsteady weak policy of the political agents 
was ended, and international obligations would be henceforth 
•rigidly enforced : for at Kurrachee he had obtained proof of 
their malpractices, and now in writing told them that he 
would, if they did not cease, make the Governor-General 
cognizant of them with a view to a forcible remedy. 

This letter being delivered, he passed on to Sukkur, where 
he arrived the 5th of October, and forthwith commenced 
a policy which reduced the Ameers to choose between an 
honest alliance or a terrible war. They chose dishonesty 
and battle ; but their deceit was baffled by a superior intel- 
lect, and their swords were broken by stronger arms. Why it 
so happened shall be shewn in another place : — clearly it shall 
be shewn that the war was of the Ameers' seeking, and their 
heavy misfortunes were a just punishment of their folly and 
wickedness — misery to them, to the world a benefit. With 
abilities and energy placing him amongst the greatest of 
those famed western captains who have forced the pride 
of the East to stoop on the battle field, Sir C. Napier 
sought not strife, it was thrust upon him ! But the peculiar 
position of Scinde in 1842, and its connection with British 
Indian policy when he assumed the command at Sukkur 
must be first considered by those who seek the truth, and are 
desirous to be assured that the dreadful sword of England 
was not drawn in an unjust quarrel. Wherefore the next 
chapter shall contain a retrospective examination — for the 
Scindian war was no isolated event. To use the conqueror's 
expression, it was " The tail of the Affghan storm" 



OF SOINDE. 



15 



CHAPTER II. 

* 

The origin and progress of British power in the East is 
well known. Commencing in trade it has been magnified by 
arms and policy, and the glittering bubble must expand until 
it burst, or it will' collapse. Strangers more civilized, more 
knowing in science and arts, more energetic of spirit, more 
strong of body, more warlike, more enterprising than the 
people among whom they settle, must necessarily extend 
their power until checked by natural barriers, or by a 
counter-civilization. The novelty of their opinions, political 
and religious, the cupidity of their traders, the ambition or 
avarice of their chiefs, the insolence of superiority, the instinct 
of self-preservation, all conduce to render collision with the 
native populations inevitable, and conquest as inevitable as 
collision. It is the struggle of the fertile land with the 
desert of Egypt, the waters of the Nile directed against the 
waste, the stream of civilization against barbaric ignorance. 

But a reflux of barbarian power continually menaces 
British India, and peace cannot be till all is won. The 
necessity for expansion is urgent, and the more so that the 
subjected people's condition has not been improved in pro- 
portion to the extent of the conquest, or the greatness of the 
conquerors : the frame of government is not essentially just 
and liberal, and as it wants support of benevolent wisdom, 
prying people must be kept at a distance. 

This inherent craving for aggrandizement has carried 
British India to the roots of the Himalayas on the North, 
menacing and menaced by the mountaineers of Nepaul ; to 
the Irrawaddy on the East, grating harshly with the Burman 
empire. It has sent fleets and armies to obtain a corner nest 
in China for the incubation of commerce ; but the eggs will 
produce the gliding serpent, the ravening kite, the soaring 



16 



THE CONQUEST 



eagle. China will be overturned, changed in all her institu- 
tions : unless her politic people, acquiring as they are like to 
do the arts of European warfare, thrust the intruding 
strangers from the land. 

The march of aggrandizement has been more rapid towards 
the West, because there is felt the dangerous influence of a 
counter-civilization, if such a term can be applied to Russia 
as she expands towards -the East. Peril from that quarter is 
prospective and probably distant, but not to be despised, 
inasmuch as the basis of Russian strength is natural and 
enormous. The perception of this truth has hurried, not 
without policy, the British Indian frontier towards the West, 
where, under the name of sovereignty protection or influence, 
it extended before the Affghan war along the left bank of the 
Sutlege to the lower Indus, and from thence by the Thurr, 
or great Indian desert, to the run of Cutch and the ocean. 
From that line the bayonets of England protruded, from 
thence her voice of command went forth to the nations of 
Central Asia, and the state of those nations must be con- 
sidered before the policy of invading them to forestall Russia 
can be judged. 

In the days of Alexander, the country beyond the Sutlege 
contained the kingdoms of Porus and Taxiles. It is now the 
Punjaub, or land of the five rivers, namely, the Sutlege or 
Garra, formed by the junction of the ancient Hyphasis and 
Eesudrus; the Ravee or Eydrastes of the Greeks; the 
Acessinesoi antiquity, now the Chenaub; the Jelum, for- 
merly the Eydaspes, upon the banks of which the Macedonian 
hero overcame the giant Indian chief ; the Indus, which still 
retains its first name. These streams, descending from the 
Himalayas or Indian Caucasus, flow southward until they 
unite in one great river called the lower Indus. Their union 
is completed at Mittunkole, below Moultan. From thence 
the vast volume of their waters bears downward to the sea 
through an immense plain, which, commencing far above 
their junction, ends only at the coast : this plain is overflowed 
periodically in summer by the Indus, as the Nile overflows 

the land of Egypt. 

Looking at the countries thus watered, as they confronted 



OF SCINDE. 



17 



the British line before the Affghan war, and in the order of 
their descent from the mountains, we find Cachmere at top, 
amongst the high branches of the five streams ; the Punjaub 
next ; Scinde the lowest. This may be called the first parallel 
of nations then opposed to British India. 

Westward of the Indus, at a mean distance of forty or 
fifty miles, a majestic shoot from the Indian Caucasus goes 
southward to the sea, bearing many names, such as the 
Soolyman, the Bolan, and Hala mountains. Presenting in 
its whole length a natural wall of rugged strength, pierced 
only in a few places by roads, it closes at some points on the 
river, at others recedes, as in Cutch Gundava, more than a 
hundred miles. 

These mountains, and their kindred ranges of Kojeh and 
Gilghie, with the elevated table lands belonging to them, 
form the countries of Affghanistan and Beloochistan ; the 
former lying to the north, bordering the Punjaub and Cach- 
mere; the latter lying to the south, bordering on Scinde. 
This vast tract, including Seestan or Segistan of the desert, 
formed the second parallel of nations opposed to the frontier 
of British India. It is bounded on the south by the ocean ; 
on the north by that continuation of .the Indian Caucasus, 
known as the Hindoo Khosh and the Parapomisan range, as 
far as the city of Herat, which is the western door of 
Affghanistan opening into Persia : with exception of the 
Herat corner, it is bounded by deserts on the west. 

From Herat a great spine of mountains runs to the 
Caspian Sea, dividing Toorkmania from Khorassan proper 
and Persia. The former, lying north of this spine, is sepa- 
rated from Affghanistan by the Hindoo Khosh and the 
Parapomisus. Anciently this was the Bactriana, Sogdiana, 
and Chorasmia of the Macedonians ; it is now known as the 
districts of Koondooz, Balk, Bokhara, Samarcand, and 
Khiva, or Orgunje, which borders on the Caspian and Aral 
seas. Toorkmania, Khorassan, and Persia, formed therefore 
the third parallel of nations between the Indian frontier and 
the Russian base of operations. 

Through Toorkmania flows the Oxus, running from the 
Hindoo Khosh to the Aral Sea ; it is navigable from above 

c 



13 THE CONQUEST 

Balk to its mouth, more than 600 miles— and it is up the 
Oxus, through the barbarous nations of Toorkmania, over the 
snow-clad Hindoo Khosh, and across the rugged Affghan 
country that Russia must win her way, by force or policy, 
to meet a British army on the Indus. Or by this route, or 
through Persia and Khorassan to Herat she must move ; for 
of her military colonies, planted in the countries ceded to her 
by China, north of the Himalayas, little account need be 
made, if indeed they exist. Her progress by Constantinople 
is another question, depending upon European diplomacy and 

European arms. 

Such being the geographical relation of the countries ot 
Central Asia with British India, the political relations and 
strength of those more immediately affected by the recent 
wars shall be now touched upon. 

The population of the Punjaub, said to be five millions, 
consists of Seiks, Hindoos, and Juts, also to be found in 
Scinde, Affghanistan, and Beloochistan. The first are the 
ruling race, though not the most numerous; they are 
athletic, warlike, and turbulent, having a peculiar religion 
and a holy book called the " Orinth" Of recent date is 
their power. A few years ago the Punjaub was under 
the shadow of the Dooranee empire; but Runjeet Sing, 
having combined the many republican communities of the 
Seiks into one conquering state, wrested Cachmere and the 
Peshawar district from Affghanistan, and took the fortress 
of Attock on the Indus, which has ever been and probably 
ever will be the entrance to India for armies coming from 
the West. He also extended his power over Moultan, includ- 
ing some tributary dominions of the Bhawal Khan lying 
between the Sutlege and the Indus. His regular force was 
fifty thousand, five thousand being cavalry ; and he had three 
hundred guns, half of them efficient for the field. All these 
troops were well disciplined under European officers ; and he 
kept eighteen thousand irregular horsemen in constant pay : 
he manufactured his own arms and materials for war, his 
revenue was large, and successive Governors-General sought 
his friendship in person. At first he held aloof, but sagacious 
to perceive that the amity of the mighty strangers, interested 



OF SCINDE. 



19 



though it might be, was less formidable than their enmity, 
he, contrary to the wishes of his nobles, accepted political 
engagements and maintained them until his death. 

Proceeding southward, Scinde would be the next country 
to treat of; but as its affairs must be curiously inquired into, 
and their connection with those of Afghanistan, Beloochistan, 
and Doodpoutra shewn, the state of those nations demands 
previous notice. 

Doodpoutra, governed by the Bhawal Khan, Bhawalpore 
being the capital, lies on the left of the Sutlege, betw een the 
British stations on the upper part of that river and Scinde. 
The Bhawal Khan's dominions extended at one time across the 
Sutlege and the Acessines to the Upper Indus, but he was 
then a tributary of the Dooranee monarch, and on his refusal 
to pay Runjeet Sing the same tribute, the latter seized the 
territory between the rivers. The Ameers of Scinde also 
took from the Bhawal Khan a large district on the left bank 
of the Lower Indus, and he being thus pressed, accepted the 
offered protection of the British, by which his dominions 
were guaranteed against further encroachments. 

The origin of the Affghan or Dooranee empire is of re- 
cent date. Ahmed Shah, the founder, was of the Sudoyzie 
family, sacred in the Dooranee tribe of Affghanistan. 
Taking advantage of the temporary ascendancy of the Doo- 
ranees over the Giljhies, with whom power had before resided, 
he constituted, in the middle of last century, one conquering 
nation of Affghans, in place of the ill- cemented confederacy 
of republican tribes, clans, and families which previously 
existed. Ahmed was not a mere eastern swordsman. A 
great commander, a statesman, and politician, he warred suc- 
cessfully against Persia, subdued Khorassan as far as Meschid 
in the west, reduced Balk and the neighbouring Uzbecks 
beyond the Hindoo Khosh, awed Bokhara, overrun the 
Punjaub, acquired Cachmere, occupied Surhind, took Delhi 
and Agra, and overthrew the Mahrattas. Moultan, Dood- 
poutra and Scinde were his tributaries ; Beloochistan and 
Seestan of the desert were parts of his kingdom. He died 
in 1773, and was succeeded by his son Timour Shah, who 
• was succeeded by his son Zeman Shah, who, blind, old, and 



20 



THE CONQUEST 



an exile, was still living when the British entered his 
country. 

Zeman Shah on the throne, had repeatedly menaced 
India, but each time Persian warfare or civil commotion 
stopped his invasion, and he was finally dethroned and blinded 
by his brother Mahmood, who was in turn dethroned, but 
not blinded, by another brother, Shah Sooja-ool-moolk, to 
restore whom the English invaded Afghanistan. 

Futteh Khan, chief of the great Barrukzie family, of 
the Dooranee tribe, restored Mahmood, but governed under 
the title of Vizier, until Kamran the son of Mahmood, per- 
suaded his father to put out the Vizier's eyes. The brothers 
of the blinded man took up arms, and then the barbarous 
Princes caused the helpless, yet stern and courageous old 
Vizier, to be deliberately hacked to pieces in the Dhurbar : 
they were, however, driven in flight to Herat, where Mah- 
mood died, but Kamran retained the government of the city 
and province. 

Shah Sooja was then recalled from exile, because only from 
the small and sacred family of the Sudoyzies could a king 
be chosen. On the journey, he displayed so much arrogance 
towards the Barrukzies, who had recalled him, that, taking 
timely warning, they at once raised his brother Eyoob to 
the throne. Sooja, whose highest merit seems to have been 
the forbearing to put out his dethroned brother's eyes, being 
thus again set aside, Azeem Khan, the eldest surviving 
brother of Futteh Khan, became Vizier and governed in 
Eyoob's name; but he soon died of grief for the loss of a 
battle against Bunjeet Sing. Commotions followed, Eyoob 
and his son became exiles, and the great Dooranee empire 

was broken up. 

During these civil wars, the Persians recovered Khorassan 
and menaced Herat; the King of Bokhara appropriated 
Balk ; the neighbouring Uzbecks resumed their independence ; 
Cachmere, Peshawar, the Punjaub, Moultan, with part of 
Doodpoutra, became the prey of Runjeet Sing. 

Meanwhile the British conquered Tippoo Sultan, over- 
threw the Mahrattas, added Delhi and Surhind to their 
Empire, and established themselves on the Upper Sutlege;at 



OF SCINDE. 



21 



Loodiana. The Bhawal Khan then ceased to be a tributary 
of Cabool ; and Merab Khan, the Brahooe-Belooch, Prince 
of Khelat, assumed independent sovereignty, allying himself 
with the Ameers of Scinde, who not only refused tribute 
but seized a part of Affghanistan on the right of the Indus. 
The hill tribes of Beloochistan also resumed their democratic 
independence, while the Affghans, averse to kingly rule from 
natural feelings, customs, and original organization, split 
into four great divisions, holding together as a nation only 
by their common religion and language. Thus, while Kamran 
held Herat, where, in 1837.-8, he was besieged for a year by 
the Persians, at the instigation of Russian agents, the bro- 
thers of the Viziers, Futteh and Azeem Khan, appropriated 
the rest of the Kingdom. One seized Candahar, city and 
province ; another took Peshawar, paying tribute to Bunjeet 
Sing ; a third brother, the celebrated Dost Mahomed, became 
chief of Cabool; his rule extending beyond the Hindoo Khosh 
on the north, to Herat on the west, to Jellallabad on the 
east, and to Ghusni, including that town, on the south. 

The Affghan population, reckoning the Persian Kuzzle- 
bashes and other settlers, is stated to be more than five 
millions ; that of Beloochistan at one million and a half. 
Dost Mahomed maintained nine thousand cavalry, two thou- 
sand infantry, and fourteen guns. The Candahar man, nine 
thousand cavalry, and six guns ; the Peshawar chief, three 
thousand men, with six guns. But these numbers did not 
represent the force of the country, every chief had his own 
followers, every tribe and clan was armed and warlike. 

The state of the countries bordering on Scinde, when 
Lord Auckland undertook the miserable Affghan war, being 
thus shewn, the course of Scindian affairs can be traced 
without interruption and a better understanding, from the 
first commercial connection to the final conquest. 

Scinde was formerly peopled by the Mhurs and Dhurs, 
now called Scindees, a strong handsome race. Pagans at first, 
they were conquered and converted by Mahomedans from 
Damascus, in the seventh or eighth century, and in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, the Kalloras, military 
fanatics from Persia, obtained rule. Ahmed Shah subjected 



22 



THE CONQUEST 



them, yet suffered them to retain hereditary power under 
the title of Meahs. 

In 1771, a Belooch tribe called Talpoorees, which, with 
others of their race, had come from the hills to settle on the 
plains of Scinde, possessed great influence. They held all the 
principal offices of state, and were the soldiers of the country, 
until the Kallora prince, jealous of their power, put their 
chief to death, whereupon the tribe dethroned him and set 
up his nephew. But the son of the murdered Talpoor, 
returning from Mecca in 1778, renewed the quarrel and 
killed the new Meah in battle. His brother replaced him, 
and peace was restored for a time ; yet soon the Meah mur- 
dered the Talpoor chief, fresh commotions ensued, and after 
many assassinations and crimes on all sides the Kallora 
prince was driven away. Aided by the Prince of Khelat, 
and the Affghan monarch Timour, he renewed the war, and 
was finally restored on certain conditions. Those he broke, 
and murdered the Talpoor chief who had succeeded his first 
victim, but the tribe then killed him in battle, and drove his 
son an exile to the Punjaub, where he still lives. 

If the Kalloras were bad princes, the Talpoorees have 
been worse. The first of them, though confirmed in his 
sovereignty by the Dooranee monarch, was forced to share 
the country with his brothers ; and when he died in 1800, 
those brothers, known as the " Char Yar," again divided 
the power, yet unequally, calling themselves the Ameers, or 
Lords of Scinde. From this division sprung the Kyrpoor 
Ameers, or Lords of Upper Scinde; the Hydrabad Ameers, 
or Lords of Lower Scinde ; and the Meerpoor Ameer :— from 
it also sprung the anomalous order of succession, which gave 
the Rais, the Puggree or turban of command, in each 
family, to the brother instead of the son. Nevertheless, the 
Hydrabad Ameers were in some degree paramount. 

The Char Yar soon called down more of the hill Beloo- 
chees, giving them land on military tenure, and with this 
aid enlarged their dominions. 

On the side of Cutch they took from the Rajah of Joud- 
pore, Omercote in the desert and Parkur beyond it, thus 
coming into contact with the British frontier. 



OF SCINDE. 



23 



South-westward, they took, from the chief of Luz, 
Kurrachee, the best port of Scinde. 

On the north-east they took Subzulcote and Bhoong- 
Barra from the Bhawal Khan. 

On the north-west they spread at the expense of the 
Affghans, from whom they took Shikarpoor, and the fortress 
of Bukkur, which, standing on a rock in the middle of the 
Indus, completely commands the navigation. 

The first Ameers and their sons, whose recent fall has 
been so inordinately and ostentatiously lamented by factious 
writers, and pretended philanthropists, who think cruelty for 
the lucre of gain a virtue, and dealing death in defence of 
country a crime ; by such philosophers, and by disappointed 
peculators in expectancy, and by political dupes, they have 
been proclaimed as innocent victims. But these heavily 
bemoaned lords were themselves usurpers of yesterday: 
many are alive, and notably Roostum of Kyrpoor, who were 
engaged in the dethronement of the Kalloras. Rapacious 
invaders of their neighbours also they were, and their 
Scindee subjects they afiiicted with every kind of misery. 
These last, indeed, call the events which changed their 
rulers, the " massacre of the Mealis." The Beloochees call 
it the " Conquest: 7 They have another conquest now to 
reckon from ! 

To the Belooch it was a conquest, resembling that of 
the Norman in England when Harold fell, for each chief 
was lord of the soil, holding it by military tenure; yet 
in this differing from his Norman prototype, that the 
Ameers could, and often did, deprive him of his Jagheere 
or grant from caprice. This precarious tenure stimulated 
his innate rapacity, and he is habitually grasping, a fatalist 
without remorse, an overbearing soldier without fear, and a 
strong-handed robber without shame, because to rob has 
ever been the custom of his race. Athletic, and skilled in 
the use of his weapons, for to the sword only his hand 
clutches, he is known, says his conqueror, "by his slow 
rolling gait, his fierce aspect, heavy sword and broad shield, 
his dagger and matchlock. Labour he despises, but loves 
his neighbour's purse." It was, however, the Scindee and 



24 



THE CONQUEST 



Hindoo that he plundered, because his own race in the 
hills were like himself in disposition, and somewhat more 
robust. 

Turbulent subjects, the Beloochees often coerced their 
princes, and always strived to sow dissension amongst them, 
because commotions yielded plunder and high pay. In- 
deed the Ameers' system led to self-destruction, and having 
an instinct of this they secured their persons by numerous 
slaves, being in the traffic of human beings, both importers 
and exporters. The slaves, chiefly Abyssinian blacks, were 
attached by manifold favours, while to all others the Ameers 
were brutal tyrants. Their policy, stupid in its selfishness, 
was to injure agriculture, impede commerce, oppress the 
working man, and accumulate wealth for sensual indulgence. 
" What are the people to us ?" was the foul expression of 
Noor Mohamed to Lieut. East wick. " Poor or rich ! what 
do we care if they pay us our revenue ! — Give us our 
hunting grounds and our enjoyments, that is all we re- 
quire." Hence the most fertile districts were made a 
wilderness to form their shikargahs, or hunting grounds : 
their zenanas were filled with young girls torn from their 
friends, and treated with revolting barbarity. In fine, the 
life of an Ameer was one of gross sensuality, for which the 
labour and blood of men were remorselessly exacted, the 
honour and happiness of women savagely sacrificed ! 

How the British power came to bear on their affairs 
shall now be explained. 

A commercial intercourse with Scinde was established 
under the Kallora prince, in 1775, through a factory es- 
tablished at Tatta, then a wealthy town. Fiscal vexations 
and civil commotions caused it to be abandoned in 1792, but 
in 1799 Lord Wellesley made an effort to restore it. The 
influence of Tippoo Sultan and the jealousy of native traders, 
aided by a cabal at Hydrabad averse to the British connec- 
tion, overcame the favourable inclination of the Talpoor 
prince who then reigned, and Mr. Crowe, the superinten- 
dent, was peremptorily ordered to quit the country in 1800. 
This insult was not resented, and in 1809, a fear of 
Napoleon's policy having caused British missions to be sent 



OF SCINDE. 



25 



to Cabool, Persia, and Scinde, the brother Ameers displayed 
great arrogance. They 'assented to a treaty indeed, but the 
terms were brief even to contempt. Commencing with the 
customary falsehood of " eternal friendship," it provided for 
mutual intercourse by vakeels or envoys, and the Ameers 
promised to exclude the French. No more. 

It was renewed in 1820, with additional article to exclude 
Americans, and settle border disputes on the side of Cutch, 
where the British frontier then touched on Scinde. An army 
of demonstration was however required to enforce faith as to 
the last article. To exclude French and Americans, of whom 
they knew nothing and whose presence they did not desire, 
was for the Ameers a pleasure, but the border disputes affected 
their interests, and troops were necessary to enforce the treaty. 

Up to this period the measures of the Anglo-Indian 
Government with respect to Scinde were merely efforts to 
open commerce ; but soon the inevitable concomitant, a dis- 
position to profit from superior knowledge and power, became 
perceptible, and its progress and effects must be traced 
to shew when it broke the bonds of justice and true policy, 
which are inseparable. 

An enlightened desire to open commerce by the Indus, 
induced Lord Ellenborough, when president of the Board of 
Control, to employ Sir Alexander Burnes, then a lieutenant, 
for the exploration of that river in 1831 ; and under pretence 
of conveying presents to Runjeet Sing, the navigation of 
the Indus was effected; an important step, the conse- 
quences of which were immediately foreseen and predicted 
by two poor ignorant but prescient men. 

" The mischief is done, you have seen our country" cried 
a rude Beloochee soldier when Burnes first entered the river. 

"Alas I Scinde is now gone, since the English have seen 
.the river which is the high road to its conquest" was the 
observation of a Syud near Tatta. 

Twelve years afterwards their sagacity was justified ! 

In 1832, Lord W. Bentinck sent Colonel Pottinger to 
Scinde, to effect a new treaty, and to survey the course 
of the Lower Indus, which was done by Lieutenant Del 
Hoste, while Pottinger negotiated. At this time the lower 



26 



THE CONQUEST 



country was governed by the Ameers of Hydrabad, whose 
chief was Ali Moorad, one of the 'Of tar Yar. His brethren 
were dead, and their sons yielded to him as the Bais, or pre- 
siding Ameer, which gave the right of negotiation, and 
certain possessions which went with the turban. 

In Kyrpoor, the capital of Upper Scinde, Meer Roostum, 
the nephew of Ali, was Bais, with like advantages, holding 
that government independently, though the superiority of 
the Hydrabad family was faintly acknowledged ; hence du- 
plicate treaties were necessary, one with Ali, the other with 
Roostum, and the following conditions were agreed upon. 

1°. A free passage for travellers and merchants through 
Scinde, and the use of the Indus for commercial pursuits ; 
but no vessel of war was to float on that river, nor military 
stores to be conveyed by it. 

2°. No merchant was to settle in Scinde, and travellers 
and visitors were to have passports. 

3°. A tariff was to be proclaimed, and no arbitrary dues 
or tolls exacted. 

4°. The old treaties were confirmed, and the friendly in- 
tercourse by vakeels enlarged. 

5°. The Ameers bound themselves to alter the tariff, if 
found too high ; and also to put down, in concert with the 
Raja,h of Joudpoor, the robber borderers of Cutch. 

This was the first treaty giving the Anglo-Indian Go- 
vernment positive and specific rights as to Scinde. It .was 
obtained by negotiation, without menace, and framed with a 
policy tending to general good. But in 1834, another 
commercial treaty was negotiated, by which the tariff was 
fixed, and the tolls on the Indus arranged. 

Colonel Pottinger was made political agent in Scinde, 
having a native commercial agent at the bunder or port of 
the Indus, where all tolls were to be collected, no transit 
duties on vessels or goods being allowed, unless the latter 
were landed. The main point of the treaty was the division 
of the money received. The Anglo-Indian frontier touched 
the Upper Sutlege, and the Government justly claimed a 
right to navigate it to the sea, because it is an injury to 
have a river sealed by a nation nearer to the sea. But to 



OF SCINDE. 



27 



profit from geographical position by reasonable tolls, is no 
more than to profit from climate or soil. Wherefore this 
treaty provided, that tolls should be taken only at the 
months of the Indus, and the gross amount divided amongst 
the Governments having territory on the banks — namely : 
the Ameers, the Bhawal Khan, the Maharajah, and the 
Anglo-Indian. 

High tolls and the robber habits of the Beloochee tribes 
on the Upper Indus rendered this treaty unavailing for trade, 
and the Ameers soon drove the English native agent away 
from the port. The coast and the lower branches of the 
river had however been meanwhile surveyed, and in 1835 a 
steamboat floated on the Indus, but this, the only fruit of 
the negotiation, was a private enterprise by Aga Mohamed 
Rahim, a m6gul merchant of Bombay. 

Declaration of irrevocable friendship headed every treaty, 
yet bad faith and jealousy were constantly evinced by the 
Ameers, and in 1836 the Anglo-Indian Government peremp- 
torily meddled with the political affairs of Scinde. This 
was caused by the increasing influence of Russia in Central 
Asia, where her agents were assiduously impressing a notion 
of Russian greatness, seemingly to prepare for an invasion 
of India. Lord Auckland was alarmed, and went about to 
obtain a counteracting influence over the Affghans. The 
ruler of the Punjaub was too wary and powerful to be 
coerced in furtherance of this plan; but the weakness of 
Scinde offered facilities not to be overlooked, and to increase 
and consolidate British influence in that country was a 
necessary preliminary. This was an approach to the abuse 
of superior power, yet founded on the instinct of self-preser- 
vation, and so far legitimate if the means involved no direct 
oppression. But when did a powerful nation ever scrupu- 
lously regard the rights of a weak one ? On this occasion 
the first proceedings were, externally, moderate as the 
attainment of the object would admit, and with a plausible 
gentleness relentless power enforced its behests. 

Runjeet Sing had been long intent to spoil the Ameers, 
and now, under pretext of chastising the Mazarees, a predatory 
tribe nominally subject to Scinde, commenced hostilities by 



28 



THE CONQUEST 



seizing the town of Rohjan, and capturing a fort on the 
north-west frontier close to the Indus. From that point he 
menaced a regular invasion ; yet, considering the great 
courage and barbaric skill of the Scindian Beloochees, it is by 
no means certain that he would have succeeded ; and it is 
certain the Ameers neither desired nor asked for foreign aid. 
" We have vanquished the Seik, and we will do so again," 
was their confident delaration. But the Seik monarch, by 
a singular coincidence, demanded at this moment from the 
Anglo-Indian Government a supply of arms, to be sent to 
him up the Indus ! that is to say, through the heart of the 
country he was going to invade ; and this opportunity for 
meddling was seized by Lord Auckland. The Maharajah 
was reminded of an article in the Scindian treaty of 1821, 
by which the transit of military stores on the Indus was 
interdicted, and he was admonished not to trouble his 
neighbours unjustly. The British political resident at Lahore 
was also directed to employ every resource, short of menace, 
to deter Runjeet Sing from hostilities ; and at the same time, 
Colonel Pottinger, who had hitherto remained in Cutch, was 
sent to Hydrabad to offer what was designated a closer 
alliance with the Ameers; he promising the protection of 
the Anglo-Indian Government against the Seiks, in con- 
sideration of which it was hoped they would receive, and 
themselves pay a British force to be stationed in their 
capital! And this force was actually assembled by the 
Bombay Government. 

Soon a doubt that mere professions of amity would not 
induce the Ameers to let their dominions be thus taken 
possession of caused a modification of this proposal, and 
Pottinger was empowered, if a demur occurred, to offer the 
mediation of the British instead of a close alliance, provided 
a political resident was admitted at Hydrabad, through 
whom all intercourse with Runjeet Sing was to be carried 
on— a British force to sustain this mediation, to be tempo- 
rarily quartered in Scinde at the expense of the Ameers ! 
He was also to negotiate for the surveying of the coast, the 
fixing of buoys and land-marks, the re-establishment of the 
native agent, the warehousing of goods without payment of 



OF SCINDE. 



29 



duties, the establishment of fairs in Scinde, the repression of 
the Mazaree robbers, and the clearing of jungle, that is to 
say, cutting down the Ameers' shikargahs or hunting grounds 
to facilitate tracking up the Indus : finally, the appoint- 
ment of a British superintendent-general. The diplomatic 
subtilty of the Ameers was thus provoked, and as their mode 
of dealing was always the same, the history of one affair will 
serve as a guide to all. But first the anomalous nature of 
their sovereignty must be treated of, because it really 
influenced their policy and actions, while it also served as a 
cover for their hollowness. 

When the first of the Talpoor sovereigns died, his brothers 
had divided the country unequally, and excluded his son 
Sobdar from power, though not from his private patrimony. 
Their names were Ghoolam, Moorad, and Kereem, of Hydra- 
bad ; Tharou of Meerpoor : Sorab of Kyrpoor. All were 
dead at this period ; Kereem without issue, and Ghoolam 
leaving one son, who was treated as Sobdar had been treated. 

Moorad left two sons, Noor Mohamed and Nusseer Khan, 
who were at this time the ruling Ameers of Hydrabad ; 
Noor, because he was Bais and wore the turban :— Nusseer, 
because he governed Noor. 

Tharou left a son, Ali Morad, who succeeded to the 
Ameeree of Meerpoor ; but he also died, and was succeeded 
by Shere Mohamed, called the Lion. 

In Upper Scinde, Roostum, the eldest son of Sorab, was 
Bais of the Kyrpoor Ameers, but he had many brothers. 

The superiority of the Hydrabad branch was faintly 
acknowledged by the Ameers of Kyrpoor and Meerpoor ; but 
by all the law of primogeniture was discarded— the brother, 
not the son, succeeded to the turban. This system, springing 
from the original usurpation, occasioned constant jealousies 
and disputes ; for though the three seats of government were 
distinct, the territories were dovetailed in a strange and 
tangled fashion, and each Ameer was absolute in his own 
hereditary domains; each had armed followers, purchased 
slaves, and hired the hill tribes according to his means. 
Discord therefore prevailed, fear was prevalent amongst high 
and low, and the labouring people were plundered and op- 



30 



THE CONQUEST 



pressed to a degree, says Pottinger, ''possibly unequalled in 
the world" Moreover, the tribes knowing that in civil 
commotions pay would be high for military services, and 
plunder abundant, always encouraged, and at times forced 
the princes into domestic wars. 

Thus influenced, the policy of the Ameers could not fail 
to be tortuous and vacillating even though their natural 
dispositions had been frank and honest, which was not the 
case. Falsehood, cajolery and delays, were their diplomatic 
resources, and forgery was common with them. Shrewdly 
polite of manners they invariably paid extravagant attentions 
to the British political agents, proffering entertainments and 
presents with prodigal liberality, flattery still more profusely; 
and judging from the official correspondence published, they 
seem never to have failed in gaining the friendship of the 
different agents, and not seldom to have blinded them. 

The chief Ameers would accept, with all appearance of 
joy and gratitude any proposition, and promise abundantly ; 
yet rarely did performance follow promise, and constant 
evasions or direct violations of every article attended the 
conclusion of every treaty. If pressed they would plead 
the difficulty, real or pretended, of obtaining the assent of 
the inferior Ameers ; and always one of these last seems to 
have been designedly in opposition, playing the refractory 
part. Forged letters, false seals, with secret and unusual 
forms of correspondence, were employed to lead, or mislead 
the recipients of them, and these were accompanied by false 
assertions as to promises which never had been made, and 
nefarious assumptions of evil intended where all had been 
fair and honest — such were the means sedulously, systemati- 
cally, and not unskilfully employed by the Ameers at all 
times in their intercourse with the British political agents. 

Pottinger reached Hydrabad in September, and in 
December told Lord Auckland that his negotiation was suc- 
cessful ; but he had only pressed the modified mediation ; 
and to obtain that, had exceeded his powers in promising 
corresponding services. His report was premature. The 
treaty was not ratified until 1838, and then only because 
significant hints were given that Runjeet Sing would be let 







OF SCINDE. 



31 



loose, perhaps aided, to work his pleasure in Scinde. That 
ambitious Prince had frankly accepted the British mediation, 
and his connection with the Anglo-Indian Government was 
cemented by a public personal interview with the Governor- 
General ; his troops also still occupied Rohjan, and fear of 
his warfare procured the treaty. It contained but two arti- 
cles, providing for the mediation and the residence of a 
political agent at Hydrabad, who was to move where he 
chose, attended by an escort of British troops of any num- 
ber deemed suitable by his own Government ! 

All this was done under pretence of a friendly interest ; 
but it is impossible to deny the injustice. Analyze the ne- 
gotiation. The Seik monarch menaced with invasion ; the 
Anglo-Indian Government seized that moment to offer pro- 
tection, on condition of permanently occupying the capital 
with troops, to be paid by the Ameers ! That was simply, 
an impudent attempt to steal away their country ; and the 
modified proposal to mediate, which followed, was only more 
subtil, not less immoral— the intent in both cases was profit, 
covered with a sickening declamation about friendship, jus- 
tice, and love of peace. Lord Auckland, while thus instruct- 
ing his envoy, declared his conviction, arising from long 
experience, that Runjeet Sing would not act against the 
Ameers in opposition to the wishes of the British authorities ; 
hence, to mediate, there was no need for the admission of 
troops into Scinde, and the threat of letting the Seik 
monarch loose was a consistent termination to such diplo- 
macy. 

This treaty, by which a loaded shell was placed in the 
palace of the Ameers to explode at pleasure for their destruc- 
tion, was abstractedly an unjust oppressive action. Was it 
also a wanton aggression ? Great interests, even self-preser- 
vation, was involved according to the views of the Anglo- 
Indian Government, and men can only act according to their 
light. Was that light good ? Was the view taken of affairs 
a sane one by statesmen of reach and policy ; or was it the 
offspring of weak distempered minds, actuated by a ground- 
less terror clouding the judgment, and by a shallow ambi- 
tion ? If the intrigues of Russia appeared to menace the 



32 



THE CONQUEST 



stability of the British-Indian Empire, it was undoubtedly 
the duty of Lord Auckland and his council to counteract 
them ; yet wisely and justly, without degrading their coun- 
try's reputation by violence and incapacity : — for surely 
public men may not with impunity undertake the government 
of millions, sport with their happiness and misery, mar or 
make their fortunes as chance guides, with profound igno- 
rance of principles, and a reckless contempt for details. 

There were two modes by which Russia could attempt 
an invasion of India. Directly with a regular army, or by 
influencing Persia and the other nations of Central Asia to 
pour their wild hordes upon Hindostan. The first had been 
effected by Alexander the Great, and he was deified for the 
exploit. No man else has done the like : for the irruptions 
of Ghengis, Tamerlane, and Nadir, were the wars of Asiatic 
princes, and though Russia is half Asiatic of dominion, her 
regular armies are European of organization. To lead a 
great and conquering force to India from Europe after the 
manner of Alexander, requires an Alexander, who shall be • 
at the head of troops prepared by previous discipline, and 
by political as well as military organization. He must be 
of a fierce genius, untameable will, and consummate know- 
ledge of war ; he must have the confidence of his soldiers, 
and choose a proper conjuncture of affairs in Europe for 
his enterprise, for that also is necessary to success. But 
such a man, and so situated, if a subject, would be as likely 
to march on Moscow, as Delhi : the leader must therefore be 
a Czar, or the son of a Czar, and the adverse chances are 
thus immeasurably increased. 

Russia wants a man. If she find him his views will 
hardly be turned eastward ; Europe will have more to fear 
than India. But is Russia really to be feared in Europe ? 
The profound falsehood of her government, her barbarous 
corruption, her artificial pretensions, the eye-glitter of her 
regular armies, shining only from the putrescence of national 
feeling, would lead to the negative. Her surprising pro- 
gress in acquisition of territory within the last hundred 
years would lead to the affirmative. If we believe those 
writers who have described the ramifications of the one huge 



OF SCINDE. 



33 



falsehood of pretension, which, they say, pervades Russia, 
her barbarity, using the word in its full signification, would 
appear more terrible than her strength. Nor can I question 
their accuracy, having, in 1815, when the reputation of the 
Russian troops was highest, detected the same falsehood of 
display without real strength. At the Imperial parades on 
the Boulevards of Paris, oiled, bandaged, and clothed to 
look like men whom British soldiers would be proud to 
charge on a field of battle, the Muscovite was admired. I 
followed him to his billet, where, stripped of disguise, he 
appeared short of stature, squalid and meagre, his face 
rigid with misery, shocking sight and feeling — a British 
soldier would have offered him bread rather than the 
bayonet. 

Nevertheless, some innate expanding and dangerous 
strength must belong to a nation, which, during long con- 
tests with the most warlike people of continental Europe led 
by Frederick and Napoleon, has steadily advanced with 
arms and policy, until her Cossacks may encamp on her own 
territory within a few marches of Vienna, Berlin, Stock- 
holm and Constantinople. Her regular armies may be bad, 
her fleets in the Baltic and the Black Sea may be worse ; 
but they are there, and she can send half a million of wild 
horsemen, who, without pay, would invade Europe for plun- 
der, and, sustained by regular armies on the Russian fron- 
tier, make such ravage as half a century could not repair. 
The chances of revolution have been spoken of as a re- 
medy for the Muscovite power ; yet who can predict that 
revolution will not augment her warlike strength and ambi- 
tion. Her policy is national, and it menaces freedom and 
happiness and civilization. Poland was the first error of 
Europe in respect to Russia ; Circassia may be the second ; 
Constantinople the last and the greatest. 

Had Russia a man capable of invading the East when 
Lord Auckland fell into such fear ? Was the conjuncture 
of affairs in Europe favourable to the enterprise ? Was 
there a suitable army ready ? By what line was it to ope- 
rate ? Was it through Persia to Herat ? or, starting from 
the Caspian, to march up the Oxus to the Hindoo Khosh ? 

D 



34 



THE CONQUEST 



Was it to overrun Affghanistan 3 or win over that country by 
policy as a new base of operation, previous to crossing the 
Indus ? Were the wild Toorkmans of Orgunje, the settled 
people of Bokhara, the fierce Uzbecks of Balk, to be con- 
quered or gained over as friends ? Were not these questions 
of weight in this matter ? Could the solution of them leave 
doubt, that a regular invasion of Hindostan by a Russian 
army was then a chimera ? 

But Persia ! Through Persia the tide of war might be 
poured ! Yes ! when Russia has broken that country down 
to a province, and that she cannot do while the gallant 
tribes of Cir cassia maintain their independence : it was in the 
western not the eastern Caucasus, therefore, that the security 
of India was to be sought. Had Russia even possessed a 
Macedonian Alexander, the policy of the Grecian Memnon 
would still have been again effectual, for slow would have 
been that hero's progress if the wise Persian General had 
lived. • There was provocation for meddling with Circassian 
affairs, modern Persia was as open to British as to Russian 
influence, and by the Persian Gulf she could be reached 
more easily than by Circassia. But the only effort made by 
the Whigs to conciliate the Shah, was a miserable abortive 
mission, stinted in presents with a ridiculous parsimony, 
which made Mr. Ellis, the able, clear-headed gentleman 
employed, ashamed of his task. 

To combine by an active astute policy the nations of 
Central Asia against the British Empire in the East, 
remained for Russia ; and Lord Auckland asserted that she 
was busily, though secretly, engaged therein ; that her 
agents were every where ; that the Persians were besieging 
Herat with her assistance, at her instigation, and for her profit. 
How was this secret hostility to be wisely met ? Surely 
by cultivating the good will of the high-spirited Affghans, 
the wild Toorkmans, the keen-witted Persians. To speak to 
their self-interests by commerce and by presents, to their 
sagacity by missions, and to trust their instinct of self-pre- 
servation for the rest : that would have been an intelligible 
policy. The reverse appeared wisdom to Lord Auckland's 
advisers, and his proceedings bore at once the stamps of 



OF SCINDE. 



35 



incapacity and injustice. He undertook a gigantic enter- 
prise of war without a knowledge of guiding principles ; 
and as he did not employ those w T ho understood war a dire- 
ful calamity terminated the folly. 

AfFghanistan had just been broken down from a great 
and domineering state to a weak confederacy of democratic 
communities ; and this new organization was in unison with 
the habits and feelings of that courageous and strong- 
bodied people. Dost Mohamed, their principal chief and 
the head of the most powerful family of the most powerful 
tribe, was comparatively an enlightened man, vigorous and 
well disposed towards British interests. Yet he, and his 
nation, whose welfare could have been promoted and its 
good-will secured, it was resolved to invade, and in the 
manner most offensive. That is to say, forcing on them a 
native prince twice before driven from supreme power by the 
nation ; thus combining the most deadly of political offences 
and injuries, a foreign yoke and a hateful native monarch. 
Shah Sooja, the exiled king, chosen as the instrument for 
this occasion, was without talent, and vigorous only in 
cruelty ; his executions, his vengeance, are well known, his 
exploits in battle unknown. He was thrust forward in the 
preposterous hope, that he, who had been unable to keep his 
throne when placed on it by his own countrymen, would 
remain firm when restored by strangers offensive to the 
Affghans as invaders and oppressors ; still more offensive as 
infidels : and he was thus to reconstitute his kingdom in 
unity and strength, so as to form an efficient barrier for 
India towards the west ! 

What kind of policy was that which sought a war in 
Central Asia, a thousand miles from England's true basis 
of power, the sea. Central Asia ! where from remotest 
times the people have been organized for irregular warfare, 
which the nature of their country and their own wild habits 
render peculiarly appropriate. The military strength of 
England lies in her discipline, in her great resources of 
money and materials for war, in the strong knit massive 
organization of her troops, in her power of combining fleets 
and armies together. She, of all nations, is least calculated 



36 THE CONQUEST 

from her customs and morals, to meet irregular warfare on a 
great scale. Yet here we find a collision provoked with 
Russia on the steppes of Tartary, a trial of strength in Cen- 
tral Asia with a nation more powerful in irregular troops 
than all the rest of the world together : and that trial pre- 
ceded by an odious aggression, sure to render all the bar- 
barous nations inimical to England, if not friendly to 
Russia. 

This wild conception, concocted and urged by the Whig 
Government at home ; this conception, so nearly allied to 
madness, was executed with consistent absurdity. Shah Sooja 
was proclaimed King, and troops, commanded by British 
officers, paid from the Calcutta treasury, were called the 
King's National Army, though not an Affghan was in the 
ranks, — and for this King was claimed all the lost rights of 
the Dooranee monarchy, with tribute and obedience from the 
nations formerly subject to it. To place him on the throne, 
a strong army was gathered with great stores on the upper 
Sutlege ; but Cabool was to be reached, and between that city 
and the Sutlege was the Punjaub, under a monarch, wily and 
powerful, a proclaimed friend and ally. It would have been 
consistent with the claims of Shah Sooja, to have demanded 
from Runjeet Sing the restoration of the Dooranee provinces, 
which he had recently got possession of by force of arms. 
For in this he differed from the other powers who had broken 
from the Affghan monarchy ; they merely asserted their 
independence, if exception be made*for the small district of 
Cutch-Gundava, seized by the Ameers ; whereas Runjeet 
conquered largely after establishing the Seik kingdom. But 
he was too fierce, too strong, too useful, to be roughly dealt 
with. It was safer to give than to take with him; and, 
therefore, a tripartite treaty was concocted, as if it were a 
voluntary compact between equal and independent powers 
understanding their own interests and able to maintain 
them — the contracting parties being Runjeet, the Anglo- 
Indian Government, and Shah Sooja ! 

Pretending to be a renewal of ancient engagements, this 
treaty bound Shah Sooja to relinquish his claims on Cach- 
mere, P.eshawar, Attock, and some smaller dominions ravished 



OF SCINDE. 



37 



by Runjeet Sing from the Dooranee monarchy ; and he was 
also, when re-established on his throne, to make presents, and 
in other ways practically admit the supremacy of the Maha- 
rajah, though in the treaty they were styled equals. If the 
Shah called for the aid of Seik troops, they were to share 
in the " plunder " of the great Barrukzie family, which con- 
tained sixty thousand heads of the noblest houses of Afghan- 
istan — an article unwise and shameful, lowering the British 
policy to the level of barbarism. 

The invasion of Affghanistan being resolved upon, mili- 
tary princfples required, that the shortest lines of operations 
should be adopted, and those were in the Punjaub. The 
Maharajah had just concluded a treaty, advantageous to 
himself, at the expense of the King, who was under the 
influence of the Governor- General ; and it was but reasonable 
that he should grant in return a free passage through the 
ceded territory acquired by that treaty ; that is to say, through 
Peshawar and the Kyber passes, which was the best route to 
Cabool. There was no reason either, if he had faith in his 
British allies, why the Punjaub should not be made the base 
of operations, and the invading army assembled on the Indus, 
to penetrate by the Kyber to Cabool, and by Deera Ishmael 
Khan, not a difficult route, to Ghusni and Candahar. 

When a great point, technically so called, is to be made 
in war, there are only two modes of effecting it recognized by 
military art. By the first, an army should march with all 
its military means, compact and strong, to bear down oppo- 
sition, trusting to its leader for an establishment in the 
country where it is to halt. Such was Hannibal's invasion 
of Italy. Success depends upon sagacious calculation of 
power and resistance, moral and physical ; in fine, upon the 
leader's genius. This is the highest effort of a general. The 
second mode is to trust the communications to allies, or to 
nations subjugated on the march, increasing the army by 
levies from those nations as it advances. Such was the 
Macedonian Alexander's method of approaching India. 

There was no Hannibal to invade Affghanistan, but the 
method of Alexander might have been adopted without his 
genius. Runjeet Sing was an ally to whom the communi- 



38 



THE CONQUEST 



cations should have been entrusted; and to ensure his fidelity, 
an army of reserve should have been assembled on the Sut- 
lege. If he refused consent, his alliance was hollow, and 
policy dictated the forcing him to acquiesce, or the subju- 
gation of his kingdom as a preliminary step to the invasion 
of Afghanistan. Not so did Lord Auckland reason. Dis- 
regarding military principles, of which his advisers seem to 
have been as profoundly ignorant as they were disdainful of 
equity in their policy, he resolved to perpetrate against the 
helpless Ameers of Scinde in the form of aggression, that 
which he dared not eveo propose in the way of friendship to 
the powerful Maharajah. With this view articles were inserted 
in the Tripartite Treaty, under which Runjeet accepted the 
British mediation for his dispute with Scinde ; and the Shah, 
who had resigned without an equivalent his richest provinces 
to Runjeet, also agreed to relinquish his sovereign rights oh 
Scinde, on condition of receiving the arrears of tribute. 

The object of all this machinery was to obtain a pretence 
for seizing so much of the Ameers' territory as would secure 
a line of operations against Afghanistan through Scinde — a 
line so defective, that military considerations alone should 
have stopped the invasion if no better could be found. But 
the Kyber passes offered one of only five hundred miles, 
reckoning from Loodiana to Cabool, and only three hundred, 
if a base had been first established at Attock. Moreover, by 
Ishmael dera Khan and the Gomul pass, taking the Punjaub 
as a base, would have been only three hundred miles to Can- 
dahar, and two hundred to Ghusni. Instead of taking these 
lines the one adopted run from Loodiana to Roree on the 
Indus, crossed that great river, and went through Cutch- 
Gundava, a country fatal from heat to European troops in 
summer, to penetrate by the terrific defiles of Bolan, amidst 
hostile predatory tribes, to the sterile highlands of Afghan- 
istan, where sepoys could not live in winter from the cold. 
Then, passing by Candahar and Ghusni, fortresses of no mean 
repute, to reach Cabool: the whole distance not less than 
fifteen hundred miles, exposed to the operations of the incensed 
Ameers, the hostile Belooch tribes of the hills, the doubtful 
faith of Runjeet Sing and his discontented nobles. And with 



OF SCTNDE. 



39 



what object ? To plunder and spoil the most powerful and 
popular family of the most powerful tribe in a nation of five 
millions,— a people whose fathers had within man's memory 
conquered from Delhi to the Caspian, from the Oxus to the 
Ocean ! It was to force a hateful monarch upon a hardy 
courageous people, democratic from customs and institutions, 
and despising the religion of the strangers who thus sought to 
control them. They were to accept him also with this stigma, 
that to recover his crown he had resigned a third of the tribes 
to their inveterate enemies the Seiks ! 

Sir John Hobhouse, in a turgid speech upon this enter- 
prise, said, the line of the Bolan pass was chosen because 
Shah Sooja's adherents were in that quarter— a puerile reason, 
yet shewing that the King was not desired by the nation at 
large. However, under the weight of this policy, Afghan- 
istan, that great military point, was to be made by a general 
of no military repute, with troops for the most part physically 
unfitted to sustain the climate, with unsafe communications, 
and without moral or political resources. He was to advance 
in the wild hope that a weak arrogant prince would rally an 
adverse people, reconstitute a great nation which had before 
fallen to pieces in his hands, and form with it a bulwark for 
India against Persia and the wild populations of Central Asia, 
stimulated to hostility, and supported by Russia ! The genius 
and sagacity of Wellington were not needed to predict mis- 
fortune, but his remark was—" The troops will force their 
way through a wild disunited people, only to find the commence- 
ment of their difficulties?'' 

The passage through Scinde and the Bolan pass nearly 
wrecked the army. It is said Lord Keane lost many hundred 
soldiers, thousands of camp followers, and forty thousand 
camels on the march ; that want of promptness and combi- 
nation amongst the tribes alone enabled him to reach Can- 
dahar ; and that at Ghusni his progress would have terminated 
but for the engineer Thomson's ready genius, and the fiery 
courage of Colonel Dennie, who, breaking through the only 
weak part of the barbarian's defence, won a peerage for the 
General. Shah Sooja thus regained his throne, and fools 
gaped at him while the Afghan men of spirit pondered 



40 



THE CONQUEST 



revenge. For a time success seemed to attend the unjust 
aggression, sustained by the vigour of the brilliant, ill-requited 
Dennie; but when he and the intrepid Sale marched to 
Jellallabad, error succeeded error, not unaccompanied by 
crime, with fearful rapidity, until an entire destruction of the 
invaders closed '" the tragic Harlequinade" The system of 
a making smart young men, who could speak Persian, poli- 
tical agents, and supposing them generals and statesmen," 
failed. England lost an army by the experiment : and Lord 
Auckland gained a new coronet — but clotted and stiff with 
the blood of British soldiers, shed in an unjust war, it must 
be uneasy to wear. 



OF SCINDE. 



41 



CHAPTER III. 

Connected with the Affghan war were some peculiar 
negotiations most discreditable to the Anglo-Indian Govern- 
ment. 

The tripartite treaty of June 1838 was in July sent to 
Colonel Pottinger, preparatory to a new course of diplomacy 
with the Ameers, modelled on that which led to the treaty 
of two articles, in virtue of which he was a political agent in 
Scinde. This time the project was more artfully conducted. 
Shah Sooja, recognized as King, and a contracting person in 
the tripartite treaty, and having an army raised, paid, and 
officered by the Anglo-Indian Government, was thrust for- 
ward as an independent sovereign. He agreed to relinquish 
all claim to supremacy and tribute from Scinde, on condition 
of receiving a large sum of money, the amount to be deter- 
mined under the mediation of the Anglo-Indian Government, 
which thus constituted itself umpire in an old quarrel, revived 
by itself to suit its own projects, without the knowledge of 
the party most interested. But war is costly : the King's 
army required pay, the Ameers had treasure, and to reach 
their gold, and lay grounds for more important demands, was 
the real object. Pottinger's instructions, shamelessly explicit, 
ran in substance thus : — " Tell the Ameers, a crisis menacing 
British India has arrived. The Western Powers have com- 
bined to work evil. The Governor-General has projected a 
counter-combination. He calls on his friends for aid. The 
King has ancient claims on Scinde, but he will accept money 
in discharge of them, and makes the Governor- General 
arbitrator of the amount. Great is the benefit thus conferred 
on the Ameers. They will gain undisturbed possession of 
their territory and immunity from farther claims. Warm is 
the Governor-General's friendship for the Ameers, and in 
return he demands ostensible proof of their attachment. The 



42 



THE CONQUEST 



King will arrive at Shikarpoor in November ; he will be 
supported bj a British army. The Ameers must therefore 
agree to pay him the money or abide the consequences, one 
of which will be, to take military possession of their town 
and district of Shikarpoor. Meanwhile, the article of the 
former treaty which forbids the transmission of military 
stores up the Indus must be suspended." Yet to maintain 
that article intact had been the very ground of interference 
with Runjeet Sing in the former negotiation ! 

So far all was in friendship ; but the Persians were 
besieging Herat, and, though no war had been declared, and 
England was by treaty bound not to interfere between Persia 
and the Affghans, the former were designated as opponents 
of the Governor-General's projects, and the Ameers were 
supposed to have formed engagements with them. If so, it 
was to be construed as an act of hostility, and a British 
army from Bombay would immediately enter their capital ; 
yet, if any inferior Ameer, popular in Scinde, was inclined to 
side with the British, he was to be separately supported and 
advanced to power ! The amount of the King's money claim 
was left undetermined, but it was significantly observed, 
" the Ameers must be wealthy." 

Noor Mohamed, the chief Ameer of Hydrabad, had 
indeed written to the Persian, yet more, as Colonel Pottinger 
judged, from religious zeal than political views ; for the 
Ameer was a "Shea" or believer in Ali, as the Persians are; 
whereas Sobdar, the person contemplated by the instructions 
as likely to side with the British, was a " Soonee" or be- 
liever in Omar. There was however a Persian agent 
hovering about Hydrabad, and there was ground for 
believing that an intercourse unfriendly to British interests 
was maintained. Nor can this excite wonder. The previous 
negotiations had left the Ameer in no doubt as to the 
ultimate object of the Governor-General, and he naturally 
looked around for support. 

Pottinger assured Lord Auckland, " he would not fail to 
tell the Ameers, that the day they connected themselves with 
any other power than England would be the last of their 
independence, if not of their rule — and neither the ready 



OF SCINDE. 



43 



power to crush and annihilate them, nor the will to call it 
into action were wanting, if it appeared requisite, however 
remotely, for the safety or integrity of the Anglo-Indian 
empire or frontier." The disclosure of his instructions was 
however to be delayed until the armies destined to support 
them approached Scinde, and meanwhile, the Ameers of 
Hydrabad obtained some knowledge of the tripartite treaty. 
Their indignation was great, and their first thought a resort 
to arms; but they heard the Persians had failed in an assault 
on Herat, with great loss, and being themselves embarrassed 
by civil contention with the Lugaree tribe, they exchanged 
the design of fighting for their usual diplomacy of falsehood, 
flattery, menaces and cajolery. And it is not to be supposed 
they had given no reasonable ground for complaint in respect 
of the commercial treaties : they had violated them systemati- 
cally, with as little scruple as Lord Auckland now set aside 
the article forbidding the transit of military stores by the 
Indus. 

Pottinger warned his Government that obstacles would 
arise ; but he treated one of the Ameers' arguments with 
such ill-founded contempt, as to create a suspicion that he 
was launching a bitter sarcasm at his own employers. — 
" Sobdar and his party, will," said he, " probably even go 
so far as to declare the demand for money a breach of the 
late agreement, *on the principle, that without our assistance, 
Shah Sooja had no means to exact a rea from them, and the 
demand may be considered as our own. I do not, by pointing 
out this argument, mean for an instant to uphold its correct- 
ness, but it is one just suited to the capacity and feelings of 
the individuals with whom I have to negotiate." 

Aye! and to the capacity and feelings of every man 
capable of reasoning at all ! And the Ameers did afterwards 
urge it with homely but irresistible force. 

" It is a jo~ke" they exclaimed, " to call it a demand from 
the King. You have given him bread for the last five-and-twenty 
years, and any strength he has noiv, or may have hereafter, is 
from you. The demand is yours ! " 

Pottinger thus continued : — 

" Had our present connection existed some years, and our 



44 



THE CONQUEST 



Resident thereby had time, by constant kindly intercourse 
with the chiefs and people, to have removed the strong and 
universal impression that exists throughout Scinde as to our 
grasping policy, the case might have been widely different ; 
but I enter on my new duties without any thing to offer, 
and with a proposal, that will only strengthen the above 
impressions, for many besides the Scindees will believe at the 
onset that we are making a mere use of Shah Soojtfs name to 
revive a claim which has long been esteemed obsolete." 

Noor Mohamed's letter to the Persian Shah, treated 
lightly by Pottinger, was by Lord Auckland, with strained 
construction the hyperbolic compliments of the» East con- 
sidered, construed as a tender of allegiance, offered when the 
opposition of the British Government to the Shah's designs 
was notorious : it implied hostility, and the Ameer had thus 
forfeited all friendly consideration. Energetic measures 
must be adopted, and as Meer Sobdar appeared faithful, it 
might be advisable to give him the turban under British 
supremacy. 

This indignation was a masque, the mode of proceeding 
had been previously decided. Five thousand men had been 
assembled at Bombay to invade Scinde ; a Bengal army was 
coming down the Sutlege to occupy Shikarpoor, contrary to 
treaty and without even the form of asking leave, and 
Pottinger was empowered to use the Bombay force to back 
his negotiation. This requires short comment. Springing 
from a predetermined plan to seize Scinde, it would have 
been better to have spared expressions of friendship and love 
of justice. The motives were the extraction of money for the 
King's army, and to plant a subsidiary force in the country, 
with a view to its final subjection. 

Lord Auckland was desirous to fasten first on Upper 
Scinde, because there the passage of the Indus was to be 
made by the Bengal army, and the line of communication for 
the Affghan invasion established. Wherefore Sir A. Burnes, 
then on a mission to the Prince of Khelat, was ordered to 
turn aside and negotiate a treaty with the Kyrpoor Ameers 
as he passed. He was to demand money, and what was 
called, a loan of the rock fortress of Bukkur, standing in mid 



OF SCINDE. 



45 



stream of the Indus, where it was purposed to cast a bridge 
that the Bengal army might pass and unite with the King's 
force at Shikarpoor. If asked for a remuneration, Sir Alex- 
ander was to give an evasive answer ; but he was to obtain 
stores and military transport, and though under the control 
of Pottinger was to present himself rather as a confidential 
friend than a political agent ! 

Meanwhile the Ameers of Hydrabad, whose rule ex- 
tended up the right bank of the Indus to Shikarpoor, far 
from assenting to the occupation of that place by the King, 
who intimated in general terms his design of going there, 
replied to him, in substance, thus : " The Beloochees are not 
pleased, you must not come to Shikarpoor. The power of Dost 
Mohamed is well known. The Shah of Persia is before Herat; 
he is supported by the Russians : you cannot come by Shikarpoor. 
If Bunjeet Sing and the British support you, there is a direct 
road to Khorassan (their name for Afghanistan) from Loo- 
diana : go that way and ive will assist you." This biting 
sarcasm on the strange mixture of fear, folly, and audacity 
which had dictated the line of operation through Scinde, was 
deemed insolent ; -and Pottinger, now changing his opinion 
as to the nature of the Ameers' correspondence with the 
Persian, exclaimed against their duplicity, and advised the 
immediate employment of the troops at Bombay. 

During these negotiations an undercurrent of complaint 
run strongly against the Ameers for violations of the com- 
mercial treaties, which they were required to respect while 
the Governor- General unhesitatingly cast them aside. It is 
however remarkable, that even at this time, Ali Moorad, the 
younger brother of Roostum of Kyrpoor, he who has been so 
vilely slandered by the Indian press, remained firm to his 
engagements and punished all transgressors of the commercial 
treaties. 

Political shame being now laid aside, and occasion rife, 
Lord Auckland, pretending a virtuous indignation at the 
duplicity of the Ameers, and their unwarrantable enmity 
and jealousy of the British !— moved with pity also for the 
distracted state of their government, a state which his envoy 
was expressly instructed to foment, declared that five thou- 



46 



THE CONQUEST 



sand troops should instantly seize Shikarpoor, and such 
other parts of Scinde as might be deemed eligible to fa- 
cilitate the invasion of Afghanistan and give effect to the 
tripartite treaty. All the Ameers who were inimical to the 
British, even those who had simply evinced unwillingness to 
aid the invasion of the Affghans, with whom they had no 
quarrel, were to be displaced from power ; and this violence 
was offered to independent governments, over which no 
rights had been established save by treaties, not sought for 
by them and both in letter and spirit opposed to these 
aggressions! But to make amends, the Ameers were as- 
sured, that the seizure of their territories by a British army 
meaned nothing injurious to their interests ! 

Pottinger, while admitting that Noor Mohamed's Persian 
correspondence had not been proved, was yet disposed at 
first, to bring the Bombay troops at once to Scinde, and 
proposed to encourage informers against the Ameers to 
strengthen the case ! But he soon found that the Ameers, 
if driven to war, could seriously embarrass the advance on 
Affghanistan, and that camels, grain, money, boats, and 
storehouses, could be more easily got under the masque of 
friendship. Hence he advised delay, but Lord Auckland 
ordered immediate action. The Ameers then menaced the 
envoy with personal violence, and failing to intimidate him 
offered abject apologies, which he disregarded and called for 
the troops. One demand however he recoiled from. The 
Ameers produced formal discharges from the King of all 
sovereign claims on Scinde — how then could money for 
another relinquishment be honestly required ? His scruples 
were spared by an order not to trouble himself about that, it 
would be settled by others ! 

In an angry discussion with the Ameers, they declared 
that the army coming to Bukkur should not cross the Indus 
there. That said Pottinger depends on the Governor- 
General's orders. " Those are not the decrees of the Al- 
mighty ! they can, and shall be altered," was the rejoinder 
of Noor Mohamed. But an iron screw was upon him, and 
each day a fresh turn taught him that resistance was vain. 
And while the Hydrabad Prince was thus writhing under 



OF SCINDE. 



47 



Pottinger's grasp, Burnes laid as strong, though a more 
courtly hand upon the Rais of Kyrpoor. 

It was now declared that all the Ameers designed to 
march on Candahar if the Persians had taken Herat, and 
Roostum of Kyrpoor, weaker than Noor of Hydrabad, and 
more exposed to the Seiks and the King's army, trembled. 
Befooled also by hints of complete independence if he 
quietly yielded Bukkur, he became infinitely conciliating 
with Burnes. Yet secret discontent was rife, and his 
brother Moobarick openly opposed concession. Roostum's 
outward conduct was however so agreeable that it drew 
forth the following exquisite specimen of diplomatic jargon 
from the Governor-General, — " The favourable temper of 
that chief has been already noted ; this feeling Captain 
Burnes has been instructed to cultivate, and for its mainte- 
nance, in connection with the great importance of the tem- 
porary cession of Bukkur, I have informed Captain Burnes, 
that I am not unprepared to receive propositions for 
admitting the guaranteed independence of Kyrpoor as an 
additional arrangement, dependent to a certain degree on 
contingent events at Hydrabad." 

But Roostum's submissive behaviour did not save him 
from the humiliating assurance, that the sins of the Hydra- 
bad Ameers would be visited on him also; and that the 
advance of the armies to Affghanistan would not free Scinde 
from British troops until the King was firmly fixed on his 
throne. 

Earnestly then the Kyrpoor Ameers offered new treaties, 
and to cast themselves generally on the British protection ; 
but this would have saved them from the peculiar protection 
designed for them, namely, entire obedience to the Anglo- 
Indian Government. Yet so unreserved did their desire to 
be received as friends appear to Burnes, that he observed, 
" With such an adherence, I am quite at a loss to know how 
we can either ask money or any favour of this family." 

Pottinger, with more penetration, judged this submission 
to be as doubtful as that of the Ameers of Hydrabad, and 
said so. Whereupon, Burnes explained, that he only meaned 
to say they were guided by interest at Kyrpoor, while fear 



48 



THE CONQUEST 



would best succeed at Hydrabad, and " Scinde might thus 
be laid prostrate at the mercy of the Governor-General." 
This was stripping Lord Auckland's policy of all disguise, a 
policy so painful, that both Burnes and Pottinger, at differ- 
ent periods, advised open war instead. 

A new influence was now employed. The Meah of the 
Kallora dynasty lived as an exile in the Punjaub, and his 
claims were put forward by the British negotiators ; yet the 
Ameers still struggled, and Pottinger, apparently tired of the 
lengthened contest, advised the cessation of diplomacy, a de- 
mand for Kurrachee, or tribute as a step to future supremacy, 
and the enforcement of that demand by an army ! Burnes, 
also, speaking of military measures against the Hydrabad 
Princes, declared that " nothing on the records of Indian 
• history was more justifiable : " a dreadful avowal for Anglo- 
Indian political morality. 

The King's force, and the troops from Bengal were now 
descending the Sutlege, the Bombay army reached the 
mouths of the Indus, and though negotiations were con- 
tinued, the establishing of a subsidiary force in Scinde was 
resolved upon : Pottinger even urged the seizure of all the 
country between the Hala mountains and the lower Indus, 
from above Tatta down to the sea, to give " a compact terri- 
tory, complete command of the river, and the only sea port; 
when, Sukkur and Bukkur being occupied by British troops 
on the upper Indus, and British agents placed in Kyrpoor 
and Hydrabad, British supremacy would be as fully es- 
tablished in Scinde, as though it had been entirely subju- 
gated." Burnes urged personal humiliation in addition, yet 
strongly objected to the seizure of territory, as likely " to 
tarnish the national honour throughout Asia, and the 
Ameers, though rancorous and hostile in feeling, had been 
guilty of no act to justify such a measure. The intention 
to injure was not injury." But what honour was there 
to tarnish, if nothing in the records of Anglo-Indian history 
was more justifiable than the aggression now being perpe- 
trated ? 

Shrinking from Pottinger's proposal, on the score of 
expediency, not that of morality, the Governor-General de- 



OF SCINDE. 



49 



clared, he would not i( incur the jealousy and distrust of 
States hitherto friendly or neutral," alluding to the power- 
ful Runjeet, and to the Khelat prince, whose hostility 
would have endangered the march upon Affghanistan. He 
however persisted as to the subsidiary force, Sir John Keane 
had arrived with the Bombay army at Vikkur on the Indus, 
no leave asked, and the means of coercing the Ameers were 
therefore at hand. Those of Hydrabad then assembled 
their warriors to fight ; but distracted between fear and 
anger could take no firm resolution. Meanwhile Roostum, 
after a sore mental struggle which led him even to contem- 
plate suicide, gave up Bukkur, he phrased it " the heart 
of his country," and admitted that Upper Scinde was a 
British dependency. 

The treaty now imposed was called the treaty of nine 
articles ; though dated the 24th of December, 1838, it was 
not ratified until January 1839. 

Thus far the course of injustice was unchecked. But 
now some of the Affghan difficulties were felt, and Lord 
Auckland, dreading the embarrassments which the Ameers 
of the Lower Scinde could still create, abated for the 
moment his demands ; yet in secret only, to Pottinger, 
who had joined General Keane at Vikkur, leaving a sub- 
political agent at the residency of Hydrabad. Soon, 
however, Sir Henry Fane reached Roree with the Bengal 
army, the King arrived at Shikarpoor, and then the three 
armies, simultaneously, made hostile demonstrations. The 
King advanced towards Larkaana by the right bank of the 
Indus ; the vanguard of the Bengal troops menaced Kyrpoor 
on the left bank ; Keane moved up that river, and a reserve 
previously assembled at Bombay received orders to embark. 
The Ameers then plundered the British stores collected at 
Hydrabad, and drove Lieut. Eastwick the sub- agent, who 
they justly despised, with contumely from the residency. As- 
sembling twenty thousand fighting men, they excited a general 
commotion, and it was discovered that to trample on Scinde 
involved great military and political questions. The cry of 
war was every where heard, Kurrachee was forcibly seized by 
the British, and Hydrabad was menaced with destruction. 

E 



50 



THE CONQUEST 



Sir J. Keane, contemplating a battle, designated it as 
a pretty piece of practice for the army ; and the Ameers 
were awed by the fierce aspect of his troops, who were eager 
to storm their capital. After announcing a horrid resolution 
to put their wives and children to death and fight to the last, 
they quailed at the muttering of the tempest, and ere it 
broke signed a new treaty presented by Pottinger — but for 
that indulgence were forced to pay two hundred thousand 
pounds, half on the instant. Dated February the 5th, this 
new instrument bound them to accept a subsidiary force, and 
contribute three lacs yearly for its support; to guarantee 
the good behaviour of the Beloochee chiefs ; to contract no 
engagement with foreign states unknown to the Anglo- 
Indian Government, to provide storeroom at Kurrachee for 
military supplies ; to abolish all tolls on the Indus, and to 
furnish an auxiliary force for the Affghan war if called upon 
to do so. 

In return, the Anglo-British Government pledged itself 
not to meddle with the internal rule of the Ameers either 
generally or in respect of their separate possessions, and 
to disregard complaints from their subjects ; but reserved a 
right to interfere and mediate in quarrels between the dif- 
ferent Ameers, and to put down refractory chiefs. It 
promised to protect Scinde from foreign aggression, and 
bound itself not to make engagements with external powers 
affecting the Ameers' interests without their concurrence — 
thus virtually admitting the injustice of the tripartite treaty, 
though it was the basis of all their proceedings. This 
stringent document did not however satisfy the Governor- 
General. It granted too much. Kurrachee had been con- 
quered during the negotiation, and he retained it, regardless 
of the treaty, which was immediately altered and ratified 
without asking the Ameers' consent to the changes ! They 
were commanded to accept it in its new form. 

The first document had been made in the names of the 
Hydrabad and Anglo-Indian Governments ; but that im- 
plied a chief, and the Auckland's policy was to weaken 
by dividing. The altered treaty was therefore made quad- 
ruplicate, one for each Ameer, alike in all things save the 



OF SCINDE. 



51 



payment of money, on which point Sobdar was favoured as a 
recompense for his amity during the negotiations. So also 
in the treaty with the Kyrpoor man, a distinction was made; 
but there the exception was to exact a penalty from Mooba- 
rick, in expiation of his previous enmity. Thus a nice 
discrimination marked every step of the oppression, and the 
amended treaty was, after many writhings, fastened round 
the lower Ameers' necks ; and in conjunction with that 
imposed on Roostum became a text for the political obli- 
gations of all the Scindian rulers, for Shere Mohamed, of 
Meerpoor, subsequently sought to be admitted to the same 
terms as Sobdar. The efforts of the Ameers to ameliorate 
the pressure continued however until July : and it is 
characteristic of the negotiations, that Kurrachee was re- 
tained as a conquest, though war had not been declared. 
Pottinger urged its restoration on the ground that no 
act of hostility had been committed by the Ameers, though 
the firing of a signal gun, unshotted, had been made a 
pretext for destroying their fort with broadsides from a 
line-of-battle-ship, the Wellesley ! 

The affairs of Scinde being now brought to a remarkable 
epoch, it is fitting to give exactly the substance of those 
treaties which guided the intercourse between the Ameers 
and the British authorities, up to the war which ended the 
reign of the former. 

First stands the treaty with Roostum. 

Defensive and offensive, it engaged the British Govern- 
ment to protect the territory of Kyrpoor. In return, Roostum 
and his successors were to act in subordinate co-operation 
with the Anglo-Indian Government, and acknowledge its 
supremacy. They were to have no connection with other 
chiefs or states nor to negotiate without the sanction of the 
British ; were to commit no aggression on any one ; and if 
by accident disputes arose, were to accept the arbitration 
and award of the Anglo-Indian Government. At the requi- 
sition of the Governor-General, Roostum was to furnish 
auxiliary troops according to his means, and render all aid 
during the Affghan war. He was bound to approve of all 
the defensive preparations in Scinde which might be deemed 



52 



THE CONQUEST 



fitting, while the security of the countries beyond the Indus 
should be threatened. 

On the other hand, the Anglo-Indian Government de- 
clared it would not covet " a drain or a dam of Eoostum's 
territory, nor his fortresses on this bank or that bank of the 
Indus." He and his successors were to be absolute and in- 
dependent in their possessions as rulers, and no complaint 
by their subjects was to be listened to. But he was to co- 
operate in all measures necessary to extend and facilitate the 
commerce and navigation of the Indus ; and to facilitate 
amity and peace, resident ministers were to be accredited to 
and from each of the contracting . powers : but the British 
Resident might change his abode at will, attended by an 
escort whose strength was to be determined by his own 
Government. A supplementary article gave the British 
power, in time of war, to occupy Bukkur, which was in 
the middle of the stream commanding the navigation ! 

This treaty was followed by the Hydrabad quadruplicate 
treaties, of fourteen articles, concluded with Noor, his 
brother Nusseer, and his nephews Sobdar and Mohamed, 
each separately. Bearing date the 11th of March, 1839, it 
provided : — 

1°. Lasting friendship and unity of interest between the 
contracting parties. 

2°. A British force, its strength determined by the 
Governor-General, should quarter in Scinde. 

3°. Noor, Nusseer, and Mohamed, were each to pay one 
lac of rupees yearly towards the cost of the subsidiary force, 
but Sobdar was exempted as a reward for previous friendship. 

4°. The Ameers' territories were placed under British 
protection. 

5°. The Ameers were to be absolute as rulers, each in 
his own possessions, and no complaint made by their subjects 
to be listened to by the British. 

6°. Disputes between independent Ameers were to be 
referred, with the sanction of the Governor-General, to the 
Resident for mediation. 

7°. If the subjects, that is to say, tribe chiefs under one 
Ameer were aggressive towards another Ameer, and the 



OF SCINDE. 



53 



latter was unable to check them, the British Government 
might interfere with force. 

8°. Negotiations with foreign states, unless sanctioned 
by the Indian Government, were forbidden to the Ameers. 

9°. An auxiliary force was to be furnished when required 
for purposes of defence. 

10°. The Timooree rupee current in Scinde being of the 
same value as the Company's rupee, the latter was to pass as 
lawful money in that country ; but if the British authorities 
coined Timooree rupees in Scinde, a seignorage was to be 
paid to the Ameers, yet not during the Affghan war. 

11°. No tolls were to be paid for trading boats passing 
up or down the Indus. 

12°. Merchandise landed from such boats and sold, was 
to pay the usual duties, excepting always those sold in a 
British camp or cantonment. 

13°. Goods of all kinds brought to the mouth of the 
Indus were to be kept there, at the owner's pleasure, until 
the best period for sending them up the river arrived ; but 
if any were sold at the mouth, or other parts, always 
excepting British camps or cantonments, they were to pay 
duty. 

14°. The treaty was to be binding on all succeeding 
Governors of India, and upon the Ameers and their succes- 
sors for ever ; and all former treaties not rescinded by this, 
were to remain in full force. 

Noor Mohamed, now convinced of the inexorable injustice 
of his oppressors, thought to turn the general injury to 
his peculiar profit, and secretly advised Pottinger to retain 
Kurrachee as a means of impressing the subordinate chiefs 
with the power of the British, in which he only anticipated 
Lord Auckland's resolution by a few days : his real object 
was to pass himself off with the chiefs as a man favoured by 
the powerful British Government, and thus keep them sub- 
missive under his exactions. His friendly tone was soon 
imitated by the other Ameers of Hydrabad ; yet the grace 
with which they resigned themselves to their wrongs, did not 
save them from the cruel mockery of being asked by Pottinger, 
if they had " the slightest cause to question British faith 



54 



THE CONQUEST 



during the last six months." And the farther mortification 
of being told that " henceforth they must consider Scinde to 
be, as it was in reality, a portion of Hindostan, in which the 
British were paramount and entitled to act as they con- 
sidered best and fittest for the general good of the whole 
Empire." To this the humbled Ameers replied with help- 
less irony, " That their eyes were opened. They had found 
it difficult to overcome the prejudice and apprehension of 
their tribes, who had always been led to think the only 
object of the British was to extend their dominion. Now 
they had been taught by experience English strength and 
good faith." 

Having concluded his long course of negotiations, Pot- 
tinger thought " the world would acknowledge, that if the 
English-Indian Government's power was great, its good faith 
and forbearance was still more to be wondered at ! " And 
then " distinctly recorded his opinion, though anticipating 
no such event, that if ever the British military strength was 
to be again exerted in Scinde, it must be carried to subjugat- 
ing the country." 

To accord a good faith and forbearance to these nego- 
tiations is impossible. Palliation on the score of necessity is 
the utmost that can be asked, and that but faintly. 

Can even that be justly conceded ? 

Pottinger said, Lord Auckland must be fatigued with 
the perusal of Nbor Mohamed's barefaced falsehoods, and 
unblushing assertions of firm devoted friendship. It was 
certainly necessary to name the Ameer, lest doubt should 
arise as to which side the words were applicable; for was 
it not with constant assurances of friendship that Lord 
Auckland gave the Ameers a right to address him thus. 

You besought us to make treaties of amity and commerce. 
We did so, and you have broken them. 

You asked for our alliance, we did not seek yours. We 
yielded to your solicitations, and you have used our kindness 
to our ruin. 

You declared yourself, without our knowledge or desire, 
our protector against a man we did not fear, our mediator in 
a quarrel which did not concern you. In return for this, 



OF SCINDE. 



55 



which you termed a favour, you demanded permanent posses- 
sion of our capital, military occupation of our country, and 
even payment for the cost of thus destroying our indepen- 
dence under the masques of friendship ! mediation ! protec- 
tion ! 

You peremptorily demanded our aid to ruin Dost Moha- 
med, who was not our enemy. And our backwardness thus 
to damage, against justice and against the interest of our 
religion, him and his nation with whom we were at peace, 
you made a, cause of deadly quarrel. 

To molify your wrath, we gave your armies a passage 
through our dominions contrary to the terms of our commer- 
cial treaties. In return, you have, with those armies, reduced 
us to a state of miserable dependence. 

Can these undeniable facts be justified with reference to 
national honour ? Can they be called forbearing, generous, 
moderate? Can they be justified on the ground of interna- 
tional law, of self-preservation— on that necessity which sets 
all common rules aside ? Can they even be justified by that 
necessity for aggrandizement which has been supposed in- 
herent to the peculiar nature of the British position in the 
East. 

Lord Auckland said Russia and the western Asiatic 
powers were combined to destroy British India, that the 
invasion of Afghanistan enjoined the contingent aggression 
on Scinde ; and if the latter was pushed too far the fault 
was with the Ameers, who were jointly hostile, perfidious, 
insolent and obstinate. 

But the invasion of Affghanistan was itself unwarranted 
by policy. Founded on doubtful anticipation of danger, it 
was unjust a,nd ill-judged, was commenced on false principles, 
political and military, executed with incredible absurdity, 
and terminated in a dreadful calamity which went nigh to 
shake in pieces that Indian empire it was designed to secure. 
It was not founded on any real necessity, or the danger it 
was intended to obviate would have augmented on its failure. 
It was not the result of any inherent force of circumstances 
beyond the ordinary foresight of man; no extraordinary 
genius, no far-reaching sagacity was requisite to detect the 



56 



THE CONQUEST 



fallacy of the conception, and the warning voice of England's 
great captain, whose words on such a subject should have 
had oracular weight, was raised in hope to stay the mischief. 
It was the offspring of vanity and ignorance, devoid of ex- 
pediency and public morality. And if this, the principal 
action, was neither just nor necessary, the accessory action 
against Scinde was an oppression, indefensible even though 
it had presented less odious phases during its progress. 

If the secret engagements of the Ameers with the Persians ; 
if their confederation with the Affghan chiefs of Candahar ; 
if their repeated violations of the commercial treaties ; if 
their violent insulting conduct towards the British Resident ; 
if their arrogance, their duplicity, their perfidious intentions 
deserved chastisement, they should so have been proclaimed, 
and war declared. This might have been a stern procedure, 
but not a treacherous oppression. It would have been politic 
also on military considerations to have first warred down 
Scinde: a subdued enemy would have been less dangerous 
on the communications, than a forced ally, incensed by 
injustice and of unbroken strength. 

Why were the Ameers' territories fastened on to have a 
long, circuitous, unsafe line, when short and safe lines were 
to be had in the Punjaub ? Runjeet Sing profited largely 
by the tripartite treaty, and was to have share of the spoil 
anticipated from the plunder of the Barrukzies. Hence it 
would have been nothing unreasonable to have demanded a 
base of operations in his dominions. If he refused, a quarrel 
would have been legitimate, and more profitable than with 
the Ameers — but Runjeet was wily, and powerful enough to 
give trouble ; the Ameers were despised, and supposed to be 
rich. Fear and cupidity ! these were the springs of action. 
Sir Alexander Burnes had said their treasury contained 
twenty millions sterling. — u The Ameers may be supposed 
wealthy," was one of the earliest intimations given by Lord 
Auckland to Pottinger. 

The armies passed onwards to Affghanistan, the subsi- 
diary force entered Scinde, and the political obligations of 
its rulers became totally changed. The original injustice 
remained in all its deformity; but when sanctioned by a 



OF SCINDE. 



57 



treaty, without public protest or stroke in battle, became 
patent as the rule of policy, and new combinations involving 
great national interests were thus imposed on Lord Auckland's 
successor, demanding a different measure of right from that 
which existed previously. For amongst the many evils at- 
tendant on national injustice is the necessity of sustaining a 
wrongful policy, thus implicating honest men in transactions 
the origin of which they condemn. Some abstract moralists 
inculcate indeed, that governments stand in the same re- 
lation to each other that private persons do in a community ; 
and as leaders and guides of nations, should be governed by 
the same rules as leaders and guides of families. It would 
be well for the world were this practicable. But when 
private persons wrong each other there are tribunals to 
enforce reparation; or they may voluntarily amend the 
wrong. Apply this to nations. Their tribunal is war. 
Every conquest, every treaty, places them on a new basis of 
intercourse. The first injustice remains a stigma on the 
government perpetrating it; but for succeeding govern- 
ments new combinations are presented, which may and ge- 
nerally do make it absolute for self-preservation, and therefore 
justifiable, not only to uphold but to extend what was at first 
to be con denm ed. 

Scinde is a striking illustration of this truth. The Affghan 
invasion being perpetrated, the safety of the troops engaged 
imperatively required that Scinde should continue to be 
occupied, and the treaties with the Ameers enforced. Say 
the Affghan armies ought rather to have been withdrawn, 
and two scores of injustice wiped off together. Was it 
possible? If possible, would it not have been imputed to 
fear, to weakness, to any thing but an abstract sense of 
justice? Nations, especially in the East, are neither so 
pure nor so frank as to greet virtue in a state garb. Wrong 
they are ever ready .to offer to others, wrong they ever 
expect ; and when it fails to arrive, opportunity favourable, 
they despise the forbearance as a folly. To have abandoned 
Afghanistan without redeeming the character of British 
strength, would have been the signal for universal com- 
motion, if not of insurrection, throughout India. The having 



58 



THE CONQUEST 



abandoned it at all led to the Scindian war, which was an 
inevitable consequence of the flagitious folly of the first 
enterprise. 

One alleviation for this otherwise unmitigated trans- 
gression against Scinde remains, and it is a great one. It 
was not perpetrated against a people but their rulers, and 
they were bad, indescribably bad. Oppressors themselves 
they were oppressed by stronger power. They were tyrants, 
without pity or remorse, and without pity their fall should 
be recorded. Their people gained as they lost ; the honour 
of England suffered, yet humanity profited; the British 
camps and stations offered asylums to thousands who would 
otherwise have led a life of misery. Yet this palliation, 
amidst so much to condemn, was incidental, and cannot be 
pleaded by Lord Auckland, because the treaties expressly 
resigned the people to the cruelty of their rulers. 

The invasion of Afghanistan presents no such redeeming 
accompaniment. It was undertaken to force a proud tyrant 
on a people who detested him ; and being conducted without 
ability, terminated in disaster so dire as to fill the mind with 
horror — enforcing what cannot be too often repeated, that 
incapacity and vanity are, in great enterprises of war, 
tantamount to wickedness. 

Colonel Pottinger, created a baronet, continued Resident 
in Scinde until the beginning of 1840. He was then re- 
placed in the lower country by Major Outram, having been 
previously relieved in the upper country by Mr. Ross Bell. 
His negotiations offer noticeable points of character. His 
natural feelings of justice, breaking out at the sight of Shah 
Sooja's receipts for a debt which he was again demanding at 
the head of an army; his reprobation of the Welleshtf s attack 
on Kurrachee, and his frequent exhortations to treat the 
people gently, are in strong contrast with his assertions as to 
British loyalty and forbearance, good- faith, and moderation 
in political acts, which no sophistry can palliate. Nor is 
the deference he recommended for the tyrannical pleasures 
of the Ameers, while he took away their real rights, less 
curious. Treating of their jShikargahs, or hunting preserves, 
he acknowledged they had formed them by turning, within 



OF SCTNDE. 



59 



a few years, 'a fourth of the fertile peopled land into a wil- 
derness ; and that they were still persistent in that devas- 
tating career, one of them having recently destroyed two 
large villages to make a Shikargah for his son, only eight 
years old ! and all declaring that their hunting was dearer to 
them than their wives and children — acknowledging all this, 
he nevertheless desired that their hunting might be re- 
spected, because the ancient forest laws of the Normans 
were equally pernicious ! And while thus recurring to the 
most cruel oppression of the worst period of English history, 
as a guide for Lord Auckland and an excuse for the Ameers, 
he recommended a conciliating and protective policy towards 
the people ! 



60 



THE CONQUEST 



CHAPTER IV. 

The mutations of the Affghan war, and the hostility of 
Merab, Prince of Khelat, encouraged the Ameers to intrigue 
secretly against the British; the death of Merab, whose 
capital was stormed, and himself killed by General Wiltshire, 
coupled with internal dissensions in Scinde, forbad any open 
effort in 1839. But in 1840, the Brahooes rose for the son 
of Merab and defeated several British detachments ; the 
Murrees, a tribe of the Cutchee hills, were also driven by 
British injustice to insurrection; the son and grandson of 
Runjeet Sing died in quick succession, the Punjaub was in 
wild commotion, and then the Ameers thus spoke in their 
secret councils. 

"It is good to combine with other powers, because the 
British Government is surrounded by enemies, because it 
fears insurrection in India, and is lax in its rule over neigh- 
bouring states ; but it is difficult, because its rule is rigid in 
Scinde, and we are divided and quarrelling. If we could all 
unite it would be well." 

At the time these councils were held, Dost Mohamed 
returned to Affghanistan at the head of an Usbeg army; 
British detachments had been cut off in the Cutchee hills, 
and the general aspect of affairs was menacing. But 
then Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor was at enmity with the 
Hydrabad Ameers about a boundary line, and was anxious 
for a treaty with the British on the same terms as Sob- 
dar, who was his friend. In Upper Scinde, Moobarick 
had died, disputes arose about his possessioDS, and union 
amongst the Ameers was impossible. Soon Colonel Dennie 
won the battle of Bamean, the Dost surrendered himself, and 
it became known that a Russian expedition against Khiva had 
totally failed. Reinforcements then entered Scinde, and a 
strong British force was gathered on the Upper Sutlege to 



OF SCINDE. 



61 



watch the Punjaub. In this state of affairs the^ Ameers, 
seeing ten thousand men at their palace gate avoided open 
offence. 

Noor Mohamed died towards the end of the year, his last 
act being to claim the British protection for his brother 
Nusseer, and his youngest son Hoossein, against the machi- 
nations of his eldest son Shadad, a man incredibly brutal and 
wicked. He protested also in his last moments that his 
friendship and alliance with the English, since the treaty, 
had been sincere. This declaration was certainly a legitimate 
ratification of that treaty, and the other Ameers confirmed 
it soon after his death by seeking the arbitration of the 
Governor-General on the boundary dispute with Shere 
Mohamed. This last named Prince's desire to treat would 
have been another confirmation, if it had been frankly met ; 
but the Anglo-Indian Government, and its agent Major 
Outram, true to the spoliating policy of the first negotia- 
tions, rendered that which might have borne the grace of a 
voluntary contract on one side and a favour on the other, a 
rapacious injustice. 

Shere Mohamed asked to be treated as Sobdar had been, 
but a heavy fine was demanded for the alliance ; and when he 
sought to lessen the sum by undervaluing his possessions, it 
was called a crime ! Hitherto he had enjoyed a nominal 
independence ; now Major Outram, while admitting that pos- 
session and right were with Mohamed in the boundary dispute, 
recommended that a fixed tribute should be demanded by the 
British, under pain of letting the Hydrabad Ameers loose, 
with an intimation, that if he proved too strong they would 
be aided, and his losses would not be confined to the disputed 
territory. And this expressly to lower his opinion of his own 
importance ! Such a compendious negotiation produced imme- 
diate acquiescence, and was called able diplomacy ! Shere 
Mohamed paid fifty thousand rupees yearly for the favour of 
British arbitration and protection. The arbitration then went 
on, and at the same time the chiefs of tribes were assured of 
their feudal possessions. 

Every governing power having now in turn voluntarily 
accepted the treaties, by demanding protection against native 



62 



THE CONQUEST 



opponents, the legal force of those instruments increased ; 
they had lasted two years, and furnishing, as they did, asy- 
lums in the British stations to oppressed multitudes, they had 
also acquired that secondary moral force which belongs to 
utility, irrespective of abstract justice. But the Ameers, 
while apparently submissive sought to evade their tribute, 
and Lord Auckland, thinking cession of territory more sure 
and profitable, coveted Shikarpoor, the largest city of Scinde, 
decayed indeed from the tyranny of the Ameers but pro- 
mising with better government to recover its former impor- 
tance : and it was advantageously placed on the line of 
communication with Afghanistan. The Ameers assented to 
the cession in discharge of tribute, and the British thus gained 
three permanent military stations in Upper Scinde ; namely, 
Sukkur, Bukkur, and Shikarpoor. The first, having an 
entrenched camp, was on the right bank of the Indus ; the 
second, on a rock in the middle of that river ; the third, 
twenty miles to the north-west of Sukkur, on the high road 
to the Bolan pass. In Lower Scinde they also held Kur- 
rachee, the only good port : thus the Ameers' candle was 
burning at both ends. 

About the middle of 1841, died Mr. Ross Bell, who as 
political agent, had governed Upper Scinde and Beloochistan 
with unbounded power; but under his sway insurrections 
had occurred amongst the Booghtees and Murree tribes, 
occasioned, it is said, by his grinding oppression, accompanied 
with acts of particular and of general treachery, followed by 
military execution, bloody and desolating, involving whole 
districts in ruin. He was in constant dispute with the mili- 
tary officers, and has been described as a man of vigorous 
talent, resolute, unhesitating, devoid of public morality, and 
vindictive ; of domineering pride, and such luxurious pomp, 
that seven hundred camels, taken from the public service, 
were required to carry his personal baggage. That his con- 
duct was neither wise nor just, seems a correct inference from 
the results of his administration, but Lord Auckland approved 
of it, and regretted his loss ; the story of the camels is an 
exaggerated statement , and the general accusations have been 
principally promulgated by Dr. Buist, of the Bombay Times, 



OF SCINDE. 



63 



whose word, for praise or blame, is generally false and always 
despicable. 

Mr. Bell's functions were transferred to Major Outram, 
who thus became political agent for the whole of .Scinde and 
Beloochistan. • Tranquillity in the latter country was obtained 
by the cessation of oppression. Lord Auckland restored the 
son of Merab to his father's dignity, which contented the 
Brahooes, and allayed the excitement of the Ameers, who 
were connected by marriage with Merab's family : not that 
his misfortunes had been deeply felt by them, but the termi- 
nation of hostilities in Beloochistan released a large British 
force for action in Scinde. 

This quietude continued until the Cabool calamity, in the 
beginning of 1842, shook the reputation of British power 
throughout the neighbouring nations, disturbed all India, and 
excited the smouldering fire of revenge with the Ameers. 
Nusseer Khan was now considered the head of that fraternity. 
Secret communications between him and Sawan Mull, the 
Seik chief of Moultan, were detected by the political agents, 
and the suspicion thus awakened, was increased by like 
communications between Roostum of Kyrpoor, and Shere 
Sing, then Maharajah of the Punjaub, and falsely supposed 
to be less friendly to the British alliance than his predecessor 
Runjeet. The Ameer's officers behaved vexatiously, a sure 
sign, and Roostum repelled remonstrance haughtily, assuming 
an unusual tone of independence as to the cession of Shi- 
karpoor, for which no treaty had yet been executed: the delay 
being however with the British authorities. Outram accused 
the Ameer of mean shuffling on this occasion, yet himself 
directed his assistant, Postans, to give Roostum hopes of 
keeping Shikarpoor by the use of ambiguous language, such 
as would leave the Governor-General a right to reject or 
insist on the agreement, according to the profit which it might 
promise ! But a new era was now commencing, Lord Auck- 
land quitted India, leaving it in all the confusion, terror, and 
danger, necessarily flowing from the political immorality and 
•astounding incapacity which had marked his mischievous 
government. And if any man, not blinded by party preju- 
dices, shall doubt the correctness of the picture of Whig 



64 



THE CONQUEST 



oppression and folly painted in the foregoing pages, let him 
read and compare all the Parliamentary papers on the subject 
and he will doubt no longer. 

Lord Ellenborough, the new Governor -General, arrived 
too late to prevent, yet in time to remedy the most dan- 
gerous evils menacing India from his predecessor's impolicy, 
which he denounced in a vigorous proclamation designed as a 
warning to future governors. The beacon burned bright, and 
the flame spreading wide scorched some whose cries have 
never ceased. Previous to his coming, the ship was rocking 
in the shallows, but when his strong hand was felt she ceased 
to strike, and answering to the helm was steered into deep 
water. Nevertheless, those men whose political iniquity 
brought India to the verge of ruin, are now, with incredible 
effrontery, imputing their own crimes and absurdities to him, 
especially in what relates to Scinde. His share in the sub- 
sequent transactions in that country shall therefore be exactly 
stated, and judgment left to the common sense of mankind. 

He found the public mind confused with terror by the 
Cabool catastrophe, the surrender of Ghusni, the blockade of 
Candahar, and the seeming inability of General Pollock to 
relieve Jellallabad. Colonel England was, soon afterwards, 
defeated by an inferior force at Hykulzie and fell back to 
Quettah, leaving General Nott, as it was supposed, to certain 
destruction. 

He found the finances embarrassed, the civil and political 
services infested with men greedy of gain, gorged with inso- 
lence, disdaining work, and intimately connected with the 
infamous press of India, which they supplied with official 
secrets, receiving in return shameful and shameless support : 
for, thus combining, they thought to control the Governor- 
General and turn the resources of the State to their sordid 
profit. 

He found the military depressed in spirit, and deprived of 
their just allowances ; the hard-working soldier oppressed, the 
idle vapourer encouraged, discipline attainted, and the mili- 
tary correspondents of the newspapers, assuming, falsely it is 
to be hoped, the title of officers, constantly proclaiming sen- 
timents without an indication of honour or patriotism. 



OP SCINDE. 



65 



Amidst these difficulties he steered as became a brave 
man, conscious of danger and of his own resources to meet it. 
His first effort was to stay fear on one side and rising hopes 
on the other, by a manifesto of his views, in which a vigorous 
determination was apparent. This proclamation of silence as 
it were, suspended the general confusion, and gave time to 
combine military operations, for teaching exulting frontier 
nations that England's strength was not to be safely 
measured by recent misfortunes. Lord Auckland's policy 
had been unjust, wicked, and foolish towards those nations ! 
But was Lord Ellenborough therefore in the very crisis of 
evil, nicely to weigh the oppressions of his predecessor ? Was 
he to set aside all combinations flowing from that prede- 
cessor's impolicy ? Was he who had undertaken to save the 
Indian empire to bend before victorious barbarians, deprecate 
their wrath, cheer them in their dreadful career by acknow- 
ledging their anger to be legitimate ? Was he to encourage 
their revengeful passions, and foment the hopes of other 
powers eager for war, by a humility which could only appear 
to them weakness ? The safety of the empire was to be 
secured : England was not to sink because Lord Auckland 
was unwise. 

Lord Ellenborough saw clearly and struck boldly; but 
widely different was his method from that of his predecessor. 
In Scinde rapacity had hitherto been masked with professions 
of friendship — the tongue was soothing, the hand furtive 
and grasping. With Lord Ellenborough the tongue spake no 
deceit, but the hand was shewn in sinewy strength as a 
warning. 

Let Pottinger's instructions from Lord Auckland be com- 
pared with the following, given to Outram by Lord Ellen- 
borough — bearing in mind, that the one had no right to 
meddle with the Ameers, whereas the other stood on treaties 
acknowledged and acted upon for three years : that the first 
was ministering to an insane aggressive policy ; the second 
stimulated by the lofty ambition of saving India. 

" The Governor-General is led to think you may have 
seen reason to doubt the fidelity of one or more of the Ameers 
of Scinde. He therefore forwards three similar letters to be 



66 



THE CONQUEST 



addressed according to circumstances, and at your discretion, 
to those of the Ameers whom you may have ground for sus- 
pecting of hostile designs against the British Government. 
And you will distinctly understand, that the threat contained 
is no idle threat intended only to alarm, but a declaration of 
the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, cost 
what it may, the first chief who shall prove faithless, by the 
confiscation of his dominions. But there must be clear 
proof of such faithlessness, and it must not be provoked by 
the conduct of British agents, producing in the minds of any 
chief a belief that the British Government entertains designs 
inconsistent with its interests and honour." 

Nor were his letters to the Ameers less explicit : running 
thus : — - 

" While I am resolved to respect treaties myself, and to 
exercise the power with which I am intrusted, for the general 
good of the subjects of the British Government and of the 
several States of India, I am equally resolved to make others 
respect the engagements into which they have entered, and 
to exercise their power without injury to their neighbours. 
I should be most reluctant to believe that you had deviated 
from the course which is dictated by your engagements ; I 
will confide in your fidelity and in your friendship, until I 
have proof of your faithlessness and of your hostility in my 
hands : but be assured, if I should obtain such proofs, no 
consideration shall induce me to permit you to exercise any 
longer a power you will have abused. On the day on which 
you shall be faithless to the British Government sovereignty 
will have passed from you ; your dominions will be given to 
others, and in your destitution all India will see, that the 
British Government will not pardon an injury received from 
one it believed to be its friend." 

This declaration, by which he was guided in commencing 
the Scindian war, and by which its justice and policy must 
be measured, is not to be taken in a political sense alone. 
Commercial interests affecting the whole civilized world were 
at stake. The Indus had been by the treaties with the 
Ameers and with Runjeet Sing, made the high road of 
nations ; those treaties, preceding the political engagements, 



OF SCTNDE. 



67 



had been freely conceded, were just in themselves, obtained 
justly, and with a beneficent object : they were for the in- 
terest of mankind at large, and were not abrogated by the 
political treaties, save in the one point of not transmitting 
military stores by the Indus. 

But Lord Ellenborough' s singleness of purpose was 
evinced in several ways. Outram at this period announced 
that " he had it in his power to expose the hostile intrigues 
of the Ameers to such an extent as might be deemed sufficient 
to authorize the dictation of any terms to those chiefs, or 
any measure necessary to place British power on a secure 
footing;" and he advised the assuming the entire manage- 
ment of the Shikarpoor and Sukkur districts to render 
British power over the Indus invulnerable. This was quite 
in the spirit of aggressive policy, which was never distasteful 
to Major Outram until Lord Ellenborough deprived him of 
his political situation. This proposal was rejected: Lord 
Ellenborough looked only to future loyalty in the Ameers, 
and offered them a renewed intercourse On well-understood 
grounds. 

The great operations for restoring the British military 
reputation in Affghanistan, previous to abandoning that 
country, were now in full progress. Jellallabad had been 
succoured, the armies of Nott and Pollock directed by a 
combined movement on Cabool, and the Governor-General's 
hands being thus freed from the military fetters fastened by 
Lord Auckland, were instantly employed in choking off the 
civil and political leeches sucking the public. He broke the 
connection between official men and newspaper editors ; and, 
defying the blatant fury of the latter and the secret enmity 
of the former, he drove the unclean people from the admi- 
nistration. He restored the drooping spirit of the army by 
a vigorous protection of its honour and interests, and he put 
to flight the political agents and their assistants, who, nu- 
merous as locusts, had settled on the countries beyond the 
Indus, in numbers equalling the whole of the salaried officers 
employed for the diplomacy of all Europe ! Their vanity, 
uncontrolled power, pomp, and incapacity had contributed 
more than all other things to the recent misfortunes. 



68 



THE CONQUEST 



Wild was the uproar these reforms occasioned. All the 
rage of faction broke loose. No calumny that sordid false- 
hood could invent or cowardly anger dictate was spared: 
and when malice was at fault, folly stepped in with such 
charges as, that the Governor-General's state harness was of 
red leather ! he wore gold lace on his pantaloons ! But 
while such matters were dwelt upon, the incessant activity, 
the assiduity, the energy, the magnanimity of the man were 
overlooked. The moral courage and fortitude, which could, 
in the midst of disaster and abasement of public spirit, at 
once direct the armies to victory and purify the adminis- 
tration, which could confide in military honour while de- 
fying the vituperation of the Indian press, re-echoed by the 
scarcely more scrupulous press of England — these great and 
generous qualities were overlooked or sneered at, as well as 
the complete success they procured for the country. But 
newspapers are not history, and Lord Ellenborough's well- 
earned reputation, as an able, victorious, and honest Go- 
vernor-General, will outlive faction, its falsehoods, and 
malignant press. 

Outram withheld the Governor-General's warning letter 
to the Ameers, lest, as he said, fear should drive them and 
the chiefs of tribes to extremities, all being alike conscious of 
treasonable designs. This view of the matter was accepted 
by Lord Ellenborough, and was a convincing proof that his 
object was tranquillity, not subjugation; yet it seems an 
error, inasmuch as he should have been careful to keep his 
own manly policy clear of the crooked paths of his prede- 
cessor's. To declare oblivion for the past, to look only to 
the future, acting on a necessity which he found existing to 
bind him would have been a better course: but the error 
was one adverse to violence, a view confirmed by the tenor of 
his first dispatches. 

ei The recent engagements attendant on the restoration of 
the young Prince of Khelat, and the uncertain state of the 
war, imposed he said, the necessity of maintaining a strong 
position on the Indus in Scinde, and the power of acting on 
both sides of that river ; consequently, the continued occu- 
pation of Kurrachee to communicate with Bombay, and the 



OF SCTNDE. 



69 



occupation of Bukkur and Sukkur to insure a passage over 
the Indus, were requisite for safe intercourse with the 
British stations on the Sutlege on one side, and with the army 
at Candahar by the Bolan pass on the other. The sup- 
porting of commerce by the Indus was another great obli- 
gation ; and as his desire was to put an end, at any financial 
loss, to the system of taking tribute for protection, he pro- 
posed to exchange that to which the Ameers were liable 
by their treaties,, for permanent possession of Kurrachee, 
Bukkur and Sukkur. Protection was in most cases as much 
the interest of the British Government to afford, as it was 
the interest of the protected state to receive ; but however 
equable in principle the bargain might be in practice, it 
could not fail to affect amity, to raise disagreeable dis- 
cussions, and to make the British officers employed appear 
odious extortioners in the eyes of the people, who were taxed 
to pay the tribute, and oppressed by other exactions made 
under pretence of that tribute. Territory, therefore, he 
desired instead, or in place of territory, the abolition of 
duties burthensome to commerce. He was aware that, regard 
being had for the former treaties and the reciprocal obli- 
gation imposed by them, difficulties might arise, and much 
time elapse before his object could be attained, but this was 
to be the governing principle of his policy." 

Assuredly there was nothing here oppressive or unjust. 
Roostum had already consented to cede Shikarpoor to Lord 
Auckland, who had certainly contemplated the permanent 
occupation of Scinde, and no qualms of conscience then dis- 
turbed the East Indian Directors, though they have since so 
strongly expressed their disapproval of the same thing when 
done by Lord Ellenborough in a crisis which justified the 
act. It would thus appear that injustice is essential to 
render acquisition of territory palatable to the statesmen of 
Leadenhall Street ; or that they are not statesmen, but 
sordid, trading, prating persons, who adopt the amount of 
dividend, or personal irritation, as guides for the government 
of a great empire. Lord Ellenborough' s policy was wider. 
He sought to remove incentives to collision amongst the 
Ameers, to protect the oppressed people, to raise the British 



70 



THE CONQUEST 



character, and to forward the general interests of commerce 
by opening the navigation of the Indus — and those objects 
he sought by fair negotiations without menace. 

Meanwhile Outram, acting at this time with strained par- 
tisan zeal against the Ameers, and declaring that he " should 
not be sorry to afford Government grounds for making an 
example of Nusseer," diligently gathered proofs, direct and 
indirect, of the hostility of the Ameers, and grounded on 
them a proposal for a new treaty ; saying that they gave 
Lord Ellenborough a right to dictate his own terms : and in 
truth they were numerous and strong. 

1°. Intercepted letters, addressed by Nusseer of Hydra- 
bad, to the Moultan chief, and by Koostum of Kyrpoor to 
the Maharajah, Shere Sing. These he designated treason- 
able, a term difficult to understand as applied to sovereign 
princes ; but they were in violation of the eighth article of 
the treaty of 1839, which forbad the Ameers to negotiate 
with foreign chiefs or states, unless sanctioned by the British 
Government: moreover the Moultan man had collected a 
large force on the frontier of Upper Scinde under false 
pretences. 

2°. A secret confederation of the Brahooes and other 
Beloochee tribes, encouraged by the Ameers with a view to 
a general revolt against the British supremacy, if new re- 
verses in Afghanistan, which were expected, should furnish 
a favourable opportunity. The names of the chiefs and the 
plan of revolt were obtained, and the rising was to be a 
religious one. " The sword was to he drawn for IslamP 
Indeed, Colonel England's defeat at Hykulzie had so excited 
the hopes and confidence of the tribes that every thing was 
ready for a general outburst, when the relief of Jellallabad 
by General Pollock checked the movement. 

3°. Nusseer of Hydrabad and Roostum of Kyrpoor, 
formerly enemies, were become fast friends, both being go- 
verned alike by one Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the minister 
of Roostum, well known as a man of talent, intriguing, 
bigotted, and bitterly hating the British. Nusseer also, had 
endeavoured by a false accusation to have Sobdar, who ap- 
peared friendly and loyal, made to pay tribute contrary to 



OF SCINDE. 



71 



the treaty : doing this with a view to force him by such 
injustice into the general confederacy. 

4°. Nusseer had, during the previous year, proposed to 
the Seiks to drive the British away, as the Affghans had 
done, offering to assist them. 

5°. Lieutenant Gordon, employed to survey the lower 
country and the coast, discovered that several chiefs, owing 
no homage to the Ameers, had recently gone to Hydrabad 
with their followers, pretending fear of the Affghans. At 
the same time obstacles were raised to hinder the execution 
of his survey, and throughout the lower country he found a 
decided hostile spirit amongst the Beloochees— a native even 
informed him that he was to be either driven from the 
country where he could observe their preparations, or killed. 
It was known also that the hill tribes and those of the plain 
were alike ready to attack the camp at Kurrachee, when 
news of reverses in Affghanistan should arrive. 

6°. Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, had secret intercourse 
with the Seiks, and was confederate with the Moultan 
man. Sobdar of Hydrabad and Ali Moorad of Kyrpoor, 
were the only persons supposed to be faithful to their en- 
gagements. 

7°. The plan of the hostile Ameers, was to get pos- 
session of Bukkur, as all the righting would be, they said, in 
Upper Scinde, where the Kyrpoor Princes were to attack 
Ali Moorad' s villages if he did not join the confederacy ; the 
British would of course interfere, and then the Hydrabad 
troops would move up and unite to give battle. 

8°. A Persian had come with secret messages from the 
Shah to Nusseer. 

9°. There was backwardness in the payment of tribute, 
with a view to the intended outbreak, and tolls and duties 
were levied contrary to the treaties. 

Outram, grounding his proposed treaty on these hostile 
demonstrations, recommended also the taking permanent 
possession of Shikarpoor, and the overthrow of Lord Auck- 
land's policy with respect to the equality of the Ameers ; 
arguing, very justly on this point, that each Ameer evaded 
responsibility, charging it on others ; that the negotiations 



72 



THE CONQUEST 



were necessarily complicate, and every petty dispute was 
referred to the British Government when it ought to be 
settled among themselves. His proposed treaty, the pre- 
amble to which he worded very offensively for the Ameers, 
involved the cession of Bukkur, the site of the ancient 
Sukkur, and an intrenched cantonment there, in perpetuity ; 
the cession of Kurrachee in perpetuity \ free passage and 
communication for commerce between Kurrachee and the 
Indus at Tatta ; the old articles against tolls, and the right 
to cut fuel for steam navigation on each side of the river to 
a certain extent. This was the first direct proposition for 
interfering with the Ameers' " Shikar yahs," for Pottinger's 
proposal was merely to cut a way for tracking. It gave 
them infinite offence ; for they loved them better than their 
wives and children, better than their subjects' lives, better 
than their country's prosperity, better than the commerce of 
the world ! 

In return, he proposed to exonerate the Ameers from all 
arrears of debt, and from all future tribute; a boon amount- 
ing altogether to nearly half a million of rupees of annual 
tribute, and a million of arrears of debt. 

Now, if Outram and his subordinates did not forge these 
accusations, it follows that violations of the treaties, and a 
wide-spread conspiracy to destroy the British troops in 
Scinde, gave Lord Ellenborough a right to dictate new 
terms, calculated to secure the public interest. And if the 
grasping policy which has been attributed to him, really 
influenced his proceedings, the opportunity was favourable ; 
the cause of offence given of major importance, and the 
means at hand ; for Colonel England was then returning from 
Candahar, and a great army of reserve was assembling on 
the Sutlege. 

Here it is fitting to shew why that army of reserve was 
assembled. Vehemently ridiculed at the time by the Indian 
press, it was at once a proof of Lord Ellenborough' s pru- 
dence and of the infamy of that press, which was then 
vociferously devoted to the support of peculation and the 
depression of the military spirit: calumniating every man 
who displayed patriotism or useful talent, it urged the 



OF SCTNDE. 



73 



sepoys to mutiny, and incited and taught the enemy how 
and where to assail the troops with most advantage. 

When Lord Ellenborough arrived in India, there were 
30,000 Seik troops at Peshawar, and only 4000 British 
troops, of whom 1800 were in hospital. The presence of 
these Seiks gave great anxiety; and when 5000 of them ad- 
vanced, unasked and unwished for, towards Jellallabad, 
General Pollock, directed by Lord Ellenborough, persuaded 
those half hostile, turbulent men to pass to the left bank of 
the Cabool river, leaving the resources of the right bank to 
the British, with clear communications, from Jellallabad to 
Peshawar ; but when the army returned from Cabool 20,000 
Seiks followed it closely, and it was to awe them the re- 
serve was assembled on the Sutlege. For though Shere Sing 
was friendly to the British his Sirdars were hostile, and nota- 
bly so those of the Sindhawalla family, by whom he was after- 
wards assassinated. Dhian Sing, his minister, urged him to 
fall on Pollock while traversing the Punjaub, and that ex- 
pressly " because the Indian press had told him the British 
tneaned to attack the Seiks:' Shere Sing, relying on Lord 
Ellenborough's good faith, was by the presence of the army 
of reserve enabled to resist Dhian' s proposal, but he after- 
wards strongly stated to the foreign secretary, who visited 
him at Lahore, the great embarrassments caused in dealing 
with his chiefs and soldiers by the unprincipled falsehood 
of the Anglo-Indian press. 

Outram's counsel and proposed treaty were rejected by 
Lord Ellenborough, who condemned the offensive tone as- 
sumed by that agent, and rejected the cession of Shikarpoor : 
but repeating his determination to punish faithlessness, he 
intimated his wish to restore the district of Subzulcote and 
Bhoong-Barra to the Bhawal Khan, from whom they had 
been wrested forcibly thirty years before by Roostum and 
his brother Ameers. He did not however, put forward any 
pretence of abstract justice to overrule the speciality of the 
case ; but simply to give effect to his avowed resolution to 
punish bad faith and reward fidelity. Yet he did not posi- 
tively decide that it should be so, and disclaimed any desire 
for hasty change in the political relations with the Ameers ; 



74 



THE CONQUEST 



for he had then hope that the operations of Nott and 
Pollock, and the return of Col. England's column, would 
restrain their disposition to be hostile. 

Fresh offences dissipated this hope, and shewed the mis- 
chief of Outram's meddling as to the warning letters : their 
delivery would certainly Have checked the Ameers, and could 
not as Outram supposed have hastened an outbreak, be- 
cause, although their resolution was fixed to regain indepen- 
dence, their preparations varied as the mutations of the 
Affghan war gave them hopes or fears. Now, unwarned, 
they pushed their secret practices, and one Mohamed Shur- 
reef, a Syud, acting in their views, and conjoined with 
Mohamed Sadig, an Affghan, were stirring up the Cutchee 
hill tribes to war on the British communications with Can- 
dahar; but the capture of Shurreef by stratagem caused 
Sadig to fly, and stopped the outbreak. The expectation of 
it had however, excited all the hopes and arrogance of the 
Ameers. They interrupted the navigation of the Indus, 
fired on traffic boats, exacted tolls contrary to treaty, and 
even sentenced merchants and traders who had built houses 
and established shops in the British cantonment of Kurra- 
chee to have their goods confiscated, and their houses pulled 
down. This was barbarous as well as hostile, for all the 
British stations were crowded with persons flying from the 
Ameers' tyranny. The reviving commerce of the country 
was indeed odious to them when thus protected from their 
exactions — " We do not choose to let our subjects trade with 
the British, and the fifth article of treaty forbids any in- 
terference between us." 

This was a subtle plea, yet fallacious, because it was not 
a dispute between the Ameers and their subjects, but an act 
of hostility against the British, who were thus isolated like 
an infected people : indeed, the Ameers designated them as 
a " 'pestilence in the land" 

Shurreef 's capture and Sadig' s flight only checked the 
Ameers for a moment, and they were again excited by 
Nott's advance from Candahar, considered by them a forced 
abandonment of that important place. And though he 
afterwards destroyed Ghusni, and in conjunction with Pol- 



OF SCINDE. 



75 



lock ruined Istalif and Cabool, the apparently hurried re- 
treat from Afghanistan which followed, bore for these 
misjudging people the character of a flight. The Scindian 
Beloochees and Brahooes became then more confident, and 
the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde consulted how best 
to league against the Feringees.' Seik vakeels were at 
Kyrpoor, ready to start for Lahore loaded with presents for 
the Maharajah; and at the same time letters came from the 
victorious Affghans to remind the Ameers they were feuda- 
tories of the Dooranee Empire, and exhorting them to act 
boldly in the common cause. 

Outram's political agency now ceased. It was not Lord 
Ellenborough's policy to divide power between military and 
political chiefs ; nor to place the former lowest when war was 
at hand— hence the removal of Outram was a consequence 
of Scinde being under a general. But there were other 
causes for dismissing him. His capacity was found to be 
mean, and the Governor-General had been compelled to 
withdraw all confidence from him for a specific offence affect- 
ing the public honour. He was also offensive from his 
habitual pertinacious urgency of his own views and opinions 
without any supporting ability to recommend them. He was 
dismissed, and Sir C. Napier took the entire charge of Scinde 
and its troubled affairs. The clamour of many tongues 
was immediately raised, as if a man of incredible genius 
and unmatched services had been removed from a country 
where he alone could guide events to a happy conclusion. 

Outram himself publicly declared that his policy in 
Scinde was productive of beneficial results, and that his 
removal would produce deplorable consequences ; but no 
facts bore out this announcement ; his superior genius was 
nowhere to be found except in the columns of a despicable 
Indian newspaper, to whose proprietors it was said he owed 
money. Sir C. Napier indeed, misled at first by his vaunting 
tales of his own exploits, offered him a glowing compliment 
at a public dinner when he quitted Scinde, and generously 
obtained permission to recall him to service there ; but these 
things were only the measure of the General's liberality, not 
of Outram's ability, and they were responded to by gross 
public follies, private treachery, and persevering calumny. 



76 



THE CONQUEST 



CHAPTER V. 

At Sukkur Sir C. Napier found the following in- 
structions, reiterating Lord Ellenborough's policy. 

" Should any Ameer or chief, with whom we have a 
treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs 
against us during the late events, which may have induced 
them to doubt the continuance of our power, it is the pre- 
sent intention of the Governor-General to inflict upon the 
treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment 
as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct ; but 
the Governor-General would not proceed in this course with- 
out the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in 
the person accused. The Governor-General relies entirely 
on your sense of justice, and is convinced that whatever 
reports you may make upon the subject, after full investi- 
gation, will be such as he may safely act upon." 

Written in September, four months after the warning 
letter to the Ameers, and after receiving Outram's reports 
of their hostile proceedings with his opinion that the Go- 
vernor-General might dictate any terms, this dispatch shews 
how entirely adverse Lord Ellenborough was to violent pro- 
cedure against the rulers of Scinde. Necessity forced him 
to be stern in maintenance of actual engagements, but his 
desire was to forward by peaceful means a mutually bene- 
ficial intercourse ; his ultimate object being, as he said in 
another place, ie the establishment of unrestricted trade 
between all the countries of the Indus the sea and the 
Himalayas." He threw the moral responsibility of military 
action upon the General, and not unreasonably. Deep 
therefore is the feeling of truth with which the proofs of 
that General's unsullied honour and humanity are now re- 
corded ; for he went not to work shackled and bound as a 
mere executive officer ; he had a wide discretion, and an 
awful charge upon his conscience from a confiding superior 



OE SCINDE. 



77 



to do what was right and just according to the light afforded 
him. Whether he responded with a worthy spirit, or dis- 
closed sordid sanguinary feelings as prating politicians 
and writers infamous in their declamation have asserted, let 
mankind decide upon the facts now to be related— and the 
deity he will be found invoking aloud from the midst of the 
dead after battle will decide hereafter. 

It has been shewn how, amidst their splendid flattery 
at Hydrabad, Sir C. Napier warned the Ameers that it 
would thenceforth be unsafe to break their engagements. 
The offences he specified were, the levying of duties at the 
port on goods going to the British cantonment ; of tolls on 
the river, of the isolating the British station by driving their 
subjects from the bazaar. The first was a violation of the 
XII and XIII articles of the treaty of 1839. The second 
an infraction of XI article. The last was a breach of the 
first article, of the preamble, and of the whole spirit of the 
treaty, which professed amity and free intercourse, and 
was of deep interest. The Ameers justified this by re- 
ference to article V, which forbad the British Govern- 
ment to receive complaints from the Ameers' subjects. 
The General met the subterfuge, by shewing that the charge 
came from the British authorities, not from the Ameers' sub- 
jects. To this they could not reply, but as to the tolls they 
drew a nice distinction. It was true, tolls were not to be 
levied, yet that applied only to foreigners. And when the 
words of the article, precise and positive, making no such 
distinction, were shewn to them they answered, we did not 
understand it so or we should have opposed an article de- 
priving us of revenue without any explanation. 

Practically they had levied those tolls without hindrance 
up to 1840, and though Outram then opposed the practice, 
he advocated the Ameers' view of the matter with Lord 
Auckland, in opposition to Pottinger who made the treaty, 
and had, through the native agent and the English assist- 
ants, insisted on the text of the treaty being the rule. Mr. 
Ross Bell also had denied the Ameers' interpretation. Out- 
ram indeed discovered, or rather said he had discovered, that 
the native political agent had intercepted Pottinger's com- 



78 



THE CONQUEST 



munications : he therefore pertinaciously urged the Ameers' 
view ; supporting his arguments with Benjamin Franklin's 
authority, viz. — " That no objects of trade warranted the spill- 
ing of blood, — that commerce is to be extended by the cheapness 
and goodness of commodities,— that the profit of no trade could 
equal the expense of compelling it by fleets and armies." Sound 
maxims curiously miscomprehended. There was no forcing 
of commerce ; it was a simple question of duties under 
treaty. Franklin meaned that nations cannot be forced to 
trade ; nor to abandon trade, and that to use force is wicked 
and foolish. Here some four or five barbarous despots were 
to be restrained from injuring trade. Outram's pedantry 
and logic were misapplied. 

But the most notable circumstance attending this dis- 
pute was the glaring inutility of the political agents. 
Largely paid, numerous, and lauded for some occult masonic 
knowledge of Eastern people, which only the initiated could 
understand, they were deceived, baffled, laughed at by their 
own native agent, and by the barbarian Ameers alike— not 
once, or for a moment, but constantly, and upon an important 
article of a treaty negotiated by themselves : a treaty affect- 
ing the commerce of the Indus, the main object of their 
diplomacy ! At the end of three years this vital point was 
still a subject of dispute! To write long letters in self- 
praise ; to describe the dress of one Prince, the compliments 
of another, the feasts of a third ; to be the hero of a news- 
paper, to have innumerable clerks for writing nonsense ; to 
employ hundreds of camels to carry personal baggage, to 
let the real business of the state slip from their hands, and 
then call for an army to pick it up— this was to be a political 
agent : one who " knew the people." 

Lord Ellenborough was more than justified in his sweep- 
ing reform : and it was the mischievous effect of the loose 
diplomacy employed, that induced Sir C. Napier to assume 
a frank and stern tone of remonstrance from the first, as 
more befitting the dignity of such a powerful Government 
as the Anglo-Indian. He knew that though morals and 
customs differ, man is intrinsically the same and governed 
by his passions : wherefore he held it shameful to tempt 



OF SCINDE. 



79 



the Ameers by infirmity of purpose to display arrogance 
when the Governor- General was ready to bare the sword in 
vengeance. 

They had however been excited by an unsteady diplo- 
macy to offensive acts, and he was to make a faithful report 
of their misdeeds. This he effected twelve days after his 
arrival at Sukkur ; sending a list of overt acts more or less 
grave, but all proving a design for war when opportunity 
should offer. Supported by evidence, as good as could be 
obtained where the secret machinations of princes who had 
the power and the will to destroy those who informed against 
them were to be laid open, this list amply warranted the 
imposition of a fresh treaty. 

Against Roostum of Kyrpoor was proved — secret inter- 
course with foreign states, contrary to treaty and hostile to 
the British ; maltreatment of British public servants ; ob- 
structing the navigation of the Indus ; illegal imprisonment 
of British subjects, and by the agency of his minister, aid- 
ing the escape of Mohamed Shurreef, a public enemy. 

Against Nusseer of Hydrabad — the assembling of troops 
to attack Shere Mohamed of Meerpoor, upon a boundary 
dispute which had been referred to the British arbitration ; 
perfidiously inveigling the assistant political agent to meddle 
privately in a dispute between the Ameer and his subjects, 
and then charging this, his own act, against the British 
Government as a breach of treaty ; repeated wilful violations 
of the eleventh article of the treaty, with an avowed deter- 
mination to set it aside ; delaying the transfer of Shikar- 
poor when he heard of the disasters in Afghanistan; 
secretly coining base money to defraud the British Govern- 
ment in the payment of tribute; exacting illegal tolls, 
refusing to refund, and obstructing the navigation and com- 
merce of the Indus ; opposing the free supply of the bazaar 
at Kurrachee, and preventing his subjects from settling and 
trading in the British cantonment ; employing troops to 
menace the possession of another Ameer when the dispute 
had been referred to the British authorities, thus violating 
the third article of the treaty, which guaranteed to each 
Ameer his separate dominions —neglect of tribute, and 



80 



THE CONQUEST 



finally exciting by letter, Beebruck, the chief of the Boogh- 
tee tribe, to take up arms against the British troops, who 
were he said, retreating worsted from Khorassan, the Per- 
sian name for Affghanistan. 

These offences had been continued from early in 1841, 
up to September 1842, shewing a settled enmity ; and at 
the very moment of Sir C. Napier's arrival at Sukkur, Nus- 
seer and Roostum, contracted a secret alliance and confede- 
racy, offensive and defensive, against the British power. 
They sought to draw Ali Moor ad into their views, they pre- 
pared to send away their wives and children, they collected 
troops, enlisted many of the Affghans who had followed 
England's column from Quettah, issued instructions to all 
their feudatory chiefs to be in readiness to take the field, and 
held councils with the chiefs of the Murrees and other tribes. 
The English troops, they said, were so weak miserable and 
sickly they could not resist : and if they were healthy, " had 
they not been driven from Affghanistan ! Let the priests 
therefore, proclaim a religious war against the Feringee 
caffirs ! When they went against Khorassan and Oabool, 
they made us promise three lacs of rupees yearly for tribute. 
Now they have been driven from thence, and we have an 
answer ready when the money is demanded ! " 

Here were ample grounds for a resort to force. Did 
Lord Ellenborough seize the opportunity ? Did his General 
advise him to do so ? The answer to these questions will 
place their conduct in a true lights each on its own pedestal, 
for their distinct position must always be kept in view. 

Lord Ellenborough knew all the odious process by which 
the treaties, giving him the right to resent these hostile 
measures of the Ameers were obtained. The General knew 
nothing of them, the official correspondence explaining them 
was not then published ; he could not suspect its nature ; 
he could not ask for it, nor would it have been given to him 
if he had. He could only look at the treaties as contracts 
voluntarily made, and which he was in Scinde to uphold, 
both as a political agent and as a military officer. He saw 
friendship, alliance, and protection accepted by the weaker 
power ; with the promotion of trade, commerce and naviga- 



OF SCINDE. 



81 



tion, and the improvement of the people's condition. He 
saw those people, of all classes, crowding into the British 
cantonments to avoid the grinding exactions and barbarous 
tyranny of rulers, who, debauched and ignorant, were tramp- 
ling down with the hoofs of wild beasts one fourth of the 
fertile land which should have fed starving multitudes. It 
was with this suffering and wickedness on one side, this pro- 
mise of remedy on the other before his eyes, that Sir C. 
Napier made that report to Lord Ellenborough which was 
to determine the latter' s course of action. 

But Lord Ellenborough' s right to act must be considered, 
or there can be no just judgment. It was the right of neces- 
sity, the right of self-preservation, a necessity he had not 
produced, but had found. In that consists the justice of his 
course, which would otherwise have been but a continuation 
of Lord Auckland's aggressive policy : with this palliation, 
that Lord Ellenborough sought no aggrandisement, put forth 
no mocking pretensions of friendship to cover injustice. 
Standing on treaties concluded, he pursued the general in- 
terests of humanity, disregarding only the conventional rights 
of besotted tyrants, men who themselves trampled upon all 
rights, and were ever ready, sword in hand, to take from 
their neighbours. 

The origin of the Scindian war being thus placed on a 
sound basis for fair discussion, the following view taken by 
Sir C. Napier will be more readily appreciated. 

"It is not for me to consider how we came to occupy 
Scinde, but to consider the subject as it now stands. We are 
here by right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and 
therefore stand on the same footing as themselves ; for rights 
held under treaty are as sacred as the right which sanctions 
that treaty. There does not appear any public protest 
registered against the treaties by the Ameers, they are there- 
fore to be considered as free expressions of the will of the 
contracting parties. 

" The English occupy Shikarpoor, Bukkur, and Kur- 
rachee by treaties, which, if rigidly adhered to by the 
Ameers, would render those Princes more rich and powerful, 
and their subjects more happy than they now are. If stick- 



82 



THE CONQUEST 



lers for abstract right maintain — as no doubt they will — that 
to prevent a man from doing mischief is to enslave him, then 
it may be called hard to enforce a rigid observance of these 
treaties. But the evident object of the treaties is to favour 
our Indian interests, by abolishing barbarism and amelio- 
rating the condition of society, by obliging the Ameers to do, 
in compliance with those treaties, that which honourable and 
civilized rulers would do of their own accord. It is necessary 
to keep this in view, because though the desire to do good 
would not sanction a breach of treaty, it does sanction the 
exacting a rigid adherence to the treaties by the Ameers ; 
and the more so that their infractions of them evinces the 
barbarism of those Princes, their total want of feeling for their 
subjects, and their own unfitness to govern a country. These 
things must be kept in mind, or what I am about to say will 
appear unjust, which is not the case. 

" By treaty, the time for which we may occupy our 
present camps is unlimited ; but there is such hostility to us 
on the part of the Ameers, such a hatred of the treaties, 
such a resolution to break them in every way — there is 
amongst their people such a growing attachment to British 
rule, that the question arises, whether we shall abandon the 
interests of humanity and those of the British Government, 
which in this case are one, and at once evacuate Scinde, or 
take advantage of existing treaties and maintain our camps 
permanently ? 

"If we evacuate the country, future events will inevitably 
bring us back to the banks of the Indus. If we remain, our 
camps will soon be filled with the Ameers' subjects flying 
from oppression. These camps will quickly grow into towns, 
and the people within them will carry on a transit trade along 
the Indus, to the exclusion of the subjects of the Ameers 
without. Among the latter misery and poverty will sojourn, 
for the exactions of the Ameers will in a great measure 
destroy both commerce and agriculture among their people. 

" This produces another question : can such a state of 
things long continue? A government hated by its subjects, 
despotic, hostile alike to the interests of the English and of 
its own people ; a government of low intrigue, and so con- 



OF SCTNDE. 83 

stituted that it must in a few years fall to pieces by the vice 
of its construction — will not such a government maintain 
an incessant petty hostility against us ? Will it not inces- 
santly commit breaches of treaties, those treaties by which 
alone we have any right to remain in this country and must 
therefore rigidly uphold. ? I conceive such a state of political 
relations cannot last, the more powerful government will at 
no distant period swallow up the weaker. Would it not be 
better to come to the results at once ? I think it would be 
better, if it can be done with honesty. Let me then consider 
how we might go to work on a matter so critical, and whether 
the facts to which I have called your attention will bear me 
out in what I propose. 

" Several Ameers have broken treaty in the various 
instances stated in the accompanying ' Return of Complaints,'' 
I have maintained that we want only a fair pretext to coerce 
the Ameers ; and I think these various acts recorded give 
abundant reason to take Kurrachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Shikar- 
poor, and Subzulcote for our own, and for obliging the 
Ameers to leave a track way along both banks of the Indus. 
Stipulating for a supply of wood, but at the same time remit- 
ting all tribute, and arrears of tribute, in favour of those 
Ameers, whose conduct has been correct ; and finally, entering 
into a fresh treaty with one of those Princes alone as chief. I 
cannot think such a procedure would be dishonourable or 
harsh. I am sure it would be humane. The refractory 
Ameers break the treaty to gratify their avarice, and we 
punish that breach. I perceive no injustice. 

"If it be determined to keep Sukkur and Bukkur, I think 
it would not be politic to give up Shikarpoor. The town of 
Sukkur stands on an elbow of the Indus, which surrounds 
the town on two sides ; on the other two, at about four miles 
distance, it is closed in by a large jungle, through which 
passes the road to Shikarpoor where the jungle finishes. If 
we evacuate Shikarpoor, the robber tribes will descend from 
the hills and establish themselves in the jungle, Sukkur will 
be blockaded, and no one be able to move beyond the chain 
of sentries without being murdered. To clear this jungle 
with infantry will be impossible ; the robbers will retreat, 



84 



THE CONQUEST 



and when the troops retire again occupy the jungle. But if 
Shikarpoor is occupied, a body of cavalry stationed there 
could spread along the outskirts of the jungle, while infantry 
would by concert push from Sukkur through the wood. The 
robbers, thus cut off from the hills, would receive such a ter- 
rible punishment as to deter other tribes from trying the 
same experiment. 

" As a commercial point, Shikarpoor is of considerable 
importance. It offers a depot for goods from the north and 
west, with the countries of which it has long possessed chan- 
nels of communication. Adverse circumstances may for a 
while interrupt these, but under a firm protecting government 
they would soon be re-opened. Shikarpoor goods would be 
then sent to Sukkur, there to be shipped on the Indus ; and 
they would also be passed by land to Larkaana, and thence 
to Kurrachee. These seem to have been formerly the lines 
of trade ; they are geographically and naturally so, and will 
therefore quickly revive. But if Shikarpoor be left to the 
mercy of the surrounding freebooters commerce cannot thrive; 
nor, without Shikarpoor be strongly guarded, can it pass 
through the jungle to Sukkur. These two towns naturally 
support each other in commerce. 

"In a political view Shikarpoor has the advantage of 
being chiefly inhabited by a Hindoo population, tolerated for 
ages by the Mussulmans, and consequently forming a pacific 
link of intercourse between us and the nations north and west. 
Through Shikarpoor these Hindoos will gradually filter the 
stream of commerce, and be the means of social intercourse 
between the Mahomedans and ourselves, in time uniting those 
who will not abruptly amalgamate. Shikarpoor contains 
many rich banking houses, which is a sure evidence of its 
being a central point of communication between surrounding 
countries, and, consequently, one where the British Govern- 
ment would learn what was going on in Asia. The money 
market is generally the best political barometer, 

"The robber tribes in the neighbourhood have kept down 
this town in despite of its natural and acquired advantages ; 
in fact, the robber is every where the master, therefore all 
around is barbarous ; and barbarous must continue to be till 



OF SCTNDE. 



85 



civilization gradually encroaches on these lawless people, and 
I think Shikarpoor is precisely one of those grand positions 
which ought to be seized in that view. I have therefore 
directed Major-General England not to evacuate that town 
till farther instructions are received from the Governor- 
General. 

" I have drawn up this memorandum entirely on my own 
consideration of the subject ; but since Major Outram's arrival, 
which took place when I had finished the last paragraph, he 
has given me every possible assistance. He concurs in all I 
have said, but, at the same time, he has added much to my 
local knowledge, and in justice to the Ameers I must, with 
this increase of information, enlarge upon what I have stated. 

cc The Ameers say, they did not understand article XI of 
the treaty to prohibit the levying of tolls on their own sub- 
jects. They urge, in proof of this misconception, that they 
resisted the treaty because of other articles less important, 
yet never objected to article XI because they relied on 
article V. This may be, and I would willingly, if possible, 
suppose that they really did conceive the treaty gave them 
tolls on their own subjects ; but they have attempted to levy 
tolls on the boats of the Khan of Bhawalpore, which the treaty 
assuredly does not give them a right to do ; and they have 
fired into the boats of merchants from Bhawalpore. The 
treaty could not have been misconstrued on these points, and 
therefore I do not believe they misconstrued article XI, but 
broke it purposely. The treaty has also been broken by 
treasonable correspondence, and other vexatious acts, as set 
forth in the return of complaints. 

"Now, what punishment do I propose for their mis- 
conduct? Injury to their family? No! Injury to their 
subjects? No! What then? The reduction of their ter- 
ritory by four places, two of which, Sukkur and Bukkur are 
barren spots, yielding no revenue ; the other two, Kurrachee 
and Shikarpoor, towns nearly ruined by their tyranny, and 
for one of which, Shikarpoor, we have negotiations pending. 
To obtain these places in seignorage, it is proposed to remit 
all tribute in arrear, and for the future withdraw our resident 
from Hydrabad, ensure the amelioration of the impoverished 



86 



THE CONQUEST 



state in which their subjects languish, and, in time, add to 
the power and wealth of the Ameers themselves by opening 
the commerce of the river. To their selfish feelings, their 
avarice andlove of hunting, ought such great general interests 
to be sacrificed ? I think not. The real interests of the Ameers 
themselves demand that their puerile pursuits and blind ava- 
ricious proceedings should be subject to a wholesome control, 
which their breaches of treaties and our power give us at 
this moment a lawful right to exercise, and the means of 
peaceably enforcing. If any civilized man were asked this 
question : ' Were you the ruler of Scinde, what would you 
do ? ' His answer would be : 4 1 would abolish the tolls on 
the rivers, make Kurrachee a free port, protect Shikar poor 
from robbers, make Sukkur a mart for trade on the Indus. 
I would make a track-way along its banks, I would get steam- 
boats.' Yet all this is what the Ameers dread. 

" They have broken treaties, they have given a pretext, 
and I have a full conviction, perhaps erroneously, that what 
I propose is just and humane. I will go farther, and say, as 
Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad has openly broken the treaty, if 
the Governor-General chooses to punish him, he may justly 
seize the district of Subzulcote and give it to the Khan of 
Bhawalpore, as I have understood there was some intention 
of doing. 

" The second point to which Major Outramhas drawn my 
attention is a very strong one. He tells me, the tribes on the 
river, above that part possessed by the Ameers of Scinde, do 
levy tolls, and that there is no treaty or public document 
forthcoming, in virtue of which we can call upon the Ameers 
even of Upper Scinde not to levy tolls upon their own subjects. 
It is therefore evident that to call upon the Ameers of Hydra- 
bad to desist from levying tolls and to allow the tribes 
above them on the river to do so, would be unjust ; that is to 
say, it would be unjust to allow the others to levy tolls, but 
not unjust to prevent the Ameers from doing so. The answer 
to the argument : ( That tolls are levied on the Northern 
Indus' is just this. Say to those Northern tribes, 6 We have, 
with great trouble secured to your boats a free passage on 
the river through Scinde ; we are resolved to open the com- 



OF SCINDE. 



87 



merce of that great highway of nations, and yon, who receive 
benefit thereby, must join in this measure leading to the good 
of all and to the loss of none. 5 Wherefore to excuse the 
Ameers upon the ground that others are not equally coerced, 
is answered by coercing the others. 

" Having thus given the best view I can take of this 
intricate subject, I shall accompany this report by various 
documents, among which there is one giving a kind of return, 
if I may so call it, of the accusations against the Ameers, 
upon which accusations, (relative to which I have read every 
paper,) I have founded my opinion of their conduct ; and by 
referring to this return, it will be seen whether I have justly 
estimated the complaints made against them by the political 
agents. I have also added the documents verifying each 
transaction. I have caused Major Outram to give me a 
memorandum of the state in which the treaty with the 
Ameers for the purchase of Shikar poor remains, as it has 
been in abeyance since last year. From this memorandum 
it would appear, that in addition to the great advantages for 
Sukkur which would attend the occupation of Shikarpoor, 
this district would be a very valuable acquisition in point of 
revenue in time ; and would with the aid of Kurrachee cover 
the expense of guarding our newly-acquired towns on the 
banks of the Indus. Should it hereafter be deemed proper to 
make the proposed arrangements with the Ameers so as to 
punish those who have broken the treaty, the details of such 
arrangements can be easily made. The transfer of tribute 
due, would adequately repay whatever portions of the districts 
in question belong to the Ameers whose conduct has been 
loyal." 

Appended to this memoir was a table of the value of each 
town to be taken from the Ameers, the amount of tribute, to 
be remitted, being balanced against the gross sum, which 
gave a money gain to those Princes of more than thirty thou- 
sand rupees yearly ; an overplus to be offered as an equivalent 
for the right of cutting fuel along the banks of the river, the 
wood to be paid for besides. 

The view of affairs thus taken was transmitted to the 
Governor-General before a knowledge of the recent confede- 



88 



THE CONQUEST 



racy and warlike measures of the Ameers had placed them 
in a worse position ; and for a man seeking occasion to 
war, those last furnished ample reasons to draw the sword. 
But never did Sir C. Napier desire aught but peace and 
justice. Calmly he had reasoned on general grounds, and 
reached conclusions with a full conviction of their honesty 
and humanity ; hence the hostile confederacy of the Ameers 
disturbed him not. He knew them to be debauched men, 
habitually intoxicated with "bhang;" saw that their mea- 
sures though hasty and violent were adopted more in defence 
than offence, as thinking their dominions were to be wrested 
from them, and thus laconically noticed them. " The Ameers 
are nervous, and these ebullitions are the result" But though 
the confederacy was an ebullition, it was only one of many 
springing from a fixed resolution to throw off the yoke im- 
posed by Lord Auckland, and such ebullitions became more 
frequent and violent as the state of affairs in Affghanistan 
became more or less favourable to the British. 

The nature of the Ameers' rule of sovereignty and 
succession was another source of mischief. 

At every death possessions were split, each portion 
carrying with it sovereign power, to be exercised in the 
worst spirit of cruelty and rapacity. Hence jealousies, 
hatreds, and civil dissensions, were added to horrible de- 
bauchery, and ignorance among -the rulers ; and under the 
combined action of evil and hateful influences the whole 
race of Scindees were being exterminated. The land was 
becoming a wilderness, a few years would have inevitably 
terminated the Talpoor dynasty, and the occupation of the 
ruined country by the wild robber tribes would have been 
certain. Their vicinity to the Anglo-Indian frontier would 
have produced collisions, and provoked conquest at a later 
date. These considerations made Lord Ellenborough's re- 
solution just, necessary, and praiseworthy ; nothing being 
opposed, save a past wrong offered to sensual tyrants, by a 
former Governor-General. Taking therefore his General's 
report as a basis, he proceeded to punish bad faith, and 
reward good faith ; yet cautiously and with a marked anxiety 
to be just, and even merciful. 



OF SCINDE. 



89 



Roostum's letter to the Maharajah, and the part taken by 
his minister, Mohamed Ghoree, in the escape of Shurreef, 
affixed the character of an enemy on that Ameer. Nusseer 
of Hydrabad's letter to Beebruck Booghtee, placed him in 
the same category. But, said the Governor-General, these 
acts must be clearly traced home to the Ameers ere any 
demand in reparation can be justly made. Wherefore re- 
peating his former reasons for obtaining territory rather 
than tribute, he proposed to base the new arrangements 
upon that principle. Referring also to a great scheme he 
was revolving for establishing uniformity of money through- 
out India/ he resolved to bring Scinde within its operation; 
but in deference to the importance which all native Princes 
attached to the right of coinage as a mark of sovereignty, he 
purposed to unite the device of the Scindian rulers with the 
device of England, the latter bearing the expense. 

The cutting of fuel for the steamers along the banks of 
the Indus he insisted upon, yet directed that in practice the 
Ameers' feeling about their Shikargahs should be respected as 
much as possible. 

As to territory he had no wish, he said, to obtain more 
than was absolutely necessary to secure the command of the 
Indus, and therefore, whatever surplus might be taken from 
the Ameers in the way of penalty, or in exchange for tribute, 
would be given to the Khan of Bhawalpore, as a reward for 
his unvarying friendship. A gift peculiarly fitting, as re- 
storing territory unjustly wrested from him by the offending 
Ameers ; which restoration would also give an uninterrupted 
line of communication through friendly states, from the 
British Station at Ferozepore to that in Upper Scinde. 

For the military command of the Indus, he required 
Sukkur, Roree and Bukkur in Upper Scinde, Tatta and 
Kurrachee in Lower Scinde; most of them, as Sir C. 
Napier had observed, sterile places, and for which tribute 
to a greater amount than their worth was to be remitted. 

" My ultimate object, said Lord Ellenborough, is the 
entire freedom of internal trade throughout the whole ter- 
ritory between the Hindoo Ehosh, the Indus and the sea ; 
and I only await the favourable occasion for effecting this 



90 



THE CONQUEST 



purpose, and for introducing uniformity of currency within 
the same limits. To these great benefits, to be enjoyed 
equally by 140 millions of people, I desire ultimately to add 
the abolition of all tributes payable by one state to another, 
and the substitution of cessions of territory, so made by 
means of mutual exchanges, as to bring together in masses 
the dominions of the several sovereigns and chiefs." 

Such changes, if effected without shocking the national 
feelings of the different people transferred, would have been a 
noble scheme to benefit a fifth part of the human race, and 
would alone have warranted a revision of the treaties with the 
Ameers by the force of negotiation ; but the justice of a 
revision by force of arms, could only rest on the violations of 
existing contracts. The demand for territory was a punish- 
ment, to be inflicted on proof of secret negotiations for an 
armed confederacy against the British ; and to obtain that 
proof the General was exhorted to use his utmost diligence. 
Meanwhile the draft of a new treaty, embodying the 
Governor-General's views, was sent to him, in which a 
distinction was made in favour of Sobdar, whose supposed 
unvarying faith, he not being under any tribute which could 
be remitted, was to be repaid by an accession of territory 
equal to 50,000 rupees yearly. 

The required proofs were soon obtained, yet by a most 
rigid process. The General, taking an acknowledged seal 
of Nusseer, compared it with that attached to the inter- 
cepted letter to Beebruck ; they appeared similar, but when 
with a minute earnestness he measured each letter and their 
distances in both, with a pair of compasses, a difference was 
perceptible. He was however assured that to have two 
seals, thus differing to deceive, was notoriously the custom 
of the Ameers, and therefore desired the persons who had 
intercepted the letter, to procure for him also the secret seal 
of the Prince. This they tried but could not do, and thus 
removed all suspicion of treachery, seeing, that a second 
forgery would have secured the object of the first. No 
person, English or native, cognizant of the Ameer's signet, 
doubted the authenticity of the intercepted seal; but their 
assertions the General would not accept as proof, and thus 



OF SCTNDE. 



91 



delayed his decision. At last he obtained an authentic 
paper with the secret signet seal of Nusseer attached, and it 
was precisely the same as that on the intercepted letter, 
the writing accompanying the undoubted seal being known 
as that of the Ameer's favourite moonshee or scribe. The 
proof was therefore complete that the Ameer had urged 
Beebruck Booghtee to fall on the British ; he had also urged 
the Moultan man, though less openly, to the same course, 
and with effect, for he raised troops and diligently fortified 
his capital. 

Roostum's intercourse with the Maharajah was likewise 
proved by his seal, the authenticity of which was never 
questioned, and by the concurrent testimony of persons con- 
versant with such matters as to the style and verisimilitude 
of thought ; but the writing was that of his minister, and 
Roostum was old, and nearly imbecile from debauchery ; 
wherefore Outram suggested that the minister might have 
affixed the seal of the Ameer without his knowledge. This 
fastidious delicacy of doubt, by a man who had so recently 
assured the Governor-General that the Ameer's conduct 
would justify the imposition of any terms, was put aside by 
this question from the General, " If a Prince blindly gives 
his power and Us signet to Us minister, is such folly to excuse 
him from the consequences ?" Subsequently, Roostum's cul- 
pable knowledge was established, and the General, who had 
been charged by Lord Ellenborough to draw up and present 
the new treaty to the Ameers when the proofs of delin- 
quency were complete, was now empowered to choose his 
own commissioner to conduct the details of the negotiation. 
And such was the confidence reposed in his judgment to 
carry through this affair by diplomacy or arms, that the 
Governor-General left him master of both, observing only, 
« that he could make no concession before a native power 
which was collecting troops, nominally for defensive pur- 
poses, but which the least wavering would direct to purposes 

of aggression." 

Sir C. Napier thus became arbiter of peace and war ; 
on his head rested the responsibility, moral and poli- 
tical, of enforcing the treaty ; in his hands were life and 



92 



THE CONQUEST 



death for thousands ; the fate of Scinde depended on his 
word, the fate of India perhaps on the stroke of his sword. 
He was an untried general, but what his friends had always 
known him to be he shewed himself to the world — a man of 
strong heart and subtile genius, sagacious in perception, 
ready in expedients, and of heroic daring: his fiery courage 
supported by a pure conscience was tempered by the gentlest 
feelings, and a generous spirit which spurned dishonour in 
whatever garb it came. " I will," he wrote to the man 
who had so confidingly placed him in this post of difficulty 
and danger, " I will present your treaty to the Ameers. I 
will spare no pains to convince them, that neither injury nor 
injustice are meditated, and that by accepting the treaty they 
will become more rich } and more secure of power than they 
now are. If they refuse to listen to reason, if they persist in 
sacrificing every thing to their avarice and their hunting 
grounds, they must even have their way, and try the force of 
arms at their peril if they are so resolved" 

With what an insane fury they did rush to arms shall be 
shewn hereafter. 



OF SCINDE. 



93 



CHAPTER VI. 

Sir Charles Napier had early applied himself to the 
organization and discipline of his troops, for they were gene- 
rally inexperienced. He drew them out frequently, and 
accustomed them to move in masses; he taught them by 
counsel also, and exhorted them to a subordinate and modest 
conduct towards the people. Nor was he sparing of a quaint 
humour which no danger or suffering has ever abated. 
Broad at times the stream of that humour flowed, yet never 
sunk to buffoonery, being always illustrative, conveying in- 
struction and even rebuke in a laughing guise : with a jest 
he won the soldiers' hearts, for they felt their General re- 
garded them as comrades and not as slaves. Thus, when 
some insolent and silly young men persisted, insubordinately, 
to ride violently through the camp and the bazaars, causing 
frequent accidents, he issued the following characteristic 
order, bringing ridicule and fear at once to bear on the 
offenders. 

" Gentlemen as well as beggars, if they like, may ride to 
the devil when they get on horseback ; but neither gentle- 
men nor beggars have a right to send other people to the 
devil, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in 
the bazaar. The Major-General has placed a detachment of 
horse at the disposal of Captain Pope, who will arrest of- 
fenders and punish them, as far as the regulations permit. 
And Captain Pope is not empowered to let any one escape 
punishment, because, when orders have been repeated and 
are not obeyed it is time to enforce them — without obedience 
an army becomes a mob and a cantonment a bear garden : 
the enforcement of obedience is like physic, not agreeable 
but necessary." 

He had now eight thousand fighting men ; but some were 



94 THE CONQUEST 

at Kurrachee, and from the Sukkur force the Bengal troops 
were to be detached to Ferozepore. Lord Ellenborough em- 
powered him to retain these last, and even offered rein- 
forcements, but he refused them, keeping the Bengal people 
back however for a time. He was also charged with a new 
organization of the political establishment in Scinde, having 
authority to regulate both numbers and salaries, and he 
made a great reduction in both. Outram then returned to 
Bombay, telling the General that with the reduced estab- 
lishment he would not be able to conduct the public business : 
yet he did conduct it, and most successfully, when it was ten- 
fold greater than any which had fallen under Outram' s di- 
rection. This reduction excited all the brutish violence of 
the editors of Indian newspapers, and their obstreperous 
cries deafened the Eastern community, Doctor Buist, of 
the Bombay Times, being the most dissonant and shrill. 

During these transactions, the excitement of the Ameers 
increased, and the cessation of Outram' s functions alarmed and 
offended those of Lower Scinde. They called it a slight, 
and pretended to view it as a preliminary for transferring 
their country to the Affghans — the real objection being that 
they judged the evacuation of Afghanistan by Pollock, 
Nott, and Colonel England, to be the result of weakness ; 
thence conceiving new hopes, and having gauged Outram's 
capacity and vanity, they thought it easier to dupe him than 
the General, of whose temper they had made trial by sending 
him a present of six thousand pounds, which he returned by 
the bearer. 

Futteh Mohamed Ghoree for Roostum and his sons ; Ali 
Moorad for himself, and a vakeel for Nusseer of Hydrabad, 
now separately demanded conferences with the General. He 
acceded to Roostum' s request, desiring him to fix the day 
most agreeable to himself, . and even offered to cross the 
Indus and meet him in his own gardens away from the 
troops and unattended. Unable to appreciate this frankness, 
the Ameer thought it a scheme to entrap him, and instead 
of keeping tryst held a general council, where their real 
feelings were disclosed. The sons and nephews of Roostum, 
jealous of the Ghoree's influence, reproached the old Ameer 



OF SCINDE. 



95 



for offering to meet the Feringee at all, saying, Futteh's 
counsel would destroy him. Even Ali Moorad here acted 
with the others, and being the ablest and boldest assumed 
the ascendant. He declared he would send a separate vakeel 
to ascertain what the General desired ; if it were money or 
territory he would refuse both, and place the country in 
keeping of the Beloochees — in other words declare war, for 
the Beloochees were feudatory troops, eager for pay and 
commotion, it being their, custom in times of trouble to 
despoil the labouring and mercantile people. 

When the council broke up Roostum's sons took Patan 
horsemen into pay, and wrote to the Boordees and other 
plundering tribes to get ready for war; at the same time 
the Brahooe Prince, Newaz Khan, who had been deposed in 
favour of Merab's son, and was living on the bounty of the 
Anglo-Indian Government at Shikarpoor, resigned his allow- 
ance and rejoined his tribe. Futteh Ghoree made a fruitless 
attempt to recover his influence over Roostum when the 
sons had separated, but was finally fain to accept a mission 
to Roree as the agent of Ali Moorad, whose voice was now 
to decide on peace or war. Letters also came from Nusseer 
of Hydrabad, encouraging Roostum, and promising the aid 
of troops under the command of his son and nephew, the 
two Hoosseins. At the same time Shere Mohamed of Meer- 
poor was constituted commander of the forces in Lower 
Scinde, and he promised to add sixteen thousand fighting 
men of his own to the general levy. 

Roostum, thus swayed, not only avoided the conference, 
but assigned fear of treachery as his reason. He also wrote 
to the Hydrabad Ameers, reproaching them for delay in 
collecting forces, and warned all the fighting men of his own 
villages to take arms. His revenue was then collected with 
unusual rigour and violence ; Sadig the accomplice of Shur- 
reef was invited to Kyrpoor, and Patans, that is Affghan 
horsemen, continued to reinforce the younger Ameers, who 
held vaunting language about the British. In fine the 
whole country was in commotion, the hill tribes assembled, 
and the Moultan man continued his warlike preparations, 
having no ostensible reason. Soon Roostum and his family 



96 



THE CONQUEST 



gathered two thousand men as a guard, and then again 
demanded a conference with the General, to take place four 
miles from Roree, down the river. This, seeing their con- 
dition, and resentful of the former failure, he refused. The 
Ameer proposed to hold it as before arranged in his garden, 
but was thus answered, " I will not go. I will not suffer 
you to treat me with this rudeness and as a treacherous 
person." 

Now the general agitation augmented, and the Ameers 
were heard to say — " We have eat and drunk well for many 
years, and have enjoyed our Ameeree ; if it is the intention of 
the English to fight with us, without a doubt they shall find us 
ready for them." And one sanguinary monster advised that 
the throats of all their wives and children should be cut if 
the British advanced. 

It is not difficult to trace the cause of these violent con- 
vulsive movements. The aggression of Lord Auckland had 
left a deep feeling of anger, and the disasters of the British 
at Cabool had awakened, hopes of revenge and independence. 
The evacuation of Affghanistan seemed to them weakness, 
and Lord Ellenborough's policy, so publicly proclaimed, 
alarmed them, conscious as they were of secret feelings, as 
well as acts of hostility. Ou tram's plan of withholding the 
warning letters had therefore failed, because the Governor- 
General's resolution had been proclaimed to the world as his 
fixed policy ; meanwhile his secret instructions were guessed 
at, and magnified as usual by fear and hope. Territory or 
money they thought must be demanded, and the arrival of 
England's troops at Sukkur led them to imagine the demand 
would be large. While thus excited, they heard from their 
spies that the British troops were too sickly to take the 
field. Then with that sudden heat so common in barbarian 
councils they resolved on war ; but debauched, nervous, and 
cowardly — many of them being also habitually intoxicated 
with opium or bhang — their fears o'ermastered pride and 
anger, and they could take no firm resolution. They were 
nevertheless impelled forward by their feudatories, men of 
iron hardihood, fatalists, and delighting in war. Against 
this influence they had no counter-weight save their avarice ; 



OF SCTNDE. 



97 



for the Beloochee fighting men were very costly and insa- 
tiable. 

These antagonistic impulses rendered the Ameers' policy 
variable, and vacillating according to the prevailing influence 
of the hour. Hence their alternate arrogance and humble- 
ness; their falsehood, their complaints, excuses and secret 
alliances, their cry of war one day, of peace the next. And 
with all this they had quarrels amongst themselves, and no 
general plan could well be agreed upon. 

Ali Moorad and Sobdar of Hydrabad, being from policy 
averse to break off from the British alliance, soon made 
known their desires. Ali obtained a conference with the 
General, and at once asked if the English would secure the 
Turban of supremacy for him ? 

" We will adhere to treaties," was the reply. " They bind 
us to protect each Ameer in his rights. The Turban of the 
Talpoors is Roostum's, unless he forfeits it by hostility, and 
he shall keep it until he dies, when it will become yours if 
you continue to be a friend, because such is the order of 
succession, and such is the treaty." 

" But will you protect Roostum if he seeks to give the 
Turban during his life to his son?" 

" No ! that will be against the treaty. We shall not 
do so." 

Feeling satisfied with this, Ali Moorad asked if he and 
Sobdar, being of one mind, might make a secret treaty to 
support the British. 

" Be faithful to the British ! Yes ! it is your duty, but 
openly. Make no secret compact. You have the existing 
treaties, adhere to them. The English are powerful enough 
to make all parties conform to them." 

From this conference the English General drew these 
advantages. He displayed his resolution to act justly ; he 
detached the most able and formidable of the Ameers from 
the family league, and thus diminished the chances of 
bloodshed; and he made a step towards reversing Lord 
Auckland's policy, by having only one responsible chief with 
whom to negotiate. He foresaw also that the numerous 
minor Ameers, those petty despots would thus be reduced to 

H 



98 



THE CONQUEST 



the rank of rich noblemen, when Shikarpoor, then daily in- 
creasing in size and wealth under British protection, should 
become a great city. 

During these demonstrations by the Ameers, he studied 
their characters, coming to the conclusion, that a steady 
policy, appearing not to see settled hostility yet checking all 
violations of existing treaties, would induce them to accept 
the new treaty which he had peremptory orders to present, 
when the proofs of past misconduct justified its enforcement. 
This also accorded with his military precautions, for he 
could not calculate on peace without being prepared for vrar. 
Hence he resolved to give time, and circumstances, which 
were hourly changing, their chances ere he bared a sword 
whose edge he desired to withhold. 

" Nothing," he wrote to the Governor-General, " is lost 
by delay. We cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral 
ground on which to rest the defence of whatever events may 
arise. The Ameers also grow weaker, delay exhausts their 
treasury, and then they cheat their soldiers, who of course 
leave them. This also is the season of fevers on the banks 
of the Indus. Were hostilities to commence now, I should 
lose many men and have a large hospital. To move on 
Hydrabad I must go by the river or by the desert. To 
supply the sick by the last would be difficult if not im- 
possible. To go by the river would augment the hospital. 
The Indus is falling, and when it is at the lowest the fevers 
will cease. Meanwhile I have a sickly camp, and I should 
have regretted if the Ameers had called me out before; now 
they are welcome. But all these considerations have made 
me hitherto avoid pressing them hard on any point. 

"If I am forced to take the field, I will cross the Indus 
and march upon Hydrabad by land, for there are objections 
to dropping down the river. The water is low, boats go 
with difficulty when lightly laden ; I cannot float more than 
a thousand men with guns and stores, and the vessels would 
even then be overladen, and ground perhaps for days on the 
mud within reach of matchlocks. Nothing can be gained by 
rapidity. The enemy has no position to fortify, no works to 
strengthen, no stronger place to retire upon ; three or thir- 



OF SCINDE. 



99 



teen days' movement will therefore be the same; but by 
land we go compact, to beat or be beaten altogether, whereas 
crowded in boats straggling for miles along the river, and 
half of them grounded in the shallows under matchlock-fire, 
would lead to disaster. ' Slow and sure,' is an adage suited 
to my position. Moving by land I shall take Kyrpoor at 
once, and thus throw myself between the northern and 
southern Ameers, for there need be no slowness when once 
we take the field, if unfortunately the folly of the Ameers 
goes that length," 

Acting on these views he endeavoured to dissipate two 
errors which buoyed these Princes up. These were the sup- 
posed helpless state of the troops, and the belief that the 
greatest part of those fit for duty had been recalled to 
Ferozepore for the army of reserve ; which their imperfect 
information and judgment led them to think was gathered 
in fear to defend India, instead of being the prompt action 
of a prudent man to awe the Punjaub. It is thus that 
barbarians, however brave and naturally gifted, always shew 
themselves incapable of great combinations in war. They 
have neither the patience nor the knowledge to class the 
parts of an extensive military plan of operation : they see 
quickly, feel intensely and strike from impulse, vehemently 
and even mightily at times, but against civilization it is 
only the surge of waters scourging rocks. 

Sir C. Napier, as before said, had stopped the march 
of the Bengal troops, and now exhibited to Ali Moorad 
more than 6000 fighting men of all arms, moving with 
that precision and rapidity which barbarian commanders, 
used only to irregular multitudes, can scarcely under- 
stand while they see its power. Lord Ellenborough also, 
desirous to avoid bloodshed by an imposing display of 
force, offered to reinforce the army with all the Bombay 
troops under General Nott, which were however declined as 
unnecessary. 

But now continued infractions of treaty as to tolls in 
Upper Scinde, accompanied with insult and violence, forced 
the General to vindicate his own and Lord Ellenborough' s 



100 



THE CONQUEST 



avowed policy, and lie sent a staff officer with the following 
letter to Roostum : — • 

" A merchant has been made to pay toll by your 
Kardar, named Kaymah, at Dowlatpore. This is a breach 
of the VIII article of your treaty. It has taken place 
several times, although this is the first complaint laid before 
me. I would not have suffered the breach of a treaty in a 
single instance had I been aware of it, and every man who 
makes a well-founded complaint to me shall have redress. 
The sufferers in the present case accompany the bearer of 
this letter, who is one of my aides-de-camp, and he has-my 
orders to insist upon your Highness' repaying the toll levied 
by your Kardar, and also all the expenses to which the 
sufferers have been exposed, amounting to the sum of 238 
rupees. I further insist upon the offending Kardar being 
sent a prisoner to my head-quarters at Sukkur within the 
space of five days, to be dealt with as I shall determine. 
Unless your Highness does immediately comply with these 
demands, I shall consider the various and insulting violations 
of treaty have been committed with your sanction, and I 
shall treat you as an enemy. These are the orders of the 
Governor-General." 

The money was instantly paid, and promise given to 
send the Kardar to Sukkur. But the imbecile Ameer, ex- 
cited by false reports, and constantly intoxicated with 
" bhang'' immediately held a great council with his feuda- 
tory chiefs, and his words proclaimed the disorder of his 
mind: " See," he exclaimed, 44 the English having been 
turned out of Affghanistan and eaten dirt, have been killed 
so far on their return to India. Their force is large, and if 
they will but leave Scinde I shall meet all demands for 
money, even to the jewellery of our women. If they do not 
leave Sukkur and Scinde, if they advance to Kyrpoor, we 
must fight them." 

His warlike hearers placed their hands on the Koran in 
token of obedience to his orders. 

After this council messengers were sent to raise the 
Boordees, a powerful tribe ; but the General's recent menace 
had evidently shaken the Ameer's resolution; for in his 



OF SCINDE. 



101 



former council neither land nor money was to be yielded, 
whereas money was now freely offered, and points of honour 
only spoken of. There was also dissension. Roostum 
avowed a design to give the Turban to his son Hoossein, in 
violation of Ali Moorad's right, and the latter's resolution 
to adhere to the English was, as the General expected, fixed. 
He went off to his fortress of Dejee-ka-kote, not far from 
Kyrpoor, and disbanded the fighting men in his pay. They 
were instantly hired by Hoossein, who told his imbecile 
father Roostum to retire from state affairs. Then increas- 
ing his own armed followers he gave orders to rob and slay 
all British stragglers, and made loud vaunts. 

In this state of things, the favourable season for acting 
having set in, the General, who had finished his military 
preparations, and completed the proofs of the Ameers' pre- 
vious hostility, without reference to their recent conduct, 
judged it time to present the new treaty, which he had been 
again peremptorily commanded to enforce. It was delivered 
in form to the Ameers of Upper Scinde on the 4th of De- 
cember, and to the Ameers of Lower Scinde on the 6th of 
that month, together with official notes from Lord Ellen- 
borough, marking the estimation in which the conduct of 
each Ameer was separately held by the Governor-General. 

To the inferior Hydrabad Princes he expressed his dis- 
satisfaction at their conduct, and required their assent to the 
treaty generally ; yet he called their attention particularly 
to the remission of tribute, as proof of his desire to establish 
peace and friendship. To Nusseer he sent a distinct com- 
munication, enumerating his offences and interdicting all 
friendship until atonement was made. 

The tone adopted towards Roostum was one of sorrow, 
that he, formerly well disposed, should now have been led by 
evil counsels to a secret hostile engagement with the Maha- 
rajah, and to aid the escape of the Syud Shurreef, whose 
object he knew was to war upon the British. These were 
violations of the old treaty, too serious to be entirely par- 
doned, and therefore he must accept the new treaty. 

Sobdar of Hydrabad was favoured throughout, because 
he constantly leaned to the British alliance, and condemned 



102 



THE CONQUEST 



his brother Ameers. But his conduct sprung from discon- 
tent at being deprived of his father's dignity by the ano- 
malous law of succession; when the crisis came he was 
found more perfidious than any, and anxiously striving to 
betray both sides. The favour shewn to him proved that 
no unjust pretext for hostilities was sought : moreover the 
Meerpoor man was unmolested, because he had not acted 
offensively, though his sentiments were avowedly inimical. 

The Ameers now displayed all their crooked diplomacy. 
Denying that they had violated the old treaty, they invited 
further investigation, knowing it could not be openly con- 
ducted, as the death of any person daring to appear against 
them would be prompt. They recurred, with force also 
because with truth, to the original wrong inflicted by Lord 
Auckland, yet with feigned humility professed submission to 
Lord Ellenborough. But they increased their forces, and 
ordered the tax-gatherers to extort from the districts which 
were to be ceded, not only the revenue of that year but of 
the next ; their armed Beloochees plundered all the country 
between Sukkur and Shikarpoor ; their spies entered the 
British camp, and in their councils they arranged a general 
plan of campaign, to be noticed hereafter. 

In Nusseer's protest, a remarkable assertion, characteristic 
of Scindian cunning merits particular notice, as shewing 
how little reliance could be placed on any statement of that 
Ameer. " I and Noor Mohamed," he said, " saw the ad- 
vantage of seeking the protection of the wisest and most 
powerful nation on the earth, and therefore urged Sir Henry 
Pottinger, during two whole years, to come into the country, 
after which we finally succeeded in introducing a British 
force." Had this been true it would have justified the 
Auckland aggression, and, more forcibly, Lord Ellenbo- 
rough's policy; but with such a display of falsehood how 
could the General believe in the profession of submission? 
He received it indeed with seeming satisfaction ; but though 
Roostum's assent to the new treaty, more humble and entire 
than Nusseer's, specifically acknowledged British supremacy, 
Sir C. Napier found the measures of both at variance with 
their protestations, and his position became painfully diffi- 



OP SCINDE. 



103 



cult. The Governor-General's orders were peremptory and 
reiterated. But passionate violent men were to be dealt 
with ; who were neither masters of their own senses from 
habitual intoxication ; nor masters of their actions from the 
rough influence of their armed feudatories, whose attendance 
they had invoked, but whose desire for war and plunder they 
could neither check nor control. His aversion to shed blood 
was intense, his sense of duty to his country equally so ; yet 
be was responsible for the moral, political, and military re- 
sults of the highest order at a crisis when the slightest error 
might lead to a battle, perhaps to a great disaster ; when 
each hour brought change, for the vacillation of the Ameers 
was surprising. A strong head and brave heart carried him 
with a clear conscience through the trial. 

Having sent the Bengal troops across the Indus, he was 
preparing to pass over another body, when he was told the 
Ameers only awaited this separation of his forces to assail 
his lines at Sukkur by night ; and their constant intoxica- 
tion rendered the intelligence probable. Wherefore he wrote 
to Boostum thus : — 

" Your submission to the order of the Governor- General, 
and your friendship for our nation should be beyond doubt, 
because you have solemnly assured me of the same. We are 
friends. It is therefore right to inform you of strange 
rumours that reach me. Your subjects, it is said, propose 
to attack my camp in the night time. This would of course 
be without your knowledge, and also be very foolish, be- 
cause my soldiers would slay those who attack them ; and 
when day dawned I would march to Kyrpoor, transplant the 
inhabitants to Sukkur, and destroy your capital city, with 
the exception of your Highness' s palace, which I would 
leave standing alone as a mark of my respect for your 
Highness, and of my conviction that you have no authority 
over your subjects. I should also so far entrench on your 
Highness' s treasury as to defray the expenses of this opera- 
tion, because it is just that all governments should pay 
for the mischief which their subjects inflict upon their 
neighbours. I therefore advertise your Highness of the 
destruction which such an attempt on my camp would ine- 



104 THE CONQUEST 

vitably draw down upon Kyrpoor, in order that you may 
warn your people against committing any such act of hos- 
tility." 

This warning was effectual, and vakeels from Upper 
and Lower Scinde reached him with assurances from their 
masters that the new treaty should be accepted. These 
messages from Sobdar and Hoossein Ali of Hydrabad were 
cordially expressed ; Nusseer and Meer Khan employed only 
general terms. But the General's secret intelligence still 
contradicted all their declarations. Ali Moorad was loyal : 
the others of Upper Scinde were daily augmenting their 
forces ; their women had been sent from Kyrpoor ; councils 
were continually held ; and a communication from Nusseer 
was discovered, which disclosed their real views. 

He complained to Roostum that " Sobdar and Hoossein 
were, like Ali Moorad, in the British interest, but all the 
chiefs of tribes and of the armed men were with him, Nus- 
seer, and if Roostum was ready the sword should be drawn." 
That ancient Ameer also rebuked his sons for precipitation 
in sending off the women, saying, "the vakeels are at Sukkur 
to deceive. When the British regain confidence, and weaken 
their forces, the torch shall be lighted to consume them." 
The daks, or mails, were at the same time robbed, dis- 
orders were everywhere rife, and the Boordees promised 
to harass the Bengal troops if they marched towards Feroze- 
pore. These furious proceedings and wild councils did not 
disturb the General's judgment. Infirmity of purpose and 
intoxication were to him apparent in them, and he antici- 
pated no military opposition in Upper Scinde ; but the 
verbal submission of the Ameers authorized, and the orders 
of the Governor-General enjoined him, to take possession of 
Subzulcote and Bhoong-Barra, which lay in his rear on the 
left bank of the Indus. Wherefore he passed that river 
with a considerable body of troops, sent the Bengal column 
to occupy those districts, and publicly proclaimed the policy 
of Lord Ellenborough, according to the terms of the treaty. 

This passage of the river, effected in the middle of De- 
cember, was an operation of some difficulty, and it was the 
first military measure in execution of Lord Ellenborough's 



OF SCINDE. 



105 



avowed policy. It was also a decisive one, rendering the 
negotiation an armed parley. It remained to be seen, who 
would strike who succumb. On one side was the strong 
warrior armed in steel, brandishing a heavy but sheathed 
weapon in warning, for his desire was peace — on the other 
a crouching savage, urged by fury and hatred, troubled by 
fear and doubt, yet constantly creeping forward knife m 
hand. 

A slight topographical notice is here necessary to render 
the operations intelligible: wherefore, taking the British 
stations in Upper Scinde as a point of departure, the march 
of an army down the Indus on either bank shall be sketched. 

Those stations were Shikarpoor and Sukkur on the right 
bank ; Roree on the left bank ; and Bukkur between them 
in the middle of the stream. 

Shikarpoor, situated about twenty miles from the river, 
in a plain, was on the high road to the Bolan pass. 

Sukkur was on the bank of the Indus, and protected by 
an entrenched cantonment. 

Bukkur was a fortress. 

Sir C. Napier's army, occupying Sukkur and Roree, had 
the whole of the Ameer's country before it, except Shikarpoor 
which was behind his right flanks, and the districts of Sub- 
zulcote and Bhoong-Barra which were behind his left flank. 

Advancing by the right bank of the river he would pass 
over an immense alluvial plain, bounded on the right by 
the Hala mountains, on the left by the Indus, and inter- 
sected with canals, and smaller water-courses called nullahs, 
some artificial, the most part formed by the annual inunda- 
tions. 

Sixty miles from Sukkur they would come upon Lar- 
kaana, a city near a minor river, or rather a canal, connected 
with the Indus, called the Aral. 

Marching onwards they would reach Sehwan, the site ot 
an ancient fortress, about one hundred miles from Larkaana, 
where the Lukhee hills, shooting from the Hala range, close 
in upon the river and form a pass, which renders Sehwan a 
post of strategic importance, confirming the notion that it 
was one of Alexander's stations. 



106 



THE CONQUEST 



From this pass the plain gradually opens out again by 
the continued divergence of the mountains from the course 
of the river, until it reaches the ocean, and gently spreads 
with a low and placid front, assuaging rather than opposing 
the fury of the waters. 

Passing over this second plain the troops would have to 
their left Hydrabad, which lies on the other bank of the 
Indus some eighty miles below Sehwan, they would then 
reach Tatta, fifty miles below Hydrabad. ' 

Near Tatta, formerly celebrated for its manufactures, 
but then, like all places under the abominable rule of the 
Ameers, sunk to ruin, the Indus 3 opening out like a fan, 
runs in many branches to the sea, forming a delta, intricate, 
swampy and unwholesome. The march of the troops to 
avoid this tangled country, would be to the right, leading 
through Garra, a town of some consequence, to Kurrachee, 
which lies close under the Hala range, and is the only safe 
and commodious port of Scinde— its distance from Tatta 
being about eighty miles. 

From Roree, an army advancing down the left bank, 
would also pass over an immense plain, spotted with shi- 
kargahs and intersected with nullahs from one to sixty feet 
deep. 

On their right would be the Indus, which makes how- 
ever a wide sweep from Sukkur to Hydrabad. the convex 
towards the mountains, offering the chord for a march upon 
the latter town. Along this chord the main road run, but 
there were several routes, one following the winding of the 



river. 



On the left was the great desert, which flowing as it 
were from the Punjaub hems in a narrow strip of fertile 
land, including Subzulcote and Bhoong-Barra, as far as 
Hydrabad, where it eases off gradually towards the east 
leaving a wide space between it and the delta. 

Fifteen miles from Roree the army would come upon 
Kyrpoor, the capital of Upper Scinde. At twenty-five miles 
it would confront the strong fortress of Dejee-ka-kote 
crowning an isolated rock belonging to Ali Moorad, and 
supposed by the Beloochees to be impregnable. 



OF SCINDE. 



107 



At seventy or eighty miles from Roree it would enter 
Nowshera, the last town possessed by that Ameer to the 
south, bordering on Lower Scinde. From thence a march of 
one hundred and twenty miles would bring it to Hydrabad, 
the fortified capital of Lower Scinde, when, on its left, would 
be Meerpoor, the fortified capital of Shere Mohamed. 

There are several Meerpoors, but this capital is on the 
very edge of the desert, at the distance of forty miles on a 
right line drawn from Hydrabad eastward, which being 
prolonged for fifty miles more falls on Omercote of the 
desert, a strongly . fortified town forming a post of connec- 
tion between Meerpoor and the Bombay frontier. 

It will now be understood, that by occupying Roree, 
his left resting on the desert, Sir C. Napier barred the 
Ameers of Kyrpoor from Subzulcote and Bhoong-Barra 
while his Bengal troops seized those narrow districts behind 
his position ; thus he obtained the object of the treaty with 
Roostum, without quitting the defensive^ or provoking a 
war, and exactly obeying the Governor-General's orders. 
The Beloochees dared not attack him in this position, which 
could be reinforced by the Bengal troops ; they could not 
pass his flank save by the desert, where with a short move- 
ment he could intercept them. They were indeed strong at 
Larkaana on the right of the Indus, and might assail Suk- 
kur which was hemmed in with jungle ; but he had there 
an entrenched pivot of movement, and relying on its strength 
sought to quiet the Ameers by reason. 

Lord Ellenborough had allowed him to choose a Com- 
missioner for conducting the details of the new treaties, and 
with a generous impulse he asked for Outram, thus risking 
the Governor-General's displeasure. Lord Ellenborough, 
acceded, reluctantly indeed, but, discarding personal feeling, 
was unwilling to deprive the General of the supposed advan- 
tage of Outram's local experience : thus the latter was in 
an evil hour recalled to Scinde. This act of kindness was 
seized by newspapers in Outram's interest and under his 
dictation, to extol his superior genius and capacity, and to 
abase the reputations of Lord Ellenborough and Sir C. 
Napier. The first was described as having basely driven a 



108 



THE CONQUEST 



remarkable man from his former political duties in Scinde ; 
the second as presumptuously and ignorantly undertaking 
those duties without ability for the task ; both as having 
plunged headlong into difficulties which they could no way 
escape from save by recalling their able victim. This absurd 
insolence, so characteristic of Indian newspapers, is best ex- 
posed by the following letter from the General to Lord 
Ellenborough on the occasion. 

" / have no intention of waiting for Major Outranks 
arrival, because till we get into the details of the treaty I do 
not want assistance ; and as your Lordship has been so good 
as not to give me a colleague, I mean to consult no one, I see 
my way clearly" 

Soon after this letter was written Outram arrived, with 
the newspaper reputation of having consummate knowledge 
of men and things in Scinde, knowledge acquired by expe- 
rience and sustained by great natural capacity : yet he 
committed error upon error. With a dull, perverted per- 
ception of character, his experience did not prevent him from 
becoming a dupe to the Ameers' gross diplomacy ; on no 
occasion did he display capacity, on many he displayed 
great ignorance, and on all great presumption. His per- 
tinacity and vanity led to deplorable loss of life, and he 
would have caused the entire destruction of the army but 
for the superior intellect and resolution of his General, who 
he then tried to deceive and has ever since calumniated. 

While passing the Indus Sir C. Napier discovered that 
Roostum's vakeels had brought money to corrupt the soldiers, 
had delayed the delivery of the Ameer's letters, and given 
all those Princes false hopes. This mischief he vigorously 
checked, writing thus to the Ameer. " The men you sent 
to Roree are robbing you. They will tell you that they are 
bribing my soldiers, and they extract money from your 
Highness under that pretext. If they were really bribing 
my soldiers to desert I would punish them, but they are 
doing no such thing — your Highness is robbed by your ser- 
vants. However, if you are not robbed, and that, as they 
pretend, they were bribing my soldiers, it was high time to 
turn them out of Roree, which I have done, and if I find 



OF SCTNDE. 



109 



them attempting to disturb the loyalty of my troops it will 
be worse for them. Ameer, I have received my orders and 
will obey them. I laugh at your preparations for war. I 
want to prevent blood being shed : listen to my words- 
consult with your brother, his Highness Ali Moorad. Your 
own blood will not deceive you— your servants will. These 
men were four clays in Roree, and did not deliver your let- 
ters to me ; had I not sent for them, they would still have 
kept them from me to gain time that they might rob you. 
Eight days have passed, and I have not heard that your 
Highness has nominated a commissioner of rank to arrange 
the° details of the treaty. I expect to have in writing your 
full acceptance of the draft thereof, by the return of the 
bearer. Your Highness is collecting troops in all direc- 
tions, I must therefore have your acceptance of the treaty 
immediately— yea or nay. I will not lose the cold weather. 
You must be prompt, or I shall act without consulting your 
Highness ; my time is measured, and I cannot waste it m 

long negotiations. 

" Your Highness' letter is full of discussion ; but as 
there are two sides of your river, so are there two sides to 
your arguments. Now the Governor-General has occupied 
both sides of your Highness' river, because he has considered 
both sides of your Highness' arguments. Many of your 
family have taken the same view of the case that the 
Governor-General has ; and the respect which they have 
shewn to the British Government is repaid to them by the 
Governor-General. But I cannot go into the argument— I 
am not Governor-General ; I am only one of his comman- 
ders. I will forward your letter to him, if you wish me to 
do so ; but, in the mean time, I will occupy the territories 
which' he has commanded me to occupy. You think I am 
your enemy— why should I be so ? I gain nothing ^ for 
myself; I take no gifts, I receive no Jagheers. What is it 
to me whether your Highness, or any other person, occupies 
the land ? The Governor-General has given to you his rea- 
sons and .to me his orders : they shall be obeyed." 

This drew from Roostum an unmeaning public reply, but 
covering a secret message, to the effect, that being eighty- 



110 



THE CONQUEST 



five years old he was oppressed by the younger members of 
his family and desired to take refuge in the British camp. 
It was an embarrassing proposition. Too favourable for a 
peaceful termination of the disputes to be rejected, it had 
however this drawback, that every proceeding of the Ameer 
would be imputed to coercion. The General therefore pre- 
vailed on Ali Moorad, who was then with him, to carry back 
the following written response Your Highness is, I 
believe, personally a friend, but you are helpless amongst 
your ill-judging family. I send this by your brother. Lis- 
ten to his advice, trust to his care : you are too old for war, 
and if battle begin how can I protect you ? If you go with 
your brother, you may either remain with him or I will 
send an escort to bring you to my camp, where you will be 
safe. Follow my advice, it is that of a friend. Why should 
I be your enemy ? If I was , why should I take this trou- 
ble to save you ? I think you will believe me, but do as 
you please." 

It is plain the Ameer was left by this letter master of 
his movements, though invited to a step promising peace, 
and that was the only wish of the General. But mean- 
while the British daks had been intercepted, and there 
were two parties to deal with in the same house— Roostum 
and his sons. Wherefore, resolute to suffer no secret hos- 
tility, while he soothed the old man in private he publicly 
menaced through him his turbulent family. " My letters," 
he wrote, " have been stopped near Kyrpoor. This has 
been done without your consent, or it has been done by your 
orders. If by your orders you are guilty. If without your 
consent you cannot command your people. In either case I 
order you to disband your armed followers instantly ; and 
I will go to Kyrpoor to see this order obeyed." Thus with 
skilful appliance of gentleness and sternness, according to 
the need of the moment, he gradually approached a peace 
compatible with the Governor-General's orders. 

Necessary it is that Sir C. Napier's intercourse with 
Roostum on this occasion should be well understood be- 
cause the Ameers of Hydrabad did afterwards, and so like- 
wise did Roostum, contrary to all truth and reason, and 



OF SCINDE. 



Ill 



honour, represent it as the hinge upon which war turned. 
And every assertion of the Ameers, however foolish and 
false, found its echo in Bombay and in England. Their 
complaints, foul as their hearts, were adopted and pro- 
claimed in Parliament and out of it, as truths ; as truths when 
truth was the only thing they wanted ; by some with factious 
motives, by some in ignorance, the ignorance that will not 
inquire lest it should be enlightened against its will: by 
others merely to Cc bestow their tediousness upon the public," 
being as intent as ever was Dogberry, that the word not 
written down should be remembered. 

Roostum, adopting the General's recommendation, fled 
with his wives and attendants to Ali Moorad's strong fort 
of Dejee, and there resigned to that chief the Turban, with 
all the rights and lands attached. 

When Sir C. Napier heard of this cession he thus ad- 
vised Ali Moorad. " I think your Highness will do well 
not to assume the Turban, for the following reasons. People 
will say the English put it on your head against the will of 
Meer Roostum. But do as you please. I only give you my 
advice as a friend who wishes to see you great and power- 
ful in Scinde. This is the wish of my Government. The 
Governor- General has approved of all that I have said to 
you. If to be the chieftain gives you power, I should say, 
assume the Turban. But it gives you none. You are 
strong without it. No one in Scinde can oppose you, no one 
out of Scinde can oppose you. The British Government will 
secure you against all enemies. It is not true that we want 
to injure the Ameers. You know, and I know, that the 
Ameers have tried to form a conspiracy against the English, 
and for this the Governor-General has punished those who 
were guilty. His Highness Meer Roostum has been be- 
trayed by Futteh Mohamed Ghoree ; but if a ruler gives 
his power to another he must bear the consequence. The 
chief has now given his seal to your Highness, who will not 
betray him, because his honour must be your honour ; for 
you are both Talpoors, and the family of the Talpoors will 
grow great and powerful in Scinde under your auspices. 
Look at Sattara and others ; have we taken their territories, 



112 



THE CONQUEST 



though we surround them on all sides ? No ! But we do 
not surround Scinde. It is our frontier ; we wish to see it 
great and rich, and strong against those on the other bank 
of the Indus that they may not attack, but for this we must 
have friendly rulers like yourself and Meer Sobdar. Woe 
attend those who conspire against the powerful arms of the 
Company. Behold the fate of Tippoo Sultan and the 
Peishwa, and the Emperor of China. Highness, you will 
rule Upper Scinde with glory and power if you are true to 
the treaty made with the Company. You know, for I had 
it from your own lips, that the Ameers of Upper and Lower 
Scinde were in league against us, all, except his Highness 
Meer Sobdar and yourself, therefore have they suffered." 

Ali Moorad replied, that the cession had been voluntary, 
the act solemn, complete in form and recorded by the holy 
men in the Koran. It was therefore a perfect document, and 
irrevocable according to the Mahomedan law and the custom 
of the Talpoors. And this was true. The event however was 
unexpected; to use the General's expression it burst like a 
bomb-shell upon Roostum' s family and followers ; they all fled 
in a south-easterly direction by the desert, and the chance of 
war in Upper Scinde ceased. But Lord Ellenborough's 
orders had been peremptory to disperse all the armed bands 
menacing the British station, as well as to enforce the new 
treaty, and the General was actually in march on Kyrpoor 
with that object when Roostum's resignation happened. 
Wherefore, being close to Dejee and feeling it important that 
the aged Ameer's abdication should be not only spontaneous 
but publicly known to be so, he proposed to visit Roostum, 
with the intent to restore him if he had been coerced. 

Instead of accepting this friendly proposal Roostum fled 
into the desert with his treasure, two guns and several thou- 
sand followers, thus ungraciously proving his entire freedom 
of action. All the Ameers of Upper Scinde inimical to the 
British were then also in flight, and no organized force 
remained in that province, save that under Ali Moorad, who 
was friendly from disposition and interest. The difficult 
question of tranquilizing Upper Scinde without an appeal to 
arms was thus satisfactorily solved. 



OF SCINDE 



113 



Roostum when flying from Dejee, wrote such a letter to 
excuse his sudden departure as marks the profound falseness 
of his character. " The General," he said, "had advised him 
to be guided by his brother Ali Mooracl, and Ali had told 
him to fly lest he should be made captive by the British : 
therefore he fled." This was denied by Ali Moorad, and 
the old man's duplicity was apparent, seeing that when he 
sought an asylum in the British camp the General had ad- 
vised him to go to Dejee, proof that to capture him was not 
an object. He also disavowed ceding the Turban : yet the act 
had been done in presence of the holy men and all the Dhur- 
bar ; and the document recording it, being afterwards shewn 
to the doctors of the Mahomedan law in Calcutta, was by 
them recognized as authentic and irrevocable. Moreover 
Roostum had thousands of armed followers with him when he 
fled to join his sons, who were then in arms, and closely allied 
with the Ameers of Lower Scinde. Ali Moorad therefore 
could not coerce him without a battle, and it was not for his 
interest that Roostum should fly, denying his abdication. 

That Sir C.Napier desired to have but one governing chief 
in each province is true, and a proof that no evil was designed ; 
for to divide power, with a view to conquest is an old and sure 
policy. It is also true, that Ali Moorad being in the vigour 
of manhood next in succession to the Turban, and friendly to 
the British connexion, was the man he wished to make chief 
of Upper Scinde. But to desire a reasonable advantage and 
to obtain it by foul means are things widely apart. A true 
summary of transactions in Upper Scinde would run thus. 

The Ameers had violated treaties. Lord Ellenborough, 
placed in a dangerous position by the Affghan disasters, pro- 
posed a new treaty as security for the future, but containing 
also a demand of territory as a punishment for past trans- 
gressions. The conditions were not onerous in a pecuniary 
view to the Ameers, and were most beneficial for their op- 
pressed subjects and the general interest of mankind. The 
Ameers professed submission, accepted the treaty, and pro- 
mised to sign it, but prepared for war. Then the British 
General took forcible possession of the districts to be ceded 
by the accepted treaty ; yet without bloodshed, and not before 



114 



THE CONQUEST 



the Ameers had gathered forces to fight ; not before they had 
formed hostile combinations, menaced the camp at Sukkur, 
sought to debauch the soldiers, and stirred up the Boordee 
tribe to attack the Bengal division on its march to Ferozepore : 
moreover he could not have delayed longer without operating 
in the hot season — a dreadful chance where the mercury rises 
above 130 degrees in the shade ! 

The justice or injustice of the first treaties could not affect 
Sir C. Napier's proceedings. He was sent to Scinde, not as 
a lecturer to discuss the morality of a former Governor- 
General's negotiations, but as an executive officer to uphold 
the interests of England at a moment of great difficulty. This 
duty he was executing faithfully when, in the heat and crisis 
of the transactions, the chief Ameer Roostum, frightened by 
the approach of a war he was hourly provoking at the insti- 
gation of his sons and nephews, proposed to seek an asylum 
in the British camp, thus providing for his own safety while 
his family were carrying on hostilities. This was in itself a 
virtual renunciation of the Turban, and a step towards the 
introduction of one friendly and vigorous-minded chieftain, 
instead of an oligarchy of princes with whom nothing could 
be permanently or satisfactorily adjusted. But far from 
seizing with an aggressive spirit this occasion, the General, 
stedfast in justice and fair dealing, gave the Ameer advice 
tending to his safety and honour, leaving him free to act,. with 
assurance of protection and safety. " Remain with your own 
toother, you are too old for war" " Come to me and I will 
protect youP " Choose for yourself" These frank expres- 
sions could not be misunderstood, and cannot be perverted, 
they are patent in words and meaning. Roostum was not 
misled nor misused by the English General, but by his own 
falsehood and folly ; the transaction was as honourable to 
Sir C. Napier as any part of his glorious career in Scinde; 
and the efforts of Lord Howick and other persons in the 
House of Commons to give it another character only con- 
firmed this truth : futile even to ridicule they were laughed 
at and pitied. 

From the flight of Roostum may be dated the commence- 
ment of the Scindian war. The sword had been taken from 



OF SCINDE. 



115 



the Ameers of Upper Scinde, as it were by sleight, but they 
fled to the desert and to Lower Scinde, there to raise in con- 
junction with their cousins of Hydrabad the standard of 
battle. They trusted in their sandy wastes, their strong and 
numerous fortresses, their deadly sun — in the numbers, 
courage, strength, and fierceness of their wild Beloochee 
swordsmen, and braver barbarians never gave themselves to 
slaughter. In these things they trusted, and not without 
reason. But they were opposed to what they could not un- 
derstand, having no previous experience of his like — a man 
of fiery yet vigilant valour, skilled in war, daring as the 
boldest chieftain of their hills and more mighty in fight : they 
found him so when their thousands went down before the 
bayonets of his valiant soldiers, wallowing in blood : but never 
was he cruel or ferocious, for he loved peace and justice with 
a true heart, and strove hard to avoid the clash of arms. The 
Ameers would have war, and in the shock were broken like 
potsherds, it was they who sought the strife. No Etruscan 
fecial ever cast his spear across a boundary, invoking his gods 
to attest the justice of a war, with a purer conscience than 
Charles Napier marched to battle. Now it shall be my task 
to shew how victoriously he bore the banner of England, how 
widely he has since spread England's fame for justice and 
gentleness, how the Beloochees reverence and the Scindians 
bless him, though the Ameers mourn. 

Whether he is to live for more glory, or to die an over- 
laboured man beneath that flaming sun, whose fiery aspect 
withers the principle of life, casting men dead to the earth 
by hundreds as quickly as the malignant ray descends, is in 
the darkness of futurity. If he lives, he will display all the 
resources of a mind capacious to regenerate and govern as 
well as to conquer. If he dies in harness he will leave a 
spotless reputation. Living or dead his place is amongst the 
greatest of England's captains. 

This anticipation, written when he had conquered at 
Meeanee and Hydrabad, is now in 1857 being again ac- 
knowledged by the nation, as when the public voice sent him 
back to India. Living and dead the people recognize his 
genius and virtue. 



CONQUEST OF SCINDE. 

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1845. 



PAET II. 



CHAPTER I. 

In the first portion of this work it has been shewn, that 
the English General had to deal with complicated political 
matters, pitiful in character yet pregnant with terrible con- 
sequences. His second course of diplomacy was combined 
with military operations, for he had to meet the mixed nego- 
tiation and warfare of the three sovereign families of Kyr- 
poor, Hydrabad, and Meerpoor, in the aggregate and sepa- 
rately ; and also the intrigues of each member of those 
families, all of whom claimed, and by Lord Auckland's 
treaties were entitled to independent power. 

Frequently at war with each other, these petty Sovereigns 
could from the number of their Beloochee followers, and the 
treasures extorted from the miserable Scindian and Hindoo, 
easily raise serious commotions : and often they did so. Hence 
the Ameers of Hydrabad, and those of Kyrpoor, were 
neither united amongst themselves, nor together; nor as 
public bodies could they be said to be at peace or war with 
the British Government. All professed amity, and even 
boasted of their attachment to the Auckland treaties ; yet 
daily violated those treaties on essential points. When re- 
buked for infractions they boldly denied them; and some 
members of each family always urged their particular good 



118 



THE CONQUEST 



faith, designing to profit either way ; yet experience proved 
that they, like the others, secretly cursed the subjection they 
publicly acknowledged. The Ameers most remarkable for 
this double dealing were, Roostum of Upper Scinde, Sobdar 
and Mohamed Khan of Lower Scinde and young Hoossein 
of Hydrabad, but he was a boy under Sobdar' s tutelage. 

All were at this time gathering troops without ostensible 
cause; and though at enmity with each other willing to 
unite against the intruded supremacy of England. Their 
policy was however mutable in the extreme, being influenced 
by fear, anger, hope, and drunkenness, alternately. Their 
proceedings were therefore fantastic ; and with such a medley 
of interests that the General could scarcely decide whether 
he was to negotiate or to fight, how or with whom to treat, 
where to menace, where to soothe, when to strike, who to 
support. " Their system," he said, " leaves no one re- 
sponsible ; their professions are so mixed, that if I were to 
throw a shell into Hydrabad, it would be as likely to fall on 
the head of a friend as an enemy." In fine, the policy of 
dividing power among many — effectual when, as in the 
Auckland policy, the design was to encroach and oppress, 
became burdensome when justice and tranquillity were 
sought. 

To the embarrassments thus created were added an under- 
current of personal intrigues, plots and quarrels, which in 
the East especially, always disturbs the main stream of 
affairs. Sir C. Napier indeed, peremptorily refused from 
the first to meddle with this turbid flow of vice and folly ; 
but he was compelled to sound its depths as an aid for his 
judgment in doubtful matters. 

This entanglement of affairs enabled Lord Howick, Lord 
Ashley, and others of less note, to confuse and darken the 
true story of the General's negotiations with the Ameers ; 
their object being to sustain an ungenerous but impotent op- 
position to the vote of thanks in the House of Commons. 
But the taint is in the blood, the conceit hereditary. Lord 
Grey of old assailed the conduct of the Duke of "Wel- 
lington in the Peninsula ; his son that of Sir C. Napier in 
Scinde. 



OF SCINDE. 119 

To purge the public mind of credulity in the spurious 
humanity, the puerile political philosophy put forward by 
those men with all the peevishness of faction, this work is 
written. The obscurity produced by calumniators shall be 
dispelled, and with it the dream of patriarchal, fallen Princes, 
bending beneath the blood-stained sword of a fierce soldier, 
for whom military glory was as God, justice as nothing ! 
Instead of this, will be found a brave and generous British 
officer, who in nearly fifty years' service, struggling against 
climate, wounds, wrongs, and poverty, was never swayed a 
hair's breadth in his noble career, by fear or self-interest 
or false glory. Sir C. Napier never did a base or sordid 
action. 

When the Ameer Roostum fled from Ali Moorad's fort of 
Dejee-ka-kote, the affairs of Scinde had reached a crisis re- 
quiring intrepidity, enterprise and judgment, to determine it 
in favour of British interests. But the full play of the two 
first qualities was restrained by anxiety to avoid slaughter, 
" If I can prevent blood being shed, and do not do so, I 
shall be a murderer," was his language at the time. " The 
General is the only man in the army who does not wish for 
a battle, was the language of the camp." And so intent was 
he to protect the people from suffering, that when at Roree, 
exposed to and expecting an attack, he detached the Bengal 
troops to occupy the ceded districts behind him, lest the 
Bhawal Khan, to whom they were given, should first take 
possession with his wild horsemen and ravage the villages. 

Nor was Lord Ellenborough's aversion to violence less 
unequivocal. His instructions are on record. They in- 
culcate the moral obligation of avoiding war by all means, 
save the sacrifice of British honour and the supremacy abso- 
lutely necessary at the time for the safety of British India. 
And it is fitting again to advert to the real situation of that 
Empire, when this wise and vigilant statesman, so potent 
from his knowledge of affairs and laborious energy, came to 
restore the reputation and strength of England in the East. 

He found the first tarnished by bad faith aod defeat, the 
second sapped by folly and corruption. The disaster of 
Cabool was recent and terrible ; the subsequent surrender of 



I 



120 THE CONQUEST 

Ghusni augmented the general terror, and directed the 
public fears to the isolated position of General Nott's army 
at Candahar, where, blockaded by the Affghans, it was 
without money or medicine, or means of transport for a 
march. Then came the unsuccessful attempt of General 
England at Hykulzie to succour Nott ; the dangerous siege 
sustained by Sale in Jellallabad, and General Pollock's long 
protracted inability to aid him. Pollock's own army, dis- 
pirited and precariously supplied with provisions, was wholly 
dependent on the Seiks, who, irrigated by the falsehoods of 
the Anglo-Indian press, were stubborn, moody, and with 
double his numbers infesting the communications rather 
than protecting them. 

In the interior of India universal despondency prevailed, 
and such a terror of the Affghans pervaded the population, 
it was scarcely possible to find resources for succouring the 
Generals : of three hundred and fifty camels, sent in one 
convoy to Pollock, three hundred and twenty were carried off 
in a single night by their drivers, one day's march from 
Peshawar. Meanwhile the Governor-General's secret plans 
were given to the newspapers by men in office ; and a mis- 
chievous, ignoble spirit, the natural consequence of making 
editors and money-seekers the directors of statesmen and 
generals, degraded the public mind and shed a baneful in- 
fluence over the army. In Scinde deep-laid plans of hos- 
tility were on the point of execution. At Madras several 
sepoy regiments, smarting under a sordid economy, were 
discontented if not in absolute mutiny. Actual insurrection 
existed at Saugur, and was spreading on one side to Bun- 
delcund ; on the other, along the Nerbudda to Boorampoor. 
The ancient fear of England's power, and that confidence in 
her strength which upholds her sway, were nearly extin- 
guished—the Indian population, whether subjects of England 
or of her allies and feudatories, especially the Mussulman 
portion, desired and expected the downfall of her Empire. 

Such was the terrible state of affairs, and but an outline 
of them is here given, when Lord Ellenborough assumed the 
government of the East. In one year, with incredible acti- 
vity and labour he checked internal a,buses, put down insur- 



OF SCINDE. 



121 



rection, restored confidence to the public, and military pride 
to the army. Succouring the isolated forces in Affghanistan, 
he. enabled the Generals to win glorious victories, to daunt 
external enemies, to repair past disasters, and add the great 
and rich province of Scinde to the British Empire. And 
none of those Generals could truly assert that success was 
not insured, according to their genius, by the Governor- 
General's magnanimous confidence and support— his letter of 
the 4th of July to General Nott, giving him a discretion to 
move forward or retreat, was a model of fine feeling, and 
fine discrimination of character. 

These great results were not obtained under the advice of 
old Indian counsellors, but in despite of them and their mis- 
chievous habits. Lord Ellenborough's correspondence with 
Nott and Pollock, from the letter just noticed to the re- 
capture of Cabool, was withheld carefully from the usual 
official channels of communication, and even from the Council 
at Calcutta. Had it not been so, the intended operations 
would soon have become publicly known, according to custom, 
and so have reached the enemy ; Ghusni would have been 
prepared for defence against Nott ; Pollock would have been 
more strongly encountered ; and though success might still 
have been attained, great loss would have been sustained and 
the effect felt throughout India. 

This secrecy was the first offence of Lord Ellenborough, 
and, with few exceptions, the persons holding political situ- 
ations immediately commenced an intriguing hostility 
against him, for thus rolling up their vanity and official con- 
sequence while he moved onward. That he should have 
completely succeeded was the second offence : it rendered the 
first inexpiable. And when, with a just indignation, he 
suspended a civil servant of the Company for calumniating 
the army, the Court of Directors also became inimical to 
him, and made every effort to weaken, thwart, and oppose 
his Government : at last, finding his energy too great for 
their evil influence, with malignant desperation they re-called 
the man who had just saved their empire, because he would 
not sacrifice the interests of England and the welfare of 
India to their silly pride and sordid nepotism. 



122 



THE CONQUEST 



But tlie public voice now, and the judgment of posterity 
hereafter will do him justice. History bears an avenging 
rod. She will tell, and it will be a tale to wonder at and 
execrate, that what great statesmen and noble armies gained 
and defended in the East with matchless vigour, the base 
cupidity and pitiful wilfulness of their merchant princes en- 
dangered — that there was a constant struggle between en- 
lightened policy and groping avarice, between real greatness 
and conceit. That the Court of Directors, powerless as they 
should be when a man of knowledge and energy presides at 
the Board of Control, sought the semblance of authority and 
dignity, by ostentatious communications and correspondence 
with particular officers in India; heading, as it were, an 
opposition to the Government carried on in its own name — 
that, acting as a political agitator, it encouraged intrigues 
and malversations where it could not command, and in all 
ways augmented the difficulties of ruling that immense 
empire — that^the public press of India, so false, so noisy 
and base, was not the. organ of the many but of the few; 
not of the governed people but of the governing Europeans, 
who sought their own profit apart from the general good. 
Finally, that a foul complicated system, odious to honourable 
minds, pervaded the Anglo-Indian policy; and when a Go- 
vernor-General of great ability, untiring energy and un- 
bending firmness, attempted to check its evil influence, the 
Directors with puerile vanity and selfish passion recalled 
him, substituting calumny for reason in excuse. 

The Ameers' resolution to thrust the English out of 
Scinde was not one of a day, it was a deep- rooted feeling in 
accord with the sentiments of their Beloochee subjects ; and 
all the mountain tribes of that fierce race beyond the frontier 
were willing to aid. Being zealous Mahomedans, a religious 
sympathy as well as the ties of kindred made them rejoice 
in the Affghans' success, and led them to desire a repetition 
of that triumph in Scinde ; but heads of greater ability, and 
hearts of greater courage than the Ameers possessed planned 
the means. Boostum's Vizier, Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, a 
wilely man, was one of these. In conjunction with other 
designing persons, Affghans and Seiks as well as Beloochees, 



OF SCINDE. 



123 



he concerted a general combination of those nations to fall on 
the British stations with two hundred thousand fighting 
men, and of this number the Ameers could furnish seventy 
thousand. 

To destroy Colonel England's column on its return from 
Candahar to Sukkur, when Nott moved against Cabool, was 
part of this scheme ; its success was to be the signal for a 
gathering of the nations to fall on the British force, which 
would then have been weak and isolated at Sukkur and 
Kurrachee. Some default of concert, and the unexpected 
strength of England's column, far more numerous than the 
one he led up to Candahar, for he had been reinforced by 
Lord Ellenborough, prevented the meditated attack on that 
officer, and Scinde was thus strongly occupied. This checked 
the Ameers, and the Ghoree's policy was then thwarted by 
the vigorous diplomacy of Sir C. Napier, which was founded 
on their mutual jealousies and disputes, and their vacil- 
lating inebriate habits. Yet secret negotiations amongst 
themselves and with foreign chiefs, confused plans, infrac- 
tions of treaty, and the latent hatred manifested from time to 
time in their speeches and councils, indicated that the general 
plot was only deferred, not abandoned. It was national with 
the Affghans and Beloochees ; but the Seiks were deluded 
by the falsehoods of the Anglo-Indian press, and their better- 
informed Prince, Shere Sing, could hardly restrain them 
from falling on the British troops when retiring through the 
Punjaub. The assembly of an army of reserve on the Sut- 
lege was therefore imposed upon the Governor-General, 
principally by editorial falsehoods ; and as it was useful the 
editors ridiculed it, after their nature, in which folly strives 
hard with villainy for pre-eminence. 

But if the Ameers of both Scindes had been then united 
for the war so long contemplated, the Seiks could not have 
been controlled by their Prince, and a great commotion, ex- 
tending probably to Nepaul and Gwalior, to Bundelcund 
and the districts south of the Nerbudda, would have shaken 
India to its centre : the army of reserve would have been its 
only support. Most essential was it also that Sir C. Napier 
should during that critical period keep the Ameers in a state 



124 



THE CONQUEST 



of irresolution ; and he did so by his adroit diplomacy and 
imposing military attitude, the unreserved confidence of the 
Governor-General enabling him to act without fear of respon- 
sibility. " I felt," he said, " that under Lord Ellenborough 
I might go headlong, if I saw my own way clearly." Every 
thing he required, and even more, was given to him. The 
Bengal division was placed at his disposal, he was offered 
more cavalry and guns, and all the Bombay sepoys of Nott's 
army : his command also was extended to the troops of the 
Bombay Presidency in Cutch. 

The first result of this freedom in counsel and action was 
the passage of the Indus. The Ameers had then only the 
option of letting him take possession of the ceded districts, or 
of attacking him in a strong position with a part only of their 
army. The first would have been a practical acknowledgment 
of the treaty, which it was never their intention to make ; the 
last, a dangerous experiment and a premature disclosure of 
their hostility. This skilful politico-military movement there- 
fore greatly perplexed them, and gave the General Government 
another respiration under the pressure of its difficulties. Yet, 
if Boostum had not at that moment fled from his turbulent 
sons and nephews to give the Turban to his brother, the war 
would have begun in Upper Scinde ; for the Ameers of the 
lower province were certainly preparing to take the field, and 
Ali Moorad, doubtful of the result, would probably have been 
inclined to act with the others. Some time would have been 
required indeed to bring all their forces together ; but that 
was in their policy, which was not to call the British troops 
into the field until the hot season. 

Boostum's movement, the impulse of an old man's selfish- 
ness, was therefore a great event ; and it was by the ready 
sagacity of the English General rendered a decisive one. It 
secured the alliance of Ali Moorad, and forcing the younger 
Princes to a premature display of hostility compelled them to 
abandon Upper Scinde without a blow. This was an irrefra- 
gable proof of their sinister designs ; yet Ptoos turn's cession of 
the Turban has been with stupid malignity denounced as the 
result of coercion and the cause of war, when in truth it pre- 
vented a war in Upper Scinde. That old Ameer soon saw his 



OF SCINDE. 



125 



error and sought to retrieve it by low cunning which failed : 
but had he remained united with his own family and with the 
Hydrabad Ameers he would have been very dangerous. 

The General had now to disperse the armed bands in 
Upper Scinde : he had refrained from attempting it when at 
Sukkur, well knowing, as he said, that it would be to chase a 
« Will-o'-the-wisp. " His first object was to combine his 
military and political measures solidly—" I can put them all 
into the Indus, they are barbarians, yet I act as if they were 
all French." When he had fixed his base securely at Roree 
and covered the ceded districts, he resolved to execute his 
orders. Had Roostum been still Rais, he and his family would 
have secretly caused the bands to disperse, with orders to re- 
assemble again later, and then openly, with oaths and lamen- 
tations and reproaches, would have declared their innocence, 
and protested against the injustice of suspecting them ! Thus 
time would have been gained for the coming of the deadly 
sun, when they would have laughed alike at their oaths and 
at the General, and aided by the Ameers of Lower Scinde, 
have commenced war with the advantages of numbers, union, 
and climate. 

The passage of the Indus, leaving the cantonment of 
Sukkur to its own resources against the Belooch force assem- 
bled at Larkaana was not an ordinary matter. It placed 
the active force on the true line of operations, put the poli- 
tical and military measures in harmony, and insured the 
occupation of the ceded districts while it gave the army a 
menacing position with a secure base. The passage was 
however in itself no easy operation ; for though the fighting 
men were few the followers were nearly twenty thousand, and 
the baggage enormous. " I have not plagued your Lordship 
with difficulties unavoidable and not insuperable, but the 
baggage of an Indian army is an awful affair,"— such was the 
simple note of the General at the time : those who have com- 
manded will feel its force. And war involves indeed so many 
combinations, so many details, so much preparation, that 
there is no surer indication of a great commander than 
bringing the multifarious parts of an army to work well 
together in a compact form. Simple the matter seems then, 



126 



THE CONQUEST 



but what energy of genius is required to bring it to that 
simplicity ! The steam-engine with its small whirling balls 
at top governing the giant's complicated iron skeleton below, 
is the type of a well-conducted army. 

Sir C. Napier's diplomacy was now successful. By de- 
taching the legal heir to the Turban from the family policy, 
and by alternately soothing and menacing the old Rais and 
his turbulent relations, he had brought Moorad's courage and 
ambition, Roostum' s fears and cunning, and the arrogance of 
his unruly sons and nephews into collision, and all opposed to 
the able Futteh Ghoree's policy — a matter of great moment, 
for he had been the foe of Moorad, the secret director of 
Roostum, and the sound adviser of all the other Ameers, 
even those of Hydrabad when their passions would let them 
listen to his counsels. This disunion retarded that junction 
of the forces of Upper and Lower Scinde which was to be the 
preliminary to hostility, the clouds of war gathered in the 
former were conjured and dissipated ; and when the wavering 
Roostum fled from Dejee again to join his sons the farce 
of the Kyrpoor troubles terminated. But then new actors of 
a sterner aspect appeared, giving notice that a dreadful 
tragedy was preparing. 

From that time every movement of the English General 
became critical, involving terrible results ; and it is essential 
to a right understanding of his character to shew, step by 
step, how exactly he ruled his conduct by the principles of 
honour and the rights of treaties — obeying his orders rigidly, 
yet making every effort to preserve peace, ere his sharp sword 
cut away the Talpoor dynasty from the land it afflicted. 
Cautiously and justly he proceeded towards the Ameers, and 
benevolently towards their people, while he supported the 
dignity of his own country, and the honour of her arms. 
Meeting low arts with fair dealing, baffling cunning with 
superior calculation, he steadily approached his object with 
an earnest desire to avoid spilling blood ; but when the 
waving of weapons forbad this, with incredible energy and 
daring he broke through their innumerable hosts as a plough- 
share breaks through the earth. A full harvest of happiness 
for Scinde has blessed the glorious labour. 



OF SCINDE. 



127 



After occupying Roree and the ceded districts he could 
no longer delay executing the Governor-General's orders to 
disperse the armed bands. He had repeatedly warned the 
Ameers that his orders were to that effect, and the constant 
answer was — " There are no bands, we are all submission." 
Nevertheless the bands were there, strong in number and 
violence, and increasing. They exacted the revenue in ad- 
vance ; they robbed the people and the merchants ; they drove 
from the country all the camels to prevent the British troops 
obtaining any ; they stopped the daks coming to Sukkur, and 
intercepted the communications of the army. There was no 
remedy but force, and the General, seeing it would be useless 
to send moveable columns in pursuit through so large and 
intricate a country, resolved to strike at their head-quarters. 
This was Kyrpoor, the capital, which being then filled 
with fighting men he resolved to storm. He marched 
in December, at the head of two thousand infantry, nine 
hundred cavalry and twelve field pieces, besides a battery of 
241b. howitzers drawn by camels. Roostum was however 
then in Ali Moorad's fort, and Ali himself being acknow- 
ledged as Rais and in alliance with the British, the General 
had strong hopes that the other Ameers, perplexed and dis- 
mayed by Roostum' s conduct, would not risk an assault, and 
before he moved, sent them this warning letter : — 

" Ameers, I have to request your Highnesses will protect 
our post coming through your country. Two of our mails 
have been stopped in the territory of Kyrpoor, and I am 
going to inquire into this matter, and put a stop to such 
aggressions. Wherever my posts are stopped there will I 
march with my troops ; and your Highnesses will have to 
pay the expense if this happens within your territory." 

His right to act thus was undoubted. For if the Ameers 
had called up the bands and directed their operations, as 
indeed they had, it was war ; and if the bands acted without 
orders, they were common enemies, being also robbers, plun- 
derers and murderers, who filled the whole country with 
terror and wailing. But in reality the Ameers had brought 
them together, had paid them, and were quite unable to re-- 
strain them if they had desired to do so. To disperse such 



128 



THE CONQUEST 



mischievous bodies was not only a social right but a duty, 
even though orders to do so had not been received. It was 
also in strict accordance with Roostum's original treaty, 
which gave the Anglo-Indian Government a right to repress 
the aggression of one Ameer against another, and, more 
strongly to restrain violence against itself. 

The 26th of December the General reached Mungaree, 
a fort near Kyrpoor, where he encamped, because, as he 
expected, the sons and nephews of Roostum, dismayed and per- 
plexed by the cession of the Turban, had gone off to the south 
with their fighting men, treasures and families. On the 28th 
however Roostum, once more changing sides, had followed 
them from Dejee, with his troops and money, and then the 
Beloochee forces assembled at Larkaana crossed to the 
right bank of the Indus and made for Hydrabad, thinking 
that some of the Ameers would surely hire them for battle. 
Thus no armed men remained in Upper Scinde, save those 
under Ali Moor ad. The Governor- General's orders were thus 
fulfilled without bloodshed. Then arose the Scindian labourer 
with a shout of exultation, and the trafficking Hindoo clapped 
his lean hands in joy at the flight of the oppressors. Relieved 
from the swordsmen whose sharp blades cut short remon- 
strance against robbery, both husbandmen and traders flocked 
to the British camp with provisions, cowering joyfully under 
the protection of the " just Feringee G-eneral." 

With a vigorous hand he guarded their rights of life and 
property. Inflexible to marauders, he was ever on horseback 
watching and enforcing obedience to orders — no light task, 
for the abolition of flogging in the sepoy army left him only 
the choice of death or imprisonment for plunderers ; but death 
could not be often resorted to, and confinement required 
guards, weakening the force in the field, while the culprit 
enjoyed the great pleasure, according to Eastern habits, of 
doing nothing. To remedy this defect in the military code, 
he multiplied his provost-marshals, thus placing plunderers 
in the hands of functionaries who were not restricted as to 
corporal chastisement. Exhorting his officers to vigilance he 
warned them, that straggling and marauding were the 
greatest evils for an army, quoting the Duke of Wellington's 



OF SCINDE. 



129 



authority for the importance of having the peasants for or 
against the troops. He thus saved the people from violence, 
and the army from destruction; but with characteristic 
villainy the editors of the Indian press denounced his conduct ; 
calling upon the sepoys at the most critical period — " to rise 
and put an end to the fellow's breach of law." And these 
exhortations to mutiny and murder were unpunished, because 
they came from a faction supported by the Directors and the 
Bombay Government ! 

The Indian Government is weak, and it will never be 
strong, until the official persons are compelled to support 
the Governor-General in preference to courting the Leaden- 
hall trading politicians. Despicable as the editors of Indian 
newspapers are however, there is no wisdom in despising 
their efforts to produce evil ; their falsehoods nearly caused 
the destruction of Pollock's and Nott's armies, while tra- 
versing the Punjaub on their return from Cabool, and they 
actually produced the first Seik war. 

At Mungaree Sir C. Napier was detained several days 
by heavy rain, an unusual occurrence in Scinde. During 
this forced halt he visited All Moorad at Kyrpoor, to con- 
cert measures for maintaining tranquillity in Upper Scinde, 
when the army should descend on the lower province, ac- 
cording to the Governor-General's orders — for the difficul- 
ties which had just been terminated in Upper Scinde still 
existed with the Ameers of Lower Scinde, and time pressed. 
Hydrabad was one hundred and fifty miles distant, it was 
then the beginning of January, and beyond the middle 
of March military operations could not be carried on without 
great risk from the heat. The Ameers knew this, and their 
intrigues, their falsehoods, and pretended submissions, their 
promises to accept the new treaty, and the negotiation they 
had commenced by their vakeels, were all designed to waste 
the cool season unprofitably for the British. 

Correct intelligence of their movements and numbers it 
was very difficult to obtain in a country where lying is the 
natural order of intercourse, and truth-telling the excep- 
tion ; yet, many emissaries being employed and much pains 
bestowed, the obscurity gradually cleared up. The constant 

K 



130 



THE CONQUEST 



afflux of armed men from the hills, the plains, and the 
desert, was ascertained ; and it was certain the Ameers, if 
they united and freely dispensed their treasures, could, time 
being allowed, bring into the field from seventy to eighty 
thousand fighting men of most robust bodies and courageous 
spirits, well armed, and well exercised in arms after their 
fashion — a fashion not contemptible. The Beloochees 
knew well the difficulties the country presented to an enemy, 
planned their defence with great intelligence, chose their 
positions well, and, unlike other Asiatics, prided themselves 
on their infantry in preference to their cavalry. 

Sir C. Napier had not at this time more than eight 
thousand troops, widely distributed, at Sukkur, at Kurra- 
chee, and in the field. The 41st British regiment was 
below Hydrabad in march to embark for Bombay; the Bengal 
division was within a march or two, but occupying the ceded 
districts till the Bhawal Khan took possession, when it was 
to move to Ferozepore. Three thousand fighting men were 
in the field; yet only brought there by the exercise of an 
overbearing will, and incessant pains-taking to overcome ob- 
stacles of a serious nature ; for Scinde had been nearly 
exhausted by Lord Keane's army of carriage, which in Indian 
parlance means camels and other beasts of burden, and it 
had not yet recovered : moreover, the Ameers secretly 
menaced the contractors, and the principal one forfeited his 
deposit rather than risk their vengeance. They had also, 
caused all the camels to be driven away, an act of war in 
itself, and sufficiently indicative of their ultimate object. 

Only six hundred miserable worn-out animals, the refuse 
of Lord Keane's commissariat, were available for the field 
force. The delirious invasion of Affghanistan had there- 
fore entailed a dangerous war in Scinde, and nearly deprived 
the army of means to support that war with success. Folly 
begets mischief. 

Of the three thousand men in the field, many of the 
sepoys had been, during the three years of the Affghan 
contest, placed in difficult situations ; and some had suf- 
fered severe defeats from the brave barbarians of the hills. 
The moral effect of this had been dispiriting ; but now 



( 



OF SCINDE. 131 

finding themselves under an able commander, past disasters 
were only so far remembered as to produce respect for their 
enemy's courage, and that is not the worst cast of mind for 
soldiers in dangerous operations. 

Soon the emissaries' reports enabled the General to scan 
the military horizon. Two thousand men, under Mohamed 
Ali, Roostum's nephew, had thrown themselves into Shah 
Ghur, a desert fort to the east, on the borders of Jessul- 
mere ; his design being to gather a larger force there to 
operate against Roree and the ceded districts. But Shah 
Ghur was an appurtenance of the Turban ; wherefore this 
movement of Mohamed was an act of war against Ali 
Moorad, as Rais, giving the English General a right under 
the treaty of nine articles to interfere. 

Roostum had seven thousand men and several pieces of 
cannon within the borders of the desert, to the south, hang- 
ing on the cultivated district for the sake of water, but with 
the desert at hand for a retreat. He was in direct commu- 
nication with his sons and nephews, most of whom were at 
Dingee, a large fortress some forty-five miles south of Dejee, 
and just on the line of demarcation between Upper and 
Lower Scinde. To that point the Beloochees from Larkaana, 
and other places, were hastening in arms ; and from thence 
the Princes concerted with the Hydrabad Ameers a new plan 
of warfare. 

Mohamed, or Hoossein Khan, Roostum's son, had thrown 
himself with two thousand men and all his treasure into 
Emaum Ghur, another desert fortress, which he had previ- 
ously stored with grain and gunpowder. This place, was by 
the Beloochees accounted impregnable, and to Europeans 
inaccessible as being in the very heart of the waste. 
They designed it as a place of arms for the forces of Upper 
Scinde, and its seizure was another act of war against Ali 
Moorad, for it also belonged to the Turban. There were 
reports besides of several numerous bodies of Beloochee 
cavalry wandering in the waste, but the destination of 
all was said Emaum Ghur. (Plan 3.) The Hydrabad 
Ameer, and the Meerpoor man, were likewise collecting 
troops, though less ostentatiously; and all had agreed to 



132 



THE CONQUEST 



act with the Princes of Upper Scinde, on a plan arranged 
with a skill and intelligence that had nothing barbarous in 
conception. Subsequent intelligence made known that it 
was the work of the purchased Abyssinian and Arab slaves 
of the Ameers, called " Seedees" amongst whom one Hoche, 
a black, was conspicuous for his ability, greatness of mind, 
and heroic courage. 

Expecting that their opponent, so prompt and resolute as 
they had found him in all his proceedings, would not fail to 
attack Kyrpoor, as indeed he designed, the first arrange- 
ment of the Ameers had been that the Beloochees of Upper 
Scinde should fall back fighting from that capital to Din- 
gee, where they were to be reinforced to the amount of 
fifteen thousand men : those stationed at Larkaana, of equal 
force, being to assail the camp at Sukkur, while the retreat 
upon Dingee was effected. If the attack from Larkaana 
succeeded, the British field force would be isolated they 
thought, and was to be immediately opposed by the great 
mass of the Upper Scinde army, reinforced by the Hydra- 
bad and Meerpoor forces, which were promptly to unite at 
Dingee and give battle. 

The foresight of the General in forming a new base 
at Boree vitiated this military plan ; and his detection of 
their schemes, for delaying the campaign by false negotia- 
tions until the hot season, vitiated their policy. Boos- 
tum's secession completed their confusion; they fled to 
Dingee as shewn, drawing after them from Larkaana the 
force which was to have stormed Sukkur. However at 
Dingee they prepared to execute the second part of the 
original plan, modified by the course of events : that was 
to inveigle the British troops, whose numbers they well knew, 
amongst the nullahs and swamps on the left bank of the 
Indus, and to keep them stationary there by fresh negotia- 
tions and intrigues, until the inundation should flood the 
camp and the fierce sun strike the soldiers down — " then 
blades were to be drawn," and the Beloochee, as they ex- 
pressed themselves in their Dhurbars, were " To make the 
Caffirs, as they fell beneath their swords, cry out, Oh, Grod I 
what have tue done, that you let these devils loose upon us ?" 



OF SCINDE. 



133 



" If we fail to keep him on the river bank, if he attacks, 
and that we are defeated," thus they reasoned, " we will 
retreat in two bodies on different lines. The Kyrpoor 
Ameers, with the force of Upper Scinde, must strike into 
the desert to rally at Emaum Ghur, where there are provi- 
sions, powder and treasure. The Ameers of Lower Scinde 
will fall back on Hydrabad, and that is a strong fortress. 
Whichever body the British General pursues, the other must 

close on his rear. 

" No European has ever seen Emaum Ghur ; it is built 
in the heart of the wilderness, it is only to be approached by 
vague uncertain tracks, not known to strangers, and in some 
places without water for several marches. He cannot reach 
us there. 

"If he halts and encamps after his victory on the 
river's bank, late in the season, pestilence will destroy his 
troops. If he enters the waste in pursuit of the Upper 
Scinde forces, those of Lower Scinde will cut his communi- 
cation with the cultivated district and the river, and his 
troops will perish from heat and thirst on the burning sands. 

" If he marches upon Hydrabad he will encounter the 
armies of Lower Scinde well based on that strong fortress, 
and having the sultry swamps of the Delta to retire upon in 
the south if again defeated; or they shall make for Meerpoor 
eastward, another strong fortress on the edge of the desert, 
having Omercote behind them in the heart of the waste. 
Meanwhile the force of Upper Scinde, returning from 
Emaum Ghur, shall emerge upon his rear and cut his com- 
munications with Roree. 

" If he sees his danger and endeavours to fall back on 
Roree, we will all unite to pursue him with harassing attacks 
night and day. He will never be able to reach Sukkur ! " 

They counted on having nearly seventy thousand fight- 
ing men, and thirty pieces of cannon for this warfare, and 
knew, if they gained any marked advantage or even sus- 
tained the first shock without utter ruin, the Affghans and 
Seiks, the Brahooe-Beloochees, and the Moultan man, it 
might be the Bhawal Khan's people also, would take part in 
the war. Then internal commotions would shake India, the 



134 



THE CONQUEST 



native army of Gwalior would take the field, and the British 
empire in the East be rocked to its foundations. 

Such was the formidable warfare the English General 
had to deal with ; such were the terrible results to be ex- 
pected from an error in judgment, or a misfortune, where 
the adverse chances of climate, of intrigue, and of the sword, 
were arrayed to confuse his perception by a sense of respon- 
sibility as much as by the sense of danger. Did he tremble? 
Let his actions reply. 

That such a plan might be adopted had not escaped his 
comprehension, and with a counterstroke he was prepared to 
put it aside, and so shake their confidence as to render them 
amenable without fighting. 

He had at first opposed Ali Moorad's assumption of the 
Turban, thinking it would augment the chances of hostilities: 
that opinion was now changed. Roostum's restless cunning 
would have baffled Ali Moor ad's government : he would have 
equally fled from Dejee, bearing with him the dignity and 
influence of Rais ; an advantage lost by ceding the Turban, 
for the Beloochees obey the wearer of the Puggree, no 
matter how acquired. It is indeed a most ancient Asiatic 
maxim, that to the throne, not the man, belongs dignity and 
power. The cession was therefore an advantage which he 
now turned to account. 

To retire again to Roree, or to delay his own advance, 
was not to be thought of ; to beat the force at Dingee, and, 
then, lumbered as he was with baggage and followers, to 
pursue into the waste men without incumbrance and sun- 
proof, would end in disaster. To advance on Hydrabad 
involved a siege, which, as his communication with Sukkur 
would be cut by the people from Emaum Ghur, must be 
tedious and bring him into the hot season. That was the 
stay and hope of the Ameers. Their desert they thought 
inaccessible to him. He thought that an illusion, and re- 
solved to dispel it before the cool season passed. In this view 
he resolved to strike at Emaum Ghur — an enterprise as 
hardy as any of which military records tell. Similar it was 
in design but more dangerous, more daring, than that of 
Marius against Jugurtha's city of Capsa. Like Capsa, 



OF SCINDE. 135 

Emaum Ghur was accounted impregnable, as well as inacces- 
sible. It was in the heart of the desert, eight long marches 
distant, the exact site unknown, the tracks leading to it and 
the wells were but vaguely indicated by the native informist : 
indeed few knew them, and those might be traitors. Some 
marches must be made without finding water, and all the 
springs were capricious, bubbling up at times freely, at other 
times disappearing to rise again at a distance, never certain as 
to locality or abundance s and the rolling sands governed by 
the winds always menaced entire destruction to man and beast. 

This hidden fortress, Charles Napier resolved to seek 
out and assail, though he knew it was garrisoned by two 
thousand of the best Beloochee warriors, for none but the 
best would encounter the privations of the desert when ne- 
cessity did not urge them. Many thousand horsemen also 
were on the skirts of the wilderness, knowing the water pits, 
able to fill them up or poison their waters and then fall on 
the fainting soldiers ! 

It was an enterprise worthy of Alexander and his 
Agrians, but well reasoned. Success would first deprive the 
Beloochees of a moral confidence, and a material resource 
suiting their superior power to sustain heat ; then their 
chosen position of battle at Dingee would be turned, ren- 
dered useless, by the march to Emaum Ghur and the 
return, which last was designed by a way different from the 
advance. Their whole plan of operations would thus be 
frustrated, and their united forces thrown upon one line to 
the south, where, crowded and embarrassed, they must dis- 
perse or accept battle to cover Hydrabad, without time for 
preparation. This last trial however he expected to be 
spared. The taking of Emaum Ghur, thought by the 
Ameers stronger than Hydrabad, would he hoped intimidate 
those inebriate, luxurious Princes. 

But the enterprise involved political considerations. To 
move against Emaum Ghur, and Shah Ghur, which he^ also 
contemplated, would be hostile acts against the two Princes 
who had seized them; not so, necessarily, against the 
Ameers generally, though designed to influence them. It 
would be a continuance of his operations against the armed 



136 



THE CONQUEST 



bands he had been ordered to disperse, for it was with those 
bands the two fortresses were garrisoned. The right to attack 
them was under the treaty of nine articles, reinforced by the 
authority of Ali Moorad, whose property as Rais they now were. 
Originally they belonged to Roostum, but only as Rais and, 
ceding the Turban, he ceded them. Roostum did not dispute 
this law but denied the valid cession of the Turban, saying, 
he had previously given it to his son, who therefore held 
Emaum Ghur of right. This was however notoriously con- 
trary to the Talpoor law, and to complete the confusion, 
he now offered his own authority as Rais, which he had 
twice ceded, to remove Hoossein and Ali from Emaum Ghur 
and Shah Ghur. 

This was one of Roostum' s many intrigues to gain time 
for the general plan of campaign : yet it proved the absolute 
authority of the Rais over the forts, and Ali Moorad was the 
lawful Rais. He was so even without Roostum' s cession: 
for when that Ameer resigned the Turban to his son, he le- 
gally divested himself but could not legally give it to another 
— it fell by law to Ali Moorad. Hoossein and Ali Mohamed 
were thus brought under article Y, which gave the British a 
right to interpose in any dispute between two Ameers. Ali 
Moorad was indeed averse to the British entering the desert, 
saying he would reduce Emaum Ghur himself. This was 
futile. He had formally complained that his nephews re- 
sisted the authority of the Rais, and by article III he was 
bound, as Roostum's successor, to act in subordinate co-opera- 
tion with the British. It followed that Mohamed was a rebel 
and an outlaw. No declaration of war was therefore neces- 
sary, and policy forbad delay. Ali Moorad' s presence was 
however desirable, to give an appearance as well as the 
quality of right to the enterprise. His knowledge of the 
waste and of the fortress would be useful ; and it was also 
essential— to teach him who had wavered in his alliance at 
first, and now showed a dislike to have the British penetrate 
the waste, that he could no longer choose his part, having to 
deal with a man his over-match in policy, who thus described 
his views. 

" I had discovered long ago that the Ameers put im- 



OP SCINDE. 



137 



plicit faith in their deserts, and feel confident we can never 
reach them there; and therefore, when negotiations and 
delays and lying and intrigues of all kinds fail, they can at 
last declare their entire obedience, their innocence, their 
humility, and retire beyond our reach to their deserts, and 
from thence launch their wild bands against us, so as to cut 
off all our communications and render Scinde more hot than 
nature has already done. So circumstanced, and after all 
the consideration I could give the subject, and after draw- 
ing all I could from Ali Moorad, whom I saw last night 
at Kyrpoor, I made up my mind, that, although war was 
not declared nor is it necessary to declare it, I would at 
once march upon Emaum Ghur, and prove to the Talpoor 
families, both of Kyrpoor and Hydrabad, that neither their 
deserts nor their negotiations can protect them from the 
British troops; for while they imagine they can fly with 
security to the deserts, they never will be quiet. 

" I told Ali Moorad I would place his Killedar in 
Emaum Ghur ; that your Lordship was determined to sup- 
port the family chief, as bound by treaty ; that those people 
who fled with armed men to Emaum Ghur, and refused to 
obey their chief, Meer Roostum, were in fact rebels, and I 
was resolved to follow them. His reply was, ' He would 
take Emaum Ghur himself.' I answered, 6 1 knew he could 
do so, and his readiness to save my troops the trouble was 
praiseworthy, and I was much obliged to him.' However, I 
was determined to shew the Ameers of Hydrabad their 
deserts were of no avail ; that I could and would follow them 
everywhere, whether it was to the deserts of Scinde or to 
the mountains of Beloochistan ; that following his cousins to 
Emaum Ghur was, perhaps, the most difficult of any opera- 
tion of the kind, and therefore would have the most effect. 

" I thought it not amiss to lift up the curtain, and let 
my friend Ali Moorad look into futurity ; it is well for him 
to feel that he is wholly dependent on our power; that 
everything he can honestly wish for is his, as our faithful 
ally, but, that should he be a traitor he has no refuge. He 
is vigorous minded, ambitious, and, I suspect, a cunning 
man, but apparently generous and bold ; in short, as good 



138 THE CONQUEST 

as barbarians can be, and better than most. Sheik Ali 
Nusseer, his minister, is very clever ; he has lived in Bengal, 
knows our power, and has, I believe, convinced his master 
that it is not to be resisted ; besides, he sees that while he 
keeps his master good friends with us, his own fortune must 
thrive : he is therefore our own." 

Ali Moorad was now declared Rais by the following 
manifesto. 

"Ameers and people of Scinde. His Highness the 
Ameer Roostum Khan sent a secret messenger to me, 
saying, he was in the hands of his family and could not 
act as his feelings of friendship for the English nation 
prompted him to do ; and if I would receive him, he would 
escape and come to my camp. I answered his Highness I 
would certainly receive him, but my advice was, for him to 
consult with his brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad Khan. He 
took my advice. He went to the fort of Dejee, to his 
brother. When I heard of this I was glad, for I thought 
that Scinde would be tranquil ; that his Highness would 
spend his last days in honour and in peace. I moved with 
my troops towards Kyrpoor, to force his violent family to 
disperse the wild bands they had collected. I sent his 
Highness word I should visit him ; I wanted to ask his 
advice as to the arrangements for the new treaty. I thought- 
he had again become the friend of the Government I serve. 
That night I heard he had solemnly conferred upon his 
brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad, the Turban of command 
over the Talpoor family, which brother is the lawful heir to 
that honour. I thought this a very wise proceeding, and it 
added to my desire to meet his Highness, that I might hear 
from his own lips all about these things and report the 
same to the Governor-General, being assured that these acts 
would recover for him the good opinion and friendship of the 
Governor-General of India. 

" My feelings towards his Highness were those of friend- 
ship, honour and peace. I even advised his Highness' 
brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad, not to accept the Turban, 
but to assist his brother, the Chief, in the cares of govern- 
ment. I laboured for the honour of the Talpoor family. 



OF SCINDE. 



139 



What then was my astonishment to find, that when I 
expected to meet the Ameer Roostum Khan his Highness 
had departed from the roof of his brother, thus insulting 
and defying the Governor-General, whose commander I am. 
But my surprise is greatly increased, by hearing that his 
Highness has joined his family and the armed bands who 
have cut off our communications and stopped our mails. 
These things have surprised me ; but my course is plain, 
and I thus publish it to the country, that all may know it, 
and conduct themselves accordingly. I will, according to 
the existing treaty, protect the chief Ameer, Ali Moorad, in 
his right as the justly constituted chief of the Talpoor 
family. God willing, I mean to march into the desert. I 
will disperse the armed bands that have stopped our mails. 
I will place the Killedars of the chief, Ali Moorad, in com- 
mand of every fort ; and I will act towards the Ameers of 
Hydrabad as I shall find their conduct deserves." 

Scarcely had this been published, when a letter from 
Roostum arrived, in which he denied having voluntarily 
ceded the Turban, and intimated that the English General 
had betrayed him into Ali Moorad's hands, designing to 
make him a captive. At the same time a letter of an 
equally false character came from Nusseer of Hydrabad, 
professing obedience indeed, but only to obtain time for the 
assembling of the tribes. 

These artifices were too gross. 

" Ameer," said the General, in reply to Nusseer, " I 
have received your letter. When a man's actions and his 
words do not accord, I am greatly distressed to know how to 
act. The Government of the Ameers is one of many heads. 
All speak and act after a different, and a very strange 
manner. I cannot judge afar off. I came to Kyrpoor to 
see how matters stand, and I mean to go to Hydrabad to 
do the same. I cannot distinguish friends from enemies at 
two hundred miles' distance, and as you say you are the 
friend of the Company and Governor- General you will re- 
joice to see me. I hear of troops collecting in the south, 
armed men shall not cross the Indus, therefore I take 
troops." 



140 



THE CONQUEST 



To Roostum lie wrote in a sterner manner, for he was 
indignant at his falsehood, and the accusation of treachery. 

" Your Highness's letter obliges me to speak with a lan- 
guage I regret, but the honour of my country, and the in- 
terest of yours, leaves me no alternative. The gist of your 
Highness's letter is this. That I advised you to be guided by 
your brother, the Ameer Ali Moorad ; and that he advised 
you to fly from a meeting with me, as a conspirator who 
wished to make you a captive. 

" Ameer, such a subterfuge is unworthy of your High- 
ness's rank. You know it is not truth. You know that 
you offered to come to my camp, and that I advised you to 
go to your brother's fortress instead of coming to my camp ; 
you therefore well know that I had no desire to capture 
you, nor to interfere with your family arrangements. Yet 
you now pretend that when I asked you to meet me, you 
flew from, me, not from any desire to avoid a meeting with 
me but because I advised you to be guided by your brother's 
advice, and he advised you to fly ! I will not suffer your 
Highness to take shelter under such misrepresentations. 
You made submission to me as the representative of the 
Governor-General ; you have solemnly resigned the Turban, 
and you now avow that you look upon this, the most solemn 
and important act of your life, as a farce and a mockery ! 

" Ameer, I do not understand such double conduct : I 
hold you to your words and deeds ; I no longer consider you 
to be the chief of the Talpoors, nor will I treat with you as 
such, nor with those who consider you to be Rais." 

While thus occupied at Mungaree, Ali Moorad's Vizier, 
Sheik Nusseer, told him, that Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, the 
prime mover of all mischief, had come disguised to Dejee- 
ka-kote, and corrupted two thousand of the Rais' troops, in- 
tending to carry them off to the sons and nephews of Roostum. 
The Sheik had therefore seized him, and asked significantly, 
" What shall be done with him ? " " Keep him captive, but 
do him no hurt," was the reply. It was a fortunate event, 
and a good omen. 

During the fall of rain the army could not move, because 
the camels slip in the wet and dislocate their hips ; thus the 



141 

OF SCINDE. ^ x 



Bengal division, under Colonel Wallace, having moved con- 
trary to orders in bad weather, lost ninety m one day . 
Soon however the return of a serene sky enabled the Ge- 
neral to advance on Dejee, where he was desirous to conter 
with Ali Moorad again, and to receive the latest reports ot 
his emissaries before he plunged into the unknown waste. 
He reached it the 4th of January, and was then joined by 
Outram from Bombay. The reports from the emissaries also 
arrived. The Belooch forces at Dingee were said to have 
.one to the desert, on the skirts of which Roostum hovered 
with his troops ; all were bound, it was supposed, for Emaum 
Ghur, and not less than twenty thousand fighting men, 
besides the garrison of that fort, were in the waste. 

No exact intelligence could be obtained of the tracks to 
Emaum Ghur, or of the situation and copiousness of the 
waters; and it was evident that Ali Moorad was still averse 
to strangers going there. The English General was not to 
be turned from his resolution but his difficulties augmented. 
He had now made four marches with his whole disposable 
force, the two last actually within the precincts of the desert ; 
his next move was to be into the wilderness, without sure 
guides, without any well-grounded expectation of finding 
water and forage, and with almost a certainty of being met 
and fought with, or at the least harassed by the Beloochees 
in great numbers. He desired therefore to await the Go- 
vernor-General's approval before he made the attempt, but 
the recent heavy rains, unusual in Scinde, had so facilitated 
the execution of the design, that he would not lose the oppor- 
tunity by delay. 

His first notion was to march upon Emaum Ghur with 
his whole force, by the road of Laloo, a place considered to 
be in the desert, though near the edge of the cultivated 
district. This line would still turn the recusant Ameers' po- 
sition at Dingee, and cut their communication with the 
fortresses in the waste ; he could then choose, whether to 
wheel suddenly on his right and fall on them at Dingee ; or 
to his left and march on Emaum Ghur. For with a nice 
generalship, knowing how war changes its face day by day, 
he designed to steer so as to be ready for any accidental 



142 



THE CONQUEST 



advantage which might offer ; hoping always to alarm the 
Beloochees at Dingee, and again cause them to disperse or 
retreat. In either case he could gain time to make his point 
in the desert, without being troubled by them during that 
perilous march; and if, as his spies reported, the Dingee 
force had already gone to Emaum Ghur, his resolution was 
to follow them and fight a decisive battle at its gates, before 
the Hydrabad army could collect to harass his rear. If they 
retreated confusedly on Hydrabad, his intention was, to re- 
linquish the desert march and strike at them beneath the 
walls of that capital. 

New events changed these views. The Belooch movement 
into the waste from Dingee had been prematurely reported ; 
the Ameers had attempted it, but their men soon revolted 
at the difficulties, and returned, preferring battle to pri- 
vations. Meanwhile, a native agent sent to explore and 
note the state of the wells, came back with such a tale of 
arid sands and dried up pits, that the General resigned all 
hope of being able to march with the whole army. Then 
with surpassing hardihood he selected two hundred irregular 
cavalry, put three hundred and fifty of the 22nd Queen's 
regiment on camels, loaded ten more of those animals with 
provisions, eighty with water, and resolved with these five 
hundred men to essay that enterprise for which only the day 
before he had allotted three thousand, thinking it even then 
most hazardous as in truth it was. The guide might be 
false, Ali Moorad might prove a traitor, the wells might be 
poisoned, the water-skins might be cut in the night by a 
prowling emissary; the skirts of the waste were swarming 
with thousands of horsemen, who might surround him on the 
march, and the Ameers had many more and better camels 
than he had, upon which to mount their infantry: finally 
Emaum Ghur was strong, well provided, and the garrison 
alone four times his number ! To look at all these dangers 
with a steady eye, to neglect no precautions, to discard fear 
and brave the privations of the unknown wilderness, was the 
work of a master spirit in war, or the men of ancient days 
have been idly called great. 

Compelling Ali Moorad and the native guide to go with 



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him, he warned them in his quaint mode to beware of foul 
play, saying, such was his anxiety for their subsistence, they 
should only eat and drink at the wells with his soldiers, for 
thus only could he be sure they were not suffering — then 
he started, having organized a body of camel-riders to 
maintain his communications with his army. The weight 
of nearly fifty years' service had not bent his head, the drain 
of many wounds had not chilled the fiery current of his 
blood ; refusing no labour, enduring every privation equally 
with the youngest and most robust of his troops, he led his 
small band into the heart of the trackless waste, not in pride 
and arrogance of daring, but to strike at the vital parts of 
the Ameers' strength, and to find peace where they had 

prepared only war. 

His march could not be concealed, but relying on the 
weak nature of the Ameers he, with infinite sagacity, sent 
them formal notice, saying—" I am not going to plunder or 
to slay, if you make no resistance. If you do, abide the 
consequences ! " Thus he considered and provided for every 
chance in this desperate trial, with a coolness of calculation 
that gained for him the unrestricted commendation of that 
great general, whose genius is imperial England's pride; 
and now it will be understood why the man who won Assaye, 
he who commenced the passage of the Douro with a single 
boat and twenty-five men, why he, the Duke of Wellington, 
speaking in the House of Lords with that elevated simplicity, 
which is the peculiar characteristic of his mind, thus described 
the exploit : — " Sir Charles Napier' \s march upon Mnaum 
Grhur, is one of the most curious military feats which I have 
ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of 
in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against 
hostile forces ; he had his guns transported under circumstances 
of extreme difficidty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, 
and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it im- 
possible for them ever to regain their positions." 

On the evening of the 5th he began this march; the 
night was dark, the sand deep, the guide lost the track ; yet 
the troops made nearly twenty-five miles before they halted. 
The second day's journey was somewhat less, but forage 



144 



THE CONQUEST 



failed, water became scarce, and he sent back three-fourths 
of his cavalry, retaining only fifty of the best, and hoping 
rather than expecting to retain even those beyond another 
day. Yet he was resolute to proceed while a hundred men 
could be kept together. 

Roostum with seven thousand armed followers, ten times 
the number of the British, was now suddenly found on the 
flank : but treating him as one who must be submissive, the 
General sent Outram to his camp, still pushing on himself 
with his fifty wild horsemen, his two howitzers, and his three 
hundred Irish infantry, whose Guebre blood, bounding in 
their veins, seemed to recognize the divinity of that Eastern 
sun which their forefathers had worshipped two thousand 
years before. 

A wild and singular waste was that they were penetrat- 
ing. Sand-hills, north and south, stretched for hundreds of 
miles in parallel ridges, symmetrically plaited like the ripple 
of a placid tide. Varying in height, breadth and steepness, 
they presented one uniform surface. Some were only a 
mile broad, others more than ten miles across ; many were of 
gentle slopes and low, others lofty, and so steep the howitzers 
could only be dragged up by men. The sand, mingled with 
shells, run in great streams resembling numerous rivers, 
skirted on each side by parallel streaks of soil, which 
nourished jungle, yet thinly and scattered. The tracks of the 
hyena and wild boar, and the prints of small deers' footsteps 
were seen at first, yet they soon disappeared, and the solitude 
of the waste became unbroken. 

For eight days these intrepid soldiers traversed this 
gloomy region, living from hand to mouth, uncertain each 
morning if water could be found in the evening; and at 
times it was not found; they were not even sure of their 
right course, yet with fiery valour and untiring strength they 
continued their dreary dangerous way. The camels found 
little food and got weak, but the stout infantry helped to 
drag the heavy howitzers up the sandy steeps, and all the 
troops, despising the danger of an attack, worked with a 
power and will that overcame every obstacle. On the eighth 
day they reached Emaum Ghur, eager to strike and storm, 



OF SCTNDE. 



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and then was seen how truly laid down is Napoleon's great 
maxim, that in war, moral power is to physical force as four 
to one. 

Mohamed Khan had a fortress, with a garrison four 
times stronger than his coming enemies, yet he fled when 
they were two marches distant, by tracks known only to his 
people, taking with him his treasure but leaving his stores of 
grain and powder behind ! 

Emaum Ghur, never before seen by Europeans, was 
square and of considerable size. The centre was a tower, 
also square, and fifty feet high, built of well-burned bricks ; 
it was encompassed by walls forty feet high, with eight round 
towers constructed of unburned bricks. This citadel was 
surrounded by another strong wall fifteen feet high, recently 
erected, and also of unburned bricks, which offer a peculiar 
resistance to artillery, for the shot penetrates yet brings 
nothing down. The howitzers were ineffectual, and recourse 
was had to mines, for the General resolved to destroy the 
place. Ali Moorad was averse to this, but finally consented, 
firing the first gun himself. 

This was no wanton act. " Princes," wrote the General 
to Lord Ellenborough, " are not always faithful, and if Ali 
Moorad should fall off from our alliance, this stronghold in 
the desert might prove vexatious, and require another perilous 
march to retake it. Meanwhile its existence fosters a false 
confidence in all the other Ameers, and its sudden destruction 
will tell on them with stunning effect." Such were his prin- 
cipal motives, but he had observed that the Ameers perpe- 
trated their intolerable oppression with impunity from the 
strength of their castles, and he thought to destroy even one 
of those was a gain for humanity. 

The place was full of gunpowder and grain, the last was 
distributed among the troops, the price being first paid to 
Ali Moorad. The powder loaded twenty-four mines to blow 
up the fortress. This was effected on the 15th, with the 
following singular display of zeal and firmness on the part of 
the chief engineer, Major Waddington. The matches of all 
the mines having been lighted, an assistant engineer took 
refuge behind some accidental cover at a short distance to 

L 



146 



THE CONQUEST 



await the explosions ; from thence he perceived his chief still 
bending over the train of one mine. Eagerly he called upon 
him to run, for " the other mines are going to burst." 
" That may be, but this mine must burst also," was the calm 
reply. Having deliberately arranged the match, WaddingtOn 
walked away, holding up his hands as if to guard his head 
from the huge hurling fragments, which successive bursting 
mines sent into the air to fall in showers around him. It 
was a grand action ! He would have done better to have 
reserved his heroism for a greater occasion— but it was a 
grand action ! 

A choice of new operations was now to be made. The 
Beloochees in Shah Ghur, the other desert fort, refused to 
yield it to Ali Moorad. The place was distant, and the 
General had no guides ; yet he was going, when one of his 
camel riders came from Dejee, with news that the tribes 
were gathering fast at Dingee. This decided him to gain 
the Indus and rejoin the bulk of his army ; but he chose a 
new route, more to the southward, because his object of 
causing them to disperse had not been attained, and he thus 
designed to pour upon their flank, not as in retreat, but with 
war and terror. Hence, with unmitigated hardihood he 
made a fresh sweep through the unknown wilderness, seeking, 
as chance guided, uncertain tracks and springs, but trusting 
to the water skins, replenished at Emaum Ghur. 

Again his gallant soldiers marched with equal vigour and 
fortune, for on the second day they struck Tugull, from 
whence two known tracks led, one to Hydrabad the other to 
Dingee. There another camel rider met him with intel- 
ligence that Boostum had quitted the waste ; that the force 
at Dingee was broken up, and the Hydrabad Ameers were 
terrified. Thus a second time the lowering cloud of war 
seemed dissipated without a life lost. Nevertheless the treaty 
was not signed, and, following up his threat the General re- 
solved to visit Hydrabad. Wherefore ordering supplies to 
be sent down the Indus, he called the main body of his 
troops down from Dejee to Abu-Bekr. 

The first three days of his return march had been very 
trying ; on the fourth water and forage was found : on the 



OF SCTNDE. 



147 



eighth day, January 23rd 5 he reached Peer Abu-Bekr. Here 
his whole force being united, he halted. Eighteen days he 
had been wandering in the waste, suffering privations and 
risking dangers demanding the greatest mental energy to face 
unappalled : yet he came back without the loss of a man, 
having taken a fortress, dispersed an army, and baffled the 
Ameers' plan of campaign. 



148 



THE CONQUEST 



CHAPTER II. 

New combinations, military and political, now produced 
an unexpected course of action, and it is necessary so to re- 
capitulate the past policy, that each step in the conquest 
may be understood, and that the foul charges of injustice 
and violence may be dispelled by facts. 

The first period of Sir C. Napier's assumption of the 
political duties was marked by his quick perception of the 
grievous vacillating weakness and vanity of the political 
agents, and his own frank firm intercourse with the Ameers. 

The second period was marked by his precise, vigorous 
analysis of the proofs furnished by Outram as to the hostile 
designs of the Ameers : this analysis being made under the 
following just and discriminating instructions from Lord 
Ellenborough. 

" Your first political duty will be, to hear all that Major 
Outram and other political agents may have to allege against 
the Ameers of Hydrabad and Kyrpoor, tending to prove the 
intention, on the part of any of them, to act hostilely against 
the British army. That they may have hostile feelings there 
can be no doubt ; it would be impossible to believe they could 
entertain friendly feelings ; but we should not be justified in 
inflicting punishment for their thoughts." 

The third period was marked by negotiations to induce 
the Ameers quietly to accept the new treaty, imposed to 
punish their infractions of the old treaties and their under- 
hand hostility. Upon this hostility the question of justice 
hinged, and it has been shewn with what caution, pains and 
acuteness the Ameers' delinquency was ascertained. Acting 
then on the policy previously proclaimed to all India, Lord 
Ellenborough insisted on the new treaty, which did but slightly 
punish past sins, and was in truth framed rather to benefit 
civilization than to hurt the Ameers. Its unaggressive cha- 



OF SCINDE. 



149 



racter was shewn by restoring to the Bhawal Khan the 
districts taken from him by the Ameers. 

Lord Ellenborough could not with any safety recede at 
this critical period from his avowed policy. The armies of 
Pollock and Nott were then dangerously situated, and any 
weakness leading to disaster in Scinde, would be sure, aided 
by the treason of the newspaper editors to produce wide- 
spreading mischief. 

This third period was terminated by the vakeels from 
Lower Scinde accepting the new treaty in the name of their 
masters; and a like acceptance by Eoostum with the ad- 
dition of his seal in confirmation. 

To the fourth period belongs the passage of the Indus, the 
occupation of the ceded districts, and the march on Kyrpoor 
against the armed bands ; but none of these things were 
attempted until Roostum and the Ameers of Hydrabad gave 
warrant by accepting the new treaties — nor until their mena- 
cing language, stoppage of daks, anticipation of revenue, 
discrepancy of words and acts, and the unvarying reports of 
emissaries proved that a secret plan of hostility was in pro- 
gress. Ali Moorad's defection from the family policy, the 
cession of the Turban, and the flight of the younger Princes 
terminated this period. 

The fifth period was marked by the efforts of Roostum 
and his sons to maintain a footing in Upper Scinde 3 their 
sudden occupation of Emaum Ghur and Shah Ghur, and the 
entrenching of a position at Dingee; and this military holding 
•of Upper Scinde, while they were in close connection with the 
Ameers of Lower Scinde, indicated plainly their original 
design as to war. For while holding ground in the upper 
province, they were more in connection with the Seiks of 
Moultan, the Brahooe-Beloochees and the Affghans of Can- 
dahar. The astonishing desert march and rapid return 
.baffled all their calculations, and terminated the troubles of 
Upper Scinde. But during that march happened a course of 
diplomacy which led to a terrible contest, wherein Sir C. 
Napier vindicated his double armorial legend — " Beady aye 
Ready" " Sans tache." 

It has been shewn how, on the second day's march against 



150 



THE CONQUEST 



Emaum Ghur, the General came suddenly upon Roostum' s 
camp. The Ameer greatly alarmed sent a message to say 
he was submissive, which alone would prove hostile inten- 
tions. Outram, at his own desire was permitted to confer with 
Roostum, for the General thought Ali Moorad might have 
frightened the old man and caused him thus to flee into the 
waste : hence he desired to reassure him ; yet forbad Outram 
to give him hope of any thing beyond the quiet enjoyment of 
his private possessions, for no concession would reinstate him 
as Rais. 

Outram returned with a son of Roostum, to whom the 
General explained his views, telling him his father might 
return to Kyrpoor, or live where he pleased, with the assured 
protection of the British Government. The Prince seemed 
satisfied, and went back accompanied by Outram, who now, 
with the General's consent, invited Roostum to come to the 
British camp. He agreed to do so, yet pleaded present 
fatigue, and having thereby deceived Outram decamped in 
the night and fled, thus re-enacting the same false part he 
had played at Dejee-ka-kote : for he could not now suspect 
any foul design, seeing, that force might have been used to 
bring him to the camp. 

When Emaum Ghur fell, the General, thinking to profit 
by that event despatched Outram to Kyrpoor, as his Com- 
missioner. He was to invite by proclamation all the 
Ameers of both Scindes to meet him there on the 20th of 
January, either in person or by vakeels, to complete the new 
treaty. The Hydrabad Ameers did not refuse, but did not 
obey : those of Upper Scinde were entirely contumacious. On 
his journey, Outram again came on Roostum in his old camp, 
and proposed that they should proceed together to Kyrpoor. 
Roostum had seven thousand armed men and seven guns at 
this time, with which he was going to reinforce his sons and 
nephews at Dingee ; these he kept out of sight, pleaded fatigua 
as before, begged of Outram to go on, promised to be at 
Kyrpoor next day, laughed at the simplicity of his dupe, and 
then marched to the south. 

This deceit was, with an inconceivable logic, ascribed by 
Outram to the evil influence of Ali Moorad, who was then far 



OF SCINDE. 



151 



distant with Sir C. Napier, while Roostum was surrounded by 
his own friends and guided by an army ! But at this time 
Major Outram's mind was singularly disturbed, and his views, 
pertinaciously urged, were marvellously wild and inconsistent. 
He had, on quitting Scinde when deprived of political em- 
ployment, repeatedly advised Sir 0. Napier to trust Ali 
Moorad as a man of superior ability, confirmed honour, and 
unvarying friendship for the British. At the same time he 
denounced Futteh Mohamed Ghoree, Roostum' s Yizier, as 
an unprincipled man, hostile to the British and dangerous in 
every way. 

With these sentiments on his lips he went to Bombay, and 
in six weeks came back as the General's Commissioner. 
During that time he had no means for further judgment of 
men or affairs, and the two men's actions had, during the 
interval quite justified his character of them. Yet now, after 
only two interviews with Roostum, both marked by that old 
man's deceit, Oh tram with astounding mutability became the 
vehement vituperator of Ali Moorad, and by desire of Roos- 
tum, recommended at this most critical period, that Mohamed 
Ghoree, who had recently added to his other offences that of 
corrupting Ali Moorad's troops, should be released ! To assign 
any motive beyond vanity and ignorance for this conduct 
would point to crime. 

A positive refusal to release the Ghoree, should have 
taught Outram caution as to any after display of such 
meddling folly ; and this first exhibition of it should have 
taught the General to doubt Outram's capacity : it amazed 
and shocked him, yet did not destroy his first favourable 
impressions of the man, which he retained until insensate 
propositions, involving the safety of the army, brought a 
painful conviction that he had relied on a person of little talent 
but of extraordinary activity and pertinacity in error. 

Previous to the march on Emaum Ghur, Roostum, know- 
ing that enterprise was in contemplation, urged the Ameers 
of Hydrabad to persevere in their warlike preparations, saying 
the British could not penetrate the waste and would return 
suffering and dispirited. This counsel had caused the posi- 
tion at Dingee to be maintained, contrary to the General's 



152 



THE CONQUEST 



expectation : but when Roostum heard Emaum Ghur was 
taken, and the troops returning with that haughty resolution 
which success confers, he advised the Princes to retreat on 
Khoonhera, a fort skirting Lower Scinde, within the waste yet 
well watered. To that place, after deceiving Outram, he 
went himself, to be in closer connection with the Ameers of 
Hydrabad and Meerpoor, hoping to remain in safety until 
the fighting men of Lower Scinde assembled. 

With a better military head he would have met and over- 
whelmed the troops on their return through the waste ; and 
it was to avoid that danger the General came back by a dif- 
ferent route. Roostum however judged well, thus to relin- 
quish Upper Scinde altogether, and bring the influence of his 
now powerful armed force to bear on the councils of the 
Hydrabad Princes ; for dismayed at the fall of Emaum Ghur, 
and wanting still three weeks to gather all their feudatories 
for battle, they now called the Ameers of Upper Scinde 
madmen, forbade their entering Lower Scinde, and sent 
vakeels to Kyrpoor, which they had previously avoided. 

The Upper Scinde Princes were not so to be shaken off. 
They had quitted their palaces and luxurious gardens to make 
hurried journeys with their zenanas, and had expended much 
treasure in collecting forces. Hence, inflamed with fury, 
and backed up by the hardy plunder-loving Beloochees who 
had gathered under them, they would not hear of peace. The 
Hydrabad Princes were told, that willing or unwilling they 
must make common cause ; and then they swore, and with 
them swore all the Belooch Chiefs of both provinces who had 
assembled, that they would "fight the accursed Feringees and 
destroy Ali Moorad." 

In this crisis the Hydrabad Ameers played, as usual, a 
double game : assenting to war, they hastened the gathering of 
their feudatories, but also sent deputies to the British camp. 
These men came with the credentials of ambassadors, the 
instructions of spies, and vocation of military commissaries, 
bearing secret orders for the northern tribes on the right of 
the Indus, to come with all their warriors to Hydrabad. 

When they first came Sir C. Napier thought it was in 
fear, and that he should in Lower, as in Upper Scinde, arrive 



OF SCTNDE. 



153 



at a peaceable termination. He was mistaken. He did not 
then know the haughty character, the fierce courage of the 
Beloochee race, nor their influence over the feeble minds of 
their Princes. This error he the more readily fell into, 
because he wished it so ; and because Outram with pre- 
posterous vanity was continually asserting that he could 
easily procure the submission of the Ameers. Cautious 
however to test their real inclination he issued a procla- 
mation, calling on them once more, to meet his Commis- 
sioner and frankly settle the dispute, or manfully take the 
field. 

This produced no effect. Pressed by the antagonistic 
fears of the British army and their own wild chiefs, they 
yielded to the last as more nearly dangerous : but also their 
feelings were for war. They only yielded in appearance, 
dreading an immediate conflict while many of their feuda- 
tories were still distant : as these came in their pride arose. 

Such was the state of affairs when Sir C. Napier, issuing 
from the waste, rejoined his army at Peer Abu-Bekr the 
latter end of January. He had then nearly three thousand 
men, whose right touched the broad waters of the Indus, on 
which floated his armed steamers and supplies. Their left 
rested on the waste where there was no longer an enemy. 
The Ameers might indeed again launch troops on that 
side, and by a wide movement turn his flank to fall on Ali 
Moorad, who had returned to Kyrpoor ; but that Prince had 
his own forces, and was supported by British troops left at 
Sukkur. He was prepared also for hostilities, because many 
Killedars on the right of the Indus, trusting to the forts 
which covered the country, resisted his tax-gatherers; in 
the event of his being overpowered, the Bengal division 
could descend from Subzulcote to aid : nor could the Ameers 
send the tribes on the right bank of Indus against Sukkur 
with advantage, because of its strength. The line of opera- 
tions was therefore simple ; the right flank was secured on 
the river, by which the steamers could turn the enemy; 
the left was indeed uncovered, to the desert, but the Scinde 
irregular horsemen under Capt. Jacob were there to prevent 
surprise. 



154 



THE CONQUEST 



No sure intelligence of the Ameers' numbers or designs 
could now be obtained ; yet it was evident those of Lower 
Scinde were seeking to gain time, and those of Upper Scinde 
bent on war ; for the proclamation inviting them to a con- 
ference, had declared that each vakeel must come with 
full powers under pain of exclusion, and his master being 
treated as an enemy. The 20th of January was fixed for 
assembling. This was afterwards extended to the 25th, 
yet from the Ameers of Upper Scinde no person came ; and 
of the vakeels from Hydrabad only Sobdar's had full powers. 
Wherefore, after halting two days at Peer Abu-Bekr, Sir 
C. Napier moved slowly towards the south, hoping for rather 
than expecting peace, and reasoning thus : — 

" I cannot lose time, the hot season approaches, and 
these barbarians must not treat the British power with con- 
tempt. Their intentions are doubtful, their conduct suspici- 
ous ; armed men are hastening to them from every quarter ; 
it is necessary to approach near to ascertain their real posi- 
tion and views. If, as it is said, the Ameers of Lower 
Scinde have refused to make common cause with those of 
Upper Scinde, or to let them enter their country, the latter 
will be found on the frontier, where they may be attacked in 
front, while Jacob turns their right from the desert. The 
steam-boats will be on their left, Hydrabad closed against 
them, they must win the battle, or be destroyed, or submit 
and sign the treaty. If they fly to the desert, no place of 
refuge is there, Emaum Ghur is destroyed. They must go 
northward, where they will meet Ali Moorad and other 
British troops : the Bengal division is now on its march to 
Ferozepore, but the Bhawal Khan's cavalry are in the ceded 
districts and available as allies." 

This view was comprehensive, and the General feeling 
strong, sent the Hydrabad vakeels back with compliments, 
accepting their presence as a mark of amity ; and to omit 
nothing which could conduce to peace, he extended the period 
for treating to the 1st of February. Outram also, at his 
own urgent request, was suffered to go to Hydrabad, because 
he persisted to say he could bring the Ameers to submis- 
sion. Nevertheless the General continued his march : for 



OF SCINDE. 



155 



though he unwisely yielded to Outram's silly vanity he 
doubted the effect of his diplomacy. 

" I have now," he wrote to him, " waited long enough 
for the authorized vakeels, and I think you may proceed to 
Hydrabacl, if you think so doing likely to prevent bloodshed 
and reconcile the Ameers to the draft treaty, so far as being 
amenable to it can be called reconciliation. I am most 
anxious they should not resist. I am sure they will not 
resist by force of arms, but I would omit no one step that 
you, or any one thinks, can prevent that chance. I think 
you may probably do good, and not the less for my move- 
ments in that direction."— " I wish you would write to 
Roostum, to say that I will receive him at any time with 
every attention to his comfort if he comes to my camp." 

This was written on the 28th of January, and on the 
30th he again extended the time for treating to the 6th of 
February, writing thus again to Outram. 

" I have seen the Hydrabad deputies. I have ordered 
them to meet you there on the 6th of February, and you 
are to tell me directly, whether or not they have brought 
the deputies of Meer Roostum and the others, with the 
prescribed powers. If they have, I wait the result of nego- 
tiations. If not, I march against them as enemies on the 
6th, but I am willing to do all I can to save the mischief 
that will fall upon these Ameers, if they will not meet you." 

To the Ameers of Lower Scinde he wrote at the same 
time, in conciliatory terms, praising their apparent desire for 
peace ; but to those of Upper Scinde he had, on the 27th, 
addressed the following proclamation, which very exactly 
epitomized the past transactions with those Princes. 

" Ameers, I was ordered to make a new treaty with you. 
Your Highnesses agreed to the draft of that treaty in words, 
while you raised troops to oppose it by deeds. You were 
ordered to disperse your troops, you did not disperse them : 
you hoped to deceive me by a pretended agreement to the 
draft treaty. You thought you could procrastinate until 
the hot weather should prevent any military operations by 
the British troops : you imagined you could then assail us 
on all sides with impunity. If we marched against you 



156 



THE CONQUEST 



before the heat came, you thought our march would be late, 
and you resolved to resist with arms : if worsted in fight, 
you looked to the desert as a certain refuge. You were 
right, had we abided your time and marched by the road 
you expected. But we preferred our own time, and our own 
road ; we marched into your desert, we destroyed your 
magazines of powder and of grain, we destroyed also the 
fortress in which they were lodged, safely, as you vainly 
supposed • we have returned from the desert, and we have 
yet three months of weather fit for war. 

" But I want to prevent war. I therefore desired you 
to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor on the 25th instant, there 
to discuss and arrange the details of the draft treaty, to 
accept or reject them as seemed best to your Highnesses. 
What is the result ? Your Highnesses have neither replied 
to my letter, nor sent delegates invested with authority to 
meet my Commissioner. This conduct is insulting to the 
Government I serve. I told you that if you so acted I 
would take possession of your territories, but my object is to 
avoid hostilities while I obev the orders of the Governor- 
General. I therefore will still give you to the 1st of 
February to send your vakeels to my head- quarters, in hope 
that you may correct the imprudence with which you have 
hitherto acted, and which I deeply regret. My military 
operations must go forward, but your persons shall be re- 
spected, you shall be considered as friends up to the first 
day of February : after that day I shall treat all as enemies 
who do not send vakeels to meet me. 

" Ameers, you imagine you can procrastinate till your 
fierce sun drives the British troops out of the field, and 
forces them to seek shelter in Sukkur. You trusted to 
your desert and were deceived. You trust to your deadly 
sun and may again be deceived. I will not write a second 
letter to you, nor a second time expose the authority which 
I represent to indignity ; but this proclamation will, I hope, 
induce you to adopt a manly instead of an insidious course." 

The 31st of January the army reached Nowsbera, 
belonging to Ali Moor ad, on the southern border of Upper 
Scinde, and then it was said the Ameers of that province 



OF SCINDE. 



157 



were at last willing to submit. The tale was false, yet so 
ready was the General to save them, that he seized the 
occasion to urge on Lord Ellenborough a mitigation of the 
draft treaty, where he thought it pressed hardly on their 
pecuniary interests : nor would he have been refused, if the 
events which immediately followed had not ended their reign 
altogether. 

At Nowshera he halted five days, partly to bring up sup- 
plies, principally to give time for Outram's negotiation at 
Hydrabad : thus a third time extending the period for a 
peaceable termination, although then on the verge of the 
hot season. Soon repentance came. Outram's conduct at 
Kyrpoor had become a subject of amazement : at Hydrabad 
it passed the bounds of sanity. 

It has been shewn how at Kyrpoor he proposed to release 
the mischievous Ghoree, using the most abusive language 
against Ali Moorad, as if that Ameer's adherence to the 
British alliance was in his eyes a heinous crime. His next 
step was, without authority, to grant the Ameers a longer day 
for treating than had been proclaimed : that was approved 
of; but he forgot to fix a day, which gave an opening for 
indefinite procrastination until the General amended the 
error. Then he proposed to alter one of the principal arti- 
cles of the draft treaty, which had been deliberately drawn 
up by Lord Ellenborough, thus stepping beyond the line of 
his mission, which was to arrange details, not to reform. 

Corrected on those points by Sir C. Napier, he, seeing 
that only the Lower Scinde Ameers had sent vakeels, pro- 
posed as before said to proceed alone to Hydrabad as a 
negotiator, saying all would be easily arranged. The Gen- 
eral, more prescient and suspecting treachery, sent the light 
company of the 22nd Queen's regiment after him, and one 
hundred convalescents would have followed but for some 
misunderstanding of orders :* this foresight saved Outram's 
life. But his consent to Outram's going at all was given 
reluctantly and it proved very detrimental, as did all the 
counsels of Outram which were assented to : those which 
were rejected would have caused the destruction of the 
army. 



158 



THE CONQUEST 



The five days of grace now accorded to the Ameers was 
a magnanimous display of generous intrepidity ; and the 
gross imputation that Sir C. Napier sought battle ferociously 
is thus negatived. He never sought battle at all ; it was 
forced upon him : but faction has neither eyes nor ears for 
truth ; nor any sense save for malice. He saw through the 
falsehood and shifts of the Ameers to prolong diplomacy 
until the sun should become deadly : he had but six weeks 
safe for - field operations, and already the heat was oppres- 
sive ; yet, without being blind to their arts and solely 
from his strong desire for peace, he gave those deceitful 
people five days which he could have used with the utmost 
advantage in war. What was to hinder him from making 
forced marches, attended by steamers which would have 
picked up his weakly men and carried his provisions, and 
thus fall like a thunderbolt in the midst of the Ameers' half-, 
collected army under the walls of Hydrabad ? What but 
his earnest desire for peace, and his contempt of false glory ! 
Strong in his sense of justice and humanity, secure in the 
consciousness of genius, firm in moral resolution, he delayed 
the blow to his own risk, rising above the consideration of 
danger though it was of a nature to chill the stoutest heart, 
combining a fearful responsibility to his own Government 
with the risks of war. 

All the Ameers' proceedings were deceitful. They had 
no thought save to gain time for the assembling of their 
whole army, which they calculated could not be before the 
middle of February ; and to delay the war until that period, 
no falsehood or intrigue, no fraud or daring violence, was 
spared. By their agents the General's correspondence with 
Outram was stolen from the latter ; and meanwhile Roostum 
and his sons were writing ridiculous statements to Outram 
designed to mislead, and which did mislead him. The 
General's spies however, gave clear and positive informa- 
tion, all contradicting Outram's and the Ameers' statements, 
which were nearly alike. The emissaries all spoke thus : 

" The warriors of the different tribes, however distant, 
are in march on Hydrabad. All the Princes of both Scindes 
are in close alliance. The people of the country universally 



OF SCINDE. 



159 



declare, that if the Ameers stand against the British, a 
great commotion will happen all over Scinde." 

But soon an incontrovertible proof was obtained. Sobdar, 
exceeding all others in villainy, secretly sent a vakeel to say 
he had joined the other Ameers to betray them ; that he 
was still the fast friend of the British, and when the battle 
took place his five thousand warriors should fall on their un- 
suspecting countrymen. " Tell him," said the indignant 
General, " that my army fears no Beloochee force. I want no 
help, I despise traitors, and if I find his men in the field I 
will fall on them. I love not traitors !" 

The last day of grace was the 6th of January, and on 
the 5th the Hydrabad vakeels sent word, that Boostum had 
promised to meet Outram in that city. Sir C. Napier an- 
swered that the Ameers' promises, and especially Boostum's, 
were too well known to be now regarded. Next day he 
marched, but only eight miles still hoping to prevail peace- 
ably. 

Now rapidly the heat came on, and the signs of war 
augmented. From a spy he learned that Boostum had 
indeed gone to Hydrabad ; but his sons remained at Khoon- 
hera with seven guns and fifteen hundred men ; the rest 
had gone to their homes, but under an engagement to 
return at a moment's notice. It was also reported that the 
Meerpoor man would receive them, and give them Omercote 
in the desert as a place of arms. 

" This will not do," the General wrote to Outram. 
This will not do : the Governor-General's orders to dis- 
perse the armed bands with these Princes are positive. 
I have no time to lose ; my troops must soon disperse from 
the heat, I will not lose the cool weather. Say then to the 
Ameers of Kyrpoor thus — You were told in December 1842, 
to disperse your armed bands, yet you have kept, and still 
keep them together. Disperse them instantly or I will fall 
on them. 

" To the Ameers of Hydrabad say thus : — 
" If you permit the bands of Upper Scinde to assemble 
in your territory I will treat you also as enemies. And if 
you let them go to your fortress of Omercote in the desert, I 



160 



THE CONQUEST 



will first assault Hydrabad, and then Omercote. You may 
receive your relations of Upper Scinde as guests, but not as 
enemies of the British." 

Owing to some difficulty of navigation, Outram did not 
reach Hydrabad until the 8th of February, having only 
thirty sepoys under Captain Wells, for the light company of 
the 22nd did not arrive until three days later. His first 
despatch gave a positive opinion that the Ameers had no 
hostile designs ; yet he admitted they were storing Omer- 
cote with grain, and were very blustering. On this it was 
well observed by the General, When men bully and bluster 
at the head of sixty thousand men, it is no joke for three 
thousand who are within their reach. 

At a long conference with Outram, the first day of his 
arrival, the Ameers, Roostum being present, made loud lamen- 
tations, denied all the obnoxious acts, proved against them 
before the new treaty had been proposed. Pretending great 
amity still, they demanded the restoration of the Turban to 
Roostum, saying that was the only obstacle to signing the 
treaty : this could not legally be done, but it furnished 
ground for procrastination. They were earnest to delay the 
General's march, saying they could not otherwise restrain 
their Beloochees, who would plunder far and wide, friends 
and foes alike : thus admitting that they had collected a 
large force, which they had previously denied. 

Then they protested against the new treaty, again de- 
nied the charges on which it was founded : all of which had 
been furnished by Outram himself — but they added we will 
sign if you, Outram, advise us so to do : thus asserting and 
sacrificing Roostum's claims with the same breath ! Sobdar 
still the most hypocritical, declared himself ready to sign 
the treaty at once. Finally, all promised that vakeels should 
go next day to the Residency and accept the treaty. 

The next day, 9th, was however occupied with messages. 
No vakeels came, and time was thus wasted until evening. 
Then the Ameers who had meanwhile corrupted Outram' s 
moonshee sent the vakeels to the Residency, which was four 
miles from their Palace, but only to give a promise to accept 
it, having affixed their seals to this promise. This was 



OF SCTNDE. 



161 



precisely what Roostum had before done at Kjrpoor. The 
Ameers had at that moment a large force assembled in a 
camp four miles northward of Hydrabad, and it had been 
there since the 6th, yet Outram knew nothing of it though 
so close to him ! He disregarded all the indications of 
hostility pointed out by his officers, and asserted that no 
warlike designs were entertained. The Ameers had measured 
his capacity. 

They were now sure that all their fighting men, even 
the most distant, those of the hills above Shikarpoor in the 
north and those near Kurrachee in the south, were in move- 
ment, and confident in their numbers and prowess thought 
only of blood and revenge. The masks of gentleness and 
submission were no longer necessary, and in their pride and 
cruelty, they resolved, with a horrid violation of hospitality 
and the laws of nations, to murder the Commissioner, his 
officers, and escort : then to throw down the assassin's knife, 
and give battle with sixty thousand ferocious warriors, skilled 
in the use of their weapons and to whom fear was unknown. 
" How could they fail of victory f There were less than three 
thousand to fight with, and only five hundred of those Euro- 
peans ! The Affghans had ivith twenty thousand destroyed 
a greater number of English, and the Affghans were not to be 
compared to the Beloochees. How could they fail f " 

By previous intrigues, much falsehood, and feigned 
dispersions of their followers, they had, as they thought, 
adroitly drawn the small British army into an isolated 
position, far from its reserves. It was at their mercy. And 
what mercy theirs would have been is known. They had 
ordained, that, after the victory, every man woman and 
child belonging to the British Government in Scinde should 
be collected and have their throats cut on the field of battle! 
" so shall we make it famous" The General alone was to be 
spared, that they might put a ring in his nose, and lead 
him with a chain in triumph to their Dhurbar. Against the 
walls of their palace he was to be thus fastened, a spectacle 
and a signal example while life lasted of their power and 
vengeance ! Nusseer alone opposed this dire ferocity, and 
when his remonstrances were unheeded, he suggested a ring 

M 



162 



THE CONQUEST 



of gold as less dishonourable. " No ! " exclaimed the savage 
Shahdad with an oath. " Of iron, and a heavy one !" 

In this frame of mind they invited Outram and all his 
officers to attend a Dhurbar in the evening of the 12th, to 
see them affix their seals and signatures to the draft treaty, 
in ratification of the assent given by their vakeels at the 
Residency. This Dhurbar was the final snare. They had 
arranged to have all their fighting men assembled on the 
9th ; but the religious feast of the Moharem, which they 
observed rigidly, intervened and delayed many of the tribes. 
The plan was something confused thereby, for it was in- 
tended to slay the Commissioner and go forth to battle at 
once ; but the Moharem did not end until the 11th, and the 
Ameers, impatient for treachery and blood, would not, by 
waiting for the assembly of the whole army let this favour- 
able opportunity of killing the Commissioner pass: moreover 
the light company of the 22nd had now arrived, and more 
troops might follow. Wherefore they appointed the Dhurbar 
to be held on the 12th, being all prepared for murder, and 
out of thirty thousand warriors already assembled told off 
eight thousand to attack the Residency. 

Blindly went Outram to the slaughter-house, and if he 
escaped it was because the Ameers, thinking the General as 
silly as his Commissioner, hoped for a greater victim. To 
aid their hope Outram laboured with implacable active stu- 
pidity : his own statements will elucidate this. 

He arrived to negotiate with Princes who he had, only 
sixteen days before, thus described : " It is my intention to 
discuss every matter in future, in the presence of both par- 
ties, thereby to check in some measure, the bare-faced lying 
they have recourse to behind each others' backs." — " I am 
positively sick, and doubtless you are tired of those petty 
intrigues, brother against brother, and son against father, 
and sorry that we should be in any way the instruments to 
be worked upon by such blackguards ; for, in whatever way 
we may act, we must play into the hands of one party or 
the other, unless we take the whole country to ourselves." 

With these sentiments, so recently expressed, he gave 
implicit credence to the Ameers' protestations of peaceable 



OP SCINDE. 



163 



intentions; and to their assurance, that they had ordered 
their bands to disperse, though he was at the moment 
surrounded by them. He knew they had commenced storing 
Omercote, and given other signs of hostility, but that he 
called blustering. Roostum's declarations, that the General 
had ordered him to obey Ali Moorad, and that he had 
not voluntarily resigned the Turban, he in some measure 
supported, accompanying the statement with his usual abuse 
of Ali Moorad, and suggesting a change of policy with re- 
gard to that Prince. Yet one irrefragable proof of Roostum's 
falsehood he entirely passed over, namely, that the General 
had by Outram's own mouth told the old man, if he had been 
unjustly or harshly used by Ali Moorad he would right him, 
and protect him if he would come to the British camp. 
The Ameer, knowing the truth would then be discovered, 
always avoided that test. 

In this credulous state of mind, Outram continued on 
the 9th, though the Ameers had failed in their promise 
to give him camel-riders and guides for his despatches ; 
failed in their promise to send their vakeels in the morning 
to accept the treaty : and had, as he knew, corrupted his 
moonshee and stolen his papers. Nor was he shaken by 
the refusal of the Kyrpoor Ameers to send vakeels, unless it 
could be done without prejudice to Roostum's claim on the 
Turban. Finally he promised to use his influence for check- 
ing the advance of the army, which was their real object, as 
the Moharem feast had delayed the assembling of all then- 
forces. 

It was a fearful thing to see a man, entrusted with such 
great interests, thus entirely beguiled by Princes whose 
falsehood and treachery he had himself so recently and 
strongly described. At this time the Belooch villages, 
throughout the whole country, between Hydrabad and the 
British troops, were filled with warriors awaiting the signal 
for battle. Tribes were in march from the most distant 
points : the men of the desert from Omercote in the east ; the 
J ockeas from near Kurrachee in the south ; the Murrees, 
Dhoomkees, Booghtees and Chandians, from the hills above 
Shikarpoor in the north. All these tribes whose abodes 



164 THE CONQUEST 

were hundreds of miles distant from each other, who had no 
common bond save the name of Beloochee and the pay of the 
Ameers, were hastening to one central point, where an army 
was already collected, and all openly proclaiming their reso- 
lution to fight the Feringees. Yet Outram assured the 
General no hostile designs were entertained by the Ameers ; 
they had dismissed their men, and had no armed followers 
beyond their usual retinue ! But those Princes avaricious 
and luxurious, were notoriously afraid of the fierce men 
assembled around them ; how then could it be supposed they 
would expend so much money, endure such inconvenience, 
submit to such control, unless with the object of driving the 
British from Scinde, a previous plan for which Outram had 
himself detected only a few months before ! 

The General had now reached Sukkurunda, on the Indus, 
sixty miles from Hydrabad, and there halted at Outranks 
desire ; not that he agreed to his views, but was to the last 
moment willing to adopt any suggestion tending to prevent 
war, consistent with the safety of his army. Military exi- 
gencies also accorded with this desire for peace. The camels, 
worn out beasts, had fallen behind, and a three days' halt 
was convenient to get them up and prepare for a fight, 
if battle could not be avoided. Nevertheless he would not 
yield to Outram's pleading in favour of the Ameers, and 
against Ali Moorad. " I have no power," he said, " to discuss 
former treaties, yet I will state to Lord Ellenborough all the 
Ameers say, because it is fair to them ; but I am sure we 
should not tell them so now, because they would build in- 
terminable discussions thereon. Tell them therefore, that 
their plea of not being able to control the Beloochees is suf- 
ficient excuse for any Government to overthrow theirs." 

At the same time, having received a letter from Shere 
Mohamed of Meerpoor, who pretended to be disquieted, he 
thus wrote to him—" No hostility has to my knowledge 
been committed by you. There is no mention of your name 
in the treaty; nor is there any intention of dispossessing 
you of any of your land, or doing anything displeasing to 
you. The British Government makes war on its enemies, 
not on its friends." 



OF SCTNDE. 



165 



On the 10th Outram reported that the Kyrpoor Ameers, 
after promising to sign the draft treaty had deferred it on 
account of the Moharem, until the 11th — that he had accepted 
that excuse, and again desired that the army should halt, 
because he was sure the treaty would be finally executed by 
Roostum. and his -family. And now, in the extravagance of 
his credulity, the Commissioner urged the General to quit his 
army and come alone to Hydrabad S Urged him to come 
into the midst of twenty thousand warriors, eight thousand of 
whom were in the city, and all turbulent and menacing ! and 
for - what purpose ? that he might thus be convinced how 
superior the Commissioner's judgment was to his own ! 

On the 11th he again wrote that the Kyrpoor Ameers 
were to sign and seal an acceptance of the treaty by vakeels 
that day ; as if it were a step forwards, when Roostum had 
actually performed that ceremony more than two months 
before. He recommended also new arrangements, argued 
in favour of Roostum, and employed language injurious to Ali 
Moorad, which was his constant habit. To this he added, 
that the armed Beloochees under Roostum' s sons and nephews 
at Khoonhera, were, as that Ameer told him, only their 
necessary attendants, about twelve hundred ; that all others 
had been dismissed, and those remaining had no hostile 
designs against any one. Further, that the Hydrabad Ameers 
assured him, they had again sent orders for their bands to 
disperse, although they did not imagine any remained toge- 
ther after the former orders. And this strange letter, con- 
taining matter most offensive to Ali Moorad' s feelings and 
interests, he purposed to send by a servant of Roostum, 
though he had, only a fortnight before, declared that Ameer 
to be surrounded and controlled by spies and blackguards in 
Ali Moorad' s pay ! thus very directly enabling them to pre- 
sent to Ali, instead of the General, a missive calculated to 
drive him in fear from the British alliance ! 

Accident alone prevented this letter being given to Roos- 
tum' s servant ; but so intent was Outram to enforce his absur- 
dities, that he wrote a second and a third letter the same 
day, repeating them. Roostum' s anxiety to have it believed 
that there was no army at Khoonhera was well-founded. 



166 



THE CONQUEST 



That place was sixty miles from Hydrabad north-east ; Suk- 
kurunda was the same distance north. The British could 
therefore have fallen by a rush on Khoonhera and destroyed 
the seven thousand men there: Roostum would then be 
desolate. Meanwhile the armed men said to be disbanded by 
the Ameers of Hydrabad were encamped, to the number of 
twenty thousand, at Meeanee, north of the city, and there 
entrenching a position, with the expectation of being rein- 
forced by twenty-five thousand more in eight days. Never 
was a civilized man so beguiled, so mocked, so befooled by 
barbarians as Outram, since the days of Crassus. 

During this course of folly events at the British camp 
curiously contradicted his assertions. The villages in the 
vicinity were filled with armed men, who menaced and insulted 
the British officers ; and hundreds more daily passed on the 
left of the army by the desert, making for Meeanee. The 
General thinking he might find information of the Ameers' 
designs on some of these people, ordered Jacob to arrest all 
armed men passing his position. Soon twenty-five chiefs had 
the insolence to ride through the camp ; they were stopped, 
but refused to give up their arms or go to head-quarters : the 
General sent a squadron to bring them in. They were of the 
Murree tribe, whose mountain abode was north-west of Shi- 
karpoor hundreds of miles distant. Hyat Khan chief of the 
tribe was one. He pretended a mission to demand wages due 
from the Ameers for former services : yet he exclaimed when 
brought to the General "Why do you stop me? There 
are six hundred armed Beloochees in a village only two coss 
from you, there are plenty everywhere ! " 

On searching him however, letters were found from 
Mohamed Khan of Hydrabad, an Ameer who always pro- 
fessing entire submission and friendship for the British, and 
who, in conjunction with Nusseer and Sobdar, had only one 
week before sent letters by deputies to assure the General, 
" they had no part in Roostum's movement towards their 
territory— that his forces at Khoonhera were only necessary 
attendants— that they deprecated the advance of the British 
troops as improper, and claimed the fulfilment of the General's 
promise to remain at Nowshera till the 9th of February." 



OF SCTNDE. 



167 



No promise had been given, but the 9th was the day 
originally fixed by the Ameers for the concentration of their 
forces, and they would have been so but for the Moharem 
feast, which had been forgotten in their calculation. Hence 
Mohamed's letter was to cover the deputies from suspicion in 
the English camp, while they forwarded the letters now found 
on Hyat. 

In the first of these Mohamed Khan told the Murree 
Chief, that on the 9th it was designed to advance northward ; 
but a halt would take place at Meeanee, and there Hyat must 
come with every man of his tribe who could carry sword, 
shield, or matchlock. The second letter exhorted him to be 
firm and faithful and obedient to the orders of Gholam Shah, 
his deputy, who thus united, following the General's expres- 
sion, the characters of spy, plenipotentiary, and recruiting 
officer. The real designs of the Ameers could no longer be 
doubted, yet Outram continued incredulous. 

On the 12th, having to meet the whole of the Ameers, 
and see the treaty formally executed, he wrote in the morning 
previous to the holding of the Dhurbar thus : — 

" These fools are in the utmost alarm in consequence of 
the continued progress of your troops towards Hydrabad, not- 
withstanding their acceptance of the treaty, which they hoped 
would have caused you to stop. If you come beyond Halla, if 
so far, I fear they will be impelled by their fears to assemble 
their rabble, with a view to defend themselves and their fami- 
lies, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, not- 
withstanding their submission. I do hope, therefore, you 
may not consider it necessary to bring the troops any further 
in this direction ; for I fear it may drive the Ameers to act 
contrary to your orders to disperse their troops, or rather not 
to assemble them, for they were all dispersed yesterday ; and 
thus compel us to quarrel with them." 

How could it be believed that thousands of poor, rapa- 
cious, warlike men, who had come from abodes hundreds of 
miles distant, seeking prey and plunder, fanatics also, could 
be dispersed and sent back, and recalled again with a wave of 
the hand ; that powerful and arrogant chiefs were thus to be 
dealt with by effeminate Princes ! And if the latter did not 



168 



THE CONQUEST 



mean to fight, what was the meaning of Sobdar's previous 
proposal to make his men fall on their comrades in the battle ? 
Moreover, at the moment Outram was writing, Hyat Khan 
was taken, with the letters mentioned on his person ; the plain 
of Meeanee was swarming with warriors, preparing it for 
battle with mattock and spade ; and eight thousand of the 
Lugaree tribe were only waiting for the murder of the Com- 
missioner in Dhurbar, to fall on his escort. 

Outram' s statement was inaccurate as to facts as well as 
opinions. The whole of the Ameers had not accepted the 
treaty ; and those who had, were supplying the troops of the 
Upper Scinde Princes who had not. The British force had 
not advanced. 

This foolish letter was despatched on the 12th at noon, 
and at three o'clock he wrote again, to say the coming of the 
22nd light company had added to the general disquietude 
— he desired authority for assuring the Ameers that the 
British army would not advance further, and to them he had 
expressed his hope that it would not. He intimated also an 
intention to pledge himself that no harm was designed by the 
General : and complained that he was not left free to pledge 
himself positively to all he conceived fitting : in other words # 
that he had not the sole direction of this great matter, when 
every hour exposed his incapacity to conduct any part with 
judgment. 

And now, again, he urged the strange counsel that Sir C. 
Napier should come alone to Hydrabad ! " It would remove 
all doubts." " Unquestionably " replied the caustic General, 
" It would remove all doubt, and my head from my shoulders." 
But again Outram' s facts were false. The Ameers had not 
complied with all the terms ; they had not disbanded their 
troops — sixty thousand were actually on the front, flank, and 
rear of the British ; the latter had not moved forward ; the 
Upper Scinde Ameers had not subscribed the new treaty, they 
had only promised to do so. 

After despatching the last of these letters, Outram, at- 
tended by his officers went to the Dhurbar, where the Ameers 
signed and sealed the new treaty with all formalities. Nusseer 
of Kyrpoor was absent, but his seal was promised. Roostum's 



OF SCINDE. 



169 



griefs against Ali Moorad were, as usual, made the principal 
topic of conversation and remonstrance, and Outram in his 
report again advocated his cause with the same pertinacious 
abuse of Ali Moorad. 

On the 13th he thus described the state of affairs. 
" From what I saw yesterday of the spirit of the people, it 
appears to me the Ameers are now execrated for their 
dastardly submission, as they consider it, to what they style 
robbery. For the first time, since I came to Scinde in an 
official capacity, I was received last night by a dense crowd 
on emerging from the fort, after leaving the Dhurbar. Shouts 
expressive of detestation of the British, and a particular cry 
in which the whole. population joined as in chorus, the meaning 
of which I could not make out at the time, but which I have 
since ascertained was an appeal to their Saint against the 
Feringees. 

" Although the Dhurbar and streets of the fort were 
densely crowded, the Ameers' officers kept such a vigilant 
look-out that no evidence of the popular feeling was permitted ; 
but in passing through the city it could not be restrained ; 
and had we not been guarded by a numerous body of horse, 
headed by some of the most influential chiefs, I dare say the 
mob would have proceeded to violence ; as it was, a stone was 
thrown, which struck Captain Wells, but being quite dark, in 
the shade of the gateway he could not see by whom. This I 
was not aware of until we got home, and I have taken no notice 
of it to the Dhurbar, as it is evident the Government did its 
utmost to protect us, as was shewn by the escort refusing to 
go back after clearing the city ; whereas, heretofore, I had 
always dismissed it ; saying they had strict orders to accom- 
pany us the whole way. In fact the Ameers had reason to 
fear that their Beloochees might attempt mischief, having 
been the whole day engaged in paying off and dismissing those 
who had flocked to the city since the night before last, on 
hearing of the continued advance of your troops. 

"Before I went to Dhurbar they had got the city quite 
clear, but after dark great numbers had flocked in again. I 
am anxiously looking out in the hopes you will come down in 
the steamer and stop the troops ! ! " 



170 



THE CONQUEST 



The cry to the Saint might alone have awakened Outram 
to some sense, seeing he had himself in the previous year, 
said the Ameers intended a religious war, which was con- 
firmed by the spies in September 1842. Yet neither that 
coincidence, nor the violence displayed, prevented him from 
again urging the General to put himself in the power of the 
Ameers! Nor did he desist from this advice, even when 
writing a postscript to say he had discovered the design was 
to murder himself and his officers ; and that Nusseer of Kyr- 
poor, the Ameer whose signature was wanting, had gone off 
for a plundering warfare in Upper Scinde, which would draw 
all the Beloochees to that quarter ! 

His comprehension of the Dhurbar plot was very different 
from that of Captain Wells, whose view of it after knowledge 
proved to be "correct. On entering the Dhurbar, Wells saw 
at once that mischief was designed, because the armed men 
instantly clustered around each officer's chair, separating 
them. This made him fix his eyes on the young son of 
Nusseer, a fat luxurious boy, resolving to seize him as a 
shield and hostage: the boy, conscious of the intended 
treachery, slunk away. 

In this gloomy way the Dhurbar was prolonged, until 
Outram told the Ameers he had despatched a steamer for 
the General and expected him at Hydrabad immediately; 
then their aspects changed, and they left the assembly sud- 
denly, an action affronting and indecent, according to eastern 
customs. It was to deliberate, as Captain Wells thought at 
the time, upon the question of murdering those who were in 
their power at once, or sparing them that day to entrap the 
General; for in their barbarous pride they thought his 
judgment and penetration no greater than Outram's. De- 
ciding on the last, they suffered all to depart unhurt and 
countermanded an attack ordered against the Residency; 
but having little time to ensure obedience, sent a guard with 
the Commissioner to prevent mistakes, which he accepted as 
a compliment and a kindness ! 

On all points Outram was wrong. Nusseer Khan of 
Kyrpoor had not gone to the north; nor was there any 
thought of a partisan warfare. Haughty and brave, the 



OF SCINDE. 



171 



Beloochees had resolved on a pitched battle, trusting to their 
sharp swords and bold hearts for victory. Outram's diplo- 
macy may thus be measured : while assuming to know the 
Ameers' most secret policy he was entirely unobservant of 
their actions perpetrated as it were under his windows. 

Sir 0. Napier's judgment was disturbed neither by the 
deceit of the Ameers, nor by the credulity of his Com- 
missioner, nor by the inaccuracy of the reports sent to him. 
On the 13th, while Outram was giving full scope to his hallu- 
cinations, the General gave him a full exposition of their 
falsehood, and said he would march next day, finishing 
thus — " The troops have Lord Ellenborough's orders on 
their side, and I have delayed, from first to last, at risk of 
their lives, and my own character as an officer till, not the 
eleventh hut the twelfth hour. If men die in consequence of 
my delay, their blood may be justly charged to my account." 
Outram continued, however, to press his peculiar opinions. 
On the 13th he wrote a second letter, saying the Ameers 
had just told him their Beloochees were uncontrollable ; they 
had taken an oath to become " yageo" rebellious, unless 
Roostum was righted, and they would not obey the Ameers. 
Armed men, he said, were flocking into the city, and all the 
sheep and bullocks had been driven away from the vicinity ; 
yet he was resolved to stay, and again prayed the army 
might not advance, expressing his confidence that the Ameers 
were doing all they could to disperse the Beloochees, and 
send them out of Hydrabad. And this was true — they were 
sending them to the field of Meeanee ! 

Outram's monoculous diplomacy was now characterized 
by a proposition so extravagant, as to excite painful conjec- 
tures for a motive. 

The army was on the left bank of the Indus, with a 
direct line of operations by that river upon Hydrabad, 
and all the supplies came down from Roree and Sukkur by 
water. 

On its left was the desert, and a line perpendicular to 
the Indus, drawn eastward from Hydrabad, would fall on 
Meerpoor first, and then on Omercote. These towns belonged 
to Shere Mohamed. The first was on the edge of the waste, 



172 



THE CONQUEST 



the second in the heart, and both were fortified. This was 
the Ameers' principal line of retreat, because to have fallen 
back south would have exposed them to an attack from 
Kurrachee. 

Outram knew Omercote had been recently supplied with 
stores ; that Sir C. Napier had no connection with Meerpoor, 
and could have none until after a battle ; yet, having twice 
in vain pressed that General to quit his troops and come 
alone to Hydrabad, he now urged it a third time with this 
astounding addition, that he should also send his army to 
Meerpoor ! thus at once depriving the troops of their 
General, whose death was certain at Hydrabad, and of all 
communication, supplies, or means of retreat ! A mad 
house, or a scaffold should have been the answer ! 

The Beloochees of Lower Scinde, thirty thousand strong, 
were then assembled on the plain of Meeanee ; the Princes 
of Upper Scinde had seven thousand at Khoonhera ; the 
Chandians, more than ten thousand strong, had crossed the 
Indus in rear of the British camp on that river; Shere 
Mohamed had ten thousand at Meerpoor. Omercote was 
garrisoned, and thousands of the hill tribes were coming 
down to the Indus. The British army, only two thousand 
eight hundred strong, would therefore have been placed, 
without a General, on the edge of the wilderness, forty miles 
from its true line of supply, having a fortified town and an 
army and the waste in front, and fifty thousand fierce war- 
riors on its rear. Beaten, it would have been pushed into 
the desert to have perished there. Victorious, it would 
equally have perished ; because, reduced in numbers, with- 
out ammunition, and encumbered with wounded men and 
camp followers, it could never have regained Roree, a dis- 
tance of two hundred miles, harassed by swarming multitudes 
who would have renewed the action the moment it retreated. 
And in this desperate state it was to be placed, in mere 
wantonness of folly, without any conceivable object, political 
or military ! 

This was the advice of a man who afterwards caused 
himself to be represented in the newspapers as the guide 
and controller of an incapable General. This was an illus- 



OF SCTNDE. 



173 



tration of that knowledge of eastern affairs and eastern 
people ; of that wondrous talent which, it was said, distin- 
guished the political agents of Lord Auckland ; those smart 
youths, empowered to direct generals and armies as well as 
to manage negotiations, and the suppression of whom has 
drawn upon Lord Ellenborough the foulest calumnies, and 
never-ceasing vituperation. Such is the value of newspaper 
reputation. The disaster of Cabool was in the ordinary 
course of things ! 

The diplomacy at Hydrabad was not yet terminated. 
At three o'clock on the 13th, two deputies from the Ameers 
waited on Outram to say that, after he had quitted the 
Dhurbar the evening before all the Sirdars met ; and be- 
cause he had given no pledge to restore Roostum to the 
Turban, swore on the Koran to fight the British army, and 
not sheathe the sword until they had restored him : they 
would march that night, and the Ameers could no longer 
restrain them. On this statement the deputies founded new 
remonstrances, and reiterated their former griefs and argu- 
ments, finishing by a desire that he would pledge himself to 
obtain redress for their masters. This was refused. 

Then they asked if the British would let them fall on 
Ali Moorad ? No ! " It is hard," they replied, " that 
you will neither promise restoration of what has been taken 
by Ali Moorad, nor allow us to right ourselves." At last 
they exclaimed : " The Kyrpoor Ameers then must fight 
for their own bread, which Ali Moorad has taken : and why 
should the Ameers of Hydrabad be answerable for that ? " 
You will not be answerable if you do not let them fight in 
your territory, and do not assist them. 

. Outram was here compelled to answer according to his 
instructions, which were rigid. Nothing had been taken 
from the Kyrpoor Ameers, except by the new treaty, which 
they had accepted, and the justice of which has been placed 
beyond question. Nothing had been given to Ali Moorad, 
save the Turban and its rights, and that was a voluntary 
gift from his brother Roostum. The British General had 
no part in it, he had even opposed it ; but once done, it was 
irrevocable by their own laws. That it was really a free 



174 



THE CONQUEST 



gift is beyond doubt. It was witnessed by a Syud or Peer, 
a religious man of great reputation, who dared not lower his 
own fame for piety by lending his sanction to Ali Moorad's 
injustice. Advantageous it was also to Scindian and British 
interests. Neither did the Ameers care for it save as a 
pretence : they were resolved to war on much better grounds, 
namely the recovery of their independent sovereignty, which 
had been deceitfully and forcibly filched from them by Lord 
Auckland. That independence was however injurious to 
British interests and to humanity. New interests had sprung 
up, connected with an advancing civilization and not really 
hurtful to the Ameers, though restrainful of their hellish 
tyranny, which rendered them objects of horror not of 
sympathy. 

Now once more Outram wrote warmly in favour of their 
views, as stated in the conference, and reiterated, as an 
acknowledged fact, that lands belonging to the other Ameers 
had been given to Ali Moorad by the General ! This was 
utterly false : nothing had been given to him save the Tur- 
ban, and that by Roostum ! 

This curious despatch had a more curious postscript. 
At ten o'clock in the night he added " he was told the 
Beloochees were next morning to march and fall on the 
British, and the Residency was to be attacked in the night : 
but this was all boast and vanity, and he had not even 
placed a sentinel — it would end in smoke." How unfit he 
was for his employment, may be judged from the close-fol- 
lowing events, and from after acquired information. 

The Ameers were then all prepared for battle ; some 
were in the camp, and their ferocious Beloochees, from 
Sehwan to the mouth of the Indus, were, under orders, but- 
chering every man woman and child belonging to the British 
on whom they could lay hands. Many were destroyed, some 
only escaped by extraordinary courage, fighting for their 
safety, and others with great sufferings gained refuge by 
flight. Amongst those killed was Captain Innes, when 
going down the river sick. 

On the 14th the Ameers commanded Outram, to begone ; 
for they saw the hope of getting the General into their 



OF SCINDE. 



175 



hands was illusive, and designed to attack the troops at the 
Residency in the confusion of an embarkation. They feared 
also that they might entrench themselves and await reinforce- 
ments by water. He took no heed of this order, speaking 
of it as " bluster and then hearing of Hyat Murree being 
seized, treated it as confirming his own ridiculous miscon- 
ceptions. " The capture of that chief," he said, " would 
make the Beloochees commence plundering ; it would impli- 
cate the other chiefs, and hostilities would thus occur, he 
therefore had sent orders to stop the 41st regiment, then on 
its way to Kurrachee to embark for Bombay ; thus taking 
upon himself to interfere with a positive order of the Go- 
vernor-General, which directed that regiment to embark 
immediately. The letters found on Hyat he spoke of with 
contempt, as opposed to his own opinion, which he now for 
the tenth time advanced. " The Ameers had no hostile 
intentions, they only sought to gain some benefit for Roostum 
by an appearance of fermentation amongst their Beloochees ; 
but that fermentation would become real because of the 
detention of the Murree chiefs." 

Previous to this event being known at Hydrabad, the 
Ameers, through the corrupted moonshee, got back the treaties 
they had so recently signed and sealed in the Dhurbar, and 
in the same place tore them to pieces and trampled the 
fragments under foot ! 

Let the extravagance of Outram's reasoning now be 
considered. 

All the fighting men of both Scindes, some seventy or 
eighty thousand, had been put in motion at enormous cost 
merely to reinstate Roostum. The Ameers, so jealous of 
each other, so avaricious, so luxurious and selfish, had wasted 
their treasures, abandoned their debaucheries, and endan- 
gered their existence as Sovereigns, to serve an old man for 
whom they cared so little, that they will be found a month 
later refusing him a morsel of bread, and the loan of a cloak 
to keep his white head from the raging sun ! 

Outram now desired the Hydrabad Ameers to send 
those of Kyrpoor away, lest destruction should fall on both, 
pledging himself to bear them harmless through the crisis ; 



176 



THE CONQUEST 



and having thus, as he phrased it, made a last attempt to 
save them, he claimed credit for the act, as one likely to 
prevent their warriors falling on the British with large num- 
bers. — " Not that they would venture a battle, but would 
annoy the line of march, cut off foragers, and harass the 
camp at night." He also thought the Kyrpoor Ameers 
would fly to Omercote. 

It was his fate to be always wrong. The Beloochees 
were in no manner influenced by his " last attempt to 
save they did not infest the line of march ; they did not 
cut off foragers, or insult the camp at night ; the Kyrpoor 
Ameers did not fly to Omercote; the Belooch army went 
forth to battle, as they had always designed, and most gal- 
lantly and terribly they fought. 

While Outram was thus floundering, the General was 
calm, prescient and decided. He was willing to risk much 
for peace, more for his country's honour. He had been 
patient while sufferance was wise, but when it became folly 
to bear more he shook wide the English banner, and drew a 
sword as sharp as ever struck beneath that honoured symbol! 



OF SCINDE. 



177 



CHAPTER III. 

Outram's peevish voice of folly was now stifled by the 
sound of gathering armies, a sound heard by all but him : 
it caused such terror that guides and villagers who had 
hitherto been zealous in the British interests fled dismayed ; 
they knew what a strength of battle was pouring down, and 
being ignorant of the power which genius and discipline 
conferred, fled from what they thought a doomed force. 

The signing of -the treaty on the 12th was by the General 
regarded as a mockery, even as the Ameers did when they 
got it back to tear in pieces. War was certain. But the 
universal terror made it difficult to discover what he was to 
fight. He knew that Boostum's seven thousand men were 
moving from Khoonhera, on the left, to unite in his rear 
with ten thousand Chandians who had recently crossed the 
Indus. Many thousands of the Bins, a very powerful tribe, 
- were said to be following the Chandians ; the Murrees and 
other hill tribes were also coming down ; and Shere Mo- 
hamed of Meerpoor, though in no manner menaced or even 
mentioned in the new treaty, was advancing towards Hydrabad 
with ten thousand warriors. The Ameers, he knew, counted 
on having sixty thousand fighting-men on the field of battle 
by the morning of the 18th, but where that field of battle 
was, or by what roads the men were to be brought together 
he had not yet ascertained, 

Should he yield to the disproportion of force and, breaking 
through the Chandians and Khoonhera people, regain Boree ? 
He would be followed by the whole of the Belooch army, 
harassed day and night, and perhaps forced to fight at last 
on unfavourable ground, and with a retreating dispirited 
force ; he might also, as Indian Princes' faith was not pro- 
verbial, then find Ali Moorad's army before him as enemies ! 
But he had read Wellington's observations on Colonel 

N 



178 



THE CONQUEST 



Monson's disastrous retreat before the Mahrattas, and drawn 
the conclusion, never to give way before barbarians! Let 
the Beloochees then be sixty or a hundred thousand, was his 
magnanimous observation, I will fight. 

But how fight ? Should he attack whatever might be in 
front ? or, making only one march in advance, gain Halla, a 
steam-boat station, and there entrench with his back to the 
river, awaiting reinforcements by water ? I can do both he 
thought. If I fight and win all will be smooth. If I lose I 
may still fall back on Halla to entrench. In this mood, re- 
solved to dare, yet neglecting no precaution, he ordered 
Colonel Roberts, commanding at Sukkur, to dispatch two 
regiments down the river, with all the stores and provisions 
he could stow in country boats and two steamers, which were 
immediately sent up. Then putting his sick men and trea- 
sure on board the remaining steamers, he commenced his 
march; but the enormous train of baggage and followers 
embarrassed him, because the country offered no walled 
village for temporary deposit. In this difficulty, with the 
readiness of genius, he made that which was a weight and 
hindrance become a part of his order of battle, adding to his 
strength— how shall be shewn further on. Now hoping to 
surprise the Ameers he rapidly moved on Hydrabad ; and 
seeing Outram's tendency to go beyond his credentials wrote 
thus : — 

" Do not pledge yourself to anything; I am in march, 
I will make no peace with the Ameers, but attack them 
wherever I can come up with their troops. They need send 
no more proposals, the time has passed and I will not receive 
their messengers : there must be no pledges. Come away if 
possible, if you have not boats entrench your house for de- 
fence ; your men have provisions for a month, and I will be 
with you the day after to-morrow. Hold no intercourse 'with 
the Ameers. Send a messenger to the 41st regiment to 
hurry it on for embarkation, it should not have been stopped; 
both the Governor-General and the Government of Bombay 
have written letters upon letters to insure that regiment 
being at Kurrachee by the 18th, and are so anxious about 
it they have sent up a steamer to hurry the embarkation." 



OF SCINDE. 



179 



This was written on the 15th, and the storm of war so 
long impending was then bursting at Hydrabad. 

On the 11th the Ameer Shahdad, whose savage nature 
made him prone to deeds of treachery and blood, either de- 
signing to lull suspicion, or hoping to obtain some advantage, 
sent his interpreter to the Residency with a declaration of 
friendship, and to say, his people would not mix in the 
coming disturbances: he would even go in person to the 
Residency and remain there to protect it. His offer was 
fortunately rejected, yet from recklessness, for so safe did 
Outram think himself, that even on the morning of the 15th, 
when Captain Wells pointed out many indications of pre- 
paration for an attack, he would not heed him. 

This offer of Shahdad was a curious illustration of the 
habitual treachery and falsehood of the Ameers. At the 
very moment he made it, Nusseer had gone forth of the city 
to take the command of the Beloochee army at Meeanee, fixing 
his quarters in a pleasant garden, two or three miles from 
that position. There he was holding council with his chiefs 
and the brave slaves of his household, having previously ar- 
ranged with Shahdad and Sobdar, who remained behind, 
that they and their cousin Mohamed Khan, some other 
Ameers, and Ahmed Khan the Lugaree chief, should with 
that tribe, eight thousand in number, storm the Residency, 
and on the 15th this was done. Sobdar gave orders, yet 
remained close in his palace, while Shahdad, all armed for 
war and surrounded by friends, led the column of attack ; 
not however into fire ; cowardly as he was cruel, he stopped 
on horseback beneath a clump of trees, out of shot, while the 
brave Lugaree led his warriors to the assault. 

Sir C. Napier, anticipating such an attack, had on the 
14th ordered a steamer with fifty men and a supply of am- 
munition to drop down to the Residency ; by some accident 
the steamer went without the men or stores, and the assault 
of eight thousand Beloochees with six guns, was to be sus- 
tained by one hundred having only forty rounds each. They 
had however a stone house, a low wall and the support of 
two armed steamers; and when were British soldiers, well 
led, ever appalled by disproportion of numbers ? 



180 



THE CONQUEST 



About nine o'clock, cavalry and infantry were seen to 
take post on three sides of the compound, or enclosed ground, 
of the Eesidency. The 22nd men, under Captain Conway, 
immediately lined the low wall of the enclosure on the land 
fronts; the rear, though open to the river, was swept by 
the guns of the Planet and Satellite steamers. These vessels 
were moored in the Indus, some four hundred yards from the 
house. The Beloochees, occupying the houses and gardens 
around the compound, opened a matchlock fire on the British, 
whose covering wall was scarcely five feet high. 

Captain Conway, having under him Lieut. Hardinge and 
Ensign Pennefather of that regiment, was aided by Captains 
Green and Wells of the Company's service. He made his 
men reply to the fire slowly, and only when good opportunity 
offered, preserving their ammunition for the rush which he 
momentarily expected. Meanwhile Captain Brown of the 
Bengal Engineers, who had come down with the General's 
last letter, directed the guns of one steamer. Thus prepared 
the British met the attack, and when the Lugarees, ga- 
thering to make a rush, exposed their masses, the sudden 
fire, striking them down in heaps, broke their assault and 
the soldiers slowly sinking again behind the wall, awaited 
with stern content the next provocation to slaughter. 

Bravely and constantly did the Lugarees fight, and 
though their efforts were vain against discipline and courage 
combined, the want of ammunition rendered it impossible to 
maintain the post permanently. Hence, when the matchlock 
fire had been sustained for three hours it was resolved to 
withdraw while there was still left ammunition to fight a way 
to the river. At this moment the enemy brought up guns, 
which they forced John Howel, an Englishman in their 
service, to direct, but he pointed too high, and the troops 
still held the wall while the baggage and property in the 
house were being removed. 

The last operation was soon ended : the camp followers 
and servants being exposed to a cross fire, on the open space 
leading to the river, would not return for a second load. 
Then the troops, after four hours' fighting, seeing no more 
could be done, suddenly run together, and covering their 



OF SCINDE. 



181 



rear with skirmishers, retreated to the water, from whence 
the steamers, well placed by the captains^ Miller and Cole, 
swept the flanks with their guns and kept the pursuers on 
one line. 

The Satellite worked up the river at once, under fire from 
the Belooch guns, until one of the latter was dismounted. 
The Planet stopped to take off a large transport boat, and 
then the whole proceeded in search of the army, being fol- 
lowed and assailed with shot from both banks. The loss 
was however only three killed, ten wounded, and four 
missing; one of the dead, two of the wounded, and all the 
missing being camp followers. The Lugarees were said to 
have had sixty slain and many wounded ; amongst the 
latter Mohamed Khan. This was a fine prelude to the 
astonishing exploit that was to follow. 

Outram, during the action, had remained safe within the 
stone house, and did not appear until the troops were em- 
barking ; yet he had the effrontery afterwards to claim the 
merit of the defence ; and the musketry had scarcely ceased 
when he wrote a despatch commencing with the startling 
assertion, that " his letters for several days back must have 
led Sir C. Napier to expect the negotiations would fail!" 
Whereas, besides constant assurances that the Ameers were 
not hostile, and calling their menaces bluster, he had on the 
13th announced the formal acceptance of and signing of the 
treaty in full Dhurbar ! 

He joined the army at Muttaree. not, as might be ex- 
pected, downcast at his political failure, but with a more 
inflated notion of his own sagacity, and still forward to thrust 
pernicious counsels on the General. Thus, despite of the 
attack, and his despatch above quoted, he persisted to say 
the innocent Ameers desired peace, and urged another day's 
halt ! Then, finding Sir Charles fixed in his resolution to 
advance, he proceeded to meddle with the military dispo- 
sitions, displaying an incapacity truly remarkable. 

First he desired, as shewn, that the march might be de- 
layed a day, which would have given the enemy twenty-five 
thousand additional men at Meeanee; then he proposed 
sending a detachment to Tatta, as if the disparity of 



182 



THE CONQUEST 



numbers was not already sufficiently great ; and with ig- 
norant presumption, he spoke of the Beloochees' mode of 
warfare, and the places where they would be found, as if war 
was a thing of conjecture instead of fact : finally, assuming 
that the enemy would only harass the line of march and 
would not fight, he asked for a detachment to drop down the 
river and burn a shikargah, to deprive the Beloochees of 
cover ! He urged this so pertinaciously, that the General 
yielded ; and then Outram demanded the best of the Euro- 
peans and native troops: he would thus have caused the 
destruction of the army next day : being restricted to two 
hundred sepoys he with them quitted the army at the 
moment it was marching to battle ! It was a great fault to 
give him so many ; ten would have furnished him with an 
excuse for going away as well as two hundred. 

War is a series of facts ; imagination has no place in the 
art : he who would admit conjectures instead of conclusions 
from realities, will never be a great general, though he may 
be a fortunate one. A commander should be always pre- 
pared, but only act upon what is, not on what may be. 
Outram here conjectured that the Beloochees would occupy 
a wood near the Indus, and in the night they moved eight 
miles off. War is however never made without errors, and 
the permitting Outram to go to Hydrabad at all was the first 
of a series made by Sir C. Napier. Delaying five days at 
Sukkurunda was the second. Permitting Outram's shikargah 
expedition was the third. The two first were made, knowing 
them to be errors, but were sacrifices of military advantages 
to humanity. The last was a violation of the rule which 
forbids detachments on the eve of battle. There is no impu- 
nity for mistakes in war ; and thrice, and again, this truth 
rushed next day upon the General' mind, when his line bent 
inwards before the hurricane of Belooch warfare. 

Quitting Sukkurunda the 14th, the army had reached 
Muttaree the 16th, being then sixteen miles from Hydrabad, 
and towards evening the spies brought reports, afterwards 
found to be generally correct. They said the Ameers' troops 
were ten miles off, entrenched in the bed of the Fullaillee, a 
river flowing strong and large during the inundation time 



OF SCTNDE. 



183 



but then dry, some parts excepted, where deep muddy pools 
remained. Only fifteen thousand men were actually en- 
trenched, but twenty-five or thirty thousand others would 
certainly be found there on the 18th, and there were as 
many more on the flanks and rear of the British. 

This was a formidable state of affairs : the army was 
reduced to two thousand six hundred of all arms fit for duXy, 
and from those the two hundred under Outram were to be 
deducted. The attack on the Residency had shewn the Be- 
loochees to be brave and persevering fighters, and their 
numbers were overwhelming. Sir C. Napier thus questioned 
himself — " Shall I attack or await their assault? If the 
latter, I must entrench myself on the Indus, and await rein- 
forcements. This will have the appearance of fear, and 
pestilence may pervade the camp ; accidents may detain the 
reinforcements, and the enemy's immense numbers may 
abate the courage of the sepoys, many of whom have been 
formerly defeated by these savage foes, and still feel the in- 
fluence of those disasters. I will not await, I will attack." 
Such were his written notes on this occasion. 

He knew the gathering of the tribes had been retarded 
by the Moharem, and having ascertained their distances and 
rate of movement, judged that the whole could not assemble 
before the 18th, which coincided with the statements of his 
spies; wherefore he resolved to fight next day, hoping to 
find only fifteen thousand in position. But subsequent to 
the emissaries' last reports, twenty thousand Beloochees had 
suddenly crossed the Indus, and thirty-six thousand men 
were really in order of battle. This great army had been 
passing the river since the 14th within a few miles of 
Outram, while he was vehemently asserting that the whole 
had been disbanded, and the fermentation only feigned to 
support Roostum's restoration to the Turban ! 

Late in the evening of the 16th the General heard of the 
formidable accession of strength, yet only vaguely, and with 
different versions, but his resolution was unshaken, and thus 
avowed in a letter, written after receiving the intelligence. 

" The Beloochees are robbers, inspired by a feeling of 
enthusiasm against us, and because of our protecting the 



184 



THE CONQUEST 



poor Scindian people. They have sworn on the Koran to 
destroy the English General and his army ! I, being ready 
for the trial, march at midnight, and I shall he within a few 
miles of them by six o'clock: perhaps I may make a forced 
march and begin the battle sooner than they expect. Vari- 
ous matters will decide this between now and the morning."— 
" Their cavalry is ten thousand strong, and in a vast plain 
of smooth, hard, clayey sand; my cavalry about eight 
hundred ! These are long odds, more than ten to one ; 
however, to-morrow or the t day after, we shall know each 

other's value." 

Marching in the night of the 16th, his advanced guard 
discovered the enemy at eight o'clock next morning, and at 
nine o'clock the British line of battle was formed. Thirty- 
six thousand enemies were in front : the best spy said forty 
thousand, but the cavalry were only five thousand. Their 
position was twelve hundred yards wide, along the bed of the 
Fullaillee, whose high bank, sloping towards the plain in 
front, furnished a rampart. 

Eighteen guns massed on the flank in advance of the 
bank, poured their shot on the troops while forming the 
line, and the Beloochee wings rested on shikargahs, which 
lined the plain so far as to flank the advance on both sides. 
They were very large and dense, and that on the Beloochee 
right intersected with nullahs of different sizes, but all deep, 
carefully scarped, and defended by matchlock men. Behind 
this shikargah the Fullaillee made a sudden bend to the 
rear, forming a loop in which the Ameers' cavalry was placed. 

The shikargah on the enemy's left was more extensive, 
and though free from nullahs very strong. It was covered 
towards the plain by a wall having one opening, not very 
wide, about half way between the two armies. Behind this 
wall five or six thousand men were posted, evidently de- 
signed to rush out through the opening upon the flank and 
rear of the British when the latter advanced. 

To force the shikargah on his own left and assail that 
flank, the General thought impracticable ; to turn it would 
waste the day, and only bring the army on to the Fullaillee 
again at the bend, where it furnished the Ameers with 



OP SCTNDE. 



185 



an equally good defence. To turn the other shikargah on his 
own right was more difficult, and would also bring him on to 
the Fullaillee where it had water and deep mud ; he would 
then have to make bridges and force a passage, having the 
Beloochees in the shikargah still on his flank : the time thus 
lost would bring twenty-five thousand more enemies into po- 
sition; and meanwhile the sight of such numbers might 
break down the confidence of the sepoys, none of whom he 
had proved in danger. 

To fall on hardily remained, but thirty-six thousand foes 
were in front, and the British force was reduced by the de- 
tachment under Outram to twenty-four hundred ! And from 
that number a strong baggage guard was to be furnished, 
lest the enemy should during the battle strike at the camp 
followers and animals, whose numbers made the fighting 
men appear a mere handful. There was no village with 
walls near ; and the embarrassment was great ; but with a 
happy adaptation of the ancient German and Hunnish me- 
thod, the General cast the mass into a circle close in his 
rear, surrounding it with camels, which were made to lie down 
with their heads inwards, having their bales placed between 
them for the armed followers to fire over. Thus he pre- 
sented a fortress not easy to storm, and assigning two 
hundred and fifty Poona horsemen and four companies of 
infantry as a guard, under Captain Tait, proceeded with 
less than two thousand to fall on thirty-six thousand at the 
lowest, for his best spy still asserted that there were forty 
thousand before him. 

His order of battle was soon framed. 

Twelve guns under Major Lloyd, flanked by fifty Madras 
sappers, under Captain Henderson, were on the right. 

On Lloyd's left stood the 22nd Queen's regiment, under 
Colonel Pennefather. Less than five hundred they were, half 
Irishmen, all strong of body, high blooded soldiers, who saw 
nothing but victory. On the left were the swarthy sepoys 
of Bombay ; small men of low caste, yet hardy, brave and 
willing; as good in fire and more docile out of it than the high 
caste soldiers, having fewer prejudices and less pride. Of these 
the 25th regiment were immediately on the left of the 22nd, 



186 



THE CONQUEST 



and next to them the 12th under Major Reid. Finally 
came the 1st grenadiers under Major Clibborne — the whole 
in the echellon order of battle. 

Closing the extreme left, but somewhat held back, rode 
the 9th Bengal cavalry under Colonel Pattle, men of high 
caste, stern and proud. 

In front of the right infantry, skirmishers were thrown 
out, and on the left the Scinde horsemen, under Captain 
Jacob, fierce eastern troops, were pushed forward. This was 
to make the Beloochees shew their position and numbers ; for 
it is the habit of the latter to ensconce themselves in holes 
and nullahs, resting their matchlocks on the edge and firing 
until the mark is close, when, throwing down that weapon 
they leap out with sword and shield: and strong and 
courageous must be the man who stands before them. 

Between the two armies the plain was about a thousand 
yards, and for the first seven hundred was covered with low 
jungle which impeded the march ; but three hundred yards 
in front of the Beloochees' line had been cleared to give free 
play for their matchlocks, with which they fired long shots 
at times, without shewing themselves. The order to advance 
was given, and the General rode forward attended by his 
staff; and by his moonshee Ali Ackbar, an Arab gentleman of 
high race and courage who never left his chief in danger. 
Constant and heavy was the fire from the Beloochee guns, 
and though few men could be discerned, the rapid play 
of the matchlocks indicated the presence of numbers, and 
marked the position. 

A village called Kottree covered the enemy's right and 
was filled with matchlock men; there was no weak point 
there, but on their left a flaw was detected. Observing the 
wall enclosing the shikargah, the General rode near, and saw 
it was about ten feet high, and that some matchlock men 
who were astride on it disappeared suddenly. Biding nearer 
he found there were no loopholes, and still approaching the 
opening he looked behind and saw there was no scaffolding. 
Then with the inspiration of genius he instantly thrust a 
company of the 22nd into the space, telling their captain, 
Tew, to block the gap and die there if necessary: his 



OP SCTNDE. 



187 



orders were obeyed, Tew died, but the gap was maintained, 
and thus six thousand enemies were paralyzed by only 
eighty ! It was, on a smaller scale as to numbers, Marlbo- 
rough's game at Blenheim repeated. 

The main body advanced in columns of regiments, the 
right, passing securely under the wall, were cheered and 
elated by the rattling of Tew's musketry, now reinforced by 
a gun. The left was meanwhile refused, to avoid a fire from 
the village of Kottree, which Clibborne's grenadiers were di- 
rected to storm. During the march the dead level was 
swept by the Beloochee guns and matchlocks, which were at 
times answered by Lloyd's battery, but not frequently, for 
rapidly and eagerly did the troops press on to close with 

their hidden foes. 

The 22nd when within a hundred yards of the Ful- 
laillee opened into line, and all the columns formed in 
succession, each company as it arrived throwing its fire at 
the top of the bank, where the faces of the Beloochees could 
just be seen, bending with fiery glances over their levelled 
matchlocks. But the British front was still incomplete, 
when the voice of the General, shrill and clear, was heard, 
commanding the charge. Then arose the British shout, 
four guns were run forward, and the infantry at full speed 
closed on the Fullaillee and rushed up the sloping bank. 
The Beloochees, sternly quiescent, with matchlocks resting on 
the summit, let their assailants come within fifteen yards 
before they delivered their fire, but the steepness of the 
slope inside, which rendered their footing unsteady, and the 
rapid pace of the British falsified their aim, the execution 
was not very great. The next moment the 22nd were on 
the top of the bank thinking to bear down all before them, 
but staggered back at the forest of swords waving in their 
front. 

Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers 
were the Beloochees in their many coloured garments and 
turbans. They filled the broad deep bed of the Fullaillee ; 
they were clustered on both banks, and covered the plain be- 
yond. Guarding their heads with large dark shields they 
shook their sharp swords, gleaming in the sun, and their 



188 



THE CONQUEST 



shouts rolled like a peal of thunder as with frantic might 
and gestures they dashed against the front of the 22nd. But 
with shrieks as wild and fierce, and hearts as big, and arms 
as strong, the British soldiers met them with the queen of 
weapons and laid their foremost warriors wallowing in blood. 
Then also the few guns that could be placed in position on 
the right of the 22nd, flanked by Henderson's small band 
of Madras sappers, swept diagonally the bed of the river, 
tearing the rushing masses with a horrible carnage. Soon 
the sepoy regiments, 12th and 25th, prolonged the line of 
fire to the left, coming into action successively, in the same 
terrible manner. Clibborne's grenadiers were distant, skir- 
mishing with the matchlock men in Kottree when they 
should have charged them : but that was their commander's 
fault. 

Now the Beloochees closed in denser masses, and the 
dreadful rush of their swordsmen was felt, and their shouts, 
answered by the pealing musketry, were heard along the 
line, and such a fight ensued as has seldom been told of in 
the records of war. For ever those wild fierce warriors, with 
shields held high and blades drawn back, strove with might 
and valour to break through the British ranks. No fire of 
small arms, no sweeping discharges of grape, no push of 
bayonets could drive them back ; they gave their breasts to 
the shot, their shields to the bayonets, and leaping at the 
guns were blown away by twenties at a time, their dead 
rolled down the steep slope by hundreds : but the gaps were 
continually filled from the rear, the survivors pressed for- 
ward with unabated fury, and the bayonet and sword clashed 
in full and frequent conflict. 

Thus they fought, never more than five yards apart, 
often intermingled, and several times the different regiments 
were violently forced backwards, staggering under the might 
and passion of the swordsmen. But always their General 
was there to rally and cheer them. At his voice their 
strength returned, and they recovered ground, though nearly 
all their regimental leaders were down : for fast those leaders 
had fallen, dying as British officers always will do when they 
cannot win. 



OF SCINDE. 189 

" The noble soldier Pennefather " fell on the top of the 
bank, deeply, it was thought at first mortally, wounded, but 
his place was instantly taken by Major Poole. 

Major Teasdale, animating the sepoys of the 25th regi- 
ment, rode violently down a gap into the midst of the Beloo- 
chees, and there was killed by shot and sabre, dying with a 
glorious devotion. 

Major Jackson, of the 12th, coming up with his regiment, 
the next in line, followed the heroic example as if the suc- 
cession of death had been also in his orders. Two brave 
Havildars kept close to him, all three in advance of their 
regiment, and all fell dead together covered with wounds ; 
not passively : several of the fiercest swordsmen were seen to 
sink beneath the strong arm and whirling blade of Jackson, 
as crowding around him they tore his body with their grid- 
ing weapons. 

Nearly all the European officers were now slain or 
wounded, and several times the sepoys, wanting leaders, 
slowly receded; but the General, a skilful horseman and 
conspicuous from his dress, was always at the point of 
greatest pressure, and then manfully his swarthy soldiers 
recovered their ground. Once he was assailed by a chief, 
and his danger was great, for his right hand had been 
maimed before the battle ; but Lieutenant Marston of the 
25th native regiment sprung to his side and slew the Sirdar, 
whose tomb has been raised by his tribe since on the spot 
where he fell. At another period he was alone for several 
minutes in the midst of the enemy ; they stalked around him 
with raised shields and scowling eyes, but whether from 
something alfecting their minds, for the Beloochees are very 
superstitious, none lifted sword against him, and the 22nd 
soldiers seeing him thus emerge called to him by name, and 
gave him a cheer, heard distinctly above the general din of 
the battle ! And there are men who think the murmur of 
their factious calumnies can stifle that heroic sound ! 

More than three hours this storm of war continued with- 
out abatement, and still the Beloochees, undismayed, pressed 
onwards with furious force, their number seeming to aug- 
ment instead of decreasing. Then painfully the General 



190 



THE CONQUEST 



felt the absence of the brave men carried off by Outram : 
and that the British were not trampled under foot was to be 
attributed to their rapid firing ; they tumbled their foremost 
enemies down the steep bank so thickly, that the followers 
could never get clear of the carcases before the muskets 
were again ready to deal death, and the bayonet sufficed for 
those unharmed by shot. 

During this struggle Tew's company secured the opening 
in the shikargah wall, and even advanced : he fell but the 
gap was defended, and the right flank and rear of the men 
fighting on the Eullaillee were covered. But on the left 
flank, Clibborne, though not deficient in courage or talent, was 
unable to grasp the points of battle, and instead of storming 
Kottree withdrew his grenadiers nearly out of fire ! Thus 
a fourth of the fighting men were rendered useless. 

Such, at the end of three hours, was the state of the 
field, when that inevitable crisis of every battle which offers 
victory to the ablest general arrived at Meeanee. Clibborne's 
error was grave, the right was sorely pressed, and there 
was no reserve save the cavalry, which was iij^ a manner pa- 
ralyzed by the village of Kottree : yet the battle must be 
won or lost within twenty minutes ! Jacob had previously 
endeavoured to penetrate the shikargah on the left with the 
Scinde horse, designing to turn the village and gain the 
flank of the enemy's position; but the frequent scarped 
nullahs, the thick jungle and the appearance of matchlock 
men, soon forced him to return. The General could not 
quit the right, so thick and heavily the Beloochees pressed 
on, so stern and dreadful was their fighting, so wearied and 
exhausted were his men ; but his eye caught the whole field, 
and on his left he saw victory beckoning to him. Wherefore, 
urging his men by his voice and example firmly to sustain 
the increasing fury of their foes, he sent Colonel Pattle 
orders to charge with the whole body of Bengal and Scinde 
horsemen on the enemy's right. 

It was the command of a master spirit, and with fiery 
courage obeyed. Spurring hard the eastern horsemen 
passed the matchlock-men in the village of Kottree, and 
galloped unchecked across the small nullahs and ditches 



OF SCINDE. 



191 



about it, which were, however, so numerous and difficult, 
that fifty of the troopers were cast from their saddles 
at once by the leaps. But dashing through the Beloochee 
guns on that flank, and riding over the high bank of the Ful- 
laillee the mass crossed the deep bed, gained the plain 
beyond, and charged with irresistible fury. Major Storey 
with his Bengal troopers, turning to his left fell on the 
enemy's infantry in the loop of the upper Fullaillee ; while 
the Scindian horse led, though not commanded, by Lieu- 
tenant Fitzgerald, wheeling to their right, fell on the camp, 
thus spreading confusion along the rear of the masses op- 
posed to the British infantry. Then the barbarian swords- 
men, whose fury could scarcely be resisted before, abated 
their fighting and looked behind them. The 22nd perceived 
this, and leaping forward with the shout of victory pushed 
them backwards into the deep ravine, there closing in 
combat again. The Madras sappers and the other sepoys 
followed the glorious example ; but the Beloochee multitude 
in the shikargah then abandoned that cover to join battle 
in the Fullaillee, and how fiercely the brave barbarians still 
fought may be gathered from this. A soldier of the 22nd 
regiment, bounding forward, drove his bayonet into the 
breast of a Beloochee ; instead of falling, the rugged warrior 
cast away his shield, seized the musket with his left hand, 
writhed his body forwards on the bayonet, and with one 
sweep of his keen blade avenged himself: both fell dead 
together ! 

The battle was now lost for the Ameers, and slowly their 
gallant swordsmen retired, not in dispersion, nor with fear, 
but in heavy masses, their broad shields slung over their 
backs, their heads half turned and their eyes glaring with 
fury. The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after 
volley. Yet those stern implacable warriors still preserved 
their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a 
run though death was at their heels ! Two or three thousand 
on the extreme right, who had been passed by the cavalry, 
kept their position, and seemed disposed to make another 
rush, but the whole of the British guns were turned upon 
them with such heavy discharges of grape and shells, that 



192 



THE CONQUEST 



they also went off. All were now in retreat, but so doggedly 
did they move, and seemed so inclined to renew the conflict 
on the level ground where the British flanks were unpro- 
tected, that the General, unwilling to provoke a second trial, 
recalled his cavalry and formed a large square, placing his 
baggage and followers in the centre. 

Such was the battle of Meeanee, fought on the 17th of 
February, 1843, with less than two thousand men against 
thirty- six thousand. It was in fine arrangement, in all that 
depended on the commander, a model of skill and intrepidity 
combined; and in its details fell nothing short of any re- 
corded deeds of arms. The front of battle was a chain of 
single combats where no quarter was given, none called for, 
none expected ; Sepoys and Europeans and Beloochees were 
alike bloody and remorseless, taking life for life, giving death 
for death. The ferocity was unbounded, the carnage horrible. 
The General, seeing a 22nd soldier going to kill an exhausted 
Belooch chief, called to him to spare, but the man drove his 
bayonet deep, and then turning, justified the act with an ex- 
pression, terrible in its homely truthfulness, accompanying 
such a deed : " This day, General, the shambles have it all to 
themselves." 

Feats of personal daring and prowess as well as ferocity 
were rife. 

Lieutenant McMurdo, a young staff-officer, riding, like 
Teasdale and Jackson, into the bed of the Fullaillee, had his 
horse killed and fell; regaining his feet he met and slew 
Jehan Mohamed a great chief and a hardy warrior, in the 
midst of his tribe. Several of Jehan's followers then en- 
gaged him in front, while one struck at him fiercely from 
behind, but was by a sergeant of the 22nd so instantaneously 
killed that the blow fell harmless. McMurdo turned and 
repaid the service by cleaving to the brow a swordsman who 
was aiming at his preserver's back ; another fell beneath his 
whirling blade, and then the two champions broke from the 
hostile press. The tomb of Jehan, a great one, has since 
been raised by his people, not where he fell in the nullah, 
but with an excusable martial vanity, sixty yards beyond 
the British lines where he never penetrated. 



OF SCTNDE. 



193 



McMurdo was even surpassed in prowess by Fitzgerald 
of the Scinde horse, whose exploits made all who saw him 
in fight marvel. Three or four Beloochees had fallen be- 
neath his tempestuous hand, when one, crouching, as their 
custom is, beneath a broad shield, suddenly stepped up on 
the bridle hand, and with a single stroke brought down the 
horse. Fitzgerald's leg was beneath the animal, and twice 
did the elated swordsman drive his keen blade at the prostrate 
champion; but each time the blow was parried, and then, 
clearing himself from the dead horse, the strong man rose. 
The barbarian, warned by the herculean form and counte- 
nance, instantly cast his shield over a thickly rolled turban 
of many folds, but the descending weapon went through all, 
and cleft his skull ! 

Lieutenant Harding, of the 22nd was the first to leap 
upon the bank, his legs were cut by the swordsmen and he 
fell ; but rose again instantly, and waving his cap cheered his 
men to the charge ; a shot went through his lungs and again 
he fell, receiving another sword cut that maimed his right 
hand, yet still he urged the men forward. 

Such was the fighting of Meeanee, and it was no slight 
glory that those men of iron limbs and heroic hearts acknow- 
ledged their General to be worthy of them. 

Twenty European gentlemen, including four field-officers, 
went down in this battle — six killed — and with them two 
hundred and fifty sergeants and privates, of whom more than 
fifty were slain outright; hence, as the sepoy grenadiers 
were very slightly engaged, this was nearly a sixth of the 
fighting force. The loss of the Beloochees was enormous, 
almost exceeding belief. A careful computation on the field 
gave six thousand, but the Ameers said eight thousand; 
and as no quarter was given, only those whose wounds did 
not disable them could have escaped: seventeen hundred 
bodies were heaped in the bed of the Fullaillee alone, and 
thus in four hours two thousand men struck down six 
thousand ! At Salamanca, one hundred thousand men, with 
a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery were engaged for 
seven or eight hours, and the loss of the British scarcely 
exceeded five thousand ! 





194 



THE CONQUEST 



When the English General had fixed his camp for the 
night, he rode alone in darkness to the scene of carnage, and 
in the midst of the dead, raising his hands to Heaven, thus 
questioned himself aloud " Am I guilty of this slaughter?" 
His conscience answered No ! 

He returned to sleep, and so soundly, that Outram, 
coming back from his silly expedition, could only arouse 
him by force. A false alarm had disturbed the camp, and 
fearing a night attack, orders were given to fire the enemy's 
camp. 

At daybreak the victor sent this message to the Ameers — 
u Surrender or Hydrabad shall be stormed." Yakeels 
came to ask for terms. " Life ! and you must decide before 
twelve o'clock, because the dead will then be reckoned and 
my soldiers have had their breakfasts." 

Then came forth Nusseer, Roostum, and Mohamed of 
Upper Scinde ; Nusseer, Shahdad, and young Hoossein of 
Lower Scinde. Entering the camp on horseback, they yielded 
their fortress and laid their rich swords at the General's feet. 
These last were worth many thousand pounds, his lawful 
spoil, of which none could claim a share, and it would have 
been no small honour to a private gentleman to place the 
swords of so many sovereign princes in his armoury. He 
however returned them, making this simple report to the 
Governor -General " Their misfortunes are of their own 
creation, but as they were great I gave them back their 
swords." 

Richly ornamented things of state they were, but the 
Ameers had always been curious in the collection of cele- 
brated swords, and three of the most famous in Asia had been 
picked up on the field, covered with blood — not thrown there 
by any Ameer for they did not enter the fight ; but probably 
dropt by their brave slaves who died for them in crowds, 
lying stark and grim at Meeanee. Mohamed Khan and 
Sobdar never left the fortress. The former was detained by 
his wound, the latter by cunning and cowardice. If the British 
won, he had not been in the field ; if they lost, his followers 
had fought with the rest ! Hoossein, the youth who, under 
the tutelage of Sobdar and Mohamed, had professed such 



OF SCTKDE. 



195 



amity for the British was, when the crisis came, sent by his 
mother, clothed in a curious coat of mail to the battle, with 
this Spartan admonition — " Fight for your race and your 
religion." He was amongst the foremost until the cannonade 
commenced, but then fled, casting off his armour, which is in 
the General's possession. 

The Ameers were cowardly, but their chiefs and warriors 
signally brave ; and full honour and praise their conqueror 
gave them in his public despatches and private letters. 
Every respect and indulgence consistent with the public 
interests he has shewn to them since, letting them know, 
that courage in an enemy was no bar to his favour. This 
mode of dealing, springing partly from a fine policy, partly 
from his natural feelings, has deeply stirred those rough 
men's hearts, for they have stroog though rude notions of 
honour. 

Praise also he gave to his own gallant troops, with a 
profound sense of what he and their country owed to them. 
And for the first time in English despatches, the names of 
private soldiers who had distinguished themselves were made 
known — an innovation perceived and hailed by those who 
never served under him : it has rendered his name dear to 
thousands who never saw and never will see him, for the 
British soldier is keenly sensitive to honour. His despatch 
also proved how little desire for military glory influenced his 
actions. It commenced with an apology for having gained a 
great victory. To the Duke of Wellington he wrote thus, 
modestly, as became him when addressing so great a man ; but 
when Sir Jasper Nichols, the Indian Commander-in-Chief, 
thought fit to criticise and censure his generalship, he, with 
the rebound of genius, thus repelled the assumption of 
superiority. 

To Sir Jasper Nichols, Commander-in-Chief. 

" 2m June, 1843. 

" I have just had the honour to receive your Excellency's 
note of the 9th of March, in which you say — c But I see you 
made that an arduous struggle which might have been an easy 



196 



THE CONQUEST 



success, had you detained the 41st regiment, and some part of 
Colonel Wallace's detachment? 

" This is a serious charge. Whether you will think it 
justly founded when you hear my defence, I cannot say ; but 
you will I am sure excuse my desire to stand higher in your 
opinion as an officer than I appear to do. 

" To begin with the 41st. Versed as your Excellency is 
in Indian warfare, I need not tell you that an European regi- 
ment cannot march, especially in hot weather, without 
' carriage' The 41st had none — they were on the Indus in 
boats. I had not, and could not obtain sufficient carriage for 
the force with me ; much less could I assist the 41st. The 
want of carriage compelled me to leave the 8th N.I. at 
Roree. The 41st must therefore have joined me, if it could 
have joined me at all, without carriage for sick, for ammuni- 
tion, for water, for tents, for provisions. How could it have 
joined me ? Impossible ! 

" But this was not all, though sufficient. Up to the 15th 
the Ameers of Hydrabad had loudly declared their perfect 
submission to the will of the British Government ; and they 
disclaimed all union with the Ameers of Kyrpoor. The latter 
had not an army that my force was not fully equal to cope 
with ; and the Governor-General and the Government of 
Bombay, had reiterated their positive orders to me to have the 
41st ready to embark at Kurrachee on the 20th of February. 
I knew the cause of their anxiety, and that it was very 
important the 41st should embark on the 20th. Was it 
for me in January, when all the Ameers had declared their 
acceptance of the new treaty, to write to Sukkur, in the 
face of superior authority, and order the 41st to halt? 
Not to join my force, for that was impossible, but to halt ! 
I suspect the Governor-General and the Bombay Govern- 
ment would not have been much satisfied with my conduct 
if I had done so. The 41st therefore arrived at Sukkur 
the 4th of February, found orders to proceed instantly on 
its voyage, and passed Hydrabad the 10th of February, 
five days before the Ameers declared war, and when Major 
Outram, an accredited agent of mine, was by their own in- 
vitation living in their capital, and assuring me of their 



OF SCINDE. 



197 



earnest desire for peace — he being the person supposed to 
know more of Scinde than any other Englishman ; and more 
of the Ameers personally. 

" On the day of the action the 41st were at Kurrachee. 
I being inland, and my letters being constantly intercepted, 
could not know where the 41st was, except that it was some- 
where on the Indus — that is somewhere or other in a range 
of three hundred miles ! I did not hear of its arrival at 
Sukkur, until it was past my reach, had I supposed it would 
be required, which I did not. How could I suppose so ? On 
reference to my journal, I find that on the 13th of February, 
being then at Syndabad, I received no less than two expresses 
from Major Outram to say and impress upon me, that " (here 
were no armed men at Hydrabad 1 1 " At that moment how- 
ever the town was full and 25,800 men were in position at 
Meeanee six miles off ! Short miles — for the battle was seen 
from the walls. I think after the above statement, your 
Excellency will acquit me of having the power to reinforce 
my army with the 41st regiment ; but this, and more, shall 
become public if any enquiry be necessary. 

" Now for the second part of your Excellency's charge 
viz. ' That I might have had an easy success, had some part of 
Colonel Wallace's detachment been with me.' 

"In the first place the whole brigade under Colonel 
Wallace, as far as I recollect, and my memory is tolerably 
strong, could not turn out fifteen hundred rank and file. It 
must therefore have been a large portion to have made the 
battle of Meeanee an ' easy success' However, say that I 
had five hundred ; assuredly that number would not have 
changed the character of the engagement. It would have 
brought a larger force of the enemy into action very possibly, 
and consequently their loss and ours would have been greater 
in that proportion, but the action would not have been 1 an 
easy success.' No ! nor an easier success. But what ex- 
cuse had I to weaken Wallace, who, apparently, at the time 
we separated, was in more danger than I was ? He was about 
to seize an extensive district, and if any resistance were to be 
made, assuredly there it might be expected. 

" Suppose me to have made the military error of sending 



198 THE CONQUEST 

a feeble force to execute what was expected to be a perilous 
operation, and that I had brought a thousand men down with 
me to the south ; what would have been the result ? Water 
was everywhere scarce, and oftentimes I had scarcely suffi- 
cient for the small force with me. Had I had the Bengal 
column also, or a large portion of it, I must have marched in 
two columns with the interval of a day between, to let the 
wells fill after being emptied by the first column. The result 
would have been that I should have been unable to have given 
battle till the 19th of February, before which time the Chan- 
dians under Wullee Chandia ; seven thousand under Meer 
Mohamed Hoossein ; and ten thousand under Shere Mohamed 
would have joined the enemy at Meeanee ! When the vic- 
tory was decided all these men were within six or eight 
hours of the field of battle— an additional thousand on my 
side, an additional twenty-seven thousand on that of the 
enemy, would not have rendered my success more 6 easy? 

« Your Excellency will say these things were not known 
to me at Roree when I first marched south. All were not, 
but enough were. 1°. I knew there was a great want of 
water. 2°. I knew I could carry spare provisions with me if 
the country refused supplies; but I should not have had 
carriage for this if the Bengal division was with me. The 
additional baggage would have been nearly as great as our 
own baggage, and all the wells would have been drunk dry. 
The Bengals had carriage for their own baggage but not for 
additional water and spare provisions, independent of wells 
and their own bazaar. 

« Suppose I could have conveniently brought down the 
Bengal troops, and left the north unguarded. Still men are 
not prophets. The Ameers of Hydrabad were at peace with 
us, I was only marching against those of Kyrpoor. The latter 
had not ten thousand men, and I wanted no increase of 
numbers to encounter them— nor did any man believe they 
intended to fight : nor the Ameers of Hydrabad neither. 
Even on the 12th of February, Major Outram, then m 
Hydrabad, wrote me two letters assuring me the Ameers of 
Kyrpoor and Hydrabad had not a single soldier— so little did 
he even then apprehend hostilities. 



01 SCINDB. 



199 



" The Belooch army suddenly assembled, as if by magic ! 
I saw nothing but disgrace and destruction in an attempt to 
retreat, and I resolved to attack, confident in the courage of 
the soldiers. My confidence was not misplaced : neither will 
it be now, I hope, when I trust this letter will satisfy you 
that I brought every man into action that was at my 
disposal." 



200 



THE CONQUEST 



CHAPTER IV. 

Sir Charles Napier now took possession of Hydrabad. 
His first design had been to fall on Shere Mobamed of 
Meerpoor, who was, with ten thousand men, only six miles 
from Meeanee during the battle, and it was to combine that 
attack with the instant gain of Hydrabad that he sent the 
stern message to the Ameers, thinking it would succeed during 
the terror of defeat. It did so, and Shere Mohamed would 
have been surprised, if Outram, the evil principle, the Ari- 
manes of the army, had not been in camp. He had burned 
a wood ten miles off, where there was nobody to oppose him, 
and it is possible the smoke might have been discerned, after 
the fight — not while it lasted, for none were then in a mood 
to look for distant objects : but with his usual intolerable 
boasting he affirmed that it had essentially contributed to the 
success ; whereas it had only enabled Outram to avoid the 
battle and deprive the army of two hundred better men than 
himself. And now, seeing that another battle was at hand, 
he implored the General not to fall on Shere Mohamed, 
saying he knew the man, his views, his temper, his general 
policy, his disposition. He would never fight. His march 
was a mere menace, he would be too glad to submit and 
obtain peace ; he would hurry to that conclusion if his present 
aggression was unnoticed. Write to him and he would be 
pliant, march against him, and all would be mischief and 
bloodshed, Such were the arguments — to which in an evil 
hour the General assented, saying, " Write then what you 
like and I will sign it." 

Unhappy was that presumptuous counsel. Had the army 
marched, Shere Mohamed would have been defeated and his 
capital taken in three days. He knew this, and in his first 
fear, on learning the result of the battle, wrote that he had 
no part in the late fight, had not even crossed his own 



OF SCTNDE. 



201 



frontier. This false excuse was accepted, Outram's advice 
adopted in all its extent, and the Ameer having thus gained 
time to place himself in safety by a retrograde march, imme- 
diately commenced rallying the warriors who had escaped 
from the battle. In a few clays he was at the head of twenty- 
five or thirty thousand fighting men more fierce than ever. 
Meerpoor, his fortified capital, gave him a base and Omer- 
cote a refuge in retreat. Sir C. Napier here made the 
greatest error of the campaign : he should have spurned 
Outram. His army scarcely escaped destruction, but his 
desire was to spare blood, and standing amidst the carnage of 
Meeanee who shall blame him ? 

On the 19th Hydrabad was entered, the citadel was occu- 
pied the next day : then the Ameers' cowardice became manifest. 
Apparently built of soft bricks the fortress seemed weak ; but 
the heaviest shot would penetrate without causing vibration, 
and beneath was the solid rock which could not be breached. 
Sir Alexander Burnes describes it as a weak place : he was in 
error, it was too lofty for escalade, too solid to breach, and 
could only be taken by mines and storm, for which its want 
of flanking defence gave facilities. Now the Belooch warriors 
were undismayed by the battle, and they were still in over- 
whelming force, for ten thousand fresh men had joined during 
the retreat from Meeanee : they were urgent for defending 
fortress and city, house by house, and the thick walls of the 
dwellings were well adapted for such a warfare. The Ameers 
would not fight, and their warriors went off in disgust to 
Shere Mohamed. The Princes rode to the British camp : 
thus terminating a long course of hideous cruelty and brutal 
enjoyment by an act of miserable cowardice. 

The terrible sun of Scinde was now felt, the thermometer 
marked 112° in the shade, yet Sir C. Napier, who knew of the 
butchery contemplated by the Ameers, if they had been vic- 
torious, and of the horrible fate designed for himself ; he who 
had before returned their swords, because their misfortunes 
were great, now left them full enjoyment of their luxurious 
palace and gardens, remaining himself in a common field tent ; 
a generosity which, though known to Lord Howick and Lord 
Ashley, did not stay them from the baseness of asserting 



202 



THE CONQUEST 



in Parliament, that he had treated the fallen Princes with 
harshness and outrage. The strong sense of an English 
House of Commons rejected the foul charge with contempt. 

The victor's situation now became hourly more compli- 
cated ; a result of Outram's counsel. The force was greatly 
reduced, unendurable heat was rapidly approaching, and 
Hydrabad was too distant from the Indus, now his only line 
of supply, to serve as a base, or even a depot, seeing he had 
not carriage to convey the stores from the river, a distance of 
four miles. He was however compelled to put five hundred 
men in the fortress, and meanwhile Shere Mohamed's army 
was hourly increasing. To move in the heat with reduced 
strength against him, who could retire to the desert if beaten, 
would be risking all hitherto won with little hope of success. 
But he knew that Ameer thought himself, and justly, the best 
soldier of the Talpoor race ; and that he had not much wealth ; 
wherefore he resolved to let him raise a new army, which 
would augment his pride and diminish his money, because 
thus doubly stimulated to action he was likely to seek the 
camp, perhaps attempt to storm it, and so spare the army long 
marches in the heat. This would enable the British to fight 
with a refuge at hand in case of disaster, and an asylum for 
the wounded in any circumstances. 

In this view the General remained tranquil, but sent to 
Kurrachee for every spare man there ; and judging that while 
the terror of the battle was rife he might be daring, he not 
only sent to Sukkur to hasten the troops he had called for 
when at Sukkurunda, but also desired Colonel Roberts to send 
another column of all arms by land. He had before refused 
the aid of men from the Upper Sutlege, he now asked for them ; 
but in this was anticipated. Rumours of the battle had 
reached Lord Ellenborough before the despatch, and with 
sagacious vigilance, he instantly ordered three regiments to 
Scinde ; adding a camel battery, with three hundred and fifty 
of Chamberlayne's irregular horsemen. Soon afterwards he 
also sent the 3rd Bombay cavalry, taken from General Nott's 
force, which had then passed the Sutlege, coming from 
Cabool. 

Meanwhile Sir C. Napier entrenched a camp close to the 



OF SCINDE. 



203 



Indus, thus protecting his steamer station, which he farther 
covered by a fort, on the opposite bank, from the hostile 
tribes at that side. In this camp he placed his hospitals 
and stores ; and then, he so enterprising before suddenly, 
in all outward appearance, became timid and forbearing. 
Changing as circumstances demanded, he patiently awaited 
the moment when he might break forth again the -fiery 
General of Meeanee ; and for this wariness also he ob- 
tained the unstinted praise of the great captain who could 
best appreciate such conduct. 

"Sir 0. Napier gamed the camp of the enemy, got possession 
of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, tailing up 
a position in which he was not again likely to be attached. 
Not only did he secure Eydrdbad, and the portion of the Indus 
which lay in his rear ; he brought up a reinforcement, and 
placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which 
he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discre- 
tion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult 
operations of war." 

Such was the Duke of Wellington's criticism. And yet 
one stroke of ability, indicating the great commander as 
clearly as any act of this eventful campaign, was unknown 
to him. While the General encouraged Shere Mohamed's 
presumption, by professing, and giving all outward signs 
that he dreaded that Ameer's force, he guarded carefully 
against the influence of such conduct on his own soldiers ; 
making them pitch their tents outside the strong camp, on 
an open plain, and giving them to understand he did so in 
contempt of the enemy. 

Fame had extravagantly magnified the treasures of 
Hydrabad, or the Ameers' expenses had been prodigious 
since Sir A. Burnes announced that twenty millions sterling 
were in their coffers. Gold and jewels together did not much 
exceed half-a-million, but probably much was undiscovered. 
Bernier, Aurungzebe's French physician, says, the Scindian 
rulers of his clay had secret vaults for their treasure, very 
difficult to discover. But in truth the women of the ze- 
nanas had the greater part ; for no man was permitted to 
enter their apartments, and their property was so scrupu- 



204 



THE CONQUEST 



lously respected, that when the slaves handed from the door 
females' ornaments the prize agents sent them back. The 
ladies, when quitting the palace were not searched, and it 
was afterwards ascertained that they carried away above 
two millions sterling. This great abstraction the General 
had not expected, though he was willing they should go forth 
with comfort and even splendour. 

In the fortress, proof was obtained that Sobdar and 
Mohamed, the Ameers who had not surrendered as being 
absent from the battle, were equally guilty and treacherous 
as the others. It was they who had concerted the attack 
on the Residency, Mohamed had been engaged there, and 
the followers of both were at Meeanee, although the masters 
kept away, and now pretended amity : they were therefore 
constituted prisoners. 

Previous to the battle, and after it, the country south 
of Hydrabad was in commotion ; the British coal stations 
and depots had been plundered ; officers and servants were 
killed, or driven with their wives and children to fly for life, 
losing all their property. Small guards and escorts were 
destroyed generally, or escaped down the river, but one 
sergeant with a few sepoys fought his way up the Indus so 
manfully as to draw forth the public applause of the General, 
who promoted him. The communications, above and below 
Hydrabad, were thus intercepted for all but the armed 
steamers, Roostum's nephew, Ali, acting from Shah Ghur, 
cut those on the side of Jessulmere, while Shere Mohamed' s 
gathering force did the same on the side of Cutch. The 
army was thus isolated. But the greatest difficulty was to 
deal with the captive Ameers. 

To treat them generously and secure the troops from 
their treachery was impossible. This shall be made mani- 
fest ; because advantage has been taken of the intricate and 
generally unknown state of affairs which intervened between 
the battles of Meeanee and Hydrabad to calumniate Sir C. 
Napier. It was a short but a terrible period of danger, and 
nothing but his intrepidity, coolness and energy, could have 
preserved the army. " We shall Cabool him" was the con- 
fident cry of the Ameers, inside and outside his camp. 



OF SCINDE. 



205 



" Yes, he will he Cabooled" was the exulting echoing cry 
from the faction at Bombay. And because Sir C. Napier 
would not suffer his army to be Cabooled, according to the 
predictions and wishes of that sordid set, his character has 
been maligned, and his actions misrepresented in India and 
in England. 

He was however, happily relieved at this time of diffi- 
culty from the burthen of Outram's presence. Having 
evaded the first battle by asking for a detachment, having 
delayed the second battle by false counsel, that person now, 
when another action became inevitable, returned to Bombay 
on pretence that his political functions had ceased. Sir G. 
Arthur, strangely and erroneously supposing that Sir C. 
Napier acted by the advice of a military council, told Out- 
ram, truly, that as a soldier he should have remained when 
a battle was at hand. He offered to return, but when all 
danger had passed away ; he could only come for mischiev- 
ous intrigue, and the General refused to have him again. 
Then he went to England, to work evil against the interests 
of those whose dangers he had not shared, and to calumniate 
the man who had befriended him against the just anger of 
Lord Ellenborough. 

The treatment of the Ameers was at first a perplexing 
question : were they prisoners of war, or deposed Princes ? 
This difficulty was resolved on the 12th of March by the 
following Governor-General's proclamation, annexing Scinde 
to the British territory. The Ameers were to be sent as 
captives to Bombay. 

" The battle of Meeanee entirely changed the position 
in which the British Government stood with respect to the 
Ameers of Scinde. To have placed confidence in them 
thereafter would have been impossible. To have only 
exacted from them large cessions of territory, would have 
been to give them what remained as the means of levying 
war for the purpose of regaining what was ceded. Foreigners 
in Scinde, they only held their power by the sword, and by 
the sword they had lost it. Their position was evidently 
different from that of a native Prince succeeding a long line 
of ancestors, the object of the hereditary affection and 



206 



THE CONQUEST 



obedience of his subjects. They had no claim to considera- 
tion on the grounds of ancient possession, or of natural 
prejudice. Certainly they had none arising out of the good- 
ness of their government. To take advantage of the crime 
they had committed to overturn their power, was a duty to 
the people they had so long misgoverned. It was essential 
to the settlement of the country to take a decided course 
with respect to the Ameers ; and the justice of dethroning 
them being clear, that decision was announced." 

When this was made known, the General expressed his 
satisfaction. 

" I had no prejudice," he said, " against the Ameers. 
I certainly held their conduct as rulers to be insufferable ; 
but as individuals I felt pity for them. I thought them 
weak Princes, whose folly had brought them into difficulties. 
It was this feeling that made me return to them their 
swords, for assuredly I was not insensible to the honour it 
would be for a private gentleman to possess the swords of so 
many Princes, surrendered to him on the field of battle : 
and I believe by all the rules and customs of war their 
swords were mine. This was an undoubted proof of my 
feelings then. Since then I have seen their real character 
developed; and I do think that such thorough-paced vil- 
lains I never met with in my life. Meer Sobdar is even 
worse than the others. He certainly had five thousand men in 
the action. I doubted this at first, as he was not there in 
person. Being now assured that your Lordship will occupy 
the country, I can act decidedly, and I shall have cover for 
my troops very soon. I executed the murderer of the 
Parsee, putting a label on his breast, to say he was not 
hanged for fighting with us, but for murdering a man who 
was a prisoner. The villagers are coming back to their 
villages. I believe that the country is gradually growing 
quiet. The proclamation has already produced effect." 

This character of the Ameers was just, and it was 
impossible to treat them with respect, because their power to 
effect mischief was still very great. The six who had sur- 
rendered on the field had been at once placed in a large 
pleasant garden of their own, close to the entrenched camp. 



OF SCINDE. 



207 



There they occupied pavilions containing all luxuries ; they 
had an unlimited number of attendants, and free intercourse 
with the city and the country. Sobdar, Mohamed Khan, 
and the two Hoosseins were at first treated as friends. When 
their delinquency was discovered, Sobdar and Mohamed were 
sent to this garden, the younger Princes remained in the 
fortress, but all were allowed their usual luxuries and 
numerous attendants. This arrangement, which greatly 
augmented the difficulty of guarding them, was made at 
Outram's desire, his last pernicious meddling being to im- 
plore the General so to lodge them ! 

It was now ascertained that the Ameer Shahdad had 
caused the murder of Captain Innes. That unfortunate 
officer's boat had been grappled and dragged to the bank 
by some Beloochees ; they stripped him naked : when they 
were tearing off his linen, he shivered and pleaded hard to 
save it. " I am ill," he said, " the water is very cold, leave 
me my shirt." The reply was a sword stroke which sent 
his head flying into the river. Shahdad, when taxed with 
this crime denied it, but the actual murderer was by the 
other Ameers given up, and he, glorying in the deed, said 
he acted by Shahdad's orders. " I did it/' he exclaimed, 
" and I would do it again : hang me." He was hanged, 
and it was the General's design to hang Shahdad also on 
the highest tower of Hydrabad in sight of Shere Mohamed's 
army, but Lord Ellenborough with misplaced lenity forbad 
the execution. 

While the Ameers were thus gently used in confinement, 
their women remained in the zenanas, strongly-built palaces, 
presenting six separate citadels within the great fortress of 
Hydrabad. They were scrupulously respected, and no man 
of the British army entered the women's apartments ; but it 
was soon discovered that the Ameers had, under the name of 
attendants, also left eight hundred robust Belooch warriors 
of the Talpoor race within these zenanas, which contained 
arms complete for the eight hundred, sword, shield, pistol, 
and matchlock. These men were constantly going back and 
forwards to the garden of the Ameers, to the city, and to the 
camp of Shere Mohamed. If one of them was stopped or 



208 



THE CONQUEST 



questioned, a cry that the women would starve if their at- 
tendants were molested was immediately raised ; and it was 
impossible with any human feeling to reduce these fierce 
fellows to obedience, because they openly threatened to cut 
all the women's throats on the instant, and fight their way 
out. They were capable of both actions, and no great effort 
was necessary ; for Shere Mohamed's army was within a few 
miles, the British garrison was but four hundred strong, and 
had both to guard the outward ramparts of the fortress, which 
was of great extent, and to watch the six separate zenanas 
within. 

In the garden the Ameers adopted a similar course of 
policy. Under the name of attendants they gathered five 
hundred stout Beloochees, all armed with large knives, many 
with sword and shield; and they were continually send- 
ing some of these men to the British camp to spy out the 
disposition and number of the troops, and then to Shere 
Mohamed to give him intelligence. They arranged a plan 
also for a concerted attack by his army on the fortress and 
camp from without, while their Beloochees should fall upon 
the garrison from within, their intercourse with him being 
incessant, almost every hour, and they were so confident as 
scarcely to conceal their treachery. 

Outside, Mohamed, called Shere or the Lion, had, the 
spies said, forty thousand men ; but they went plundering, 
a long way and his force varied. He was by public rumour 
charged with horrible crimes, matricide amongst them ; but 
he did not disgrace his cognomen in the field. Advancing 
within ten miles of Hydrabad, and being deceived by Sir 0. 
Napier's feigned timidity, and real difficulties, he openly 
boasted that he would " Oabool him." This boldness again 
put the whole country in commotion. The hill tribes, always 
eager for spoil, prepared to descend on the plains. Mir- 
Allee, Jam of the Jokeas, the most powerful chief of Lower 
Scinde, instead of protecting the daks, for which he was 
paid, intercepted them, and menaced Kurrachee. The mili- 
tary stations of Jerruck and Vikkur were plundered. 

Meanwhile the reinforcement coming from Sukkur by 
land, was exposed to a sudden attack by the Lion, which 



OF SCINDE. 



209 



would have forced the General to follow him, leaving his 
camp in danger and confusion. A more critical situation 
could scarcely be. There were only four hundred men in 
• the fortress ; the field force reduced by battle and sickness 
was less than two thousand, and had to guard not only the 
camp, hospitals, magazines and steamer station, but the 
Ameers' garden, the enclosing wall of which was more than 
a mile in circuit. Hence the troops were of necessity sepa- 
rated in three bodies, the fortress being four miles, and the 
garden half a mile from the camp. The Lion, with from 
twenty-five to forty thousand brave men was but ten miles 
off, and in constant communication with twelve hundred in 
the garden and fortress ; the reinforcements from the north 
were on a hazardous march, the stations to the south 
broken up or invested ; the hill tribes were gathering in 
arms to descend on the plains; the communications with 
Cutch, Joudpore, Jessulmere and Kurrachee were cut off, 
and those with the mouths of the Indus and Sukkur entirely 
dependent on the armed steamers. 

The captive Ameers were taking active advantage of 
their conqueror's generosity. They continually despatched 
emissaries to excite their feudatory chiefs and allies to con- 
tinue the war ; they kept the Lion informed of all that 
passed in camp ; and organized their own Beloochees in the 
garden and in the fortress to fall on the garrison of the one, 
and the hospitals of the other, when the Lion, according to 
a concerted plan should attack the British. To cover these 
sch#nes, and, using their own expression " throw dust in the 
eyes of the General" they continually made false complaints 
of outrage and violence being offered to them by the oflicers 
and soldiers; one of the outrages being the taking away 
knives and other weapons from their attendants: for as 
there were no women there that was done. 

At first the General admonished them mildly upon the 
extreme audacity of prisoners thus making war ; and upon 
the impudent falseness of their complaints. He spoke in 
vain, and the following curious example of unflinching 
mendacity will illustrate their characters. Before their 
attendants were disarmed, Sir C. Napier, accompanied by his 

p 



210 



THE CONQUEST 



staff, entered their garden to remonstrate against the number 
of Beloochees. they had gathered there, his license for attend- 
ance being restricted to Hindoos and household slaves. Ar- 
rived at their pavilion, which was immense, being formed by 
hanging canvass from the surrounding trees, he found the 
whole space within crowded with Beloochees, whose robust 
bodies, fierce air, and peculiar features could not be mis- 
taken.' Outside stood two hundred more, all well armed, 
and they pressed around him and his officers so rudely, that 
the latter, expecting violence, closed together for defence. 
Yet with this menacing proof of the fact, the Ameers ex- 
pressed the utmost surprise at his remonstrances, exclaiming 
with one voice— " What people ! What Beloochees ! We 
have nobody here but a few Hindoo servants ! No Beloochee 
ever enters this garden!" Then it was he caused these 
people to be disarmed, and the Ameers complained of it as 
an outrage ! 

Long this treachery was borne, lest" the remedy should 
be attributed to revenge for the cruelty- designed against 
himself; but when danger to the army pressed, he wrote 
thus in answer to one of their usual insolent and false 
complaints '.— 

« I have received your letter this day. You must recol- 
lect that your intrigues with Meer Shere Mohamed give me a 
great deal to do. I am also much surprised by the falsehoods 
which you tell. I will no longer bear this conduct ; and if 
you give me any more trouble, by stating gross falsehoods, 
as you have done in your two letters, I will cast yo* in 
prison as you deserve. You are prisoners, and though I 
will not kill you, as you advised your people to do to the 
English, I will put you in irons on board a ship. You must 
learn Princes, that if prisoners conspire against those who 
have conquered them they will find themselves in danger. 
Be quiet, or you will suffer the consequences of your folly. 
Your friend, Meer Shere Mohamed, has prevented the letter 
from the Governor-General as to your fate from reaching me ; 
his soldiers intercept the daks. He is a very weak man, and 
will soon cause himself to be destroyed ; and so will you, un- 
less you submit more quietly to the fate which your own 



OF SCINDE. 



211 



rash folly has brought upon you. I will answer no more of 
your letters, which are only repetitions of gross falsehoods 
that I will not submit to," 

Finally, seeing their intrigues were continued, when the 
Lion was come so close that a battle became inevitable, he 
placed them on board the steamers, but not in irons. 

This letter was condemned in Parliament, as an unheard 
of ferocity towards captives. Napoleon and his rock had no 
cloubt passed entirely from memory. It was stigmatized as 
wanting in chivalry ! The chivalry of a waiting woman's 
romance it may have wanted, not the chivalry of common 
sense ; nor yet the chivalry of madness, for even the Knight 
of La Mancha gives no warrant for such frothy sentiment. 
The man who fights and fails is at the mercy of his van- 
quisher, to kill or spare. Civilization leads men to spare, yet 
with the condition understood, that the man thus taken to 
mercy, relinquishes further hostility. He is not to practise 
against the safety and honour of those who have granted him 
life; he is not to profit of the victor's generosity, by plotting 
against the army under whose protection he exists. Such 
acts take away the character of prisoner, substituting that of 
spy, traitor, and assassin, and death is the proper punish- 
ment. Sir C. Napier's letter therefore, was not ferocious, it 
was generous, considerate, and merciful. To have shot them 
would have been but justice. 

But they were "Fallen Princes " — "Illustrious victims" 
— "Friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir 0. 
Napier " — " Oppressed weeping sufferers " — " Dignified 
in misfortune, domestic, and deeply attached to their rela- 
tions." In such gentle pity-seeking accents was their fate 
bewailed, by men whose only sympathy sprung from discon- 
tent at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred plundering 
the Scinde revenues, under the names of collectors, secre- 
taries, political agents, and other forms of the Directors' 
nepotism. Such in substance was the constant cry of the 
daily press in India, and a portion of that in England ; such 
was the declamation in the House of Commons, and at the 
India House, and in the pages of the Directors' nameless 
scribbling sycophants. 



212 THE CONQUEST 

But what was their real character as rulers ? 

They governed by the sword. The Beloochees were 
their troops ; the Scindees and Hindoos their victims. Up 
to their defeat at Meeanee, any Beloochee might kill a 
Scindee or Hindoo for pleasure or profit with impunity ; and 
this license was widely exercised, especially where women 

were concerned. 

They dealed largely in slave trading, both as importers 

and exporters. 

To form hunting grounds they had laid waste m sixty 
years more than a fourth of the most fertile land in ' Scinde ; 
and to form one of these preserves, even for a child, they 
would depopulate villages with less compunction than an 
Englishwoman smokes a hive of bees. 

They extracted revenue and money from merchants by 
torture and mutilations. They forced labouring men to 
work for them at a tenth of their just wages ; and more 
often than not cheated them of that pittance. When Scinde 
became British scarcely could a handicraft man be found : 
all had fled to other countries. 

They restricted commerce, oppressed merchants and 
traders, and repelled strangers lest they should tell the 
Scindians that such inflictions were unknown save in Scinde, 
the most fertile and most miserable country of all Asia. 
Finally they stopped one of the great water courses, derived 
from the Indus, purposely to destroy the neighbouring 
country of Cutch which had been irrigated by it. 

« The oppressive nature of their government is possibly 
unequalled in the world," said Sir Henry Pottinger. 

« It is an iron despotism," wrote Sir Alexander Burnes. 

" They have all the vices of barbarians without their re- 
deeming virtues," was the observation of Mount Stuart 

Elphinstone. 

Outram called it a " Patriarchal Government.'^ 
But God did not form the teeming land of Scinde with 
all the germs of fecundity, nor spread the waters of the 
Indus to bring them forth with plenteousness, merely to sup- 
port the brutal Ameers in luxury : they thought so, but his 
arresting and avenging hand was laid upon them at Meeanee. 



OF SCTNDE. 



213 



As private men they were even more hideously wicked 
than as sovereigns. 

They filled their zenanas with girls torn from their 
homes, and permitted all their great men to do the 
same. How were those girls treated ? It would suffice 
as an answer, to say, that when the Ameers fell, not one 
woman, old or young, mother, wife, or concubine, would 
follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested. And 
reason there was for that hatred. They and their Sirdars, 
and followers, perpetrated such horrid iniquities that the 
women could not but shrink from such contamination. If 
suspicion crossed the mind of a Beloochee, he sought no 
proof, but made the father or mother hold the daughter by 
the hair while he cut her throat, or hacked her to pieces 
with a sword. The slightest quarrel, or disobedience, or 
even reluctance shewn, was provocation for cutting off the 
miserable girl's nose or ears with a knife. 

The Ameers killed all their illegitimate children ; and, 
not unfrequently, their female legitimate offspring. This 
has with shameless effrontery been denied, even in Parliament. 
But Dr. Burns, who resided at Hydrabad, as court physi- 
cian, thus confirms the information acquired on that head by 
Sir C. Napier. " I may here remark, that it is the custom of 
the Court of Scinde Jo put to death all children horn to the 
Princes by slave women. The butchery which this horrid 
cruelty engenders must be shocking, and J was assured that one 
member of the family alone, had consigned to the tomb no less 
than twenty-seven of his illegitimate offspring /" And how 
did these monsters destroy? First they gave potions to 
procure abortion ; if those failed, they sometimes chopped 
the children to pieces with their own hands immediately 
after birth ; but more frequently placed them under cushions 
and sat down, smoking, drinking, jesting about their hellish 
work, while the helpless creatures were being suffocated be- 
neath them ! Nor was this the limit of their abominations. 
With inhuman cruelty they chastised what they deemed the 
poor women's offences, such, perhaps, as weeping over their 
slaughtered infants. Nusseer of Hydrabad, reputed the 
most humane of the pernicious brood, had a whip expressly 



214 



THE CONQUEST 



to correct the women ; the lash composed of two lengths of 
twisted brass wires ! It is no fable ! The usage is certain, 
the whip is in the General's possession, and not the least 
prized of his trophies — it tells him how excellent a deed it 
was to put his foot upon the ruffians' necks ! 

Such were the Ameers as Princes ; such as fathers and 
husbands. Were they better as relations and friends ? 

It has been shewn how they put Roostum's interests 
forward, protesting to Outram, that pity for that Talpoor 
patriarch was their ground for resisting the new treaty; 
and how Outram pretended to believe them. When they 
went forth in arms, they had their furnished palaces and 
gardens behind them; he came to the field after a long 
flight and a sojourn in the desert ; his all was carried on 
camels, was taken and lost, when on the false alarm the cap- 
tured camp had been fired. Thus Roostum was without 
personal resources, and when sent to the garden the other 
Ameers refused him any aid. There he stood, eighty-five 
years of age, his white beard streaming, his head bared in 
the sun of Scinde, without food, without attendance, without 
cover, without a carpet to lie down on, without a change of 
clothes —and he was sick also. He stood, a suppliant at the 
door of the other Ameers' gorgeous pavilion, which was 
filled with every convenience and luxury that their near 
palaces could supply, yet no man asked him in, none would 
let him enter ! When he prayed for shelter none proffered 
him help, none gave him clothes, or money, or food; they 
would not even lend him utensils to cook with, or a 
carpet to kneel on for his prayers. He was on the point of 
perishing when the General and his staff furnished him 
with a tent and carpets, with clothes, cooking utensils, food, 
and money taken from the prize funds. Here then was 
ample proof that not for Roostum's sake had they gone to 
war. 

But how had that old Ameer borne himself towards his 
own family ? His brother, Ali Moorad, was a child when 
their father died. He was left by that father to Roostum's 
care and protection, and to prevent dispute a will was written 
in the Koran which stated and defined each son's share, but 



OF SCTNDE. 



215 



Roostum and another adult brother fraudulently dispossessed 
Ali Moorad of his patrimony. When grown up, being a 
man of energy, he assembled a force and demanded his 
rights. This was in 1838 ; he was too formidable to be re- 
sisted ; but Roostum, making solemn promises to restore his 
villages and having contracts to that effect written in the 
Koran, induced Ali, a generous man for an Ameer, to dis- 
band his troops after a victory, and then laughed at him as 
a dupe. When the Auckland treaty was ratified, this dispute 
was referred by virtue of that treaty to the Anglo-Indian 
Government for decision, and the award, being in favour of 
Moorad, perhaps kept him true to the alliance. 

It was with a full knowledge of their faithlessness, their 
horrid government, and still more horrid practices, that Sir 
C. Napier designated the Ameers as thorough-paced villains, 
and expressed his satisfaction that they were deposed. But 
it was said their subjects loved them, fought for them to 
death! The Beloochees fought for them indeed; that is 
they fought for their pay, and for plunder, and because, 
being fanatics, they hated the Feringees as unbelievers. 
That they fought for love of the Ameers is false, and this is 
the proof. Roostum' s sons and nephews remain at large, to 
the number of perhaps thirty ; they have not ceased to solicit 
the mountain tribes on the right bank of the Indus to com- 
mence a new war, yet have never been able to rouse a man 
to battle. Many of those wild fellows have indeed come 
down to rob in the plains according to their ancient customs, 
but none to fight for the fallen Princes. 

If the fighting tribes had taken arms to restore the 
Ameers' dynasty, it would not have been pertinent to the 
matter. The Beloochees were the soldiers of the Ameers, 
the Scindians their subjects. As soldiers the first fought 
nobly, being by nature brave and emulous of military repu- 
tation; but they had no attachment for their cowardly 
Princes, who cared for them as little as they did for the 
miserable Scindian whom they killed or mutilated with cold 
cruelty. Of this there is proof. Amongst all the men who 
fought at Meeanee only three were taken alive, and they 
were badly wounded. They had been carried along with the 



216 



THE CONQUEST 



British sufferers to the hospital on the Indus, close to the 
Ameers' garden ; but no attendant speaking their language 
could be found, and Sir C. Napier, interested in their fate, 
personally requested of the Ameers to send a native. No ! 
He then ordered them to do so, and they sent a person with 
a promise of three halfpence daily ! The second day he said 
he could not live on that sum, but the Ameers answered, " It 
is too much, we have no money." The man therefore aban- 
doned his charge, and the poor wounded fellows were entirely 
taken care of by English soldiers ! Yet faction laments over 
the patriarchal Princes, and calumniates the man who has 
enhanced even the glory of England by their fall. 



OF SCINDE. 



217 



CHAPTER V. 

Sherb Mohamed, when lie first heard of the battle sent 
a false deprecatory message to the victor ; the answer would 
have been the charging shout of the British cavalry, if 
Outram had not, as before noticed, prevailed on the General 
to let him substitute a foolish epistle, which produced no 
effect. The Lion soon learned from the captive Ameers the 
weak state of the army, and was now menacing the camp, 
having concerted the following plan. 

The eight hundred Talpoors in the fortress were to fall 
on the weak garrison from within, when the Lion's right 
wing attacked from without. If the army came up to succour 
the garrison, the Lion's main body would meet it, while a 
strong detachment should join the Beloochees in the garden, 
and storm the camp. 

This was well conceived : but barbarian plans are seldom 
executed with precision, and to shew how the Lion failed, the 
operations on both sides must be exactly traced. 

On the 3rd of March Sir 0. Napier thus addressed the 
warring Ameer : — " Prince, you wrote to me, and said you 
had not joined in battle against the English. I believed 
you, and told you to disperse your troops, and that you 
would be safe. Had you done so you would have been in no 
danger ; but instead of this, you are rallying the defeated 
Beloochees ; you have increased the number of your troops ; 
and unless you come to my camp at Hydrabad, and prove 
your innocence, I will march against you and inflict a signal 
punishment." 

On the 13th the spies first reported the Lion's numbers 
to be forty thousand. Sir C. Napier would not credit this. 
He has not much money he said ; he has not much water.; 
he has not much ammunition : how then can he have as- 
sembled forty thousand men? It seemed incredible; yet it 



218 



THE CONQUEST 



was so, and again he was compelled to lament Ms own folly 
in attending to Outram's pernicious suggestion. But his 
reinforcements were coming, and meanwhile he adhered to 
his plan of tempting the Lion to approach close. Yet, 
though willing to give the Ameer a long day, he never de- 
signed to delay beyond the 24th of March, because from 
that time until the unendurable heat, would scarcely suffice 
to win a victory and capture Meerpoor and Omercote. 
Hence, with a greatness of mind which distinguished all his 
acts in this memorable campaign, he resolved, if his rein- 
forcements were delayed, to seek the enemy even with the 
few troops at his command, and fight him, though more than 
twenty to one. . 

Shere Mohamed, judging this caution to be the effect of 
fear, soon approached closer, and ravaging the country 
around, carried off the camels of the army from their pas- 
tures : thus he excited great hopes amongst the Belooch 
race, terrified the Scindians, and gave himself the air of a 
conqueror. Nevertheless, when he had concerted his plan of 
attack with the captive Ameers, he, from pride, or it might 
be latent fear, sent, on the 18th of March, vakeels to the 
British camp with an insolent offer of terms, saying — " Quit 
this land and your life shall be spared, provided you restore 
all you have taken." The vakeels entered the camp, and 
delivered their haughty message just as the evening gun was 
fired. " You hear that sound ; it is my answer to your 
chief. Begone!" And with that stern observation he turned 
his back on the envoys. Next day he received a shocking 
proposal to assassinate the Lion ; it came from the Ameer's 
own brother ! Indignant and disgusted, he instantly sent 
information to Shere Mohamed, bidding him beware of the 
treachery, but at the same time repaid his insolent message 
with the following warning : — 

" I will make no terms with you, except unconditional 
surrender, and security for your person, such as the other 
Ameers have received. We were at peace with you; we 
made no war with you; you have made unprovoked war 
upon us, and have cut off our daks. If you do not surrender 
yourself a prisoner of war before the 23rd instant I will 



OF SCINDE. 



219 



march against yon." These proceedings delayed the exe- 
cution of the Lion's concerted plan, and then the General's 
combination drew his attention another way. He was then 
at Ali-ka-Tanda, a few miles from Hydrabad with twelve 
thousand men, having detached eight thousand to Dubba on 
his right ; and five thousand to Khooserie on his left, in pur- 
suance of the project already described. (Plans 3, 5.) He 
was confident of storming the fortress and camp, and though 
the battle between were lost he judged his final success 
certain; because the British, weakened and having lost 
their camp, their stores and steamer station, must re- 
treat by land in the heat. In fine he had ably modified the 
Ameers' original plan of warfare, and would, as he boasted, 
have "Cabooledthe British" if a shallow political agent like 
Outram had been in authority instead of a skilful general. 

Before the 16th some recruits and six months' provisions, 
money and ammunition came to the camp from Kurrachee, 
and at the same time the 21st regiment of sepoys arrived 
from Sukkur down the Indus. The fortress was at that time 
repaired, and the entrenched camp completed. On the 19th 
Major Stack's column, coming by land, was computed to be 
within a few marches : he had eight hundred sepoy infantry, 
three hundred Eastern horsemen, and Leslie's battery of 
horse artillery, and his junction was looked for on the 22nd. 
Therefore it was that the General fixed the 23rd for sub- 
mission when he replied to the Lion's insolent message. 

He was however uneasy for Stack's safety because the 
Lion's army was between the camp and that officer, and might 
crush him on the march. The affair was critical, and was 
rendered dangerous by unauthorized' meddling. 

On the 21st, Stack having reached Muttaree, a long 
march from Hydrabad, was met by a cossid or native mes- 
senger, bearing orders to force his marches. But the Lion 
had notice of his approach, and designing to fall on him the 
22nd, had in the night moved with his whole army to Dubba, 
thus relinquishing for the moment his original plan. The 
two Commanders were thus pitted for a trial of skill — nearly 
all the chances being however for the Ameer, who had only to 
mass his troops and make a night march of a few miles, 



220 



THE CONQUEST 



whereas the English General, with scattered troops, very in- 
ferior in numbers, had many objects to guard. His combi- 
nations were therefore more complicated, and more subject to 
accidental disturbances, which were not wanting. 

Major Clibborne, charged with the secret intelligence, 
hearing of the Lion's movement, sent, without informing the 
General, a cossid to Stack, bearing this message in a small quill. 

" Halt, for God's sake ! You will be attacked by at least 
forty thousand men to-morrow." 

Stack, having just before received the General's orders to 
march steadily onwards, was perplexed, and amazed withal at 
the enormous force assigned to Shere Mohamed. He sent 
the cossid back instantly with the quill and message, de- 
manding positive orders, and the man, happily passing through 
the enemy, reached the camp when the General was enter- 
taining a great body of officers in his tent. The affair was 
momentous. The vicinity of Shere Mohamed, his numbers, 
his arrogant boasting and message, his known intercourse 
with the captive Ameers, the force which those Princes 
had in the garden and fortress, and the many at their 
command who were lurking in the city and the neighbouring 
villages awaiting the hour of battle— these were matters known 
to' every follower of the army, and had caused great disquie- 
tude ; the reinforcements were looked for with anxiety by the 
troops, and even by the officers, and great uneasiness prevailed. 

Clibborne' s interference was very untoward. If Stack 
should halt, the Lion having ten miles start might crush him 
before succour could arrive. If the General marched in force 
to his aid the fortress and camp would be endangered, because 
the Lion's movement might be only a feint : nor would it be 
wise to give him an opportunity of falling upon either column 
separately in march. It was essential therefore that Stack 
should force his marches to get as near Hydrabad as possible 
before he was assailed. All these considerations rushed upon 
the General's mind when the cossid brought back Clibborne' s 
message, and being very uneasy about the bad moral effect, 
he instantly adopted a happy expedient, which for the scholar 
will recall the jest of Hannibal before the battle of Cannae. 
Reading the note aloud to his guests, Sir C. Napier added 



OV SCINDE. 



221 



with a pencil " OUbborne's men are all in buckram. Come on!" 
Thus amended he sent it once more to Stack. The joke 
took, was repeated in camp, and confidence was restored. 

He had yet to save his detachment. Clibborne's news 
was confirmed in the night. There were three places where 
the Lion could fall on Stack with advantage. These were 
Muttaree, Meeanee, and a place a few miles nearer to Hydra- 
bad, between Loonar and Bagayet. (Plan 5.) The first was 
unlikely because of the distance, and Stack would soon 
advance ; but Meeanee and Loonar were distant from each 
other, and the precise combinations required would not suit 
both places. Which was to be chosen ? One of those scin- 
tillations of genius which indicate the strength of the fire 
within, determined the line of action. " Muttaree is distant, 
the plain of Meeanee is covered with the bleaching bones of 
chiefs and warriors ; the Beloochees are superstitious, they 
never will go there— Loonar will be the place of action, there 
I will march." 

But he did not neglect Muttaree. The enemy was on the 
eastern bank of the Fullaillee, whose windings would compel 
a circuitous march, whereas his own line was straight; where- 
fore he sent Captain McMurdo with two hundred and fifty 
Poona horsemen, to feel for the Lion on the road to Muttaree, 
and if the way was open to join Stack and confirm the order 
to advance. McMurdo reached Stack on the morning of the 
22nd, on which day Jacob was sent with the Scinde horsemen 
along the same road, and the General followed at a short 
distance with the Bengal cavalry and some guns, being sup- 
ported at a later period by all the infantry. 

This succession of columns was a mastery in the art. 
The report of the Lion's march had been somewhat vague, 
and no sure intelligence of his real numbers could be obtained. 
The country, though flat, was covered with houses, gardens, 
shikargahs and nullahs, where thousands of men might be 
concealed; no extended view could be got. The hospitals, 
magazines and camp, if uncovered, might be surprised, be- 
cause the Lion had men enough to overwhelm Stack and leave 
sufficient force in ambush behind: it was known that five 
thousand men had been so placed at Khooserie, and there was 



222 THE CONQUEST 

no certain report of their withdrawal. Hence McMurdo had 
been first detached; for the General expected the Lion's 
spies would exaggerate that officer's numbers, and if he met 
the Belooch army his sudden appearance and supposed 
strength would delay their movement against Stack ; that 
would disclose the Lion's real position and give time for the 
main body to support McMurdo. But if, as really happened, 
the road was clear, a resolute officer with a body of good 
horsemen would be added to Stack's force and enable it to 
push on boldly. Meanwhile the head of the army would be 
approaching Loonar, and the perilous separation of the troops 
rapidly diminished, while the rear would still be able to turn 
and aid the camp, if it was attacked. 

Stack marched at eleven o'clock on the 22nd from Mut- 
taree, and, as the General had anticipated, crossed the field 
of Meeanee without seeing an enemy; then passing the 
Fullaillee, he entered a plain, having that nullah, which there 
took a sudden bend towards Hydrabad, close on his left. He 
was however so intent on a rapid junction with the General, 
the head of whose column was now only four or five miles 
from him, that disregarding other considerations he managed 
his operations imprudently. 

His line of march lent his left flank to the enemy, espe- 
cially near Loonar, where the opposite bank of the Fullaillee 
had a thick wood, in which the Lion lay perdue. Stack's 
baggage should therefore have filed on the reverse flank of the 
column, and well in advance ; his infantry and guns should 
have kept together, covered by the cavalry towards the 
Fullaillee. All this was easy on a wide plain having no 
obstacle save a small transverse nullah crossing his front. 
Stack pushed forward his guns, followed with his cavalry and 
infantry in mass, and left his baggage behind straggling, so 
that when his cannon had passed the nullah in front the rear 
of the baggage had scarcely quitted Meeanee several miles 
behind : thus tempting the enemy. m 

When the long column of sumpter animals approached 
Loonar, the Belooch matchlock men crossed the Fullaillee 
from the wood and opened fire, while heavy masses appeared 
in movement, some supporting this attack, others menacing 



OF SCINDE. 



223 



the flank of the troops ahead, one large body evidently 
meaning to cross the front and cut the column off from 
Hydrabad. In this crisis McMurdo, who happened to be in 
rear with only six Poona horsemen, charged and beat back 
the matchlock skirmishers, sending at the same time to 
Stack for aid. The Beloochees were reinforced and renewed 
the attack, but McMurdo kept them at bay for three- 
quarters of an hour ; the troops he had asked for then came 
up, and he drove the enemy back over the Fullaillee and 
thus saved the baggage. 

Meanwhile Stack, with extreme negligence or ignorance of 
war, had continued his march. Wherefore McMurdo, still 
fearing for the baggage column, left Lieutenant Moore to 
protect it as he could and galloped ahead to obtain aid. The 
guns were then across the transverse nullah and he could 
scarcely obtain leave to take two back, but placing those in a 
flanking position he raked the enemy's masses and stopped 
the attack. The Belooch column which had menaced the head 
of the march also halted, because Stack, at last sensible of 
his error, now drew up in order of battle. Jacob's cavalry 
soon after came in sight, the baggage closed up, and the 
march recommenced, but the troops did not reach the camp 
until midnight much exhausted with fatigue. 

Had the Lion persisted in his attack the baggage must 
have been taken, and his military vigour was at the time un- 
dervalued ; but the true cause of his forbearance afterwards 
became known and did honour to his chivalry, if not to his 
policy. He saw a great number of women .with the baggage 
and stopped the attack, saying, " The English General treated 
our women very generously at Hydrabad and I will not let 
his women suffer now." He thus lost the baggage : but he 
would not have prevailed against the troops, for there were 
five hundred cavalry, a battery of horse artillery, and eight 
hundred infantry: all good troops. Moreover Jacob was 
close at hand with five hundred more cavalry, and the General 
scarcely three miles behind Jacob : the combination was 
therefore perfect. 

Sir C. Napier was desirous to find Stack closely engaged, 
for his troops were excellent, and the Lion would soon have 



224 



THE CONQUEST 



been placed between two fires, and thrown into confusion. 
The vicissitudes of war are proverbial, the decisive combat 
was yet to be fought. Shere Mohamed had calculated that 
Stack could not reach Loonar before the 23rd, but the forced 
marches imposed on that officer brought him there the 22nd, 
the Lion's reckoning was thus falsified, and his chivalric 
respect for the women perhaps somewhat enforced. 

On the British side difficulties were now abated, and 
Fortune began to pour out her gifts in double handfuls. 
After the battle of Meeanee, Sir C. Napier had played his 
game so cautiously, had so suddenly dropt from his heroic 
daring, that he appeared to his enemies sunk in sloth and 
fear, and they began to despise him, as he wished them to do. 
The Lion thought a final sweep certain, being unconscious 
that his adversary's drift was to make him waste his treasure, 
and so render a battle decisive of the fate of Scinde. Pride 
misled him and the captive Ameers, and their confidence 
being accepted as the warrant of success by their Beloochee 
subjects, numerous independent bands traversed the country 
only intent on plunder during the short time they expected 
the war to last. 

They spread terror far and near. On the day of the 
skirmish at Loonar, a convoy of three hundred camels, 
coming from the coast and escorted by a hundred sepoys, 
was assailed near Tatta ; and at another place, Agha Khan, 
a Persian prince, of whom more shall be said hereafter, 
being then wandering about Scinde and friendly to the 
British, was assailed and had, after a fight, to fly with only 
thirty horsemen out of two hundred to the entrenched camp. 
Thither also came some of Ali Moorad's Beloochees, but the 
rest of his forces he kept in Upper Scinde to enforce his autho- 
rity asRais— for many chiefs and killedars, expecting the Lion 
to win, refused obedience, and in some cases fought him with 
success. These commotions were formidable, but the English 
General had now perfected his preparations. He had secured 
his hospitals with entrenchments, had repaired the fortress, 
had reopened his communications, obtained supplies for six 
months, and brought his reinforcements happily into camp. He 
had baffled his principal adversary in the field, filled him with 



OF SCINDE. 



225 



false hopes, wasted his treasure, rendered him hateful to the 
Scindian people from the plundering of his bands, and by 
enticing him close to the British position he had saved his 
own soldiers long marches to obtain a good field of battle. 
That battle he was now fiercely eager for : the snake had 
cast his slough ! 

His first design was to fight on the 23rd, but Stack's 
troops were too much fatigued, and he waited yet a day. 
This delay was happy, for reinforcements were coming by 
water down from Sukkur, and up from Bombay and Kurrachee, 
and, though resolved not to wait for them he longed for their 
arrival. In this state of mind, being at breakfast on the 
morning of the 23rd with his principal officers, and revolv- 
ing in his thoughts the operations for the next day, he 
suddenly exclaimed, " Now my luck would be great if I 
could get my other reinforcements from Sukkur, from Kur- 
rachee or from the mouth of the Indus ; but it cannot be, 
they will not be here for a week, and I will not let the Lion 
bully me any longer, I will fight him to-morrow." Scarcely 
had he spoken, when an officer looking out exclaimed, "there 
are boats coming up the river." All rushed forth, and, lo ! 
the reinforcements from Bombay were entering the port be- 
hind the camp ! " There are more boats — a fleet coming 
down the river," cried out another officer, and in the direc- 
tion he pointed to, a grove of masts was discerned towering 
above the flat bank of the Indus : they brought the rein- 
forcements from Sukkur, and these simultaneous arrivals 
added to the army five hundred good recruits, store of 
entrenching tools, and two eight-inch howitzers, with a 
detachment of artillery men ; much needed, for previous to 
this fortunate event there were only three artillery officers 
to command sixteen guns scantily manned. 

The recruits were thrown into the fortress, the garrison 
of old soldiers was added to the field force, and a new order of 
battle was organized. These arrangements were made by seven 
o'clock in the evening, when the whole force was drawn up 
in front of the camp to give the principal officers a lesson to 
their commands; for the brigades were under majors, the 
regiments under captains, and the staff had scarcely a man 

Q 



226 



THE CONQUEST 



above three and twenty years of age. Full of fire and 
courage and zeal and devotion they were, but unpractised in 
the duties of their stations. 

His wish was to put sick men and stores in the fortress 
and augment his fighting force with their guards, but had 
no carriage to transport them from the camp. He however, 
in contempt of chivalry, put the captive Ameers on board 
the steamers, and having, organized his convalescents, All 
Moorad's men, and Agha Khan's followers, in all eighteen 
hundred men, confided his camp to them. In fine he^ mis- 
trusted Fortune just so much as to unite all his available 
strength for striking, and yet prepared for disaster while 
seeking victory. He knew her to be capricious, that the 
crisis was dangerous, but the hour of battle had struck and 
he was again the heroic soldier of Meeanee. 

Just as his line was formed in the evening, the vakeels 
of Shere Mohamed again entered the camp. They came to 
spy, but pretended to bear the Lion's last summons — " The 
British army was to yield or be destroyed." Silently the Gene- 
ral led them along the front of his line, and then turning, told 
them to report what they saw. At that moment another 
vakeel came, and eagerly sought a conversation. All these 
envoys repaired to the head-quarter tent, where with great in- 
genuity they sought to learn the General's intentions, prolong- 
ing their efforts through half the night ; but then, overwhelmed 
with fatigue, he dismissed them with the following letter 
and a recommendation to hasten or he would be with their 
master before them. " If the Ameer, Meer Shere Mohamed, 
chooses to meet me to-morrow as I march to attack him at 
the head of my army, and will surrender himself a prisoner 
without other condition than that his life shall be safe, I 
will receive him. If the Belooch chiefs choose to accompany 
him, I will receive them on condition that they swear obedi- 
ence to the Governor-General: then they may return to their 
villages with their followers, and all their rights and posses- 
sions shall be secured to them.' r 

This done, he lay down at two o'clock, to rise at four for 

battle. 



OF SCTXDE. 



227 



CHAPTER VI. 

At break of day five thousand men were under arms, 
eleven hundred being cavalry with nineteen guns, five of 
which were horse-artillery. Two guns were assigned for 
defence of the camp, seventeen for the field, and the march 
commenced. Hydrabad was kept on the left because the 
spies reported that the Lion had resumed his original posi- 
tion at Ali-ka-Tanda and Khooserie, and the movement was 
directed against the latter place. But in the night he concen- 
trated his army at the village of Dubba (Plan 6) where he had 
before entrenched a position, and this being soon discovered 
by scouts sent towards Khooserie, the march was directed 
diagonally in front of Hydrabad upon Dubba, which was eight 
miles north-west of that city. 

In one compact mass the infantry and guns moved, the 
cavalry scouting ahead and on the flank ; for so thickly was 
the whole country covered with houses, gardens, shikargahs, 
and nullahs, that fifty thousand men might be in position 
without being discovered at half a mile distance : even where 
the level was open, the nullah banks were so high, that a 
horseman could not look over. 

During the march despatches from Lord Ellenborough 
arrived, by the only post which, had not for two months been 
intercepted. They conveyed thanks to the army for Mee- 
anee, expressed in glowing terms, and assurances that honours 
and rewards would mark that victory. Prompt to apply all 
moral incentives, the General instantly made this known to 
the troops. Then arose a shout of exultation, for hope 
swelled the soldier's heart when he found that honest service 
was acknowledged ; and again arose a shout for the General 
who had named the private soldier as well as the officer in 
recounting heroic deeds. These were cries of victory which 
made the General's heart swell in return. 



228 THE CONQUEST 

Ten miles were now passed over, and still the exact 
situation of the enemy was unknown, when suddenly an 
emissary came with information that the Lion was with his 
whole force two miles on the left. The direction of the 
column was instantly changed. The irregular horsemen 
went forward at a rapid pace ; the General galloped ahead, 
and in a quarter of an hour found himself on a planum 
front of the Belooch army. Far and wide it stretched, ine 
whole plain was swarming with cavalry and infantry, and 
yet he could not see above half the real numbers, nor get 
any distinct view of their order of battle. There were, 
however, more than twenty-six thousand fighting men before 
him, with sword and shield and matchlock, and they had 
fifteen guns, eleven being in battery. Two lines of infantry 
were entrenched, and a heavy mass of cavalry was m re- 
serve 

Their right rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which, 
though generally dry, had at that point a large pond of mud 
protecting the flank, and beyond it was a thick shikargah, 
which prevented the position being turned, except by a wide 
movement. 

The front was covered by a nullah twenty feet wide and 
eight deep, with the usual high banks, which were scarped 
so as to form a parapet. Behind this, the first line of 
infantry was posted, extending on a slightly waving trace 
for a mile, in a direction perpendicular to the Fullaillee. 
From thence it was prolonged another mile in the same line 
to a wood, which was occupied, and appeared to be the left 
flank of the position. It was not so however. Another 
nullah, scarped like the first, went off from thence m a 
diagonal direction to the rear, forming an obtuse angle with 
the first line, and there the left of the enemy's army was 
really posted, for the wood only contained an isolated body 
thrown forward as if for attack. 

Thus the true front extended from the right for one mile 
perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting what may be 
termed the right wing and centre to an attack ; but the left 
wing, behind the second nullah, refused and masked by that 
ditch, was covered also by the prolongation of the first nullah 



OF SCINDE. 



229 



covering the right and centre, and by the wood, which was 
again covered by several smaller nullahs. 

All the cavalry were behind the left in one great mass ; 
and behind the right wing, close to the Fullaillee, stood the 
village of Dubba or Naraja, filled with men and prepared for 
resistance by cuts and the loopholing of the houses. 

But this was not all the defence. 

Between the first line of the right and centre and the 
village of Dubba was a third nullah, forty-two feet wide and 
seventeen feet deep, the bank scarped and prepared like the 
first. Both of them had, however, one or two ramps for the 
purpose of advancing or retreating, which proved of singular 
service to the British in the fight. 

This third and largest nullah extended to where the 
smaller one, covering the left wing, went off diagonally, that 
is to say a mile, but no further ; and was planted thickly 
with the second line of the Belooch army. The Lion's guns 
also were ranged behind it, with the exception of one, placed 
on a mound to the right between the two lines, and, raking 
the bed of the Fullaillee. 

The Lion had also scarped two smaller nullahs at a con- 
siderable distance behind the left and centre of the position, 
apparently to protect his rear, or to give himself a new 
front if he should be turned ; and having cleared the low 
jungle in front of his line, in that faultless position resolutely 
awaited the attack. But good a soldier as he may be called, a 
better and braver than he ruled in the fight. This was the 
African slave, Hoche Mohamed Seedee, who, if his first 
name be correct, was not unlikely the son of some Abyssi- 
nian attached to the French army in Egypt. His vigorous 
exhortations had urged the Ameers to war ; his genius had 
principally directed the operations at Meeanee ; and now, 
true and loyal to his captive master Sobdar, who, though 
wicked and oppressive to others, had been generous to him, 
the dark hero displayed all his magnanimity. Standing with 
his brother Seedees the foremost in the fight, when he could 
not conquer he and they died sword in hand without a 

backward step. 

The march of the British force, being diagonal to the 



230 



THE CONQUEST 



front of the Belooch army, brought the head of the column, 
left in front, near the right of the enemy, and the line was 
immediately formed on the same slant, the cavalry being 
drawn up on the wings, the artillery in the intervals between 
the regiments : thus the right was somewhat refused, though 
not in so great a degree as the enemy's left. t 

At first the General was very jealous of the wood menac- 
ing his right. It was occupied, he could not tell whether 
by many or few ; but his spies positively assured him that 
five thousand of the best men were ensconced on some part 
of the line, with design to rush out when the British should 
advance. From the wood he expected this counter attack, 
and pushed the cavalry of his right wing forward, partly 
to cover his flank, partly to make the enemy shew his order 
of battle more clearly. His own position was meanwhile 
delicate and dangerous. The plain on which he stood was 
not large, and the Fullaillee, making a sudden bend, wound 
round his rear, while on all other points of the circuit, save 
the gorge by which he had entered, was a network of nul- 
lahs, amidst which his compact column, opposed to the 
multitude of Beloochees, seemed at first like a wild beast 
within the closing circle of an eastern hunt. Yet the bend 
of the Fullaillee in his rear was no disadvantage, being dry, 
it furnished a reserved line of defence. 

He could not see the whole of the Lion's position. He 
made out that, notwithstanding their deep method of draw- 
ing up their swordsmen, they outflanked him by more than 
half a mile on his right, and still had their cavalry in 
reserve ; but the double lines and nullahs containing their 
centre and right he could not see ; neither could he ascer- 
tain that Dubba was occupied: it appeared empty. He could 
not examine their line closely without crossing the Fullaillee, 
and riding through the shikargah on the other side ; but 
here, as at Meeanee, he feared to give time for reflection and 
comparison of numbers, lest it should smother the warlike 
fire kindled by the despatches. His were not national 
troops. The rough European stood by the meek gentle 
sepoy of Bombay, the small lean Mahratta, marched beside 
the large-limbed man of Bengal; the regular cavalry 



OF SCTKDE. 



231 



charged with the wild horsemen, the fanatic Mahomedan 
levelled his musket between the Christian and the Idolator. 
But all acknowledged the bonds of discipline ; and better 
still, for the moment, were enthusiastic from the contrivance 
of their General. 

When the line was formed, the left being advanced, was 
under the Belooch cannon and several men were killed: 
one shot nearly grazed the General's leg ; but the flight of 
the balls betraying the elevation of the guns the wing 
was thrown back in safety. 

To make out the enemy's position more exactly, the 
engineer Waddington, assisted by two Lieutenants, Brown 
and Hill, rode straight to the centre of the Belooch line, 
and then along the front to the junction of the centre with 
the left, being always under a sharp fire of matchlocks. 
They thus forced the enemy to shew two-thirds of his posi- 
tion ; but the third nullah was not seen, nor was the wood 
made to speak plainly. Several ramps for passing the two 
nullahs were discovered by these intrepid officers and indi- 
cated for the artillery. 

While this daring exploit was going on, Sir C. Napier 
observed many Beloochees, troubled as he thought by the 
sudden appearance of the British army, hurrying from their 
left towards the village of Dubba ; and so hidden were their 
lines in the two nullahs covering that village, he also thought 
they had neglected their right, and were hurrying to repair 
the error. Hence he at once put his own troops in move- 
ment, advancing here as at Meeanee in the echellon order., 
with the 22nd leading, from the left. He hoped to seize 
the first nullah and the village before the enemy could reach 
it. His judgment was at fault, yet the promptitude was 
admirable, and the attack, though founded on a mistake, 
could scarcely have been amended with better knowledge. 
But while thus rapid of execution, he did not fail to provide 
for all contingencies that could be foreseen. 

The wood on his right he viewed with peculiar jealousy ; 
the close manner in which the Beloochees were there posted, 
convinced him they were the select division appointed to 
break out upon his flank. From the wood therefore as from 



232 



THE CONQUEST 



Pandora's box all evil might come, and to watch it he placed 
the Scindian horsemen and 3rd Bombay cavalry, under 
Major Stack, in advance, with orders to oppose whatever 
came out. This would give time, if he was so assailed 
before he could pass the nullah in attack, to throw back all 
the infantry on the right of the 22nd into a new position, 
between the Fullaillee and the village of Chilgheree. There 
he could fight on the defensive with the sepoys and cavalry 
of the right wing, while with the 22nd, the horse-artillery and 
the cavalry of the left wing, he continued the attack on the 
enemy's right. 

At nine o'clock the battle commenced. 

Leslie's horse-artillery, pushing forward, made a slant 
march for the junction of the point where the first nullah 
fell into the Fullaillee, on the enemy's extreme right ; he 
thus got a partial view of their centre, and a complete view 
of their left : there he halted at intervals to rake, but still 
rapidly gained ground towards the extreme right. The rest 
of the artillery, following in succession by batteries, likewise 
obtained raking positions, crossing their fire with the horse- 
artillery, so that the bullets tore the thick masses of the 
enemy's infantry in a terrible manner ; but previous to this 
Lieut. Smith, thinking of his duty and not of his life, with 
desperate valour rode foremost and alone to the bank of the 
first nullah and ascended it. He sought for a place where 
his guns could pass, and found death ! the nullah was filled 
with Beloochees, and " there the hero fell" 

Meanwhile the 22nd, followed by the sepoy regiment, 
presented only a diagonal front to the hostile line of fire, 
while the Bengal and Poona horsemen, on the left wing, 
moved in column close to the Fullaillee, to support Leslie 
and meet any sudden rush. Soon it was found that the 
nullahs and the village had not been neglected. The men 
seen hurrying towards them were rushing to reinforce the 
dark hero, Hoche, who had filled them with men, and at 
the head of his brother Seedees awaited the attack, resolved 
to win or perish. Their matchlocks and the single gun on 
the hillock behind them played incessantly, and the march 
of the 22nd was marked by the dead; half the light company 



OF SCINDE. 



233 



went down by fire from the first nullah, and beyond it 
the second and greater one was seen more strongly lined 
with men, while the village became suddenly alive with 
warriors, whose matchlocks could also reach the advancing 
line. 

Now the General saw that he had undervalued the Lion's 
skill, and that the rush of men towards the village and right 
wing had been a fine military impulse to strengthen that 
flank. He had neither time nor means to countercheck 
them, and, as generally happens even with the greatest 
captains, had to remedy his error by courage. Hence with 
the foremost of the 22nd he rode, meaning in person to 
lead the charge, when suddenly came a horseman from the 
right, to tell him all the cavalry of that wing was charging. 
Then concluding that the wood was vomiting forth its am- 
bushed warriors, and that his flank was turned, he desired 
Major Poole of the 22nd to lead the attack on the nullah, 
and went at full speed to the right. The report was 
correct. The cavalry of the right wing was madly charging 
across the minor nullahs covering the enemy's left; not 
because the Beloochees from the wood had moved, but that 
seeing numbers of the enemy still hurrying in apparent 
confusion towards the centre, the horsemen, thinking it a 
panic, had gone headlong down upon their left wing. Stack 
had thus uncovered the flank, and exposed the whole army 
to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the 
Belooch division appointed for the counter stroke. 

It was a great error, but could not be remedied. The 
whole body of cavalry was at full speed, dashing across the 
smaller nullahs, the spurs deep in the horses' sides, the 
riders pealing their different war cries, and whirling their 
swords in gleaming circles — there the fiery Delamain led the 
gorgeous troopers of the 3rd cavalry, there the terrible 
Fitzgerald careered with the wild Scindian horsemen, their 
red turbans streaming amidst the smoke and dust of the 
splendid turmoil. For a moment the General gazed, at first 
with anger, then with admiration, and seeing no indications 
of mischief from the wood while the redoubling thunder of 
his artillery called him to the left, trusting all to fortune 



234 



THE CONQUEST 



and courage he went back with such speed as to reach the 
22nd at the moment it was rushing to storm the first nullah. 

Riding to the first rank he raised that clear high-pitched 
cry of war, which had at Meeanee sent the same fiery 
soldiers to the charge. It was responded to with even 
greater ardour ; for here no check occurred, though the 
danger and difficulty was greater. Lieut. Coote first gained 
the summit of the bank, and tearing a Belooch standard 
from its bearer waved it in triumph while he reeled along 
the narrow edge, fainting from a deep wound in his side. 
Then with a deafening shout the soldiers leaped into the 
midst of the swordsmen ; and they were no sluggards to 
deal with, for there the black hero Hoche and all the 
Seedees fought — and there they fell ! 

Murderous was the fire of the British guns and mus- 
ketry, and the bayonet clashing with the sword bore back 
the bravest and strongest Beloochees, or levelled them in the 
dust, until the struggling crowd was forced into the second 
and deeper nullah, where with desperate fury the fight was 
renewed, as if the previous struggle had been as nothing. 
But still with conquering strength, and wasting fire, and 
piercing steel, the 22nd forced its bloody way through the 
dense masses, being well supported by the sepoys of the 
25th, who, striving on its right, kept pace and stroke in this 
terrible conflict. Soon the victorious troops passed the 
second nullah, pressing with undiminished fury on the rear 
of the retreating swordsmen until they reached the village 
of Dubba, where the Lugarees and Nizamanees, two of the 
most warlike tribes of Scinde w T ere well entrenched in the 
houses, and once more contended for the victory. The two 
regiments, thus opposed, immediately lapped round the 
nearest point of the village, while the cavalry of the left 
wing turned the place, partly by the bed of the Fullaillee, 
partly by passing the nullahs. Galloping round the left 
of Dubba they got a view of the plain beyond, where the 
cavalry of the right wing were now seen driving the 
Beloochees, horsemen and footmen, before them in scattered 
bands. Leslie's horse-artillery, also came up, having passed 
the nullahs with the cavalry by the aid of Henderson's 



OF SCTNDE. 



235 



sappers, who had worked slopes down the bank in the midst 
of the fire. Dubba, thus isolated, was left to the infantry, 
and was soon surrounded ; for the other regiments of the 
line, seeing the 22nd and 25th across both nullahs on the 
left, Stack's cavalry victorious on the right, and the enemy 
in their own front fearfully smitten by the guns, which never 
ceased to ply their masses with sweeping discharges ; seeing 
all this, the other regiments rushed vehemently forward, 
crossed the nullahs, and bringing up their right shoulders 
continued the circle from the position of the 25th, la/pping 
further round the village. In this charge the 21st sepoys 
stabbed every Eeloochee they came up with, whole or 
wounded, calling out Innes ! Innes ! at every stroke of 
death they dealt. Thus hundreds died for the crime of the 
villain Shahdad. 

From the speed of this advance some confusion ensued, 
and a Belooch field magazine exploding, killed all around 
the General as he was striving to restore order, he alone 
remaining unhurt, although his sword was broken in his hand 
and his clothes singed. Strongly and fiercely the enemy 
still fought, but they were finally driven from the village, 
and joined the other retreating masses ; yet there was 
nothing like flight amongst the footmen : slowly and sul- 
lenly they retired, some going off to the desert with the 
Lion, the greater number making for the Indus, hoping to 
pass that river ; but the victorious cavalry of the right 
wing intercepted and drove them in heaps towards the 
wilderness. Meanwhile the Bengal and Poona horse, under 
Major Storey and Captain Tait, were by the General in per- 
son, after forcing his way through Dubba at the head of the 
infantry, led against the retreating masses, putting them to 
the sword for several miles : not without loss to themselves, 
for the brave Captain Garrett and others fell. 

• The Scinde horsemen pursued on a parallel line more to 
the right ; and there Fitzgerald and Delamain actually got 
sight of the Lion's elephant and camel, on one of which he 
was retreating : in a few moments he would have been taken 
or slain, but Colonel Pattle, second in command, rode up, 
and thinking perhaps the dispersion of the cavalry too great, 



236 



THE CONQUEST 



stopped the pursuit. It was the third great error of the day. 
The two first were however happy errors, this was a mis- 
fortune — the Lion escaped to renew the war. 

When the General returned with his cavalry from the 
pursuit, the infantry met him with loud cheers, thus pro- 
claiming their admiration of his conduct in this battle, which 
lasted three hours and was very bloody. Hoche and three 
great chieftains, two of them Talpoorees, the other a Murree, 
fell on the field. The victors lost two hundred and seventy 
men and officers, of which number one hundred and forty- 
seven, more than a third, were of the 22nd regiment. The 
vanquished lost five thousand, and would have suffered still 
more but for the untimely halt of the cavalry on the right. 
Eight hundred bodies were lying in the nullahs and at 
Dubba ; and all the villages and lanes beyond the latter place 
were so filled with dead and dying that the army encamped 
where it stood. All the fallen warriors were of mature age, 
grim-visaged men and of athletic forms: the carcass of a 
youth was not to be found. 

Two thousand archers, coming to join the Lion, were too 
late for the fight and dispersed, and no judgment could be 
made of their value in battle. The weapon seems however 
to be in use. Shere Mohamed's own bows of painted horn 
were afterwards taken at Meerpoor, and a Belooch archer, of 
Ali Moorad's force, attended the General as an orderly during 
the battle, but he gave no specimen of his skill. Seventeen 
standards, and fifteen guns, eleven taken on the field and 
four next day, were the trophies of the fight, and, contrary 
to all expectation, there were thirteen wounded prisoners. 
Three only had been found alive at Meeanee, and this slight 
approach to mildness gave the General infinite satisfaction, 
for the ferocity on both sides had pained him deeply : the 
Beloochees would neither take nor give quarter, and the 
British troops would shew no compassion. 

Here, as at Meeanee, surprising feats of personal prowess 
were displayed. Four or five fell beneath the iron hand of 
Fitzgerald, whose matchless strength renders the wildest 
tales of chivalry credible. And again the hardy vigour of 
McMurdo was displayed in three successive combats, hand to 



OF SCINDE. 



237 



hand, with champions who had the advantage of shields to 
aid their swordsmanship. Two he slew in succession, but the 
third, with an upward stroke sheered him from the belly to 
the shoulder, and the well-driven blade would have gone to 
the viscera, if McMurdo's blow, falling first, had not cleft 
the man to the brows and thus abated his stroke, which never- 
theless gave a terrible wound. 

Three other officers, Wilkinson, Nixon, and Thompson 
also displayed surprising personal prowess ; but the most re- 
markable exploit of the fight was performed by a sepoy, who 
was seen by the cavalry fighting in the nullah alone against 
five swordsmen, and slew them all ! 

Near the village, a chief retiring with that deliberate 
rolling stride and fierce look, which all these intrepid fatalists 
displayed in both battles, passed near the General, who 
covered him with a pistol, but then, remembering Meeanee, 
where in the midst of their warriors no hand had been raised 
against him, he held his hand. A fruitless generosity, for a 
sepoy of the 21st instantly killed him with the terrible cry 
of blood! blood! Innes ! Innes! 

This battle, fought thirty-five days after Meeanee, and 
within a few miles of that field, bears three names, Dubba, 
Naraja, and Hydrabad. The first from the village, the 
second from the plain, the third from the city near which it 
was fought. The last is the one inscribed on the colours and 
medals of the soldiers by whom it was won. 

Prompt as the English General was for the battle, he 
was still more to render it a decisive one. 

Having gathered his wounded and arranged for their 
transmission to Hydrabad, he wrote his despatch, reorganized 
his army, and having ascertained that the enemy's retreat 
was towards Meerpoor, in eight hours he was again on the 
march, resolute to take all that Fortune would give. The 
desert was before him, the Lion's force was still four to one, 
and it had two fortified towns, Meerpoor and Omercote on 
which to rally. The mercury stood at 110° on the day of 
the battle, and the heat was hourly augmenting ; the troops 
had marched twelve miles to find the enemy, had fought for 
four hours and only rested eight, if that can be called rest 



238 



THE CONQUEST 



when they had to gather the wounded, to receive fresh am- 
munition, and to cook within the time. But all this was 
disregarded by their General when he found himself greeted 
with cheers wherever he moved, and remembered Caesar's 
saying that " nothing was done while aught remained to do." 
Nor were his hopes baffled by his men's weakness, for not- 
withstanding their fatigue and the withering heat they 
advanced twenty miles without a halt. 

During this march they passed two strongly intrenched 
positions previously prepared by the Lion, but his warriors 
were too dispersed to rally on them in time. This was the 
first reward of energy, and next day the Poona horse were 
at the gates of Meerpoor, forty miles from the field of battle ! 
Thus pressed, the Lion abandoned his capital, and carrying 
with him his treasure aud his family, fled to t)mercote. The 
gates of Meerpoor were immediately opened by the people, 
for being all Hindoos and Scindians they welcomed the 
victors as deliverers. It was well fortified, and stored, and 
had it been defended could scarcely have been besieged, for 
the hot season was coming on apace, and the Indus on the 
rise for inundation. An escalade would have been a desperate 
matter against Beloochees, and there were no ladders; the 
chance of blowing in the gates was small ; and failure must 
have been ruinous for so weak an army. The Lion would 
then have quickly gathered a new force, all the hill tribes, * 
and those of the plain on the right bank of the Indus, would 
have taken arms, and they could still produce sixty thousand 
fighting men. In the Delta also, the peculiar Ameeree of 
Shere Mohamed, swampy, unhealthy, intricate, and having 
many forts, a partisan warfare had already commenced ; and 
it would, if a check had been given to the British have 
gained such a head, that more than one campaign and twice 
five thousand men would have been required to put it down. 
But Hoche was dead, and the Lion, though a stout warrior 
was not equal to the crisis. 

Abashed by the rapidity and vigour of his opponent 
Shere Mohamed fled with diminishing forces in all haste- 
but swift as his flight was, his pursuers were not far behind. 
Even while taking possession of Meerpoor, the Scinde horse- 



OF SCTNDE. 



239 



men and the camel battery of Captain Whitlie were laid on 
his traces, and were supported with the 25th sepoy infantry 
under Major Woodburn. The General remained at Meer- 
poor with the rest of the forces, not from fatigue of body, 
though he had endured much, but from that cautious skill 
which characterized all his operations. For the line of march 
upon Omercote furnished little water, and he pushed on his 
troops at first only by small bodies and in succession, rather 
that he might not affront Fortune than with strong hope of 
gaining the place, which he knew to be well fortified and well 
stored. 

Meanwhile having to fear the inundation of the Indus in 
his rear, he kept his main body in a central position, ready 
to regain Hydrabad with the artillery if the waters continued 
to rise; and to reinforce, his vanguard at Omercote if the 
Indus kept down. 

But to understand the nicety of his operations, it must 
be remembered that nearly the whole of Scinde is a dead 
flat, and all the cultivated districts near the Indus and its 
branches present a network of nullahs, artificial or natural. 
These water-courses are from six inches to sixty feet deep, 
broad in proportion, and when the Indus overflows become 
streams, rivulets, and rivers, most of them impassable for 
guns and cavalry, and many impassable for infantry without 
bridges. On the other side Omercote had eleven guns 
mounted, and its own garrison besides the men accompanying 
the Lion : wherefore Sir C. Napier trusted more to the moral 
effect of victory and rapidity than to force, and did not 
choose to risk the loss of that power by sustaining a check in 
person. Acting therefore by his lieutenants, he wrote thus 
to the Lion four days after the fight : " Ameer, I offer to 
you the same terms as before the battle ; the same terms as 
those given to the other Ameers ; what those terms will be I 
cannot tell you, because I have not yet received the orders of 
the Governor-General, but I am sure he will treat them ge- 
nerously. However, I, being his servant, cannot tell what 
the orders of my master may be. I promise to you your 
life, and that your family of women shall be respected as 
those of the other Ameers have been. I advise you to sur- 



240 



THE CONQUEST 



render. There is no dishonour in being defeated in battle. 
To try and defend Omercote is foolishness. I can batter it 
down in a day, and destroy all within it." 

This letter sent by a camel rider, he expected some benefit 
from ; but he was not so elated as to risk the danger of 
the inundation in his rear for the uncertain chance of getting 
the town ; wherefore, though he menaced it with his irregular 
cavalry and camel battery, the portion of his army most ca- 
pable of moving in the desert, he supported them very 
cautiously with his infantry and the rest of his artillery, and 
his troops placed in succession at different posts, were 
equally ready to close up and assault Omercote, or fall back 
to escape the inundation. 

Reports soon arrived from both sides. " The river was 
rising before its time, and with unusual rapidity." " Omer- 
cote would not open its gates." Then orders were issued for 
a retreat. Nevertheless all hope of winning the city of the 
desert was not resigned. Lord Ellenborough, as noticed, 
had two months before extended his command to the troops 
of the Bombay Presidency quartered in Cutch. Now exer- 
cising that authority, the chief officer at Deesa was ordered 
to move from the east upon Omercote, and to aid that 
movement a new combination was to be arranged at Hydrabad, 
but unexpected events intervened. The order to retreat 
reached Whitlie when twenty miles from Omercote, and at the 
same moment that officer heard that the Ameer had quitted 
the place : hence he resolved to await further instructions, 
and found in Lieutenant Brown a young man ready to go for 
them. 

He had before distinguished himself, and now rode the 
forty miles to Meerpoor without a stop, borrowed one of the 
General's horses, and back with the same speed, bearing orders 
to attack Omercote! Eighty miles he rode under a sun 
whose beams fell like flakes of fire, for the mercury stood 
above 130° ! Passing the supporting infantry in returning 
he pushed them forward, and on the 4th of April Omercote 
opened its gates, the garrison retiring to a small interior 
fort. Major Woodburn soon got up with the 25th sepoys 
by forced marches under great difficulties, and then the 
citadel surrendered. 



♦ 



OP SCTNDE. 



241 



Omercote was thus reduced ten days after the battle, 
though a hundred miles distant and in the heart of the 
waste ! This was the third advantage forced from Fortune, 
and it was a great one — the desert was no longer a refuge 
for the Lion, who fled with a few followers northward. 
if There" said his conqueror, u he may wander for a time; 
he may even collect another force; but he cannot base a 
warfare on sand, he must come sooner or later to the culti- 
vated districts, where he will be met by the British." The 
event justified the prediction. 

These operations could not have been successfully con- 
ducted without astonishing exertions and resolution, illus- 
trating the character of the troops. On one of the long 
marches, which were almost continual, the 25th sepoys, 
nearly maddened by thirst and heat, saw one of their water- 
carriers approaching ; they rushed towards him, tearing away 
his load, with loud cries of Water ! water ! At that moment, 
some half-dozen exhausted soldiers of the 22nd came up and 
asked for some ; at once the generous Indians forgot their 
own sufferings, and gave the fainting Europeans to drink. 
Then they all moved on, the sepoys carrying the 22nd men's 
muskets for them, patting them on the shoulders and en- 
couraging them to hold out : they did so for a short time, but 
soon fell, and it was found that those noble fellows were all 
wounded, some deeply ! Thinking there was to be another 
fight, they had concealed their hurts and forced nature to 
sustain the loss of blood, the pain of wounds, the burning 
sun, the long marches, and the sandy desert, that their last 
moments might be given to their country on another field of 
battle ! Their names have been recorded by their grateful 
General; but what will that avail them, when that General 
himself has been reviled and calumniated for leading them to 
battle at all, and Lord Ellenborough driven from power for 
honouring and protecting such soldiers ! 

It was a grand and touching spectacle to see those poor 
men displaying such heroism, while their young officers, full 
of fire and intelligence, gathered about their veteran leader, 
to offer that hardihood which no fatigue could break down, 
that resolution which no danger could appal, that nervous 

R 



242 THE CONQUEST 

strength and courage in battle before which no enemy could 
stand— yet acknowledging that none amongst them endured 
more labour of body and mind than he, their aged chief. His 
victories were indeed not lightly gained, nor was his the ge- 
neralship that required hundreds of camels from the public 
service to carry his personal luxuries ; he did not direct the 
marches from a palanquin, appearing only when the battle 
was commenced. Five camels, purchased at his own cost, 
carried all the baggage and records of his head-quarters; 
and all day the soldiers saw him on horseback engaged with 
field objects, while his staff knew that far in the night he 
was engaged in the administrative duties. Seldom did he 
sleep more than five hours. But none could know the extent 
of deep and painful meditation, which amidst all this activity 
and labour enabled him to judge clearly of affairs, and or- 
ganize with so much simplicity the means of winning those 
glorious battles and conquering so great a kingdom. 

WhenWoodburn's success was known, orders were sent by 
camel riders to stop the march of the troops from Outch, a 
small garrison was placed in Omercote, the army was again 
concentrated at Meerpoor, and the tide of good fortune con- 
tinued to rise. From information received from the natives, 
it had been calculated that the inundation would permit 
operations in the desert until the 15th of April ; and on that 
chance the troops had pushed so boldly against Omercote. 
The sudden, unexpected, rapid rise in the river, suspended, 
as before noticed, the attack on that fortress, and induced 
the order for retreat it was then even feared the guns of the 
army must be left in Meerpoor until means could be prepared 
to bridge the nullahs. But when Lieutenant Brown arrived 
the river had begun to fall as rapidly as it had before swelled, 
and such false indications of the periodical overflows are not un- 
common : Hydrabad was, therefore, easily regained, and on 
the 8th the General was in the palace of the Ameers, master 
of Scinde, having in sixteen days, with five thousand men, 
defeated more than twenty-six thousand in battle, captured 
two great fortresses, and marched two hundred miles under a 
Scindian sun ! 



OF SCINDE. 



243 



CHAPTER VII. 

Lord Ellenborough now appointed Sir C. Napier 
Governor of Scinde, and independent of the Presidencies ; 
enjoining only the abolition of slavery, yet giving a wide 
discretion as to the time and mode. He also conferred 
honours and rewards upon the troops, thanking them with 
expressions of deep feeling, evincing his grateful admiration 
of their heroic services. " The army of Scinde" he said, 
" has twice beaten the bravest enemy in Asia, under circum- 
stances which would equally have obtained for it the victory 
over the best troops in Europe. 

" The Governor-General regards with delight the new 
proofs which the army has given of its pre-eminent qualities 
in the field, and of its desire to mitigate the necessary cala- 
mities of war by mercy to the vanquished. 

" The ordinary expression of thanks would ill convey the 
extent of the debt of gratitude which the Governor -General 
feels to be due to Sir C. Napier, on the part of the Govern- 
ment, the army, and the people of Hindostan. 

" To have punished the treachery of protected Princes ; 
to have liberated a nation from its oppressors ; to have added 
a province, fertile as Egypt to the British empire ; and to have 
effected these great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in 
brilliancy, whereof a grateful army assigns the success to the 
ability and valour of its general; these are not ordinary 
achievements, nor can the ordinary language of praise convey 
their reward." 

Thus speaking to, and of, brave men in humble life, Lord 
Ellenborough shewed that he knows the heart of a soldier, 
and how it beats : but the appointment fell like a wet blanket 
on the sordid hopes of the Bombay authorities and civil 
servants, who looked to Scinde as a fine field for the accus- 
tomed rapine of the Company's Government. 



244 THE CONQUEST 

Their anger broke forth in abuse of Lord Ellenborough 
and Sir 0. Napier, and by their newspaper organs they en- 
deavoured to destroy the conquest which they were not 
allowed to profit from. Henceforth Sir G. Napier was, both 
in words and deeds, treated as a public enemy. Outram s 
journey to England and his slanders against his General there, 
was a part of these factious proceedings, which were instantly 
adopted and encouraged by the Directors in Leadenhall-street. 

The captive Ameers, eleven in number, including three 
of their sons, were transferred to Bombay ; the murderer 
Shahdad being separately and strictly confined a slight 
punishment for the death of Captain Innes. And now the 
women proved how inhuman and brutal the Ameers were 
in their domestic habits. Not one female in the zenanas 
would accompany them into captivity, though it was not de- 
void of luxury and state : abhorring their former masters 
they desired to rejoin their families. The lash of Nusseer's 
brass-wire whip, said to be mild compared' with the punish- 
ments of the other Ameers, was not forgotten, and with one 
accord the women demanded leave to return to then- homes. 
It is impossible to conceive a more entire and destructive 
condemnation of those "fallen Princes" and their " patri- 
archal rule," for the condition of Scindian women m their 
own families is never agreeable or safe, and the soldier was 
then abroad. 

By the departure of these vile tyrants, for whose fa.l no 
Beloochees expressed sorrow, while all theScindians and Hin- 
doos openly rejoiced, Sir C. Napier was left free to act as he 
thought fitting, in civil as well as military matters. With 
respect to the war, the principal subject of his anxiety was 
the Lion's operations. Emaum Ghur, having been with a far- 
reaching policy destroyed, be had no rallying point in the 
waste nearer than Shah Ghur on the frontier of Jessulmere 
where the son of Roostum still maintained a small force and 
from thence menaced Ali Moorad. But the last had an 
army, and British troops were, on the side of Roree ready to 
support him and intercept the Lion if he fled to that quar- 
ter. Meanwhile several great chiefs proffered submission. 
They were not treated alike. 



OP SCTNDE. 



245 



Wullah Chandia, whose tribe was the most powerful but 
one on the right bank of the Indus, proffered his salaam the 
day Omercote surrendered. He had led ten thousand war- 
riors from the hills, and was close in rear of the British at 
Meeanee, though too late for that battle. His tribe was less 
lawless than the Booghtees, and Dhoomkees and Jakranees, 
who were his neighbours, and with whom he was often at 
feud, and the General, anxious to conciliate him, thus ac- 
cepted his submission. " I honour you for your obedience 
to the Ameers of Hyderabad, but God has decreed that they 
are to rule Scinde no more. The British Government is now 
master ; serve it faithfully as you have done the Ameers, and 
honour and respect will be shewn to you. But mind what I 
say, keep your own side of the river. Woe to the mountain 
tribes that cross the Indus." 

Relying on this message Wullah met Ali Moorad in con- 
ference, but that Ameer, with barbarian habits, seized and 
sent him to Hydrabad. The General instantly rebuked 
Moorad severely, set the Chandian free, restored his arms, 
and made him a present. Touched by this, Wullah swore 
that he would always be true, and he was so to his death, 
without fault or failure. 

Meer Mohamed, one of the Talpoor Sirdars, who had 
plundered Jerruck before the battle of Hydrabad, also de- 
manded terms : the reply run thus : — 

" Give back to Agha Khan the plunder you took from 
Jerruck, and make your salaam. I will pardon you then 
and be your friend, and your jagheers shall be respected." 

To the Jam of the Jokeas, whose conduct had been dis- 
loyal and insolent, he wrote menacingly. That powerful 
chief, scarcely acknowledging the supremacy of the Ameers 
though their feudatory, was eighty years of age, yet of strong 
body and vigorous mind, had great reputation as a preda- 
tory leader, and was a very superb robber ! His country, 
partly on the plains westward of the Delta, partly in the 
lower ridges of the Hala mountains was very strong ; and 
during the war he had menaced Kurrachee, though the en- 
trenched camp there was occupied by two thousand fighting 
men with a fine field battery, one of the regiments being the 



246 



THE CONQUEST 



British 28th ! From this it may be known, that if Sir C. 
Napier brought his army triumphantly through all dangers, 
it was by the exercise of unusual sagacity and vigour, amidst 
embarrassments which would have overwhelmed an inferior 
man. The Jam had only seven hundred warriors, yet Colonel 
Boileau suffered him to invest his camp, until the battle of 
Meeanee taught the barbarian who was master. Then, half 
submissive, he merely asked protection for some ladies of his 
family who had fallen into the victor's power : and he con- 
tinued to menace Colonel Boileau until the battle of Hydra- 
bad. Incensed at this, and that he should have been allowed 
to insult a British force greater than that which strewed the 
plains of Meeanee with carcasses, the General ordered Boileau 
to make a sally, whereupon the Jam fled, and Sir C. Napier 
sent him the following missive : — 

" You have received the money of the British for taking 
charge of the dak ; you have betrayed your trust, and 
stopped the daks ; and you have also attacked the troops. 
All this I forgive, because the Ameers were here, and were 
your old masters. But the Ameers are now gone from 
Scinde for ever. They defied the British power, and have 
paid the penalty for so doing. I, being Governor of Scinde, 
am now your immediate master. If you make your salaam 
and promise fidelity, I will restore your lands and former 
privileges, and the superintendence of the daks. If you re- 
fuse, I will wait till the hot weather is gone past, and then I 
will carry fire and sword into your territories, and drive you 
and all belonging to you into the mountains ; and if I catch 
you I will hang you as a rebel. You have now your choice. 
Choose!" 

The Jam yielded, but his barbarian pride would not bend : 
entering Boileau' s camp at the head of his armed followers, 
he pushed even into his room with six of his grim attend- 
ants, displaying the insolent airs of a conqueror rather than 
the submissive demeanour of a man obnoxious to the anger 
of a victorious General. He soon discovered his error, when 
a single officer delivered the following message from that 
General ! 

"Come here instantly. Come alone and make sub- 



OP SCTNDE. 



247 



mission, or I will, in a week, tear you from the midst of your 
tribe and hang you." To back this menace, a select body of 
cavalry and guns were ready to march ; but the Jam obeyed, 
and with such dread, as^ to entreat the British agent at Kur- 
rachee, whom he had until then oppressed by insolence, to 
accompany him as an intercessor. He was pardoned, and the 
lesson induced several chieftains, fugitives or still in arms, to 
offer submission ; they were treated so frankly that the con- 
queror's clemency and liberality spread widely, that even 
Meer Mohamed Khan of Kyrpoor, and another Mohamed, a 
great Talpoor Sirdar, desired to know what terms they might 
expect. 

To the former, as a dethroned Prince, the General, not 
being authorized to propose any but unconditional surrender, 
replied thus : — 

" Ameer, I advise you to go to Ali Moor ad, and remain 
with him till the pleasure of the Governor-General be known. 
I recommend to you to join the other Ameers at Bombay ; but 
till I have the authority of the Governor-General I can 
promise nothing but personal security." 

To the Talpoor Sirdar, who was a brave man, he wrote as 
follows : — 

" I never quarrel with a good soldier. Come and make 
your salaam, serve the British Government and be faithful ; 
your jagheer shall be safe." 

The Sirdar, still feeling doubt, only sent his sword in 
token of fealty, whereupon, allowance being made for his 
fears, he was thus reassured. 

" Come and make your salaam and you shall receive 
from the English Government all you held under the Ameers; 
and I will place the sword which you have sent me again in 
your hands, that you may fight as bravely for my nation as 
you did against us when you served the Ameers." 

This brave man was conscious that resistance was vain, 
but being a Talpoor would not desert the Lion then : after- 
wards when that Prince was irretrievably ruined he submitted, 
and met with no worse treatment for the delay. 

There was still another chieftain to be dealt with. Ahmed 
Khan, head of the Lugarees, whose dwellings were on the 



248 



THE CONQUEST 



right of the Indus. His men fought well and suffered se- 
verely ; but at their head Ahmed had attacked the Residency : 
he however only obeyed his sovereign's orders, had bravely 
exposed himself in battle, and was a gallant, generous bar- 
barian, who did not fear to trust his conqueror. The latter 
could not promise the Governor-General's pardon, but he 
would not hurt him, and answered thus : — ■ 

"I honour a brave soldier, but have no authority to for- 
give you. You attacked the residence of the British Envoy, 
your Princes themselves accuse you. The Governor-General 
is in wrath at this insult, and has ordered me to make the 
Ameer Shahdad and yourself prisoners. I must, therefore, 
appeal to the Governor-General, and I will plead your cause 
with him. I hope to gain your pardon; but I will not 
pledge myself to anything which I may not be able to per- 
form. If you come and reside here, I will receive you until 
his Lordship's pleasure be known ; and if he refuses pardon 
I will give you forty-eight hours to depart unmolested." 
This pardon he finally obtained. 

Notwithstanding the second battle, the country, especi- 
ally in the Delta, continued to be troubled by the plundering 
bands calling themselves the Lion's soldiers. The followers 
of the British army also, above fifteen thousand, and all 
armed, began to rob the Scindees, but were with a rough 
hand checked by the General, who at once disarmed them. 
To quell the Beloochee robbers was more difficult: the 
proper time for dealing with them by the troops had not 
arrived ; but Sir C. Napier soon organized a native police 
force, and by great activity and vigilance gave protection to 
the traders and cultivators. This, and his liberal treatment 
of the feudatory chiefs and sirdars, produced a surprising 
quietude, and the character of the new Government was indi- 
cated by unmistakable gestures. Rapid to strike, prompt 
to pardon, clear and simple in detail, its aim was to produce 
tranquillity and give the labouring masses security. 

Make no avoidable changes, was Sir C. Napier's in- 
struction to the officers entrusted with the subordinate go- 
vernment of the districts into which he divided Scinde — 
make no avoidable changes in the ancient customs and 



OF SCINDE. 



249 



laws of the land. The conquest of a country is sufficient 
convulsion for the people, without adding to their disturb- 
ances by abrupt innovations in their habits and the usual 
routine of their social life. Confine your exertions to the 
correcting of those numerous evils which the late tyrannical 
government of the Belooch conquerors inflicted on this un- 
happy land. It will depend upon the Government of Scinde, 
to make the people hail the coming of the British as a 
memorable redemption from slavery and oppression, or look 
upon it with apathy as a mere change of cruel masters. 

It was however impossible that so large a territory, 
governed as Scinde had been by a federation of tyrants, and 
a dominant race of feudatory chiefs and followers, warriors 
by profession and used to commotions which it was for their 
interest to excite — connected also with kindred hill and 
desert tribes, poor, rapacious, and robbers by national cus- 
tom, who looked down on the cultivated plains with longing 
eyes, and had sure retreats, as they thought, in their rocky 
fastnesses on one side, and their burning arid sands on the 
other — it was impossible for such a population, to sink at 
once into quiescence under the rule of a conqueror, whose 
strength had been tried in only two battles, and then only 
by a portion of those ferocious warriors. New commotions 
were naturally expected, and the hope that they would prove 
fatal to British ascendancy in Scinde filled the hearts of 
Lord Ellenborough's enemies at Bombay, and in other parts 
of India, with a treasonable delight which they did not 
conceal. 

The newspaper editors loudly proclaimed the wishes of 
this infamous faction. The Beloochees were regularly in- 
formed by articles, translated and read by the chiefs, which 
were the strong and weak points of the occupation, of the 
number of sick, and of those who could carry arms ; of the 
places along the river where the steamers could be assailed 
with most effect, and precise information was given how to 
effect their destruction with most certainty. One extract 
from the Bombay Times, edited by Dr. Buist, will illustrate 
their system. 

" The Indus is but a pitiful protection against an enemy 



250 



THE CONQUEST 



who sweeps over fifty miles at a stretch, who could leave his 
mountain home in the afternoon, approach the river in the 
dark, and before morning have a trench and embankment 
constructed sufficient to protect some scores of matchlock 
men. A single volley from a position which no musketry or 
ordnance could touch, might clear the deck of a steamer, 
and leave the vessel aground, and at the mercy of the enemy 
before danger was suspected. Should the crew be too 
strong, or not have been sufficiently reduced by the first fire 
to prevent their landing to attack their opponents, the fleet- 
footed Beloochees would have mounted their fleeter steeds 
and left pursuers far behind before our shot could reach 
them." 

They were also encouraged to profit from these sug- 
gestions by assurances of the deep interest in their cause 
felt by persons of power and influence at Bombay. When 
the General stopped plundering by his provost-marshals' 
punishment, the sepoys were invited to rise in mutiny and 
" put a stop by force to the fellow's breaches of law ! " 
And when an unusual sickness, afflicting the natives as well 
as the soldiers, broke out, the latter were told that the 
General was the cause of their sufferings. The information 
thus given to the enemy was often false, and generally 
exaggerated, because it was an object with the faction to 
disgust the people of England with the conquest ; and the 
editors were also so habitually intent on falsehood that truth 
was often rejected even where it might have best served 
their villainy. This was notably the case with Dr. Buist, 
who, surpassing all others in pandering for the faction he 
served, endeavoured to account for the refusal of the Ameers' 
women to follow them into captivity, by announcing that the 
ladies were carried off by the British officers as paramours ; 
an inexpiable offence, which he called on all the Mussulmans 
of India to avenge ! the Indian population of that sect 
being at the time very inimical to the British power. It 
was in the following terms this despicable tool assailed the 
honour of British officers. 

" They who three months since were sharers of a palace 
and in the enjoyment of the honours of royalty, are now the 



OF SCINDE. 



251 



degraded lemans of the Feringhi ! So it is ; the harem has 
been denied ; the last drop of bitterness has been mingled 
with the cup of misery we have given the Ameers to drink : 
the heaviest of the insults Mahomedans can endure has 
been heaped upon their grey discrowned heads. Let it not 
be supposed we speak of this in the language of prudish 
sentimentalism. The officers who have dishonoured the 
zenana of kings have committed great wrong ; but for that, 
as for the other evil deeds attending upon so unjust and 
cruel a conquest, the Government which ordained it is re- 
sponsible. We know now, to our shame and sorrow, the 
evils which flowed from frailties such as this permitted in 
Cabool ; and at Hydrabad we may yet discover the heinous- 
ness of our sins in the magnitude of our punishment. If 
one thing more than all the other wrongs we have inflicted 
on them, could awaken in the bosom of each Beloochee 
chief the unquenchable thirst of never-dying vengeance, it 
must be to see the sanctities of domestic life invaded and 
violated as they have been — to see the daughters of nobles, 
and wives of kings, living while youth and beauty lasts, as the 
concubines of the infidel, thrown aside when those attractions 
have departed to perish in their degradation and shame. 
This is the first of the black fruits of invasion for which 
Britons must blush. We have avoided explicitness on such 
a subject ; our readers will be at no loss to discover our 
meaning : — The most attractive of the ladies of the zenana 
now share the tents of British officers ! A series of acts of 
injustice first introduced to the Scindians the character of 
the British Government: what has just been related will 
afford them an insight into the virtues and blessings they 
may look for from the advance of civilization ; the benefits 
and honours destined them by the most refined people of the 
world. This contrasts well with the reception English ladies 
experienced at Affghan hands." 

To this accusation, an instant and indignant denial was 
published, signed by the General and all the European offi- 
cers at Hydrabad : not one lady had ever even been seen by 
a British officer ! When this slanderous falsehood was ex- 
posed, Buist contended that the Ameers' women should be 



252 



THE CONQUEST 



collected by force and shipped to join the Ameers. " They 
were prisoners," he said, " as well as their lords : they were 
slaves, and should be made to follow their lawful masters, 
who had the right, if they had the will, to cut their throats 
or poison them !" 

These calumnies were a part of the intrigues set on foot 
in revenge. The greatest misfortunes were predicted, and 
Ali Moorad, because he had not joined the other Ameers to 
destroy the British, was denounced as a traitor whose atroci- 
ties had been rewarded by Sir C. Napier with honours and 
grants of territory ! Yet no territory, no money had he 
received, and the only honour was an elephant given at his 
request on condition that he was to pay for it if the Go- 
vernor-General disapproved of the proceeding. It was prog- 
nosticated also that Ali would betray the British as he had 
betrayed his own family, and that he would join the Lion, 
whose power was exaggerated and dwelt upon with malignant 
anticipations of his final success. 

" He was no fugitive, he was undismayed, he laughed at 
the impotent boasting English General; he was a great 
commander, a heroic Prince ; he was gathering new forces 
in the desert, the advantage of which he well understood. 
His kindred were joining him from all quarters with the war- 
riors of the hills, in fine all the Beloochees were resolved to 
support him ; he had crossed the Indus, he was at the head 
of forty thousand men; the standard of Islam had been 
raised, the war had taken a religious turn, the feeling would 
spread throughout Beloochistan and Afghanistan and the 
Punjaub ; he was advancing with an irresistible army, was 
within a few miles of the British, who, few in numbers, sink- 
ing from disease, and commanded by an incapable ignorant 
old man, would inevitably be overwhelmed, and the tragedy 
of Cabool re-enacted." 

Sir C. Napier after the last battle had said, there was 
reason to believe another shot would not be fired in Scinde — 
meaning that the Ameers yet at large, would not again dis- 
pute the conquest at the head of an.army in the field. This 
expression the faction affected to take in its literal sense, 
and contrasted it in ridicule with the mighty power and 



OF SCINDE. 



253 



menacing position falsely assigned to the Lion. It was, 
nevertheless, the result of a sagacious consideration ol his 
enemy's character, the heterogeneous population and the 
peculiar topography of Scinde. He knew the Lion was the 
only Sovereign Ameer, still at large, having treasure and in- 
fluence he knew the bravest chiefs and most daring swords- 
men had fallen, and the spirit of the others cowed. He 
expected Meerpoor and Omercote to fall, as they did, calcu- 
lated on the moral effect, and had with a long foresight 
destroyed Emaum Ghur, leaving the Lion no refuge m the 
desert The fugitive Ameer could not collect a formidable 
army 'in the waste, though he might rally a few thousand 
men and become troublesome. Meanwhile the disposition of 
the Scindees and Hindoos was unmistakable. They clung 
to the conquerors as children would to a protector, and the 
Beloochees would not serve the Lion without pay or plunder: 
the first he could not long furnish, and the second must be 
got from the Scindees and Hindoos, who would thus be knit 
more strongly to the British. It was clear therefore that no 
army able to deliver a great battle could be raised on the 
left bank of the Indus, north of Hydrabad, and if the Lion 
could be debarred passing to the right bank the conquest 
would be established. 

But though no formidable force was to be expected on 
the left of the Indus, partisan warfare was to be apprehended, 
especially in the Delta, a peculiarly unhealthy intricate 
district, intersected with nullahs and tormented with jungle 
and marshes. Already bands had there gathered and it was 
to be* feared that the Lion would throw himself into that 
quarter, which was his patrimony. There he could prolong 
the warfor another year, as the Delta malaria could not be 
braved in the hot season. Sir C. Napier however, thought 
himself.skillful enough to baffle the Lion's attempts to get 
there ; and the Ameer's warfare could not hinder the establish- 
ment of a solid government which would satisfy the Scindees 
and Hindoos without exasperating the Beloochees. 

With great vigilance therefore he watched every move- 
ment of the Lion in his desert lair, silently and surely 
surrounding him and predicting with surprising accuracy 



254 



THE CONQUEST 



the spot where he would be taken in the toils which were 
thus spread. 

Chamberlayne's horse, moving from Roree, supported Ali 
Moorad, who had orders to intercept Shere Mohamed if 
he attempted to gain the Seik country, or to join Roostum's 
son at Shah Ghur. Ali dared not be unfaithful; his instruc- 
tions were precise, Chamberlayne watched him, and the 
success of the Lion and Roostum's son would be his ruin : 
but there was no reason to doubt him ; the alliance had 
been a rock of safety : his house was standing when those of 
the other Ameers were in ruins. 

The Lion's force augmented, not, as the Bombay faction 
asserted to forty thousand, but to eight thousand, with four 
guns, and the plunderers in the Delta began to unite in 
larger masses, and occupied several forts. Some tribes from 
the south also collected eastward of the Delta, calling them- 
selves the Ameer's troops, and they and the Beloochees were 
continually exhorted to vigorous warfare by the treasonable 
Bombay faction speaking through the Bombay Times. De- 
barred of the expected plunder of Scinde as civil administra- 
tors, they thought the destruction of the army, which they 
laboured assiduously and insidiously to effect, would be a poor 
atonement for the offence ; and when the General's courage 
and genius left them no hope of such a catastrophe they 
railed thus. " Alas ! that this man bears the name of English- 
man. Alas ! that he is bom in the glorious age of Wellington, 
which he disgraces." 

To aid Chamberlayne, Fitzgerald, who knew the desert, 
was sent to the north, and Colonel Roberts was ordered to 
come down the right bank of the Indus to Sehwan with fifteen 
hundred men and a battery. His instructions were to seize 
all boats as he descended, and thus prevent the Lion crossing 
to the right bank, and the western tribes passing to, the left 
bank. These movements were combined with others in the 
south and east, on a plan so vast, yet so profoundly reasoned 
and vigorously executed as to vie with any of the previous 
exploits of the war. 

Was not that an intrepid general, and a leader of good 
troops, who could resolve to brave the deadly sun of Scinde in 



OF SCINDE. 



255 



its utmost force ; and when the thermometer stood above 130° 
in artificially- cooled tents, to make marches of one hundred 
to two hundred and fifty miles— and this to circumvent a 
native army wandering without baggage in an unknown 
country covered with jungles, and intersected by nullahs 
filled at that time with water ? Less brilliant in its results, 
less obvious in its difficulties and dangers, less imposing 
for public ' admiration than the battles of Meeanee and 
Hydrabad, or the march into the desert, it was more com- 
plicate in arrangement, and not less heroic in execution, or 
decisive in effect. Nor was it a reckless enterprise, under- 
taken in the pride of command ; it could not be rejected 
without risking the conquest altogether. 

The General was indeed between two millstones : great 
loss from heat during the operations, greater loss from sick- 
ness afterwards, were inevitable. But if the Lion could throw 
himself into the Delta, an insurrectional warfare, longer 
operations in the heat, and greater loss of men, or inactivity 
until the cool season came round were as inevitable. The 
whole country would thus have been delivered to oppression : 
the labourer would not dare to till the ground while the 
Beloochee was abroad in arms ; famine would have followed, 
and the whole scheme of government designed to attach the 
people would have been delayed. Commotion, horrors and 
misery, would have ensued : the hill tribes, those of the plains 
westward of the Indus, and those of the desert eastward 
would have all taken the field, ravaging and slaying ! None 
but a man of overbearing resolution and uncommon resources 
could win his way through such difficulties. 

Shere Mohamed, now called by the natives the " Jungle 
Wallah" or keeper of the jungle, remained in the wilderness 
until the last days of April : then he removed to Khoonhera, 
fifty miles north of Meerpoor, and sixty from Hydrabad. He 
was driven there to seek water, which became each day 
scarcer in the desert as the hot season advanced : he however 
came with eight thousand men and four guns, and had other 
objects in view. His family were on the right bank of the 
Indus, in the Lukkee hills, inciting the tribes there to take 
arms, and he desired to be near the river when they should 



256 



THE CONQUEST 



be ready to cross over. His brother, Shah Mohamed, had 
also come down, and encamped not far from the right bank 
with two thousand men and some guns ; but with views for 
his own aggrandizement rather than the relief of the Ameer, 
who he had before offered to assassinate. 

In the north, Roostum's son, had advanced from Shah 
Ghur, and some slight actions happened between him and 
Ali Moorad. 

In the south, the robbers of the Delta were very mis- 
chievous ; and eastward of them, five thousand fighting men 
had taken post in the thick jungle on the Poorana river, forty 
miles below Meerpoor and Hydrabad, intercepting the com- 
munications between those places and Wanga Bazaar, on the 
road to Cutch. 

These simultaneous movements, and the general state of 
affairs, becoming more critical every day, gave Sir C. Napier 
great anxiety, but his own plan of counteraction also made 
progress. Colonel Roberts was in full march to Sehwan; 
Chamberlayne and Ali Moorad were vigilant in the north. 
Jacob was at Meerpoor, where the General, under divers pre- 
texts, and as if he merely designed to complete his posts of 
communication with Omercote, and hasten the repairs and 
additions to the works of that fortress and Meerpoor, formed 
a column, consisting of the Scinde horse four hundred 
infantry and two guns. Ali-ka-Tanda, the connecting fort 
between Hydrabad and Meerpoor was repaired, and the Lion 
was thus debarred a passage southward, and his communi- 
cations with the Delta and the tribe on the Poorana inter- 
cepted. Troops were also drawn from Deesa across the 
desert to watch the Ameer eastward, while the General, 
having a select body organized for rapid movement, was ready 
to pounce in person upon him if he should seek to force a 
way to the south. 

Captain Jacob, contrary to orders, now made a movement 
against the Poorana tribe, but had not firmness to attack, 
and retired again, thus augmenting the difficulties. At the 
same time the Lion was reported as about to move to Sukkur- 
unda on the Indus, to cover the passage of the Lukkees, who 
were said to have collected boats to cross over to him ; moreover 



OF SCTNDE. 



257 



the Rins, the most powerful tribe of Scinde were in arms and 
had promised him twenty thousand warriors. These wide 
combinations menaced evil, and the General immediately 
sent steamers up the river with orders to destroy the Lukkee 
boats, and run down without mercy every vessel carrying 
armed men : a stern order, purposely made public to alarm 
the tribes on the right bank and abate their desire to aid the 
Lion. The effect was to discourage the Ameer, and he tried 
negotiation, demanding terms ; but his adversary, resolved to 
preserve his moral ascendancy replied by the following 
austere communication. 

" In ten days I shall attack you with a larger army than 
I had on the 24th of March. Troops will come upon you in 
all directions. I do not wish to kill either you or your 
people, and I advise you to submit in time to the will of the 
Governor-General. If not, take your fate. Your blood will 
be on your own head." 

This was on the 2nd of May, but the Ameer, with arro- 
gance and false pretensions, continued to negotiate until the 
following missive, dated the 6th of May, put an end to his 
hopes, leaving him only the choice of absolute submission or 
victory. 

" You never disbanded your army, as I desired you 
to do. 

" You sent an insolent letter to me by vakeels ; you 
offered, if I would capitulate, to let me quit the country. I 
gave your vakeels the only reply such a letter deserved, 
namely, that I would answer you with my cannon. Soon 
after that your brother sent to me a letter, offering to assas- 
sinate you : I sent the letter to you. In my letter, I told 
you that you were a brave enemy, and I sent you the propo- 
sition of your brother, to put you on your guard. I did not 
say you were not an enemy. If your Highness cannot read, 
you should get trusty people to read for you. Your Highness 
has broken treaties, you have made war without provocation, 
and before a fortnight passes you shall be punished as you 
deserve. I will hunt you into the desert, and into the moun- 
tains ; if you wish to save yourself, you must surrender in 
five days." 

s 



258 THE CONQUEST 

This letter was decisive, and both Commanders prepared 
for battle. They were not of equal skill. The Lion, though 
prompt and hardy was not vigilant or long-sighted: the 
English General was both, and of equal hardihood : his plans 
were wider, and always he knew how to seize accidental 
advantages. Thus he had instantaneously turned Roos- 
tum's flight from Dejee, and his resignation of the Turban, to 
profit ; thus he marched on Emaum Ghur, forcing Ali Moorad 
to go with him before he could find an excuse for refusing, 
and so placed the younger Ameers in rebellion against the 
Rais. The same promptness brought him to Meeanee before 
the enemy could collect all his forces, and in that battle 
taught him how to paralyze the action of six thousand men 
with a single company. Again, at Dubba, the reading Lord 
Ellenborough's despatch aloud previous to engaging, and his 
rapidity after the victory, which, gave him Meerpoor and 
Omercote, were all proofs of his aptitude for war. 

To these instances he now added another. Between the 
four points of Sukkurunda, Rhoonhera, Hydrabad, and 
Meerpoor, the Lion was ensconced amidst nullahs, jungles and 
ravines, known to him, unknown to Sir C. Napier; but with 
great exertions the latter got some knowledge of it, and in- 
stantly formed a new scheme more concise than his great 
combination, yet without disarranging it. He put a detach- 
ment on board the steamers to land at Sehwan before Roberts 
could reach that place from Sukkur, and meanwhile prepared 
to close on Sukkurunda from Meerpoor and Hydrabad, thus 
encompassing the Lion and driving him into the Indus. To 
slip between these three columns he must go into the desert : 
then, by occupying Khoonhera, the only watering place 
on its edge, he could be forced to return to the Indus, or fly 
northward to Shah Ghur, where he would be met by the 
united forces of Ali Moorad, Chamberlayne, and Fitzgerald. 

This scheme did not take effect. The Ameer had de- 
layed his march while negotiating, and the caprices of the 
Indus unexpectedly delayed the British operations. It had 
twice irregularly overflowed in April, and twice as irregularly 
subsided. It was now rising a third time with all indication 
of truth, but the uncertainty chained the army, for the troops 



OF SCINDE. 259 

might march, to find themselves suddenly cut off from their 
base by nullahs filled with water ; or be prevented from ad- 
vancing, by swamps through which camels could not pass. In 
fine no movements could be made until it was known how far 
the waters would spread, a knowledge denied by the unusual 
vacillation of the inundation. 

While thus frettiug on the curb of necessity, Sir C. 
.Napier heard, that the Lion was actually in the cultivated 
districts, expecting soon to be at the head of thirty thousand 
men, and had proclaimed his resolution to fight and win, or 
die sword in hand. He was a brave man, and on a line 
of more than a hundred and fifty miles of river might draw 
aid in small bodies from the tribes, which could not be 
prevented by the steamers. The General's remarks on this 
new turn of the war were short. 

" I doubt the Lion's determination to die on the field ; but 
if he really collects twenty or thirty thousand men I shall be 
in no hurry to fight him. Let him bear the expense, I can 
laugh at his attacks from behind my entrenchments on the 
Indus : I can sally when he retreats : and if the present 
overflow is the true one, his followers will find it difficult, 
the waters being out, to disperse when beaten, and I shall 
make them deeply repent their temerity." 

This uncertainty lasted until the 22nd of May, when the 
spies said, the Lion, unable to raise the Scindian Beloochees 
generally, was negotiating with the hill tribes of Beloo- 
chistan ; and the Lukkees, recovered from the fear of the 
steamers, had again collected boats where their rocks over- 
hung the river, thus very exactly following the advice 
given to them by Buist in the Bombay Times. To stop them 
Lieut. Anderson was put, with one hundred sepoys, on board a 
steamer with orders to destroy their boats and drive them- 
selves from the bank. On the 27th he reached the rocks, from 
whence a fire of matchlocks was opened and the Captain of 
the steamer, Miller wounded. He replied with his large guns, 
and some sepoys being landed drove the Lukkees away ; 
the boats were then destroyed, and the armament steered for 
Sehwan to meet Roberts and aid his operations : thus the 
Lion was again deprived of his expected allies. 



260 THE CONQUEST 

On the 29th Colonel Roberts reached Sehwan. with 
fifteen hundred men. The communication between the Lion 
and his brother, and the intercourse with the western tribes, 
was thus entirely cut off, and the three points from whence 
the movements to encircle him were to be made attained. 

Now let the difficulties overcome be considered. Sukkur 
was one hundred and sixty miles from Sehwan, Hydrabad 
was eighty miles from it, and Omercote was a hundred miles 
from Hydrabad ; Shah Ghur was more than a hundred miles 
from Omercote, and Deesa was two hundred miles: yet all 
these places were embraced by this vast combination, which 
was conducted with such secrecy and exactness that the 
circle was completed around the Lion ere he knew it was 
being formed, and by marches made under a Scindian sun 
in the hottest season ! Nor was thO secret gathering of the 
troops at the different points of departure, without disclosing 
the object, less worthy of notice : it was so managed as to 
baffle the Lion's spies, and render the mischievous loquacity 
of the Indian newspapers subservient to the design. 

Colonel Roberts's orders were to cross to the left bank 
of the Indus in the night of the 9th of June, and march 
towards Khoonhera, upon which point also Jacob was to 
move from Meerpoor, and the General himself from Hydra- 
bad. Meanwhile Ali Moorad came down towards Lower 
Scinde, having Chamberlayne's horse in the desert on his left. 
But on the evening of the 7th, Roberts heard that the 
Lion's brother, after a successful skirmish with one of Ah 
Moorad's Sirdars, in which he took some prisoners, had 
encamped at Peer-Arres, fourteen miles from Sehwan. This 
opportunity was instantly seized. Roberts marched m the 
night with four guns, five companies, and a troop of cavalry : 
when day broke he was three miles from the Ameer's camp, 
which was at the foot of the Lukkee hills in a large grove. 
He had taken the alarm, and was retreating, but the cavalry 
under Captain Walker charged his rear, and put ninety to 
the sword. 

Meanwhile the infantry, reaching the camp, found bnan 
Mohamed in a close part of the grove, with seventeen attend- 
ants. At first he was disposed to resist, but seeing the 



OF SCTNDE. 



261 



sepoys eager to kill him surrendered. All his cannon, and 
family collection of matchlocks swords and shields, were 
taken, but no treasure ; a fact proving his impotence to 
raise a serious warfare, for the Beloochees do not serve 
without pay. This enterprise had been undertaken chiefly 
on the information and advice of a Patau horseman, called 
Ayliff Khan, one of those eastern adventurers who serve 
any side for pay. Simple horsemen one day, generals the 
next, they will aim at a kingdom if occasion offers as readily 
as at a gratuity. Ayliff guided the column, and in the 
charge four Beloochees fell beneath his vigorous arm : he 
is now with his son in the mounted police of Scinde, both 
being alike distinguished for courage, comeliness, fidelity 

and skill in arms. 

On the 9th Roberts crossed the Indus, on the 10th 
Jacob advanced from Meerpoor, and the General from Hy- 
drabad, all pointing on Shah-i-Khauta, where the Lion was 
said to have gone from Khoonhera ; but that chief, taking 
alarm, retreated not to Khoonhera, but up the river leaning 
towards the desert. (Plan 3.) 

On the 13th, the General, being at Ali-ka-Tanda, heard 
that Roberts was over the Indus and Jacob would be that 
day near Khoonhera. Ali Moorad also reported that the 
Lion, now seemingly aware of Roberts's approach, had sud- 
denly returned again to Shah-i-Khauta, only sixteen miles 
from Ali-ka-Tanda. Thither Sir C. Napier made a night 
march with his cavalry and guns, directing some of the 
infantry to follow as fast as they could. His design was to 
keep the Lion in check until Jacob and Roberts could close 
on him, but early on the 14th it became known that the 
Ameer had again moved to the eastward of Shah-i-Khauta ; 
he thus indicated an intention to break through to the south, 
and the General also moved eastward upon Nusserpoor to 
intercept him. The rest of the infantry had orders to come 
up from Ali-ka-Tanda, on his right, and communicate with 
Jacob ; but he had no report of that officer's position, nor 
any intelligence from Roberts : it was however evident from 
the uneasy movements of the Lion that both were near. 

These marches were generally made by night, the soldiers 



262 



THE CONQUEST 



keeping under canvass during the day with wet cloths on 
their heads, yet more Europeans died from heat than would 
have sufficed to win a battle, and the General's anxiety 
hourly increased; for the Belooch population was much 
excited and an insurrection had been prepared, the signal 
to be the presence of Shah Mohamed. The capture of that . 
Ameer by Colonel Roberts was publicly announced, but 
the Beloochees were incredulous; wherefore his person 
being well known, he was exposed to public gaze in a 
balcony of the Tower of Hydrabad. This was a successful 
device, but to put down the Lion was the main object, and 
no obstacle, difficulty or danger could arrest the General. 
His fatigue of body and mind was indeed so great, that 
fearing he might drop, he wrote to Colonel Roberts thus — 
" Whatever you may hear of insurrection, whatever may hap- 
pen to me, let nothing divert you from crushing the Lion? 

He had quitted Hydrabad suffering from fever, and in 
the midst of his movements the dak, long retarded, reached 
him with the accumulated correspondence of four months from 
the Governments of Calcutta and Bombay, thus imposing 
the perusal of and replies to hundreds of letters after long 
marches when rest was most needful. Nature could not 
long sustain this pressure. 

On the 14th, unable to obtain intelligence of Jacob or 
Roberts, he halted during the heat, very uneasy, because 
the Lion was evidently seeking to break the circle, and 
might succeed ; for the columns were not in military com- 
munication — a failure, caused by the officer at Ali-ka-Tanda, 
who neglected his orders. While thus anxious the sound of 
Jacob's guns boomed in the east, but ceased so abruptly as 
to give rise to the painful suggestion that he had been sud- 
denly overwhelmed, that the Ameer had broken the circle, 
had rendered abortive the great operations made with such 
labour and loss, and would raise the dreaded partisan war- 
fare in the Delta. 

While thus oppressed with care, fever, fatigue and want 
of sleep, Sir C. Napier stepped from his tent and instantly 
fell from a sun-stroke ; around him at the same moment 
went down thirty-three European soldiers, and most of them 



OF SCTNDE. 



263 



died in a few minutes : all in three hours! The General, 
caught up and bled instantly in both arms, survived, but 
the struggle for existence was hard and thus described by 
himself. "All was anxiety for me, when just. as they bled 
me, a horseman came to say Jacob was victorious, and the 
Ameer's force dispersed. I think it saved me. I felt life 
come back." 

The Lion had dallied in the cultivated districts until he 
found the columns were around him, and then desirous to 
repair his fault by courage had made a dash at J acob as 
the weakest. But that officer, while conducting his column 
along the edge of the desert, had on the 13th, got informa- 
tion of the Lion's march up the river, and of his sudden 
return, the cause of which he rightly judged to be the 
approach of Roberts, and therefore pushed on to Shahdadpoor, 
an advantageous post for intercepting the Ameer. In the 
night a Bramin servant, deserting from the Lion, reported 
that he would fall on next morning with ten thousand men 
and four guns— and, as he said, when day broke the Ameer's 
army was descried advancing, yet slowly and with hesitation, 
whereupon Jacob, leaving a guard in his camp, marched out 
to meet him. With the Lion were eight great Sirdars, most 
of them Talpoorees, and amongst them a son of Roostum, and 
the brother-in-law of Nusseer. But he was not bravely 
supported by any chief save Mohamed Khan, the Sirdar 
who had before sent his sword to Sir C. Napier. The 
^troops also were disaffected, the greatest part had deserted 
in the night, and only four thousand with three guns were 
in line. These he drew up behind a nullah, taking the left, 
and giving the right, composed of cavalry, to Mohamed 
Khan. So rough was the ground that battle could not be 
easily joined, and during a short cannonade that ensued, the 
Beloochee infantry dispersed before Jacob came personally 
into action. Their cavalry made a false charge in a cloud 
of dust, and when that cleared there was no enemy ! No 
effectual pursuit could be made, yet the rout was entire ; 
Jacob lost no men, very few Beloochees fell by the can- 
nonade, and the Lion fled with only ten followers. 

Sir C. Napier's operations were thus ended without loss 



264 



THE CONQUEST 



in action ; but more than sixty officers and soldiers died from 
sun-strokes, and a greater number afterwards from sickness : 
peace was however attained. " We have taught the Belooch, 
that neither his sun, nor his desert, nor his jungles, nor his 
nullahs can stop us — he will never face us inoreP Such was 
his summing up ; and in truth those desperate fatalists, who 
had at Meeanee and Dubba dashed with sword and shield 
like demons on the serried bayonets and rolling fire, fighting 
as if life were to them a burthen, now suffered nature to 
prevail, .and acknowledged the mastery of the British soldier. 
Their real feelings and particular behaviour in this action 
were made known afterwards by the Sirdar Mohamed, who 
commanded the Lion's right. Finding all lost he made 
salaam, and being well received, the following dialogue took 
place. 

G-eneral. — Mohamed, how came it you made such a bad 
fight with Jacob ? Twice you fought with me well, and I ho- 
noured you as stout soldiers ; I hold you cheap now. You 
ought to have killed half of Jacob's men, and he had to fire 
only five or six cannon-shot at you : he had not a man 
wounded. 

Mohamed (laughing).— Why, General, it is just because we 
did fight you twice, that we did not like the third time. 
We were afraid of you. But, to tell the truth, I know as 
little of the fight with Jacob as you do. I commanded the 
right, the Ameer commanded the left, he had the guns, and 
I nearly all the cavalry. It was hardly light when I heard^ 
the Lion's guns. I thought Jacob was upon him, as there 
was nothing that we could distinguish in my front. I there- 
fore rode full gallop, expecting to charge Jacob's flank. You 
know our horrible dust, it was in vain to look for a man, I 
thought I was followed. I reached the Ameer, he was alone 
almost. On halting, the dust cleared off and behold ! only 
twenty-five men were with me : I was lucky, had Jacob been 
there I should have been killed. But all had run under 
cover of the dust, and so the Lion and I run also, and that is 
all I know of the battle. 

G-eneral. — Well, the Lion is a fine soldier ; I honour him, 
and if I could take him, I would do all in my power to get 



OF SCINDE. 



265 



the Governor-General to pardon him and give back his 
estates. 

Mohamed Khan.— The Lion is a fool. After the battle 
of the 24th we all saw our people would never stand more, 
and none of us will ever try it again ; you are hawks, and we 
are but little birds. . I stood out as long as I could, but we 
see our folly now, and are your slaves for ever. 

General— Buz Mohamed, (he was a very strong, hand- 
some, portly man,) how did you get so fat in the jungle? 

Mohamed— I am not fat, I have been too much worked 
since you drove me into the jungle ; now that I am safe and 
at my ease under you, who treat us all so well, you will see 
what I shall become ! 

With this courtier-like stroke the conversation ended. 
Yet the Khan spoke knowingly and truly, as well as flatter- 
ingly ; for soon afterwards, four hundred minor chiefs came 
to lay their swords at the General's feet, relying on his gene- 
rosity as to their jagheers, and offering their rich weapons as 
propitiatory presents: every blade was richly sheathed or 
ornamented, and their value estimated from fifty to two 
hundred pounds each, a great sum, and a lawful prize of 
war, belonging solely to the General. Without hesitation 
he returned them, as he had before returned those of the 
Ameers, simply saying, " I lose money, but I gain the good- 
will and confidence of these chiefs." 

The Lion escaped to his family, which had remained 
with his treasure on the right bank of the Indus. Then he 
went to the Khelat Beloochees, afterwards to the Affghans of 
Candahar, who promised him aid with barbarian deceit, to 
gain his money, in which they succeeded. From them he 
fled to the Booghtees and other predatory tribes of the 
Cutchee hills, and his warfare became that of a mountain 
robber. They devastated villages, he became a sharer in 
their crimes, and Sir C. Napier gave him notice that he 
should, if taken, share their fate : finally he took refuge at 
Lahore, and sinking in sloth became fatuous. 

When Roostum's son heard of the defeat he abandoned 
Shah Ghur, disbanded his men, and joined Shere Mohamed 
in the Booghtee country. This terminated the war in Upper 



266 



THE CONQUEST 



Scinde, and meanwhile the General tranquilized the Delta 
bj means of his native police. The tribe on the Poorana 
river dispersed ; the roving robber bands, no longer able to 
call themselves the Lion's soldiers, were readily opposed 
by the people ; and many were taken : those against whom 
murders could be proved were hanged with labels on their 
breasts, announcing, that they were executed for those crimes, 
not for fighting against the British. The effect was great, 
the principle appreciated ; " the Padishaw is just, he does 
not kill any one for himself," became a saying with the 
people, and the conquest was achieved ! 



OF SCINDE. 



267 



CHAPTER VIII. 

OBSERVATIONS WRITTEN IN 1845. 

The complete subjugation of Scinde, a great kingdom 
teeming with natural riches, was effected by Sir C. Napier 
in six months. He thus gave to the Anglo-Indian Empire, a 
shorter and safer frontier on the West, with command of the 
Indus, opening a direct commercial way to Central Asia, and 
spreading through that vast country a wholesome terror of the 
British arms. All this he did with a force varying from two 
to five thousand men in the field, and in one campaign, during 
which, though ill supplied with carriage and delayed by in- 
tricate vexatious negotiations, he, in the first three months 
marched above six hundred miles, constructed an entrenched 
camp, repaired a large fortress, fought two great battles, de- 
feated sixty thousand enemies, killed twelve thousand, took 
twenty-six guns in the field, two camps w^h their baggage, 
four considerable fortresses, several minor forts, and made 
eight Sovereign Princes captives ! 

In the second three months, he marched two hundred 
and eighty miles, dispersed twelve thousand fighting men in 
the field, drove another Sovereign Prince, the one of most 
reputation, a fugitive and a vagabond on the face of the 
earth, and captured his brother. He received the submission 
of four hundred feudatory chiefs, some so powerful as to 
bring twenty thousand fighting men into the field ; he re- 
paired Meerpoor and Omercote, erected a fort at Ali-ka- 
Tanda, and another on the right bank of the Indus to protect 
the steamers. He formed a military police of horse and foot, 
and a body of spies upon the Ameers yet at large, choosing 
them from persons who had suffered in purse or person from 
their tyranny. 

He organized the civil and military occupation and go- 



268 



THE CONQUEST 



vernment of Scinde, and with such sagacity, that the first con- 
ception and framework has never been disturbed, though he 
enlarged it by degrees. It was not made with the pride of 
conquest but with all regard to justice, and it did not violate 
any of the people's customs or habits which were not opposed 
to the immutable principles of humanity. Mild it was to all 
save murderers. But they were many, for the Beloochees 
had enjoyed such impunity for wrong, that to slay a Scindee 
man or woman, or drag them into slavery, was an every-day 
occurrence. For such crimes he had no pardon ; but his 
boast was that in his military operations no man was slain, 
save in battle, no cruelty was perpetrated, no plunder per- 
mitted, no insult offered to a woman ! The Scindian people 
hailed his soldiers as deliverers, while they abandoned their 
villages at the approach of the ruthless Beloochees. 

With what resolution and sagacity he imposed his own 
system of government on the land shall be told hereafter, in 
a history of his administration : it has now continued two 
years, and is not less extraordinary than his military career. 
In that period he has substituted security, peace, and com- 
parative happiness, for misery, oppression and brutal degra- 
dation, has raised the Scindian serf to freedom, and abated 
the pride of the^erce Beloochee by moral force and just 
control. He has protected trade, fostered commerce, par- 
tially explored the natural resources of the country, and 
taken measures to draw them forth. Public works, with a 
view to future prosperity, have been commenced on a great 
scale, such as the construction of a mole at Kurrachee, 
which, besides its land approaches, will run two miles into the 
sea and furnish a secure harbour. 

Large and healthful stone barracks for the troops are 
being erected ; the police amount to more than two thousand 
well-organized, zealous and courageous men ; a native battalion 
of troops has. been raised and disciplined ; a fighting camel 
corps has been formed, which has made marches of ninety 
miles at a time to surprise robber bands ; and were it not 
for the commotions in the Punjaub the General would under- 
take the charge of Scinde without the aid of a soldier. 
Finally, although the revenue is drawn from territory, less 



OF SCTNDE. 



269 



by Ali Moorad's share than the Ameers possessed, it exceeds 
their receipts, being raised under a rigidly economical 
system, executed by young officers of his selection. 

All the expenses of the civil and political administration, 
including the police force, have been defrayed from the re- 
ceipts, and a surplus of ninety thousand pounds paid into 
the Calcutta treasury ; making with the prize-money half a 
million derived from this "decried conquest in one year— a 
profit received with complacency by the Directors, who are 
only inimical to the men whose courage gained it for them. 
Meanwhile the Scindian labourers cultivate the land, sure 
of something more than, a miserable existence and the handi- 
craftsmen, no longer dreading mutilation in payment of 
work, are returning from voluntary exile, allured by high 
wages and ample employment. Girls are no longer torn from 
their families to fill zenanas, or to be sold for distant slavery; 
the Hindoo trafficker and the Parsee merchant pursue their 
vocations with confidence ; and even the Belooch warrior, not 
incapable of noble sentiments though harsh and savage, is 
content with a Government which has only changed his 
feudal ties into a peaceful instead of a warlike dependence. 
He has moreover become personally attached to a conqueror 
whose prowess he felt in battle, and whose justice and gene- 
rosity he has experienced in peace. 

These great actions have, according to the usual course of 
human nature, created a desire in small and envious minds 
to lessen them ; and all the ingenuity of petty malice has 
been exerted to discover errors or to invent them, and pro- 
mulgate censures. Some of the latter are puerile and ridi- 
culous in the extreme, others plausible for those who know 
not the motives which determined the choice of measures : 
the first may be contemned, the second shall be refuted. 

The disparity of force at the battles of Meeanee and Hy- 
drabad struck men with astonishment, and the public gene- 
rally admired the courage and fortitude which could obtain 
victory against such odds. But self-constituted judges, 
turning away from the glorious spectacle, proceeded to con- 
demn Lord Ellenborough for furnishing so few troops ; and 
the General for risking the army in such an unequal conflict. 



270 



THE CONQUEST 



These censures are unfounded. Lord Ellenborough gave 
more troops than were required, and offered others. Sir 
C. Napier, therefore, was responsible for having so few 
troops at Meeanee : but he was not censurable. When he 
took the field he had strong grounds for believing no war 
would ensue, and was therefore anxious to save Government 
an expense it could ill afford. This induced him to send 
back the Bengal troops ; but he used them on their passage 
skilfully, to save the ceded districts from plunder, to cover 
the rear of the army from insult, and prevent a partisan 
warfare menaced by the Ameers. They kept the Bhawal 
Khan true to his alliance, an object not to be left entirely 
to his sense of honour when all India was beginning to waver, 
from the Affghan disasters. And all this was effected while 
these Bengal troops were advancing slowly to the Upper 
Sutlege, where, from the falsehoods of the Indian editors, a 
war appeared more likely to happen than in Scinde. . 

It has been, however, plausibly said, that war being 
commenced Sir C. Napier should at any cost have collected 
his whole force, seeing how numerous the Beloochees were. 
No man felt this more strongly than himself; but he was 
governed by necessity, not choice. In Scinde it was then 
impossible to act with a large force. At certain seasons 
water could not be got at any distance from the Indus, at 
other seasons a scanty supply only could be obtained ; and 
there are extensive districts in which it cannot in any sea- 
son be found sufficiently abounding for an army. On the 
march to Emaum Ghur only three hundred men could be 
supplied, when prudence demanded the employment of three 
thousand; and there, and all through the campaign, the 
want of numbers and facilities was remedied by genius and 
hardihood. The chances were all adverse : it was only by 
great moral qualities success was obtained. 

Sir C. Napier commenced his campaign with three thou- 
sand men when he had six thousand available ; but to use 
the greater number he must have adopted a different line of 
operations, have moved slowly, close to the Indus, in one 
huge unwieldy mass ; for his camp followers would not have 
been less than thirty thousand. The war however required 



OF SCTNDE. 



271 



rapid enterprise, with the temporary loss of communications : 
wherefore suppleness was substituted for numbers. 

At that season water was scarce, hardly could three 
thousand men be supplied at once ; moreover, the country was 
intricate and unknown, and the General had to grope, as it 
were, like a blind man for the wells ; had he been harassed 
by the enemy the difficulties would have been very great, be- 
cause the marches were necessarily determined by the water 
localities. But in Scinde every season has its peculiar mi- 
litary obstacles. At one period there is no water, at another 
there is too much ; the heat is unendurable in its climax, 
and anon, when it cools, intermittent fevers strike down the 
soldiers by thousands : man was found the least dangerous 
opponent, and yet the Beloochees were brave, well-armed, 
fanatical, not deficient in skill, and twenty to one in 
number ! 

Sir C. Napier was by circumstances compelled to 
operate in all the seasons. He had to bf ave climate, sickness, 
scarcity of water, and superior numbers, difficult to contend 
with because they moved without a commissariat, plundering 
for subsistence, always knowing where water could be had, 
and able to change their positions without difficulty. They 
knew also how to conceal the wells they left behind ; they 
would inevitably have baffled a large force, and were only 
overcome by the cautious though prompt genius of their 
opponent. These motives for acting with a small force 
would suffice, but there was another reason even more potent 
— the want of camels to transport provisions and stores ; and 
if these had been abundant only one regiment could have 
been added to the field force, without leaving Sukkur and 
Roree open to an enemy who could easily move round the 
flanks of the army to attack them unawares. 

It has been said the Governor-General should have in- 
creased the garrison of those places at once, and sent camels 
to the field force. He did so soon as it was practicable ; but 
Lord Ellenborough came out, not to a well-ordered govern- 
ment having command of great resources ; he came amidst 
disasters and confusion, amidst public poverty both of money 
and spirit : he came to save, to create, and time was re- 



272 



THE CONQUEST 



quired. Moreover the Ameers' quarrel grew very suddenly 
to a head : it was unexpected. Ferozepore is forty marches 
from Sukkur, and had Sir C. Napier waited for rein- 
forcements and camels, he would have been thrown into the 
hot season, and then the Ameers, with all their forces united, 
would have defied and insulted the British Government, have 
made new combinations with the Brahooe-Beloochees, the 
Affghans, the Seiks, and the Mahrattas of Gwalior, and the 
warfare of the latter was not found easy even as an isolated 
event. 

It was impossible to avoid war with the Ameers, and as 
the crisis was vital, there was a necessity to strike boldly and 
promptly. The army was undoubtedly ill provided, and the 
risk great; but the English General, conscious of ability, 
put aside all difficulties with this remark. " If a man is 
afraid to undertake that which the public good imperiously 
demands till everything in his army is perfect, he had better 
try any trade rather than war, because the very nature of 
war prevents everything from being perfect." 

When the result justified his daring, he thus epitomized 
his campaign. " I did everything I could to maintain peace 
with the Ameers, but I resolved to force their bands to dis- 
perse, as I was ordered. I considered the troops I took with 
me able to coerce the Ameers, and they were so." 

They would not have been so under a man of less genius 
and resolution. Yet he did not provoke the danger, he only 
confronted it heroically. When he marched against Kyr- 
poor from Roree, the Upper Scinde Ameers were not united 
with those of Hydrabad ; nor with the Lion. Separate ne- 
gotiations were going on with each; and though a secret 
concert for a general war was known to exist, the constant 
inebriety, the unsettled policy, and the clashing personal in- 
terests of the different broods, made it doubtful if they could 
act with a timely unity. The General therefore judged, and 
truly, that when Ali Moorad broke from those of Upper 
Scinde, the latter could be coerced before the others could 

come to their aid. 

Again, when the whole military power of Scinde was 
being collected around Hydrabad, Sobdar's and Mohamed 



OF SCINDE. 



273 



Khan's protestations of amity, joined to those of the young 
Hoossein, deceived even Ali Moorad, who assured the Ge- 
neral, and in good faith, for his own interest was involved, 
that they might be depended upon. 

Then came the treacherous proposal from Sobdar to 
send five thousand men, with secret orders to fall on their 
own countrymen during the battle, giving reason to suppose 
that all the Ameers' forces would not take the field, and that 
a like result would be obtained in Lower as in Upper Scinde. 
It was only when this, apparently well-founded hope failed, 
that the astounding discrepancy of force became apparent, 
and called forth the heroic energies of the leader, and his 
gallant troops. 

The two great errors, namely, the detaching men at 
Outram's desire the night before the battle of Meeanee; 
and refraining from an attack on Shere Mohamed the 
morning after that battle, have been noticed. It has been 
shewn that they sprung, not from want of judgment in the 
General, but from yielding against his judgment to the impor- 
tunities of a man for whom he had at that time a friendship, 
at a moment when the intrepid defence of the Residency 
falsely claimed by Outram, had touched his feelings. 

So difficult an art is war, that it has been, with something 
of hyperbole, designated as a series of errors, even when ex- 
ercised by the greatest captains. No great captain was ever 
quite satisfied when calmly considering his own exploits; 
perhaps, because the fiery spirit and energy, so conducive to 
success in action, being then quiescent, extraordinary daring 
appears rashness, even to the man by whom it was displayed. 
It shocks the cold reasoning faculty, which always seeks per- 
fection by a cautious, circumscribed process ; whereas the 
sudden impulses of genius belong to a higher intelligence, 
impervious though inexplicable, and vouchsafed to few. 

Sir 0. Napier blamed the precipitancy of his own attack 
at Dubba, He thought he should have employed an hour or 
two to examine the enemy's position more exactly from the 
flank, as well as on the front. Passing with some cavalry 
across the bed of the Fullaillee on his left, he could from 
thence have seen the whole of the Beloochee right and 

T 



274 THE CONQUEST 

centre, and would thus have discovered the double nullah and 
the great numbers posted there, and in the village of Dubba ; 
and with that knowledge would have made his principal at- 
tack at the junction of their left wing with the centre. 

This self-criticism is just, but the enemy's numbers were 
so great, and his position so strong, that delay might have 
affected the enthusiasm of the troops ; moreover the spies 
affirmed that the Lion had prepared a counter attack, whicn 
might have happened while the General was on the other side 
of the Eullaillee, the armies being within cannon shot of each 
other Here then the impulse of the moment was probably 
more valuable than the conclusions of an after examination. 

The battles of Meeanee and Dubba were astonishing 
exploits : the victor's despatches did not do them justice. 
When that of Meeanee was written all was confusion; oincers 
and soldiers were oppressed with fatigue ; heat, dust, and a 
false alarm in camp after the battle, conjoined with severe 
bodily pain from a broken hand, weighed on the writer. 
The Adjutant-General Wyllie was too badly wounded to be 
disturbed, there was no field return ready, and Sir C. Napier 
taking the last morning state of the army from his desk, more 
than a week old, hastily gave the force there set down as the 
number engaged. Nothing could be more erroneous. Outram s 
detachment, the sick of the last ten days, and the baggage 
guard, were thus all reckoned as good fighting men m the 
field ' When the true returns were afterwards made up, the 
total of sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Clibborne's grena- 
diers, who were scarcely engaged, did not exceed seventeen 

hundred and eighty ! 

With respect to the enemy's force the error was greater. 

The surest of the spies said the number before the battle 
was forty thousand, while others said thirty-five thousand, 
and one reduced it to twenty-two thousand : this last number 
was, from modesty, adopted in the absence of sure proof to 
the contrary. But subsequently, formal authenticated muster 
rolls of the tribes, made out for the Ameers, were found. These 
gave only twenty-five thousand eight hundred and sixty-two 
men, bearing sword and shield ; but there were two strong 
tribes, numbering together twelve thousand fighting men, 



OF SCTNDE. 275 

which joined on the very morning of the fight, and were not 
in the muster rolls : thus the whole force coincided with the 
report of the best emissary. The English General therefore 
fought with one to eighteen, not effeminate reluctant Hindoos 
without discipline and having ten thousand of their cavalry 
in secret league with their opponents ; not a rabble more ready 
from the beginning for flight than battle, as at Plassey, but 
strong valiant warriors, fanatics, wielding sword and shield 
with terrific power, giving no quarter, asking for none — men 
habituated to war, skillful after their own mode, and so intre- 
pid, that six thousand died under shield, and the remainder 
retired, amazed rather than dispirited, broken, not subdued. 
Six thousand was the number assumed by the conqueror ; but 
the Ameers, who were allowed to bury their dead, said eight 
thousand. 

Here may be noted a remarkable resemblance between the 
English General's operations and those of the Macedonian 
conqueror two thousand years before, in the same country. 
In Williams' Life of Alexander, a work which, with some 
errors of conclusion, arising from the author's want of mili- 
tary knowledge, is the best digested account of that wonderful 
man, the following passages occur : — 

" Alexander received information that the Malli and 
Oxydracae, two powerful and free states, were preparing to 
give him a hostile reception, and dispute the passage through 
their territories. . . . The plan agreed upon by the two nations 
was, for the Malli to send their warriors down the river and 
make the territories of the Oxydracaa the scene of war, for 
the former looked upon themselves as sufficiently protected by 
a considerable desert. . . . Alexander marched laterally from 
the left bank of the Acessines, and encamped near a small 
stream which skirted the western edge of the desert. . . . 
There, after a short repose, he ordered them to fill their 
vessels with water, and marching the rest of the day and all 
night, with the dawn arrived before a Mallian city which had 
no fear of being attacked thus suddenly from the side of the 
desert. The Malli fought resolutely, but the passage of the 
desert had taken them by surprise, and entirely deranged 
the plans of the chief who had conducted their warriors down 
the river." 



276 THE CONQUEST 

Substitute the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde for 
the Malli and Oxydracse, and the native plan is the same ; 
while the march to Emaum Ghur is a repetition of Alex- 
ander's operations, with this difference, that he was only five 
days in the desert, and the English General was eighteen. 

The campaign ended, as it begun, in the mazes of the 
Ameers' deceit and falsehood, aided and abetted by a cabal at 
Bombay, whose discontent at being debarred by Lord Ellen- 
borough of expected official plunder in the new conquest, was, 
and continues to be, evinced with all the rancour and vulgar 
vehemence belonging to sordid minds deprived of anticipated 
profits Had Lord Ellenborough annexed Scinde to the 
Bombay Presidency all would have been well ; lean relations 
and dependents would have been fattened, and the two or 
three years required so to fatten them, would have given 
Scinde back to the Beloochees with the loss of a British 

army. , 

Scarcely had the Ameers reached Bombay, when tne 
newspaper organ of this unprincipled cabal commenced lamen- 
tations over the " fallen patriarchal Princes." Their virtues, 
their dignity, their generosity were extolled, the iniquity 
of overthrowing them was denounced. The deposed Princes set 
their names and seals to petitions, concocted at Bombay and 
bearing unmistakable signs of their origin. These men, Maho- 
medans, few of whom can either read or write, were made to 
interlard their statements with appeals to the doctrines of 
Christianity, which they had, they said, learned from history 
and books ! Appeals also to the principles of the English 
Government which they had acquired a knowledge of m the 
same manner, and they prated about the Queen of Sheba ! 
Each Ameer signed separate statements, designed for the 
Queen, the Governor-General, and the Governor of Bombay ; 
and these were multiplied with such alterations and additions 
as it suited their European prompters to dictate. Ranging 
over all their past intercourse with the British Government 
they may be thus epitomized :— _ 

" The Ameers, always sincere friends of the British 
Government, had willingly become its subjects at the demand 
of Lord Auckland, and, as such, were faithful. There was 



OP SCINDE. 



277 



no cause of complaint against any of them, yet they had been 
treated with a violence and oppression exceeding any thing 
recorded in history. They had accepted and signed all the 
Auckland treaties, and never violated an iota of any one of 
them. They had, though feeling deeply the injustice of it, 
accepted and set their seals to Lord Ellenborough's new 
treaty ; yet they had been, in disregard of that act of sub- 
mission, attacked and deprived of their dominions. Sir C. 
Napier's arrival in Scinde was the signal for perpetrating 
every species of iniquity against them, helpless innocent 
Princes as they were, reposing without care or suspicion of 
evil, with quiet confidence in the British Government. 

" Astonishment and grief overwhelmed them at first, 
when they found their gentleness and dutiful behaviour no 
safeguard from oppression. 

" In their anguish they pleaded for mercy, but it was 
denied, and then their Belooch subjects and friends, enraged 
at the sight of their misery, assembled in arms and could 
not be restrained from attacking the British army, though 
they, the Ameers, had, with wonderful zeal and perseverance 
sought to restrain their fury ; and they would in truth have 
succeeded, if Sir C. Napier had not, with unexampled vio- 
lence, seized Hyat Khan and the other Murree chiefs while 
passing through his camp. Negotiations were then going 
forward, but this iniquity rendered fruitless the efforts of the 
Ameers to repress the national phrensy, which w r as excited, 
not so much by the injustice and harshness practised against 
the Ameers of Hydrabad as by the cruelty exercised towards 
the aged Roostum, whose desolate condition neither the other 
Ameers nor the Belooch warriors could bear. He had been 
misled, deceived, tricked out of his possessions by the insi- 
dious English General, and by his false brother Ali Moorad, 
who drove him forth, at eighty- five years of age, a wanderer 
in the desert. 

" The attack on the Residency, and the battle of Meeanee, 
were results of the natural generous indignation of the 
Beloochees. The first was commenced without orders, con- 
ducted without chiefs ; the Ameers had strenuously exerted 
themselves to prevent the accident. At the battle of Meeanee 



278 



THE CONQUEST 



the Ameers were forced to appear by their warriors, but their 
intention was not to fight ; they were in the camp to prevent 
others from fighting ; and they thought they would even then 
have succeeded in this humane project, if the English General 
had not attacked the moment he came in sight, killing some 
and forcing others to run away. But he could claim no 
triumph, because he had attacked and killed, not enemies but 
Queen Victoria's subjects, seeing the Ameers had long con- 
sidered themselves as her people. 

" After the battle the Ameers entered Sir C. Napier's 
camp, not as captives but as friends. They delivered their 
swords to him indeed, but he returned them, saying to Nus- 
seer in particular, 6 1 give you all praise. In twenty-five days 
your affairs shall be settled, and you will be restored to 
Hydrabad with all your dignity and rights.' To their aston- 
ishment, after this voluntary promise given, the English 
General entered Hydrabad a conqueror, and as it were by 
storm, plundering houses, breaking into zenanas, robbing the 
women by violence, even of their ear-rings and other orna- 
ments, causing them to rush out of their secret apartments to 
save their lives, and thus exposing them to the gaze of 
strangers, an abomination and an insult not to be endured by 
Mahomedans. Every article in the palaces, even to the 
peculiar family arms of the Ameers, things of no real value, 
yet dear to them as heirlooms, were made spoil of, and the 
original treaties and certificates of alliance with England 
were carried off with the plunder. Servants of the palace, 
men of high rank and respectability, were made prisoners 
without cause, and their houses plundered, and especially one, 
named Meerza Khoosroo, who former Ameers treated as a 
child, was in wantonness of cruelty tied up and flogged until 
he fainted. In fine, unparalleled horrors were perpetrated." 

These accusations, repeated and varied, formed the 
substance of the memorials ; but Sobdar and Shahdad added 
circumstances peculiar to their cases. The first stated, " That 
he had been the known particular friend of the British 
Government, in contradistinction to others. That he took no 
part in the battle, nor in the attack of the Residency. That 
after Meeanee he remained in his palace, confident in the 



OF SCINDE. 



279 



good will of the General, who could have no fault to find with 
him and indeed owed him favour, since he had strenuously 
opposed the wishes of those turbulent Beloochees, who, when 
returning from the battle, desired to defend Hydrabad and 
the fortress. Yet all his merit had not saved him from cap- 
tivity or from plunder ; his women had been insulted, his 
servants maltreated. Never since the English had become 
masters of India had such disgrace and oppression, and tyranny, 
been experienced towards any friend of Government." 

And then he, a Mussulman, appealed in the name of 
Jesus Christ for redress ! thus betraying the real authors of his 
shameless memorial. He, who pretended he had no control 
of the Beloochees that attacked the Residency ; he who claimed 
favour because he was not at Meeanee, thus casting aside the 
declarations of his brother Ameers as to their innocence of 
hostilities; he, this Sobdar, had nevertheless offered just before 
the battle, to place five thousand of his warriors in the Belooch 
ranks with orders to fall on their own countrymen during the 
action ; he had control over them for that treachery, none to 
prevent them attacking the British ! But ample proof was 
obtained that he had urged the attack on the Residency, and 
had sent his warriors to fight at Meeanee, where hundreds of 
them perished, while he, coward and traitor, remained in his 
palace to profit from whatever might happen. In truth he 
expected victory, like all the other Ameers, and sent his men 
because any lukewarmness would have been his ruin if the 
battle was gained. The other Ameers cared not for his pol- 
troonery, but they had his former fallings off from them to 
avenge ; and as he was a" Soonee" while they were " Sheas," 
religious fury would have conjoined with political revenge. 

The Ameer, Mohamed Khan, who had been wounded at the 
attack of the Residency, complained, that though, like Sobdar, 
he was the peculiar friend of the British, had sent no men to 
fight, and was in no way concerned in the disturbances, he 
had, nevertheless, been plundered, and made captive in a more 
degrading manner than the other Ameers had been. For 
while residing in the fortress he was suddenly seized, thrown 
on an elephant without attendants, and so carried off to the 
garden of captivity. He also had learned from books and 



280 



THE CONQUEST 



histories, that oppression was not allowed by the Christian 
religion. 

Shahdad's case was even more piteous. He was a lonely 
captive, yet he had always been a friend, and had nothing to 
do with the attack on the Residency. He had restrained the 
Beloochees at that time ; he had harangued the other 
Ameers on the folly and wickedness of such a proceeding, 
and, after Outram's retreat, he had prevented the Luga- 
rees from pursuing the boats up the river. Finally, he had 
no part in the murder of Captain Innes. 

Such were the shameless memorials concocted for those 
degraded beings by their infamous coadjutors at Bombay ; 
and hard they prayed not to be sent out of that capital, feel- 
ing truly that at a distance the game of interested calumny 
could not be so conveniently played. 

Three of these memorials, namely, those of Sobdar, Nus- 
seer, and Mohamed, were sent by the Bombay Government 
to Sir C. Napier ; and they reached him while engaged in his 
last operations against the Lion, just two days before he was 
struck down by the sun : he thus noticed them to Lord 
Ellenborough : — 

" I send your Lordship three complaints against us, with 
the replies of the accused. I think it my duty to make no 
answer (except to your Lordship) to accusations which I 
know to be concocted by a hostile party at Bombay. There 
are several other complaints, each of several sheets of fools- 
cap, and gross impudent falsehoods all. I have not answered 
them, but when I have a little leisure I shall send them with 
the necessary remarks. After your Lordship has seen my 
defence I will burn it, if your Lordship pleases, or re-word it, 
for the facts are as I state. Your Lordship will, I am sure, 
make some allowance for a man absolutely wearied out with 
their incessant unblushing downright falsehoods. As to going 
minutely into a disproof of all their gross assertions, I could 
easily do it, but I must give up my command, and request a 
permanent establishment ; for every disproof of their asser- 
tions would be immediately followed by another volume of 
lies." 

But notwithstanding his fatigue and anxiety and illness, 



OF SCTNDE. 



281 



and the accumulation of business suddenly imposed on him 
by the arrival at once of four months' communications from 
two Governments, he did send refutations of the Ameers' ca- 
lumnies, complete and irrefragable. Those calumnies were, 
as he had foretold, then repeated, and sent to him by the 
Bombay Government, purposely to irritate him ; but he re- 
fused to receive any more, and desired they might be sent to 
Lord Ellenborough. But as their aim was neither truth nor 
justice, nor the public interest, nor any thing decent or 
honourable, they were, notwithstanding the complete exposure 
of their falsehood transmitted to England by their concoctors, 
to influence the Directors, and with the hope of influencing 
Majesty : the only effect hitherto, however, has been to dis- 
play the baseness and knavery which originated them. 

It has been shewn that Outram's expedition to burn a 
skikargah saved him from the dangers of Meeanee ; and that 
he voluntarily quitted the army before the battle of Dubba, 
leaving Sir 0. Napier with a lowered opinion of him both as 
a diplomatist and an officer ; yet he still bore the name of 
friend, and the assurance, not coldly expressed, of the 
General's esteem. After a short stay at Bombay he pro- 
ceeded to England, openly professing his obligation to the 
man who had risked the Governor-General's displeasure to 
get him restored to a public situation in Scinde ; yet when 
he obtained access to the Ministers and the India House, he 
secretly stated that the Ameers were to the last moment 
willing to submit, and there was no necessity for hostilities — 
that he could himself have attained the peaceable termina- 
tion of the difficulties, if he had not been restrained by the 
General, who had moreover misled Lord Ellenborough, by 
withholding certain notes of conferences held with the 
Ameers of Hydrabad, by Outram himself, and copies of 
which he now gave to the secret committee : in fine, he re- 
peated the falsehoods of the Ameers' memorials, so exactly, 
as to prove that he had aided in concocting them. 

Astonished at these revelations from such a source, the 
Ministers became apprehensive that Sir C. Napier's victories, 
instead of being worthy of honours and rewards, would be 
found crimes subversive of England's reputation for justice 



282 



THE CONQUEST 



and good faith. That reputation was not indeed very high 
for those virtues in the East, but the Government, disturbed 
by this intelligence, suspended all notice of the victories. No 
rejoicing guns announced, no public thanks graced the con- 
quest of a great kingdom, and battles almost without parallel 
in history, were passed over in gloomy silence. A whispered 
accusation had more weight than those great exploits ! 

Outram, who had evaded the battles, who had been the 
direct cause of the only military errors committed, and whose 
counsel, if followed, would have destroyed General and army, 
thus intercepted the Government's acknowledgment of the 
dangers and glories which he had not shared. And English 
journals, taking for guides the foul Indian press, laboured to 
extol him and to depreciate Sir C. Napier, asserting that 
Outram ought to replace the General as the abler man! 
This was what he aimed at, but his swelling pretensions soon 
collapsed : he returned to India, and after having declared 
that he disdained to fill any office under Lord Ellenborough, 
accepted, meekly, an inferior political one, in an obscure 
province, which he had held twenty years before. 

Sir C. Napier has governed Scinde with the same energy 
and ability he displayed in the conquest. Widely spread is 
his fame as a General, widely as an Eastern ruler : his name 
is known and his warfare dreaded throughout central Asia. 
Distant barbarian Princes seek his friendship, for they cannot 
separate the idea of sovereign power from great exploits in 
war. A curious proof of this has been furnished by two 
embassies. 

The first from Yar Mohamed of Herat, whose nephew, 
being sent with credentials to the Bombay Government, 
turned aside to offer them and presents to Sir C. Napier. 
He was advised to go on to Bombay, and did so, but was 
there insulted. Scarcely had he quitted the camp, when 
another Prince, sent by the Khan of Khiva, whose dominions 
touched on the Aral Sea, arrived in the camp, sent also with 
presents direct to the conqueror of Scinde. He had made 
his journey with great difficulty and danger, delivered his 
credentials and thus spoke : 

" The Khan of Khiva hates the Russians, and the Bok- 



OF SCINDE. 



283 



hara Ruler, and the man of Herat. Why do you English, of 
whom it is said, you will avenge even the death of a dog, 
suffer tamely the massacre of your army at Cabool ? If you 
will attack the Affghans the Khan will assist you. It you 
will attack the man of Herat and the Ameer of Bokhara from 
the east, the Khan will attack them from the west, and suc- 
cess will be certain." 

Such is the renown of Sir C. Napier in Central Asia. 
With twelve thousand selected troops he could gibbet the 
murderer of Bokhara over the graves of Connolly and Stod- 
dart. The glory he has gained by arms and policy is too 
bright to be obscured by the foul breath of insidious ma- 
ligners. The morning sun which lights up the mountain's 
brow raises malignant vapours from the marsh at its base, 
but the midday sun disperses them. 

Outram's notes were sent by the Secret Committee to 
Lord Ellenborough. He had never seen them before, and 
required an immediate explanation. He soon got it, and so 
full, so complete, that all doubts as to where censure should 
fall were instantly dissipated. Far from furnishing ground 
for belief that peace might have been preserved, Outram's ac- 
cusatory notes only proved how egregiously he had been deluded 
by the Ameers. The withholding of them from the Govern- 
ment, to whom they were not addressed, was accidental ; but 
in a public view the General thought them of no importance, 
Outram's weakness of judgment and want of penetration 
being apparent to him at the time, and more completely ex- 
posed by subsequent events. In justice to himself, however, 
he now sent other communications which he had received from 
Outram, and had designedly withheld, from a generous re- 
luctance to lessen him as a public man in the opinion of Lord 
Ellenborough. » 

Among these defamatory notes was Boostum's account of 
his intercourse with Sir C. Napier as to ceding the Turban ; 
but Sir 0. Napier's letter to Outram, contradicting Boostum's 
statement, and exposing its falsehood was withheld by Outram, 
and the Government was thus led to believe the General had 
coerced that Ameer. And while thus treacherously retentive, 
he had reported that Sir C. Napier, by treaty, pledged him- 



284 



THE CONQUEST 



self to give Ali Moorad wide lands and revenue. Hence 
along with a demand for explanation as to Outram's notes, 
Lord Ellenborough required also, an account of this pledge 
and treaty, of which he had not before heard. Neither had 
Sir C. Napier ! It was one of Outram's many figments ! 

The General's exposition of these falsifications was so 
complete, that both the English and the Eastern Governments 
were more than satisfied ; and Lord Ellenborough recorded, by 
a formal minute of Council, the strong sense entertained of 
Sir C. Napier's conduct and the astonishment felt at Major 
Outram's delusions ! 

The English Ministers then moved for the thanks of Par - 
liament to the gallant troops and their leader, declaring in 
glowing language the great qualities of the man whose honour 
they had before doubted on the secret report of a factious 
tool. The Duke of Wellington's encomiums on the occasion, 
amply and forcibly expressed and with a nice discrimination, 
shewing that he had critically judged the operations, may be 
considered as history and fame. 

Outram's slanders were thus dispersed. But though the 
Sovereign and the Parliament have accepted the policy of 
Lord Ellenborough and the military exploits of Sir C. 
Napier, as honourable augmentations for England's glory, 
anonymous calumniators, encouraged by faction, still labour 
to lower the fame of those brave and worthy men, misrepre- 
senting the judgment of the Queen and Legislature, as one 
founded on expediency, in scorn of justice, whereas it was 
fouDded on the expediency of justice, as the following slight 
summary will prove. 

It was inexpedient and unjust to invade Affghanistan, 
and that invasion made it expedient, though unjust, to coerce 
the Ameers of Scinde; but both being done by Lord Auck- 
land's Government, with hypocrisy superadded, the result was 
imminent danger to the Anglo-Indian Empire. His suc- 
cessor had to save it, and to do so it was expedient and just 
that Lord Ellenborough should insist upon the exact main- 
tenance of existing treaties, and should punish any violation. 

The Auckland treaties were unjustly imposed, but ac- 
cepted by the Ameers without protest. They had profited 



OF SCINBE. 



285 



from them, and claimed the merit, not only of adhering to them 
but of having been eager to accept them ; both claims false, 
yet proving the validity of the treaties, which, however, they 
grossly violated. It was, therefore expedient and just to 
punish those violations and to insure future faith by new 
conditions. 

The Ameers accepted the new treaty, signed it, and next 
moment attacked the British troops. They were defeated, 
and it became expedient, just, wise, and benevolent, to put an 
end to their horrid rule. Expedient, because they were faith- 
less in peace and war ; benevolent, because the well being of 
their people was thereby secured. It was wise, because it was 
benevolent and just, and because it promoted civilization and 
commerce in barbarous countries. 

Who has suffered by it ? The Ameers only ! The very 
persons who had offended. To remove such brutal treach- 
erous tyrants, having a well-grounded right to do so, was 
worthy of England's greatness. The conquest of Scinde is 
therefore no iniquity. The glory of the achievement is a 
pure flame kindled on the altar of justice. 



APPENDIX. 



i. 

The trustees of the British Museum, through their se- 
cretary Mr. Forshall, have denied ever giving directions to 
cut the statue of Sesostris, or any other statue in Egypt, 
for the ease of transport. Such directions may however 
have been given without their knowledge by subordinates — 
my statement was derived by Sir C. Napier from Dr. Abbot 
of Cairo, whose collection of Egyptian antiquities is so 
well known to travellers. — W. Napier. . 

n. 

LETTERS FROM SIR C NAPIER. 

16th January, 1843. I found the Ameers and our 
Government in the position which a treaty made by Lord 
Auckland placed them. I had no concern with its justice, 
its propriety, or any thing but to see it maintained. I found 
that all the politicals had gone on, from the beginning, 
trifling ; sometimes letting the Ameers infringe the treaty 
without notice, at others pulling them up, and then dropping 
the matter : in short I saw it was a long chain of infringe- 
ment, denial, apology, pardon, over and over. I therefore 
resolved not to let this, which old Indians call " knowing the 
people," go on ; and I wrote to the Ameers, saying, I would 
not allow it to continue ; they of course continued their game 
and I, as I had threatened, reported the infringements to 
Lord Ellenborough, who agreed with me, that their irri- 
tating, childish mischievous secret warfare and intrigue 
should not continue. And as letters from the Ameers were 



288 



APPENDIX II. 



intercepted, proposing to other powers to league and drive 
us out of Scinde, Lord Ellenborough thought, and I think 
justly, that a new treaty should be entered into, which he 
sent me. I had laid before him the proposal, and I think 
my treaty was a more fair treaty, at least a more liberal 
treaty than his ; but I do not, as far as I have been able to 
consider it, think his unjust. Mind, I always reason upon 
affairs as Lord Ellenborough and myself found them. I can- 
not enter upon our right to be here at all, that is Lord 
Auckland's affair. Well ! I presented the draft of the new 
treaty. The Ameers bowed with their usual apparent com- 
pliance, but raised troops in all directions. These I was 
ordered by the Governor-General to disperse. To disperse 
irregular troops, they having a desert at their back and four 
hundred miles of river to cross and run up the mountains ; 
and all this with their chiefs swearing they submitted to 
everything to get me into the hot weather, when I could not 
move, and thus cut off all our communications at their ease, 
was no trifle. In short it was to attack a " Will-o'-the-wisp." 
Every man is armed to the teeth, and armies of great 
strength could assemble and disperse like wildfire. 

Suhkur, 16th and 17th December, 1842. I am ordered 
to take a considerable portion of the territory which belongs 
to the Ameers or Princes of Scinde, who have been plotting 
to turn us out by a simultaneous attack in concert with 
various allies: there are many of these princes, some are 
with us, some adverse. My object is to save bloodshed. 

I have cut off the communication between the Ameers 
and the ceded districts and their town of Roree. So I shall 
effect what I am ordered to do, and, unless they attack me, 
no blood will be spilled. I can produce a war in two hours 
if I like it, but I want to prevent it and trust in God I shall. 
I am the only man in camp who does not wish for war with 
the Ameers, and their own peasantry detest them and are 
longing for us. But still they collect great numbers of Be- 
loochees and other warlike tribes of the mountains: these 
robbers form their armies, and their deserts are difficult, and 
there are great jungles in the deserts. So it is necessary to 



APPENDIX III. 



289 



be careful. A very little rashness might invoke disaster for 
my small army : and as it is, I have near nine hundred sick 
with fever. I shall move across the river in three days. I 
am only waiting to arrange the defence of my camp here 
against the tribes from Larkaana, who, it is said, mean to 
attack it the moment I move over to Roree and am engaged 
with the Ameers. If they do it will be worse for them ! I 
feel I am their master in every thing but numbers. How 
our troops got defeated by these tribes is to me inconceiv- 
able I 

March , 1842. I mourn over the whole thing. I hate 
bloodshed. I did all I could to prevent it as my conduct will 
prove, and as every officer in this army knows ; for they used 
to say, " The General is the only man in camp who does not 
wish for a battle." The Ameers are the greatest ruffians I 
ever met with, without an exception ; however I have only 
obeyed my orders. 

in. 

ON THE AMEER ROOSTUM. 

Sir 0. Napier to Major Outram, 11th February, 1843. 

Roostum's plea of being sent to Ali Moorad by me is a 
shallow affair, because, in the first place, he sent a secret 
message (by Moyadeen, I think Brown told me) to say he 
was to all intents a prisoner in Kyrpoor, and that he tried to 
send away his family, and was obliged to bring them back 
after they were on the road, and that he would escape and 
come to my camp. Brown knows all this matter. The 
messenger said, he, Roostum, would do whatever I advised. 
My answer was, " Take your brother's advice — go to him, 
and either stay with him, or / will escort you to my camp" 
His flying from his brother's camp proves that he was not a 
prisoner. His not flying to mine, proves either his duplicity 
or his imbecility. I believe the latter, {)ut imbecility is not a 
legitimate excuse for Rulers ! I have only to deal with his 
acts. He played you the same trick. He even now stands 

v 



290 APPENDIX III. 

out ! He cannot say Ali Moorad still influences him ! I 
believed he did at first, but lie does not now ; and I am half 
inclined now to doubt the former fact, though I did not do so 
at first. But as I said, the intrigues of these people are no- 
thing to me ; only I will not let his cunning attempt to cast his 
conduct on my advice pass. He went contrary to my advice, 
and now wants to make out that he went by it. 

December 1843. Outram told me what a fine fellow 
Ali Moorad was ; how frank and open, and a thorough friend 
of ours ; adhering to his treaty honestly, as indeed he has 
done up to this moment. Well ! I was quite new to them all, 
and one night, 18th of December, 1842, a secret message 
came to me from Roostum, to say, he was a prisoner among 
his family, and they forced him to act against the English ; 
he begged of me to receive him in my camp, for he was 
helpless. I wrote to him the above letter [given in the text, 
chapter YI, advising him to go to his brother, &c. &c] He 
did go to his brother, and then would not see me ! I really 
know not what I am found fault with for. He did not take 
my advice, he only took a part. Now if I advised him to 
take a seidlitz powder, and he drank only the acid powder, 
he could have no right to complain that I gave him a pain 
in his belly. But this is exactly what Roostum did. He 
went to Ali Moorad as I advised; but he neither remained 
with him as I advised, nor came to me as I advised. He 
made over everything to Ali Moorad and then fled, and pro- 
claimed that he was forced ! The formal way in which he 
made all over to Ali has been proved in detail, and is in 
the hands of Government : it was also submitted to the 
Mahomedan College by order of the Governor-General, and 
the College pronounced it perfectly correct in all particulars. 

Now, why did not Roostum meet me? If he was 
forced as he pretends, why not tell me ? " Oh ! " said 
Outram, " he was afraid. Ali Moorad made him think 
you were going to put him in prison." My answer was, 
" Why should he think so ? There was not the slightest 
motive ; but if he did fear it at Dejee, that was no excuse 
for his not meeting me when I overtook him on the march to 



APPENDIX III. 



291 



Emaum Ghur. When I had force to seize him and all that 
were with him ; and when instead of doing so I sent you, 
Outram, his friend of four years, to invite him to come to 
my tent, and you returned with his two sons, and brought 
me a message, that he was so tired he could not come him- 
self. He could have no fear then." To this Outram said, 
" Oh! Ali has bribed all about him." This was nonsense; 
he had humbugged Outram. 

Well ! after Emaum Ghur, Outram again met him on 
the road to Kyrpoor, and he agreed to meet Outram there 
the next day to discuss the treaty, but was again so tired that 
he advised Outram to ride on and he would follow early next 
morning. Off went Outram, duped ; and the moment he was 
out of sight, Roostum ordered his baggage to be packed, and 
marched that night with all his treasure and seven thousand 
men, who he had kept out of sight of Outram, and also two 
pieces of cannon ; and he never stopped till he got to Khoon- 
hera, sixty miles from Hydrabad, where he had land, and a 
fort, which he held until I captured him ! Here you see my 
conduct was all clear. 

I wished to have one man to deal with instead of a dozen, 
and that dozen in the hands of an old fox, Futteh Mohamed 
Ghoree, the sworn enemy of the English, and working to 
form a coalition to fall on us with Beloochees, Affghans, and 
Seiks united, to the number of two hundred thousand men ; 
I- having but seven thousand in Scinde, and those divided 
between Kurrachee and Sukkur, five hundred miles asunder! 
I wished the younger brother to be the minister of the 
other, the Mayor of the Palace, the King being an imbecile 
old fool, full of useless cunning and in the hands of a clever 
knave and some six or seven violent young men. When I 
found Roostum had resigned the Turban to his brother I 
was opposed to it ; because, at first, I thought it would pro- 
duce war, and I sent to Ali Moorad to advise him not to 
take it. His answer was, " he could not give it up ; that 
it had been solemnly given by his brother with all legal 
formality, and he neither could nor would give it back." I 
had in the mean time reflected upon the matter, and was 
convinced Ali was right. It made the matter a decided one, 



292 



APPENDIX III. 



whereas the old idiot would constantly, by his^ cunning 
tricks, prevent Ali doing what was necessary. Thinking it 
was voluntary, I offered no opposition, but sought a meeting 
with old noodle to ascertain from his own lips that it was 

voluntary. , 
I never advised him to give up the Turban, I consented 
to it because I thought it would prevent bloodshed : indeed, 
it mattered little whether I consented or not, for it was done 
before I knew of it, and Ali Moorad refused to undo it at my 
request. He proved right ; for, as the sequel shewed, Roos- 
tum would have bolted, and used his power as "Bais" against 
us with some appearance of justice. I mean, that holding 
the Chieftaincy he could have sanctioned acts which might 
have embarrassed us ; for the Mahomedans think much of 
whoever holds the title The more this question is dis- 
cussed about Roostum the better, because my conduct was 
quite honest. I advised Roostum to be guided by All 
Moorad. I never forced him to do anything. I never 
advised him to give up the Turban, when I heard he had 
I tried to prevent it, and when I could not prevent it I 
sought an interview with him, to be certain the old man had 
not been forced or ill used by Ali. But he fled of his own 
free will. This is the whole story. 

I was very much afraid of the old man being killed in 
the attack of Kyrpoor if the people defended it, and I knew 
this would be vexatious, and give a handle for abuse of all 
sorts from the infamous Indian press, than which the whole 
world cannot produce one more rascally. Besides, I pitied 
the old man. I thought he was the victim of his son, who 
wanted to get the Turban against all law and right, and who, 
for aught I knew, might kill him on purpose in the row ! 
They are capable of this, any one of them. 



Ali Moorad to Sir 0. Napier, October 9th, 1843. 

Meer Roostum Khan, a week before he granted me 
the Turban and territory, importuned me to accept them, 
saying, that none of his sons appeared qualified to possess 



APPENDIX III. 



293 



the Turban and rule the country ; and that I should there- 
fore take possession of the Turban and territory from him. 
He deputed to me at Kote Dehuj, his eldest son Meer 
Mohamed Hoossein, Meer Nusseer Khan, Futteh Ghoree, 
Peer Ali Grohur, and certain other confidential persons to 
solicit me earnestly to accept the Turban and territory. At 
last he came in person, bound the Turban with his own 
hands and of his own accord around my head, made the 
entry in the Koran of his having granted me the whole of 
his country, sealed it and ratified it with his seal and 
signature, and thus distinctly made over his country to me. 

How is it possible then that I should have used coercive 
measures to obtain possession of the country, since I had not 
even preferred a request to obtain it ? 

Note by the Secretary to the Government of India, 
August SOth, 1843. 

Sir C. Napier adverts to the legal bearing of the deed 
under which Meer Roostum abdicated in favour of Meer 
Ali Moorad. 

It had been represented to Sir C. Napier, that every 
chief is master of his own property, none of which can be 
entailed ; that the will of the possessor decides who is to 
have the land ; that if he gives it to his children, he may, 
in virtue of his paternal power, revoke that gift ; but that 
if he gives it to a chief who is his equal, and over whom he 
has no paternal power, the deed is final. 

It is quite correct that every person is master of his 
own property, and that there can be no entail : — he may 
give it to whom he chooses. The gift, when possession has 
been obtained by the donee, is complete. It can, however, 
be cancelled under certain circumstances ; but one of the 
barriers to cancelling a gift, is relationship within the pro- 
hibited degrees. A gift therefore to a son cannot be 
cancelled any more than to a brother.* If made to a person 

* Vide Macnaghten's Principles of 3Iahomedan Law, chap. v. par. 13, 
p. 51 ; Hamilton's Eedaya, vol. iii. p. 302. 



294 



APPENDIX III. 



not a husband or wife, nor within the prohibited degrees, it 
may in certain cases be cancelled. 

Sovereign power is not however considered property 
according .to the Mahomedan law, nor is it regulated by the 
laws which govern the transfer of property, whether real or 
personal, for there is no distinction between the two. The 
legal title to sovereign power amongst the orthodox Ma- 
homedans of the Soonee sect, rests upon the election of the 
chiefs or people ; but, as there are few Sovereigns who could 
bear to have their titles subjected to this test, much inge- 
nuity has been exercised by lawyers to accommodate their 
system to modern usage. The accompanying opinions by 
the doctors of the Mahomedan college of Calcutta are a, 
fair specimen of the kind of arguments which can be brought 
forward. There is no reason to suppose the opinions to be 
otherwise than sound and correct. It is customary to refer 
to the law officers of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, when a 
legal opinion is wanted ; but there is only one such officer 
now entertained in the court, and the post happens at the 
present time to be vacant. By referring to the college, the 
unanimous opinion of ten doctors has been obtained : some 
of them are very able men. and all of them are well in- 
formed on the subject. 

It will be seen that the opinions given lead to the 
same result as was represented to Sir C. Napier, though 
there is no ground for the possible distinctions which were 
supposed to exist. The abdication of Meer Roostum is 
complete and irrevocable ; the assumption of the power by 
Meer Ali Moorad is also complete, and recognized by law. 

J. Thomason. 

Questions and Answers respecting the legal effect of the 
transactions between Meer Roostum and Ali Moorad. 

Ques. 1.— The ruler of a country died and left his 
country and forts to his sons. They divided the country 
and forts amongst them, and each obtained full possession 
of his own portion. After a time, one of the sons gave, 



APPENDIX III. 



295 



and made over to his brother, his country, forts, and power. 
In this case, can the donor recall his gift of country, forts, 
and power ? 

• A ns . — The donor cannot recall his gift, because, when 
he has once removed the country, and power, and forts, 
from his own control, and made them over to his brother, 
he is necessarily divested of all authority, and becomes one 
of the subjects of the state. Thus no option of recalling 
his gift remains. Such is ruled* in the books, but God 
knows what is right. 

Qaes. 2. — What proof do you adduce that the ruler of 
a country cannot legally retract his gift to his brother, of 
his forts and country, and that he becomes thenceforward 
one of the subjects of the Government ? 

Ans. — There are two foundations of all authority and 
kingly power, — 

1st. The consent of the nobles and chiefs to the supremacy 

of any one. 

2nd. Obedience to his orders, in consequence of the 
establishment of his power and his supremacy. It is thus 
laid down in the Buhur-oor-rayik, in the chapter on Judicial 
Decrees, and in the Kazee Khan, in the chapter on Apos- 
tacy. " A king obtains his power by two means :— first, by 
consent to his accession, and this consent must be on the 
part of the nobles and chiefs of the nation ; and, secondly, 
by the obedience of the people to his orders, from fear of his 
power and superiority. But if men consent to his acces- 
• sion, and yet no obedience is paid to his orders, from his 
inability to enforce them, he does not become a king. If, 
on the other hand, he become king by common consent, and 
then turn oppressor, still, if his power and authority be 
confirmed, he cannot be deposed, for if sentence of deposi- 
tion were passed, he would yet remain king by his power 
and strength, and the sentence would be ineffectual ; but, 
if he have no power and authority, then he would be 
deposed." Now, since in. these troublous times discord is 
the common practice, and union is seldom procured, there- 
fore the learned men of later times have agreed upon this, 
that in the present day, power and supremacy is the test 



296 



APPENDIX III. 



of kingly authority. It is thus laid down in the Fatawa- 
i-Alumgiri and the Khuza-nutool-Mooftiem, in the chapter 
on Judicial Decrees, " and in our time authority depends 
on superiority ; and we do not inquire whether kings be 
just or unjust, because all of them seek after temporal 
power." 

It is gathered from the drift of the question, that the 
ruler in question was actually possessed of power and supre- 
macy ; and whereas he gave over to his brother his country 
and power and forts, and divested himself of his supremacy 
and dignity, with all their attendant circumstances and 
pomp, and made these over to the donee, it follows that this 
gift and transfer could not have been made, without the 
deposition of himself. Thus necessarily the donor becomes 
completely deposed, and this may be gathered from a remark 
of Hunavee upon a passage in the Ushbah. The passage in 
the Ushbah is to the following effect : " A king died, and 
the people consented to the succession of his minor son. It 
is necessary that the affairs of the administration be made 
over to a regent, and that this regent consider himself a 
dependent on the son of the king, on account of the superior 
rank of the latter. Now the son is the king ostensibly, but 
the regent is king in reality." Upon this passage Hunavee 
has remarked, " The object of this arrangement is to meet 
the necessity for a renewal of the administration after his 
coming of age, for this cannot (legally) take place, except 
when the ruler has effected his own deposition, because a 
king cannot (legally) be deposed, except by his own act." 

The ruler who makes the transfer, and is thus deposed, 
becomes one of the subjects of the realm : and this is 
established by a passage in the Hedaya, on the resignation 
of a judge, — " On account of the resignation, the power 
reverts to the people, and therefore he no longer retains the 
option of recalling his resignation.' 7 

Moohummed Wujeeb, First Professor, Ma- 

homedan College. 
Mohummud Bushiruddin, Second Professor, 

Mahomedan College. 



APPENDIX IV. 297 

Nookoolluck, Third Professor, MaJwmedan 
College. 

Mahummtjd Ibrahim, Fourth Professor, Mct- 

homedan College. 
Abdoorehrem, Professor of Indian Law and 

Regulations. 

Ghoolam Hoossein, First Assistant. 

Mahummed Muzheer, Second Assistant. 

Hubeeb-ool-Nubbee, Third Assistant. 

Ujeeb Ahmud, Moidvee of the Law Exami- 
nation Committee. 

Humud Kubeer, Secretary to the College Com- 
mittee. 

IV. 

Sir C. Napier on conversations letween himself and 

Major Outram. 

• 

Outram.— Ali Moorad is by far the best of the Ameers. 
I wish you knew him. He is good looking, a frank open 
manner that you cannot help liking. I wish you could see 
him, you would be pleased with him. At first he was quite 
opposed to us, and would have made war against us if the 
other Ameers had joined him, however seeing it was of no 
use to oppose us, he joined the alliance with us, and is the 
only one who has never given us cause of complaint. I am 
sure you will like him." 

Napier.— 1 believed all that Major Outram said as 
far as a certain point ; that is to say, that Ali Moorad was 
a superior description of barbarian ; but I had too much 
experience of barbarian chiefs to have much confidence in 
the best of them. They may be naturally very superior 
men, but the best of them is, and must be under control of 
the petty chiefs who surround them ; and however strong 
their own minds may be, the physical force which these 



298 



APPENDIX IV. 



petty chiefs command is too powerful to be resisted, and 
consequently, however naturally honest the great chief may 
be, you can never be sure of any engagement you enter into 
with him being fulfilled ; unless that engagement involves 
the good wishes of the minor chiefs, or that you have power 
to force both him and them to a steady line of conduct. I 
therefore could not altogether confide in Major Outram's 
admiration of Ali Moorad : but it so far influenced me as 
to make me believe that he was the best among the Ameers 
of Kyrpoor to hold the rule in Upper Scinde. 

Outram. — " The great agitator and cause of all opposi- 
tion to the English is a scoundrel named Futteh Mohamed 
Ghoree. I have tried to catch this old villain, but he is 
such a cunning fox, that there is no discovering any fact 
which I can lay hold of. But allow me to put you on your 
guard against him, for he is the secret mover of all the 
breaches of treaty and insults that we have received from 
the northern Ameers : the Syud Mohamed Shurreef whom 
I caught with so much trouble was merely one of this old 
villain's emissaries." 

Napier. — These observations of Major Outram, I con- 
sidered as the result of long experience in the petty politics 
of Scinde. I scarcely knew Major Outram then, but his 
public character and position gave me a right to confide in 
his opinion. I therefore assumed upon his authority, that 
Ali Moorad was the man to look to, and Futteh Mohamed 
Ghoree, the man to be watched in any transactions I might 
have with the Ameers. It is curious, that within a month or 
six iveeks of this time, Ali Moorad being then Bais, and 
Futteh Mohamed Grhoree a prisoner, there was no term of 
abuse too strong in Major Outram? s opinion for Ali Moorad ! 
and the Major ashed me to let Futteh Mohamed Grhoree loose ! 
having himself before told me that this man rided Meer Boos- 
tum ; that he ivas the bitter enemy of the British, the most 
intriguing and dangerous man to our interests in all Scinde I 
This dangerous man he would have had me let loose at the 
most critical juncture of affairs that ever existed between 
us and the Ameers ; namely, at the moment of my return 
from Emaum Ghur, when I had summoned a general meet- 



APPENDIX IV. 



299 



ing of the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde, personally 
or by their vakeels, to discuss the new treaty : the question 
of peace or war being in the balance! Futteh Mohamed 
ruled the majority of the Ameers of Kyrpoor, and yet 
Major Outram wanted me to let him loose ! If Major 
Outram wanted to secure our having war, such a step was 
likely to accomplish it. I positively refused to agree to it, 
and was in utter astonishment at Outram being so short- 
sighted as to propose it, which he did at the request of 
Meer Roostum ! 

Now let us consider how the elevation of Ali Moorad 
to the Turban took place. 

First, I will give two extracts from Major Outram' s 
letter to the Government of India, dated 21st April, 1842. 

1st Extract. " Even were not right so clearly in Ali 
Moorad' s favour, I should have been loth to advise the at- 
tempt to dispossess him in favour of any other party of what 
he now holds ; for it could only be done at the risk of consi- 
derable disturbance, Meer Ali Moorad being by far the most 
powerful, influential, and able of all the Upper Scinde 
Ameers ; on which account, so far from wishing to weaken 
his power, I would consider it politic to strengthen him, at 
least by our countenance and guarantee to such a degree as 
will induce his assuming the chieftainship in Upper Scinde 
without opposition on the demise of Roostum Khan." 

2nd Extract. " My opinion is that it would be both just 
and politic to support Meer Ali Moorad : the public recog- 
nition of whom, and investiture with the Turban, by the 
British representative when Meer Roostum dies, most pro- 
bably would at once put an end to the intrigues of other 
parties for that distinction; and at any rate Meer Ali 
Moorad would not be likely to require further support, than 
merely the countenance of the British Government. Whereas, 
as he would not under any circumstances relinquish what he 
deems his right, and is powerful enough to maintain his own 
cause against the pewer of the other party, we should have to 
support the latter with troops did we espouse their cause." 

Major Outram here speaks of the death of Meer 
Roostum, but his resignation of the Turban, whether" to Ali 



300 



APPENDIX IV. 



Moorad or to his son Hoossein Ali, was the same thing : it 
was ^he cessation of Meer Roostum's wear of the Turban. 

My mind being imbued with the substance of this letter 
and Major Outram's conversations, made me accept with 
pleasure an invitation from his Highness Ali Moorad, to 
meet him at Roree. After some time had passed in general 
conversation in the Dhurbar, his Highness invited me to 
retire with him and his vakeel into a private apartment of the 
tent. Lieutenant Brown was with me, and the following 
conversation took place : 

Ali Moorad.—" My brother Meer Roostum is about to 
give the Turban to his son Meer Mohamed Hoossein. By the 
laws of Scinde, if he dies, I inherit the Turban. If he abdi- 
cates he can only legally do so in my favour — he has no right 
to pass me over, and place the Turban on the head of my 
nephew. I am willing to obey him, but I will not allow him 
to give the Turban to any one else — what I want to know 
from you General, is, if we quarrel, do you mean to assist 
Meer Roostum or not ? I am determined to assert my right. 
I have force enough to do so if you will be neuter, but at any 
ra te — I am determined to maintain my right by force of 
arms whether you agree to it or not." 

Sir 0. Napier. — I will certainly give you assistance to 
take the Turban from your nephew, but not from your brother. 
By treaty we are obliged to support the Ameers in their re- 
spective rights, one against the other. My duty here is to 
maintain the treaties, and you may be sure of my doing so in 
your case in all lawful rights. 

Ali Moorad.—" That is all I want. I wish my brother 
to keep the Turban, and I will obey him ; but I will not allow 
him to give it to any one else. 

" I have great affection for my elder brother. I am 
ready at all times to obey him, and I always have obeyed 
him, but he has become so weak and vacillating that if 
you go into his room and make any arrangement with 
him, however important it may be, he will change it all, if 
the next person that goes in thinks fit to propose another 
scheme. Now, as Futteh Mohamed Ghoree is always with 
him, and always making war upon me, I am obliged to de- 



APPENDIX IV. 



301 



fend myself, not against my brother but against Eutteh Mo- 
bamed Ghoree, who controls bim in every tbing. I am 
determined not to let Futteh Mobamed wear tbe Turban, and 
I will not obey bis orders. I am much stronger than my 
brother's family. I beat them lately in battle. Every body 
knows I can take the Turban if I choose by force, but I don't 
want it : I wish my brother to remain chief." 

Embued by Major Outram with a good opinion of Ah 
Moorad, of whom all the English with whom I conversed at 
Sukkur held the same opinion, I gave credit to what he said, 
because I knew the mischievous character of Eutteh Ghoree, 
and the imbecility of Roostum was proverbial. Soon after, a 
message arrived from Roostum, claiming my protection 
against the intrigues of his own family ; this offered an op- 
portunity of having one man to deal with, instead of a faction 
with which it was impossible for a civilized government to 
deal, and into whose intrigues, with due respect to Major 
Outram and his predecessors, I considered it undignified for 
a great government to enter, and from the first I determined 
not to enter into them. I was resolved, when there was a 
breach of treaty, whether great or small, I would hold all the 
Ameers responsible, and would not be played off like a 
shuttlecock, and told this was done by one Ameer, that by 
another, and so have a week's inquiry to find out who was 
responsible for aggression ; for I at once saw, on arriving at 
Scinde, that this hide and seek, shifting responsibility, was 
the game which the Ameers had been playing. The proposal 
of Meer Roostum to come into my camp offered me an easy 
remedy for this evil, and having adopted the high opinion of 
AH Moorad entertained by Major Outram, I had no hesi- 
tation in recommending his brother to seek his protection and 
be advised by him : but it must be borne in mind as a matter 
of first importance, and one upon which the gist of the thing 
depends, that, while advising Roostum to be guided by his 
brother, I, having suspicion, despite the high character given 
by Major Outram of Ali Moorad, that some intrigue must be 
going on, gave Meer Roostum not only the option of coming, 
but an invitation to come to my camp, and to put himself 
under my protection. I use the word must, because it is 



302 



APPENDIX IV. 



utterly impossible for me to believe that any Eastern divan 
can act without intrigue. 

By my advice to Roostum, which was not given until 
asked , I o'ffered to him the . honourable and powerful pro- 
tection of the British Government. This he did not choose 
to accept. He went to his brother, and then he fled from 
that brother with his usual vacillating imbecility, an imbe- 
cility I believe to have been produced by his long habits of 
drunkenness ; for he is said never to be sober after mid-day. 
That this flight was caused by Ali Moor ad, as Major Outram 
affirms, 1 do not now believe. I have neither seen nor heard 
of any thing to make me believe it. He deceived Major 
Outram twice in the same manner, if not oftener. Thus, 
when he promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor next 
morning, but walked off to the south with a large armed 
force and his treasure, he could not have been influenced by 
Ali Moorad, who was then far off with me in the desert. 
He had played me the same trick on my first arrival at 
Sukkur, long before there was any question of a new treaty 
and when Ali Moorad could have no interest to prevent our 
meeting. 

When I heard he had resigned the Turban to Ali 
Moorad I disapproved of it, and Mr. Brown will recollect my 
sending Ali Moorad' s vakeel back to him with this message. 
I even recommended him to return the Turban and act as his 
brother's Lieutenant. His answer was the deed had been 
executed in due form, before all the Moolahs or Priests, and 
it was impossible to alter it. I had nothing to reply. I had 
no business to interfere with the private arrangements of the 
Ameers. I was authorized to give advice when asked. I 
was obliged by existing treaties to give protection to any 
Ameer whose rights were invaded by another ; but I was not 
called upon to originate a complaint when none was made to 
me, and especially in a case, which, whether originating or 
not in family intrigue, had a result so favourable to my own 
Government and useful to that of the Ameers. I therefore 
did not interfere between Ali Moorad and his brother. The 
proofs that he was voluntarily elected by Roostum were laid 
before me. I sought to have an acknowledgment that it was 



APPENDIX IV. 



303 



a voluntary act from Roostum's own lips, but he pertina- 
ciously avoided meeting me ; nor was Major Outram able to 
bring about a meeting afterwards. I believe it was his 
own family prevented the meeting; they were afraid he 
would confess to having voluntarily given up the Turban. 
Evidence of their complete power over him from beginning to 
end are not wanting in every transaction that I have had 
with him siDce I have been in Scinde. 

As to Ali Moorad's conduct, I do not believe Major 
Outram can give proof of any thing he alleges against him ; 
all his allegations are general, there is nothing specific. If 
the not joining his family in their breaches of treaty be be- 
traying his family, it is clear that he has betrayed them; 
but I know of no other act of treason against them. Ali 
Moorad may be any thing Major Outram chooses to accuse 
him of being, but there must be something specific and ac- 
companied by proof. I have heard of neither. We will even 
suppose, what I do not admit, though I suspected it at the 
time, that Ali Moorad bullied his brother into ceding the 
Turban and his estates ; he, Ali Moorad, guaranteeing a due 
and dignified maintenance to Roostum. We will suppose 
this, and change the position of the individuals. Suppose 
Roostum an English gentleman of a large fortune, eighty- 
five years of age, perfectly imbecile, incapable of managing 
his estates. Ali Moorad is his legal heir ; those who are not 
his heirs try to deprive him of his inheritance. What would 
the law of England do ? I imagine it would give him the 
guardianship of the estate and of the old idiot, under certain 
restrictions. Well ! what the law of England would have done 
for him Ali Moorad did for himself and by his own power ! 

However upon these matters Major Outram, or Major 
anybody, may form their own opinions, they are indifferent 
to me ; but Major Outram had not a right to tell Sir George 
Arthur, that I had given power and riches to Ali Moorad, 
and had caused the war, because there is no foundation for 
such an erroneous assertion ; and by giving his notes of a 
conversation with Meer Roostum and the other Ameers at 
Hydrabad, in which I am represented, and certainly by im- 
plication made to have forced Roostum into his brother's 



304 



APPENDIX V. 



power, and to the surrender of the Turban and all his terri- 
tory, without accompanying such notes with my denial of 
the circumstance, I do consider Major Outram to have acted 
very unjustly towards me, if Major Outram did so ; of which 
however I have no proofs, except hearing of his notes being 
in the hands of high and influential authorities without any 
notice being taken of my contradiction. All this I am de- 
termined shall be cleared up. 

V. 

The falsehoods published by Outram, and ignorantly 
repeated by Lord Jocelyn in the House of Commons, as to 
Roostum' s cession of the Turban, are peremptorily dis- 
posed of in the following letter written by Roostum to his 
son at the time he resigned the Turban. It was only made 
known in 1850 before a Commission appointed to inquire 
into a charge against Ali Moorad. Roostum here acknow- 
ledges that he was a free agent, for he speaks only of 
persuasion not of force, and if he could have withheld any 
territory he could have retained all. 

Meer Roostum Klian, to Meer Mohamed Hoossein. 17th 
Zehaght, 1258. A. D. 20th December, 1842. 

\_After compliment] — According to the written directions 
of the General (Napier), I came with Meer Ali Moorad 
to Dejee-ka-kote. The Meer above-mentioned said to me — 
" Give me the Puggree (Turban of Rais) and your lands, and 
I will arrange matters with the British ! By the persuasion 
of Meer Ali Moorad Khan I ceded my lands to him ; but 
your lands, or your brothers', or those of the sons of Meer 
Moobarick Khan, I have not ceded to him ; nor have I ceded 
the districts north of Roree. An agreement to the effect, 
that he will not interfere with those lands, I got in the hand- 
writing of Peer Ali Gohur, and sealed by Meer Ali Moorad, 
a copy of which I send with this letter for you to read. 

Remain in contentment on your land, for your dis- 
tricts, those of your brothers, or of the heirs of Meer 



APPENDIX V. 



305 



Moobarick Khan (according to the agreement I formerly wrote 
for you), will remain as was written then, and Meer Ali 
Moorad cannot interfere in this matter. 

Dey Kingree and Bashapore I have given to Peer Ali 
Gohur in perpetuity ; it is for you to agree to it. My ex- 
penses and those of my household are to be defrayed by Meer 
Ali Moorad. 

[True Translation.'] (Signed) John Younghusband, 

Lieutenant Scinde Police. 

Sukkur, 14th May, 1850. 

The letter, of which the above is a translation, was 
given to me by Meer Mohamed Hoossein. * It bears the 
seal of Meer Roostum. 

(Signed) John Younghusband. 

t 

Sir G. Napier to Ali Moorad, December 1842. 

Meer Roostum Khan voluntarily went to your High- 
ness' s fortress of Dejee ; he there publicly and formally 
placed the Turban on your head. He then wrote solemnly 
in the sacred Koran, that he had given to you the Turban 
of the Talpoors. 

When I heard of these things, I asked permission to 
wait upon the Ameer, to speak with his Highness as to the 
new treaty, and to hear from his own lips that he had given 
up public affairs to your guidance. What was the course 
pursued by his Highness ? He abandons your roof, he flies 
from me, he places himself at the head of those Ameers who 
have been intriguing against the English, and who have, as 
you inform me, collected bands for the purpose of resistance 
to the authority of the Turban. This is strange conduct in 
the Ameer. The only course for me to pursue is to advise 
your Highness publicly to proclaim to the Scindians, that you 
are the legitimate chief of the Talpoors ; to call on the other 
Ameers to obey you as such and to dismiss their armed fol- 
lowers. If they refuse, I will disperse them by force. To 

* Eoostum's sou. 

W 



306 



APPENDIX V. 



those Ameers you will preserve their lands, but no fortress 
shall be held in Upper Scinde but by your Highness's 
Killedar. 

To the same, January \4tth, 1843. 

I understand from Major Outram, that he thinks your 
Highness has not clearly understood what has been inter- 
preted to you, which makes me greatly regret not being 
able to speak with your Highness myself, that I might 
make myself understood by your Highness personally. 
The next safe thing is to put my meaning into writing. 
The Governor-General has ordered me to support your 
Highness as the lawful possessor of the Turban. As Rais, 
your Highness has certain privileges and certain lands, 
which appertain, not to the individual, but to the Turban. 
These must be given to you with the Turban, but the 
rights and possessions of the other Ameers must be main- 
tained, as prescribed in the draft of the new treaty ; and 
I endeavoured from the first to have it explained to your 
Highness, that no portion of their estates can be transferred to 
you. If they resist the arms of the Company in war, and if 
a shot be fired by them at the troops under my command, 
then I have orders to take all their estates, in the name of 
the Company, and they would not be made over to your 
Highness ; at least such, in my belief, is the intention of the 
Governor-General. I hope, therefore, that your Highness 
will explain to your relations, what great loss of power and 
territory would fall upon the Talpoor family, if any of them 
commit hostilities upon the troops under my orders. 

To the G-overnor-G-eneral in Council, August 16th, 1843. 

By reference to my letters and proclamations, it will be 
seen that I promised to preserve to all the Ameers their 
rights. If Roostum had legally bestowed upon his brother 
Ali Moorad, all his, Roostum's lands, I should have held 
myself pledged to support that gift in the discussion of the 
details of the treaty. If Meer Roostum had not done so, then 



APPENDIX V. 



307 



would his Highness in that discussion have rejected the claims 
of Ali Moorad, and I should have felt bound to support his 
Highness Meer Roostum. I more than once repeated to their 
Highnesses Ali Moorad and Roostum, that all should be sup- 
ported in their rights and possessions. My letters and 
proclamations to this effect are before your Lordship in 
Council ; but I never attended to the details of private 
transactions, the time for which had not arrived. 

In one of the letters to Major Outram., I proposed, even 
after insult had been offered to me by the Ameer Roostum, to 
receive him with every honour and attention, whenever he 
pleased to come to my camp. From first to last, I sought a 
meeting with Meer Roostum. I made every effort to succeed. 
Once I sent Major Outram into the Ameer's camp, it was 
close to mine ; he persuaded Outram that he was tired, and 
would not come. This was all a trick, as I well knew at the 
time. I was always baffled by the Ameer himself, not by 
the intrigues of Ali Moorad, as the Major believes, but, as I 
assert, by the Ameer himself, which finally changed the 
opinion I originally entertained, that Roostum' s flight from 
Dejee was caused by his brother. I became satisfied that his 
flight was a voluntary act of the old Ameer's concocting. He 
is full of duplicity. This, subsequent events have proved. 
He fled in like manner from Outram. 

By the above your Lordship and Council will perceive 
three important things : — 

First. That I made every attempt to ascertain from the 
Ameer himself, whether or not he had voluntarily made 
over the Turban to his brother, and I was invariably foiled 
by the Ameer himself. 

Secondly. That I considered the lands given over, exclu- 
sive of those belonging to the Turban, as a mere private 
transaction, with which my Government had then no concern ; 
that it was an affair for after consideration in discussing the 
details of the treaty. 

Thirdly. That I was, without a choice, obliged by treaty 
to acknowledge Ali Moorad. It was the Ameer Roostum, not 
I, that had given him the Turban. But I was very glad that 
it was so, for it was evident, that the Ameer Roostum' s con- 



308 



APPENDIX V. 



duct made it almost impossible to negotiate with him. I 
could not trust him ; and Major Outram, who was his personal 
friend, was duped by him. 

It may be worth remarking, that before Meer Roostum 
made over his Turban and lands to Meer Ali Moorad at 
Dejee, he had placed all those lands and the forts in the hands 
of his son and out of his own power, (see his letter, a trans- 
lation of which I enclose.) This shews that he was casting 
discord amongst his relations, for it is evident, that he had 
virtually made his son the Rais as Ali Moorad averred, and 
said he would not submit to it ; all this shews the duplicity of 
this Prince. 

To the same, September 29th, 1843. 

In reply to your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant, I 
am again obliged to dissect Major Outram' s letter. The 
sentence to which your Lordship refers is contained in the 
Major's letter of the 24th Jan. I shall take certain sentences 
and examine them : — 

Major Outram. — " Assigning to Ali Moorad what has 
been pledged to him, viz. one-fourth of the remaining terri- 
tory of Upper Scinde as his perquisite as Rais, besides one 
fourth as co-heir of the former sovereign, Meer Sohrab." 

What has been pledged to Ali Moorad? Bylaw Meer 
Ali Moorad became Rais. By law certain revenues are 
attached to the Turban. The laws of his family and country 
are pledged to him, and he is pledged to them to perform the 
duties of the chieftainship. I know of no other pledges. 

When his Highness Meer Ali Moorad told me he would 
never interfere with his brother's chieftainship, he added, 
that he would not allow him to place the Turban on the head 
of his, Roostum's, son. " It is," said he, " either my brother's 
during his life, or mine if he chooses to resign it, but it 
cannot be placed on the head of my nephew. This shall not 
be, for I have force sufficient to prevent it ; what I want to 
know is, whether you will interfere with me or not ? " This 
is the substance of our conversation. My answer to the 



APPENDIX V. 



309 



Ameer was distinct. It admitted of no equivocation; it 
entered into no treaty ; it gave no pledge. The substance 
was — « By the existing treaties of 1839, the British Govern- 
ment is bound to support the Ameers in their rights. You 
have a right to the Turban ; the existing treaty obliges me 
to support you, and I will support you." 

Your Lordship will perceive that I merely assured his 
Highness that I would support the treaty, and this assurance 
was in a casual conversation. But Major Outram's words 
imply that some treaty had been entered into by me with 
Ali Moorad, and, as I know nothing beyond what I have 
stated above, I must leave it to Major Outram to explain his 
own meaning. 

Major Outram.— ■" And as you are bound, I understand, 
to make good to Ali Moorad his share." 

I know not what Major Outram understood, or did not 
understand, but I was bound to nothing, neither to Ali 
Moorad, nor any other Ameer. 

With regard to the claim of Ali Moorad to part of the 
territory ceded to Bhawalpore, all that passed between me 
and his Highness here follows: — 

Conversing during the march to Emaum Ghur, the Ameer 
told me that he possessed one or two villages in the midst of 
the territory ceded to Bhawalpore, but he added, throwing 
up his head, " they are trifling things, and the Governor- 
General is welcome to them." I replied, " if your Highness 
has any possessions in that territory the Governor-General 
has not been aware of it, and when the details are arranged 
any loss of this kind will be made good to you. The new 
draft treaty does not contemplate depriving your Highness 
of any part of your possessions." This is all that passed, and 
as nearly as I can recollect, the interpretation was in the 
above words. It is not impossible that a similar conversation 
may have passed more than once between Sheik Ali Hoos- 
sein (Ali Moorad's vizier) and myself; indeed, I am sure 
this must have been the case, for I find a pencil memorandum 
on Outram's letter, saying, that the moonshee, Ali Ackbar, 
informed me that the village, or pergunnah, in question, was 
in value from 40 to 50,000 rupees ; and the Secretary of 



310 



APPENDIX V. 



Government, Mr. Brown, informs me he thinks the value 
does not amount to more than 30,000 rupees at the utmost. 
Major Outram. — " By a late treaty." 
What treaty Major Outram alludes to I know not. I 
have already said that treaty, pledge, or promise, entered into 
by me, there has been none. I know that before I arrived in 
Scinde, Meer Ali Moorad and his family were at war ; a battle 
had been fought, in which he defeated his brother Roostum 
and the rest of his family. Roostum, I believe, gave himself 
up to Ali Moorad on the field of battle. The general opinion 
that I heard at the time I arrived was, that Meer Roostum 
and his family had behaved ill to Ali Moorad. However, the 
latter made it up with his brother on the field of battle, and 
some family compact may then have been entered into, but 
that such was the case I do not know, nor did I ever hear 
that any such compact had taken place. I have been driven 
to this conjecture in my endeavour to account for Major 
Outram's expression, " By a late treaty." 

Finally, my Lord, I never gave, or promised, a farthing 
of money or an inch of land to his Highness Ali Moorad, 
although Major Outram seems to think, from his letters, and 
from what I have since heard of his conversations at Bombay, 
that I piled riches and power upon the Ameer ! I made him 
one present, it was an elephant; your Lordship confirmed 
the gift ; and to shew your Lordship how very cautious I have 
ever been in giving what is not my own property, I took a 
pledge from his Highness that if your Lordship disapproved 
of my giving the elephant, he was to pay for it, far as I take 
no presents I am too poor to make them myself. Ali 
Moorad's conduct appears to have been loyal from first to 
last, both to his family and to the British Government. It is 
obvious that this was his interest, but with his motives we 
have nothing to do. The fact has been as I state, and had 
the Talpoors been ruled by the advice of his Highness 
they would now have been in the full enjoyment of their 
sovereignty. 



APPENDIX VI. 



311 



VI. 

TOUCHING OUTRAM'S NOTES OF CONFERENCES WITH THE 

AMEERS. 

[The notes are to be found in the Parliamentary Papers on 
Scinde; the substance has been given in the narrative of 
Outram's diplomacy at Hydrabad.] 

The Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 
June 13th, 1843. 

These notes I never read until I saw them to-day. I 
know absolutely nothing of what may have passed between 
Major Outram and the Ameers, while he was acting as 
Commissioner under Sir C. Napier for the settlement of the 
details of the treaty, to which the Ameers had generally 
given their assent. 

Sir 0. Napier to the Governor -General. 

Hydrabad, July 11th, 1843. 

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's 
letter, dated 14th ultimo, which arrived here yesterday, 
inclosing notes of conversations held by Major Outram with 
the Ameers, and with their vakeels, between the 8th and 13th 
February last. 

The notes of the meeting with the Ameers, on the 12th 
of February, were probably sent to me, but I did not receive 
them. 

The notes of the meeting on the 8th February, I received 
on the 11th ; these I could not forward to your Lordship, 
because, after the 13th, our communications were inter- 
cepted ; but the enclosed copy of a letter to Major Outram 
shews that I intended to do so, although I did not think it 
necessary, as we were on the eve of a battle, which I knew 
could not take place if the Ameers were honest and spoke the ' 
truth. After the action, the Ameers placed my small force 



312 



APPENDIX VI. 



in so much danger, by their intrigues with Meer Shere 
Mohamed, that I never thought more of Outram' s " minutes," 
till I received your Lordship's present letter. 

Recurring to that period : as it seems that Major Outram 
has sent his statement to the Government, it is incumbent 
on me to shew what weight was due to his judgment 
on. that occasion; and what weight also was due to the 
assertions of the Ameers, that they wanted to keep the 
peace with us ; for upon their sincerity depends any value 
which may be supposed to attach to their conversations 
with Outram. 

I shall, for the present, confine my remarks to the period 
between the 8th and 12th of February. 

Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On 
the 10th and 11th February, he sent two letters to me, 
following each other, by express; these letters contained 
three important things : — 

1. A request that I should halt the troops. 

2. A request that I should go in person to Hydrabad. 

3. The information that the Ameers had dispersed all 
their troops. 

Now, my Lord, it so happened, that the moment when 
Major Outram wrote the above, 25,862 fighting men were, 
a portion of them strengthening their position at Meeanee, 
about six miles off, and the others were round Major Out- 
ram's house, preparing to attack it. 

Ten thousand men of the Chandia tribe had crossed the 
river, and were coming down the left bank of the Indus, m 
my rear ; 7000 of Meer Roostum's men were within thirty 
miles, in'rear of mv left flank at Khoonhera, and were about 
to march on Meeanee ; 10,000, under Shere Mohamed, were 
marching from Meerpoor ; and in the mountains on the right 
bank of the Indus, thousands more were preparing to come ; 
so that I had, as my spies correctly stated, 25,000 men in 
mv front, and 25,000 more marching upon me in all direc- 
tions, and these without reference to the tribes gathering in 
the hills, and all these, as the Ameers affirmed to Major 
Outram, perfectly beyond their control. Yet Major Outram 
sent me two letters in one day, to assure me that the Ameers 



APPENDIX VI. 



313 



had dismissed all their troops, and asked me to let him give 
them a pledge that I would not march. Thus, in a most 
perilous position, would the Major's advice have completely 
shackled my movements, and placed my small army beyond 
the power of being saved, except by a miracle. 

In examining the foregoing facts, let me draw your Lord- 
ship's attention to two very important points : — 

1. That the Ameers did not want to have peace, that 
they were confident of victory, and had accurately calculated 
the day I should arrive at Meeanee, namely the 17th Feb- 
ruary ; that they knew that they could not assemble their 
full force of 50,000 men, till the night of the 17th or the 
morning of the 18th of February. Therefore all their diplo- 
macy of dissimulation, procrastination, and protestation, was 
put in force to deceive Major Outram and obtain a pledge 
that I should halt, if only for a day. I think he would have 
so pledged himself, had I not positively forbidden him to 
give any pledge without my consent. 

That this was the real motive of the anxiety exhibited 
by the Ameers to suspend my march, if only for a day, is 
made more apparent by the fact that there was no advantage 
to be gained by delaying the signature of the draft Treaty. 
On the contrary, to sign this draft would enable the Ameers 
at once to discuss and formally to protest against any and 
every part of it, while it would relieve them at once from 
the presence of our troops ; but they were confident of vic- 
tory, and wanted to fight. There were 25,000 men to be 
obtained by one day's delay in my arrival at Meeanee ; and 
if the Ameers could have gained a week, it would have 
brought us into the hot season, which they thought would 
paralyze my movements, and finally destroy the troops — 
they were in a great measure right. 

2. Had I been persuaded to believe in the jesuitical 
protestations of the Ameers, I should have betrayed the Bri- 
tish arms. 

Now, my Lord, when I considered these matters, I saw 
that I could place no faith in the truth of the Ameers. 
Their "conversations" (Outram's) appeared to me to be so 
much waste-paper. 



314 APPENDIX VI. 

But this was not all. Outram had asked me seriously to 
go to Hydrabad alone, and recommended me to send my 
troops to Meerpoor. My throat would have been cut, of 
course ; and the troops having lost their General, and 
having been removed forty miles from their line of com- 
munication, viz. the Indus, would have been placed as fol- 
lows :— 




From this position they would very quickly have been 
pushed into the desert, and there every soul must have 
perished; even victory could not have saved them, they 
could never have regained the river, harassed by a repulsed 
but hourly increasing force for forty miles, a force more 
than twenty times their own numbers before the battle. 

As Major Outram seems to have forwarded his notes, I 
think he ought also to have forwarded my denial of Meer 
Roostum's assertions. 

This does not appear to have been done, so 1 take the 
liberty of sending herewith a copy of my letter ; being in- 
deed the same letter in which I acknowledged the receipt of 
the conversation with the Ameers on the 8th of February. 

Though much harassed by the unavoidable labour, 
which attaches to the command of a young and inexperi- 
enced force suddenly assembled, I am not aware that I left 
anything unreported to your Lordship that I considered of 
importance ; but, in case of accident, I have all my letters 
to the Ameers copied, as well as my proclamations, together 
with any letters to Major Outram, which bear on the sub- 
ject ; indeed, I believe, all I have do so. These will enable 
your Lordship to shew the English Government, that I did 



APPENDIX VI. 



315 



all but sacrifice the honour of our arms to maintain the 
peace, for which I believe that both your Lordship and 
myself were as anxious as Major Outram or any other 
person." 

The Governor-General in Council to Sir 0. Napier. 

Calcutta, August 7th, 1843. 

We have all read with the greatest interest your Ex- 
cellency's letter of the 11th ult., communicating certain 
explanations, with respect to your correspondence with 
Major Outram immediately before the battle of Meeanee, 
and with respect to the position of your army at that period. 

We cannot but feel that it is to your penetration and 
decision your army owes its safety. 

Major Outram's confidential letter to you, of the 11th of 
February, he had intended to send by a servant of Meer 
Roostum, who was then betraying him by a false statement 
of his force at Khoonhera ; yet that letter contained a sug- 
gestion, which, if communicated to Meer Ali Moorad, might 
have added him to the confederacy against us. 

On the 15th of February, Major Outram observed, that 
his despatches of the last few days would have led you to 
expect, that his earnest endeavours to effect an amicable ar- 
rangement with the Ameers of Scinde would fail ; yet, on the 
previous day, the Ameers had affixed their seals to the 
treaty, a proceeding usually viewed in the light of an ami- 
cable arrangement, or at least, an arrangement intended to 
preclude hostilities, not immediately as in this case to pre- 
cede them. 

Sir 0. Napier to the Governor-General. 

Hydrabad, July 13th, 1843. 

I was much vexed at myself for not having sent Major 
Outram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I 
received them on the 11th of February, and the post was 
open to the 13th, as I find, by a long letter written to your 
Lordship on that day. 



316 



APPENDIX VI. 



We were all hard-worked at the time, and I recollect 
thinking that, as a battle would take place, or peace be 
made in a few days, (if Major Outram's assertions were 
correct,) the face of affairs would change. I therefore de- 
layed sending this paper, till I heard of the Ameers having 
signed the draft treaty. I had however made preparations 
for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lordship, 
for I have just found among my papers, a copy of that paper 
prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I 
find my private notes made on reading it. I had by that 
time discovered, that there was a party resolved to support 
the Ameers through thick and thin. 

I received Outram's notes on the 11th, I must have made 
these notes that evening. The copy, occupied as every one 
was, could hardly have been ready before the evening of the 
12 th. I required much time each of those days to be alone 
in uninterrupted reflection, upon the conflicting information 
sent me by Major Outram, and the reports of my spies. It 
was impossible to " jump at conclusions." Major Outram's 
character and local experience, gave great weight to his 
assertions, yet they were diametrically opposed to the state- 
ments of the scouts. The fate of the force, perhaps much 
more, depended on my decision ; few men could go through 
more anxiety than I did during those days, lest disgrace 
should fall on the British arms through my agency. The 
papers found on the Murree chiefs, and their arrest, had oc- 
cupied all the 12th nearly, and decided my opinion. There 
remained little doubt of the way in which Outram had been 
duped. I thought it essential that the copies of the letters 
found on the Murree chief Hyat Khan should be sent to 
your Lordship, in case of any misfortune befalling the 
troops. I still hoped for the promised treaty, and must 
have intended to send that and the notes on the interview 
together. On the 14th all communication was at an end, 
and my whole time occupied by preparations for meeting 
the enemy, endeavouring to ascertain where he was, what 
were his intentions, our proper direction of march, for our 
guides were either treacherous or frightened to death. The 
Ameers and their falsehoods passed from my head; their 



APPENDIX VI. 



317 



armies alone occupied my attention. The march upon an 
enemy of such force, was alone so engrossing, that really if 
I had thought these papers important, which I neither did, 
nor do now, I could not have attended to them. If they 
produce annoyance, or throw difficulties in your Lordship's 
way, yery deeply do I regret that I forgot to send them 
after the battle. 

The (xovemor-Greneral in Council, to the Secret Committee, 

August \Mh, 1843. 

Sir C. Napier has entered at some length into a justifi- 
cation of his proceedings previous to the battle of Meeanee. 
In doing this, he has placed upon our records a mass of most 
curious and interesting matter, which we regret that it was 
not in our power to lay before you at an earlier period. We 
, strongly feel that it was to Major-General Sir C. Napier's 
penetration and decision that our army owed its safety ; and 
we are astonished at the extent to which Major Outram 
suffered himself to be deluded by the Ameers. 

We transmit for your consideration, certain memorials 
which the ex- Ameers have addressed to us from Scinde ; but 
we consider it unnecessary to make any observations upon 
them. Sir C. Napier's indignant refutation of the calum- 
nious charges brought against himself and the gallant troops 
whom he commands, will be sufficient to satisfy you that the 
Ameers are without truth. 

Remarks on Letter from the ex-Ameers Roostum Khan and 
Nusseer Khan of Ktjrpoor to the Rt. Son. Sir Robert 
Peel, dated 11th August, 1844. 

The Ameers write — 

" In the meantime Mr. Ross Bell was appointed Resi- 
dent and arrived at Sukkur, part of our kingdom, and aided 
my younger brother, Meer Ali Moorad, in seizing four or 
five inhabited villages of my country, which I had presented 
to my nephew Meer Nusseer Khan." 



318 



APPENDIX VI. 



Remarks. 

On the division of Upper Scinde by the deceased Meer 
Sohrab Khan, he, to prevent future disputes, wrote in his 
Koran, detailing exactly the shares of his three sons, Meers 
Roostum, Moobarick, and Ali Moorad Khan. By this 
deed the villages alluded to were granted to Ali Moorad 
Khan. During the minority of this Meer the villages were 
by deceit taken possession of by his brothers in 1838. Ali 
Moorad assembled a force to recover the villages he had 
been unjustly deprived of. Roostum Khan persuaded him 
to disband his force, solemnly promising by writing in the 
Koran to cause the restoration to Ali Moorad of the villages. 
This promise Roostum Khan broke. On the British troops 
being located in Scinde the matter in dispute was, accord- 
ing to treaty, submitted to the Political Agent, Mr. Ross 
Bell, who after due enquiry adjudged the case in favour of 
Ali Moorad, That decision has been approved of and 
confirmed by the Rt. Honourable the Governor-General of 
India. 

(Signed) E. J. Brown, 

Secretary to Scinde Government. 

The Meers write— 

" After about seven days, on the 16th of Zil Kadur, 
1257 Hegira, Captain Brown came to Kyrpoor, and said, < If 
you agree to seal the treaty good ; if not, the English army, 
which is now at Pultun, near Roree, will march on Kyrpoor 
to-morrow and plunder it.' Under this threat he com- 
pelled me to seal (sign) the new treaty ; he also told me 
I was to be guided in all parts of my conduct by the advice 
of my younger brother, Ali Moorad, which I would find for 
my advantage." 

Remarks. 

There is not one word of truth in this. I was deputed 
on the occasion referred to by Major-General Sir C. Napier 



APPENDIX VII. 



319 



to take a letter to Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan at 
Kyrpoor, calling on them to give a direct answer whether 
they would sign the new treaty, which had previously been 
offered for their acceptance. They detained me more than 
two hours, endeavouring to persuade me to enter into a 
discussion of the details of the treaty. I gave them but 
one answer throughout, viz. that I had no authority to enter 
into any such discussion, that I was the bearer of a letter to 
them, and that I required their reply, yes or no — and that 
if they would not give it I should leave for Sukkur without 
it. They eventually gave me a reply stating their willing- 
ness to sign the treaty. 

I need hardly remark that at this period no British troops 
had passed the Indus from Sukkur. Ali Moorad's name 
was not once mentioned in the conversation. 

(Signed) E. J. Brown, 

Secretary to Scinde Government. 

VII. 

outram's diplomacy. 

Sir C. Napier to the G ' overnor-General. 

Hydrabad, July 3rd, 1843. 

A private letter from Bombay informs me that a letter 
received from * * *^ a \ says he " considered the destruction 
of Emaum Ghur, as a more flagitious act than the attack 
upon the Residency." 

As nothing would give me more pain than having done 
anything which might expose your Lordship to attack, it is 
necessary for me to furnish proofs that I have not done so. 

1. Emaum Ghur, with all other fortresses in Upper 
Scinde, belonged to the Turban, or " Rais." 

2. His Highness Ali Moorad was Rais by the law of 
Scinde, and Meer Mohamed was in rebellion against him. 

3. His Highness accompanied me to Emaum Ghur. 
On our arrival, he proposed to destroy the fortress, but 
afterwards seemed doubtful whether he would do so or not. 

( a ) Name unknown. 



320 



APPENDIX VII. 



I wrote to his Highness to convince him of the necessity of 
that measure. 

4. He consented, and I enclose to your Lordship his 
Highness' s reply, authorising me to destroy Emaum Ghur. 

5. His Highness himself fired some of the guns, and 
once or twice threw shells into the fort, so that I was fully 
borne out in what I did by the owner of the fortress. ^ I 
could legally have done the same thing under the like 
sanction in the middle of England, and this without advert- 
ing to the breaches of treaty and preparations for war every- 
where carrying on by the Ameers against us. 

Another charge against me I find to be, that my " con- 
tinued march upon Hydrabad, in despite of the advice of 
Major Outram, was that which forced the Ameers to war." 
I certainly did reject Major Outram' s advice, because I soon 
saw that he was grossly deceived by the Ameers. _ I had 
several proofs of this, one or two of which I now feel it right 
to state to your Lordship. 

1. Major Outram, being at Hydrabad, sent me two 
(three my journal says, but I can find but two) despatches 
by express, on the 12th, to assure me that the Ameers had 
not any armed men except their usual personal attendants, 
and that these were not more numerous than Indian Princes 
of their rank would move with in time of profound peace. 
At that moment the army of the Ameers was assembled at 
Meeanee, only six miles from Hydrabad, and were preparing 
their position ! At the moment he was writing these des- 
patches to me, his house was surrounded by 8000 Beloochees 
(who had eight pieces of cannon) preparing for their attack 
on him, the 15 th February. 

2. Major Outram wrote to ask me to go to Hydrabad 

alone to meet the Ameers. 

3. He proposed my sending my troops to Meerpoor. 
Had I allowed myself to be guided by Major Outram, 

my own throat and his, and the throats of all with us, would 
probably have been cut, and the army left without a leader 
at Meerpoor, forty miles from the river, which formed our 
line of communication by steam with Sukkur and Bombay, 
and with the friendly territory of his Highness Ali Moorad 



APPENDIX VII. 



321 



which extended south as far as Nowshera: when thus 
isolated, the army would have been attacked by 60,000 
men, pushed back upon the desert, and there have miserably 
perished. 

As Major Outram had lived many years at the Court of 
Hydrabad, and every one spoke of his " great local knowledge 
of the Ameers, and of this country," while I was a perfect 
stranger to both, I might well have been excused (supposing 
anything can excuse a general officer for losing an army) 
had I allowed myself to have been guided by Major Outram ; 
and his advice was pressed upon me with all the zeal in- 
spired by honesty of purpose, added to an ardent disposition. 
But my spies brought me intelligence that 30,000 men were 
in my front; some said 40,000. I concluded that these 
spies exaggerated numbers, but it was clear to my mind that 
the Beloochees were above 20,000 men, and in sufficient 
numbers to make them believe that their victory would be 
certain. Therefore I argued that Major Outram' s report was 
wrong, that he was deceived, and ignorant of what was 
passing about him. His proposal to march the troops to 
Meerpoor, made me think he understood very little of war ; 
I therefore paid no attention to his suggestions. I put all 
my sick and treasure on board a steamer, and resolved to 
attack the enemy ; if we were beaten we had plenty of pro- 
visions, and with our backs to the river and the steamers, 
(for retreat would have been disastrous,) I would have en- 
trenched myself till reinforcements arrived. I had full con- 
fidence in the troops, and little feared an undisciplined 
multitude ; but still the game was not an easy one, and I 
have shewn that, had I taken Outram' s advice, as I am 
reproached for not having done, a second Cabool massacre 
would probably have taken place. 

One would have imagined that the attack on the Re- 
sidency would have, at least, opened Outram' s eyes to the 
treachery of the characters he had to deal with. Not a bit ; 
he joined me on the 16th at Muttaree, and still wanted me 
to delay my attack for a day ! yet, six hours' delay would 
have added 24,000 men to the forces of the Ameers at 
Meeanee. It is true I had no positive information of this at 

x 



322 APPENDIX VIII. 

the moment ; but I was sure of it from the letter I found on 
the Murree chief, Hyat Khan, whom I had seized. In this 
letter the Ameers pressed the Murrees to join on the 9th. 
Now, I knew these barbarians would not leave their villages 
while the feast of the Moharem lasted, it was to finish on 
the 11th, and therefore I guessed how fast they would gather 
after that day, and resolved not to lose an hour. If my 
conduct be attacked in the House of Commons, I think the 
foregoing statement will be sufficient defence. I am not con- 
scious of having erred in rejecting Major Outram's advice. 

Outram's answer will be, " there would not have been 
war." The Ameers answered this on the 15th ; but suppose 
not ; was I to place the army at their mercy, to spare or 
destroy as they pleased ? Their mercy ! I have it in proof, 
that about the time Major Outram kept assuring me of their 
pacific feelings and disposition towards us, they had sent 
orders along both banks of the Indus to their people, " to 
kill every Englishman, woman and child, they could lay their 
hands upon." We should have received the tender mercies 
of the Affghans in the Tezeen Pass,— the mercy which Outram 
would have received himself but for my forebodings, and 
sending him the light company of the 22nd regiment. 

Meer All Moorad to Sir 0. Napier. January 12th, 1843. 

I have received your letter pointing out several reasons 
why you think it would be better to blow up Emaum Ghur. 
As far as the value of the property goes, I am quite in- 
different ; and I fully concur with you in the reasons which 
make it necessary to destroy it. Therefore, considering me 
joyfully willing, by all means blow up the fort and consider 
me always your well-wisher. 

VIII. 

Sir O. Napier to Major Outram. 

Hydrabad, 22nd July, 1843. 

My dear Outram, . . 

1 Before I proceed to discuss other things, I shall begin 
by observing, that in one of your letters, you twice remark, 



APPENDIX VIII 



323 



that you had only received a short note from me. Now the 
only letters which I have received of yours which I have not 
answered, are those dated the 8th and 29th of March ; the 
first (with a letter from Lady Napier about the same date, 
and yours describing your visit to Mahabuleshwar,) I only 
received a few days ago ! ! ! so it is idle to refer to any 
letters but those actually received. 

2. I could not reply to your letter dated 20th, sooner ; 
that of the 29th, reached me as I was going out against 
Shere Mohamed ; that of the 8th, I have only had a few 
days. If I had not a sincere regard for you, I should have 
no anxiety at all ! However, I shall state all that has passed, 
and you must judge how far you consider yourself right or 
wrong. I am placed in a situation where in my own defence 
I am obliged to state all that passed between the 3rd and 
12th of February. I am attacked both in public papers and 
private letters, and I am accused of forcing on the war, be- 
cause I did not allow myself to be advised by you to halt, 
but am said to have attacked the Ameers after they had 
signed the treaty ; and about four days ago I had a letter 
from Lord Ellenborough, saying that he had received from 
the Secret Committee, printed notes of conversations between 
you as Commissioner, and the Ameers, and asking if I had 
ever heard of these conversations; and expressing his sur- 
prise at now hearing of them for the first time. At the 
same time private letters have said that I am supposed to 
have intercepted reports made by you, and which ought to 
have gone to the Governor- General. 

3. How these notes came into the hands of the Secret 
Committee I do not know, nor do I the least care ; but the 
results are these : — First, That Lord Ellenborough evidently 
attaches importance to them ; . and as I never sent them to 
him, I appear, till he gets my explanation, as if I concealed 
what passed from his Lordship for the purpose of forcing the 
Ameers to battle. Second. That Sir George Arthur also 
attaches importance to these papers, in consequence of his 
conversation with you and their own contents, for he sent 
them to Lord Fitzgerald. Third. That the Secret Com- 
mittee attach importance to these notes because they have 



324 APPENDIX VIII. 

not only sent them to Lord Ellenborough, but caused them 
to be printed ! My position has therefore this appearance, 
that I intercepted most important papers, which, had . they 
reached Lord Ellenborough, might have prevented the war ; 
or, that- even if I had been induced by your advice to halt and 
act differently from the way in which I did act, the war 
would not have broken out ; and worse, (if any thing can be 
worse,) that I betrayed Lord Ellenborough who had placed 
unbounded confidence in me, and given me the utmost possible 
support in every way. This was the position in which the 
letters from Lord Ellenborough and Sir G. Arthur ^ must 
have placed me in my own and their opinion, and this the 
position in which the printing of those notes, if they become 
public, must place me in the opinion of the world. Now it 
is quite clear that if such was the state of the case, I might 
perhaps be allowed to lay claim to courage, and to some 
degree of military skill, because success will generally give a 
man so much credit ; but assuredly I could never pretend to 
honour, to humanity, or to be trusted with the slightest di- 
plomatic transaction : in short, I should deservedly be exe- 
crated as a resolute scoundrel, who had sacrificed every thing 
to military glory, and turned a deaf ear to the supplicating 
cry of injured and betrayed Princes. This would be my po- 
sition in face of the public, supposing that there be a word of 
truth in the whole story. That there is not, it was necessary, 
to shew to Lord Ellenborough and my friends. 

4. I therefore directly answered Lord Ellenborough thus. 
Firstly. That I had only received two of the conversations, 
and I believed that the third had been intercepted. Secondly. 
I sent him the copy of those notes, prepared on purpose to 
send to his Lordship with the probable reasons why they were 
not. Thirdly. I forwarded to his Lordship your demi-official 
letters, between the 8th and 13th of February, (first exa- 
mining them to see that they contained nothing private.) 
Fourthly. I told him that my reasons for not halting were, 
that I knew the assertions contained in those conversations 
to be false as respected anything I had done, especially 
Roostum's assertion, that I had made him give himself up to 
Ali Moorad ; and that I thought, when you shewed that 



APPENDIX VIII. 



325 



assertion to Sir G. Arthur, you should also have shewn him 
my contradiction of it, (perhaps you did?) Fifthly. That 
your wantiug me to halt, and twice in one day and once in 
another, telling me the Ameers had dispersed their forces, 
when I knew they had not, convinced me you were deceived 
by the Ameers ; that your wanting me to go to Hydrabad 
without my army added another proof to my conviction that 
they had deceived you, and finally, that your proposing to 
me to march to Meerpoor completed the proofs. Sixthly. 
That the important letter I found on the Murree chief Hyat 
Khan, coupled with my secret intelligence and a comparison 
with the Ameers' anxiety that I should halt, proved to me, 
past all hesitation or doubt, that they were only trying to 
gain a day or two, that they might bring 50,000 men to 
Meeanee instead of 25,000: our subsequent knowledge of 
events leaves this a matter of history. Therefore, had I 
halted I should have lost the army, unless saved by a miracle ; 
and if the force had marched to Meerpoor and lost its line of 
communication with the Indus, it would equally have been 
destroyed. Now you, a Major, without much experience of 
war, may well be excused such errors ; but I as an expe- 
rienced General officer could have no excuse, and should be 
very justly condemned. For these reasons I stand acquitted 
for not attending to your advice. Finally. I have told his 
Lordship my reason for being silent, and not keeping him 
informed on these matters with that exactness which I did 
on all others. The reason was, I thought it would injure 
you in his Lordship's opinion; and that I was anxious to 
avoid. Afterwards I gave that up, because it was evidently 
out of the question ; so that when, not long ago, he wrote to 
tell me he heard you were going to apply for employment 
again in Scinde, I told his Lordship I was sure you were not 
going to apply, for that our ideas of the politics in Scinde 
were°so adverse, that our working together was impossible. 

Now, my dear Outram, whether it has been you or your 
friends that have pushed this matter ahead, I know not ; but 
it has been done, and I necessarily have defended and will 
defend my conduct. " It has been clone," as ****** * 
********* ver y justly says in a letter to me, 



326 



APPENDIX VIII. 



speaking of the attacks of the press, " to attach Lord Mien- 
borough through you." All this has passed within a few days, 
except the attacks upon me in the papers (especially the 
Bombay Times). They have long been at work, but I did 
not condescend to defend myself against them, nor indeed 
had I time. 

Having now told you all that has passed, I shall refer to 
your letter dated 20th March. You are angry that Lord 
Ellenborough did not thank you for your exertions during 
the short time you were Commissioner ; and you say you are 
sure I reported to him all your exertions. My answer is 
that I did no such thing. I studiously avoided mentioning 
your name to Lord Ellenborough, as I was well aware that 
my appointing you Commissioner was contrary to his opinion : 
from all you had told me I judged this. You were not his 
selection, and I have heard that he was surprised at hearing 
that the papers, without contradiction, held you up as having 
powers in Scinde. If any one had to thank you it was me, 
and I did so in my despatch. As to your political exertions 
they failed; my advance is said to be the cause of that 
failure ; to thank you for them would have been to condemn 
myself. Now I entirely differed with you except in your 
wish to prevent blood being shed. We even there differed in 
our motive ; I did it from humanity alone, thinking the war 
policy of Lord Ellenborough perfectly just ; you wished to 
keep the peace because you thought the policy unjust, and, 
as you said to me, " every drop of blood shed you thought 
was murder." Of course, in despite of such feelings, you 
exerted yourself as you were bound to do after accepting the 
office ; but I confess I see nothing in that which particularly 
calls for public thanks ! Suppose that the Ameers had made 
peace, and no battle taken place, should I have thanked you, 
or expected Lord Ellenborough to thank me ? Certainly 
not; I should have expected no such thing; my view of 
thanks is that they are only to be given for great success in 
battle, or for a long series of brilliant civil service. I confess 
I cannot see how it casts the slightest reflection upon you; 
but I think your wishing to moot the question is injudicious. 
I did all I could to avoid the question being brought forward ; 



APPENDIX VIII. 



327 



but it has now been done, and we must both abide the public 
judgment, for assuredly I never will allow it to be even 
hinted at without a flat contradiction that I led Lord Ellen- 
borough into error — that I deceived him, that I was unequal 
to the high position in which her Majesty had placed me as a 
General officer. Even the affection of a brother should by me 
be swept away in a question involving my honour and military 
character : if you were wrong it was an error of judgment ; 
if I was wrong it was either a criminal sacrifice to a thirst of 
military glory, or a total ignorance of my profession. 

This brings me to another matter. The violence of a 
party against Lord Ellenborough at Bombay, leads it I hear, 
to say I made my promised account of the defence of the 
Residency, and that Lord Ellenborough " burked it." This 
is false, I did mean to make it, and I do mean to make it, 
but I never said when, nor can I now I I have not time to 
devote at least two days to make a good dissertation on the 
defence of outposts, and give the Residency as an example in 
all its details. You know the heat here, and that the opera- 
tions I have carried on, military and civil, since the capture 
of Hydrabad 3 preclude all work which is not absolutely neces- 
sary, but I nevertheless do mean to write the essay on the 
defence of the Residency when I can. 

I assure you that this business of defending my conduct 
has given me more pain and annoyance than anything that 
has happened to me in Scinde. 

Believe me to be, my dear Outram, 
Yours truly, 
(Signed) C. J. Napier. 

I beg of you not to mistake me ; I neither do nor have a 
right to object to your defending both the cause of the 
Ameers and your own exertions ; nor am I at all worried at 
any one else defending them. I only mean to say that I must 
defend myself ; and if the public take a different view, if 
it pronounces that you were deceived, it has not been my 
doing, but that of those who have placed me on my 
defence.* 

* Outram's reply to this letter caused Sir C. Napier to renounce his 
friendship. 



328 



APPENDIX IX. 



IX. 

Sir 0. Napier 1 s Observations on (he Ameers 1 Memorials. 

Hydrabad, June 12, 1843. 

The complaints of the Ameers form a tissue of false- 
hoods. I will answer them seriatim, meeting assertion by 
assertion, for to send documentary proofs would take up a 
volume. 

1. Complaint of Meer Mohamed Khan. 

The Ameer may have, and did acquiesce in, and I believe 
signed all the treaties with the English ; and in common 
with the other Ameers violated their provisions. The 
Ameers formed one Government, and must be responsible 
collectively. The proofs of their violations of treaties are 
in the hands of the Governor-General, signed by Major 
Outram. 

The Ameer says he submitted to the draft treaty. This 
is exposed by the answers to three plain questions : — 

First Question. Who solemnly signed the new treaty in 
full Dhurbar ? 

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan. 

Second Question. Who attacked the residence of my 
Commissioner, (sent in the sacred character of diplomatist,) 
with the intention to massacre the said diplomatist and all 
that were with him ? 

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan. 

Third Question. Who, in full Dhurbar, insultingly tore the 
signed treaty to atoms, the treaty to which the traitor had 
affixed his name and seal, for the purpose of blinding the di- 
plomatist and securing his destruction ? 

Answer. Meer Mohamed Khan. 

" None of the Ameer's servants went by orders to fight," 
but they did fight, and our comrades were slain by those 
servants. I utterly disbelieve the fact, that he did not order 
his servants to fight, but he was bound to prevent his troops 
from fighting against his ally : as he did not do this he must 
take the consequence. 



APPENDIX IX. 



329 



The falsehoods stated against Lieutenant Brown and 
Major McPherson, are answered by those officers with the 
truth and simplicity becoming English gentlemen. Colonel 
Pattle is away. 

Does the Ameer suppose, that when he and his compeers 
had received their just punishment by force of arms, the lost 
lives of our soldiers and the cost of the war were to be cast 
out of sight as matters of no value, and their traitorous 
Highnesses be allowed to keep all their forfeited treasures ? 
Assuredly not ! 

The Ameer proceeds, I have spent my life in serving 
the Government." I deny the assertion : I refer to Major 
Outram's letter to Sir JohnKeane; I refer to Major 
Outram's book ; I refer to a mass of documents against the 
Ameers that I forwarded to Lord Ellenborough, which were 
delivered to me as authentic by Major Outram and verified 
by his signature. 

2. Meer Sobdar's complaint. 

I always thought Meer Sobdar was a faithful ally. He 
was greatly favoured by the new draft treaty, and his 
position among the Ameers raised by the increased revenue 
he would have received ; but the cloven foot of duplicity and 
cowardice was soon displayed. His Highness' vakeel, named 
Outrai, met me on the march to the south ; he assured me of 
his master's good wishes; that he would send 5,000 men into 
battle with the other Ameers, and on a signal turn and trai- 
torously fall upon those troops, while I was so to arrange it, 
that my soldiers were not to attack those of his Highness. 
The wretched duplicity of such conduct was disgusting. Had 
the force that I commanded been worsted in battle, Sobdar's 
5,000 men would have been fresh, unattacked and untouched 
during the combat, and they would mercilessly have cut the 
British up, to clear themselves from the charge of treason to 
their friends if secrets should transpire. If, on the other hand, 
we were victorious, no doubt the troops of Meer Sobdar would 
have fulfilled his engagements by the merciless slaughter 
of his flying countrymen. My answer to this insidious 
and abominable proposition, was, " Tell your master, that my 
army has no fear of the Beloochees, and does not need the aid 



330 



APPENDIX IX. 



of traitors. I consider his Highness as our good ally, and, as a 
friend, advise him to keep his soldiers in Hydrabad, for if I 
should meet his 5,000 men in the field of battle, I would as- 
suredly fall upon them." His Highness sent 4,800 men into 
the field at Meeanee, where they fought us manfully. 

The Ameer Sobdar says, " no sepoy in my service fought 
in the recent battle by my orders." This hypocritical 
quibbling is of a piece with that of the Ameer Mohamed. 
The answer is, " your chiefs lie dead at Meeanee by the side 
of our men whom they slew : and for this your Highness 
must answer, or the responsibility of Government for the con- 
duct of its subjects must become a farce and a by-word among 
men." 

Had Meer Sobdar been found in this fortress at the head 
of his 5,000 soldiers, and that none of them had fought at 
Meeanee, I should have respected him as an ally. In proof 
of this, I offer the respect which I paid to Meer Shere Mo- 
hamed, whose dislike to us has been inveterate from first to 
last. I well knew he was our enemy. I knew that he had 
arrived within six miles of Meeanee with 10,000 men, when 
the defeat of the Talpoors made him rapidly retrace his steps ; 
and he wrote to me a letter, assuring me that he had never 
passed his frontier (which was a falsehood), and requesting 
me to say how he was to be treated. Major Outram, who 
was with me at the time this letter arrived, assured me that 
this Ameer would be quiet if I would only shut my eyes upon 
his premeditated aggression. 

By my desire Major Outram wrote to the Ameer, and I 
consented not to notice his misconduct. I thought Major 
Outram' s knowledge of the man would give a tone to his 
letter, and insure the best chance in my power of making 
peace: but my hopes were vain. Major Outram was de- 
ceived in the intentions ' of Meer Shere Mohamed, and the 
battle of Hydrabad was the result. 

On arriving at Hydrabad, I discovered that Sobdar' s 
men had been in the battle of Meeanee, and I saw no good 
reason, why his hypocrisy should shelter him from the fate 
which attended the more manly delinquency of Nusseer 



APPENDIX IX. 



331 



Khan : that hypocrisy had not sheltered us from his match- 
locks at Meeanee. 

Meer Sobdar states that he signed the treaty offered by 
Lord Ellenborough, and that he has it still. Yes ! But 
Meer Sobdar signed a duplicate treaty, which was put in 
possession of Major Outram, according to the rules of diplo- 
macy. Meer Sobdar, in dark council with the other Ameers, 
had resolved to massacre Major Outram, and above a 
hundred British officers and soldiers that were with him. 
The Ameers made an ostentatious pretence of protecting him 
in the evening, knowing that he was to be slain next morning. 
They had bribed the moonshee of Major Outram to steal and 
deliver to them the treaty signed in full Dhurbar, and in full 
Dhurbar they tore it in pieces. Was this an action to restrain, 
or to encourage their Beloochee chiefs ? How absurd then 
was their assertion to Major Outram the evening before, that 
they could not protect him. But suppose this assertion to 
be true, what does it prove ? Why, that Princes who cannot 
protect accredited agents (invited by themselves to their 
capital) from being massacred by their troops, are mere 
chiefs of brigand bands, and must be put down by any 
civilized government that has the power. 

The Ameer says, " that from the time the English be- 
came masters of India/ never was such disgrace, oppression, 
and tyranny offered to any sincere friend of Government." 
The answer to this is easy ; sincere friends of Government 
don't send 4,800 men to cut British soldiers' throats. More- 
over, no disgrace was put upon him, except that of being 
defeated in battle, in which it was disgraceful to him that his 
troops should have joined ; no oppression and tyranny except 
being made prisoners, the natural result of such battle ; and 
as to being plundered, nothing was taken beyond what is the 
usual prize of the victorious Government ; nothing was pil- 
laged, everything is in the hands of the regular prize agents 
and ready to be accounted for to her Majesty. 

3. Complaint of Meer Nusseer Khan. 

If friendship be taken into consideration, I beg to say, 
from the beginning up to the day of the battle of Meeanee 
everything was wanting on Meer Nusseer Khan's part : and 



332 



APPENDIX IX. 



on arriving at Hydrabad in the month of September, hear- 
ing from Lieutenants Gordon and Mylne, then political 
agents, that the petty insults and breaches of treaty were 
frequent, my first act was to put a stop to them, and I wrote 
a distinct letter to the Ameers to that effect. Had they 
guided themselves by my letter, they would have been, un- 
fortunately for humanity and the Scindian people, still on 
their thrones at Hydrabad; but they continued to break 
certain articles of the treaty, and I reported them to the 
Governor-General, as I told them I would do. 

The Ameer says that no attention was paid to his ques- 
tions relative to shares in the port of Kurrachee. The de- 
cision of these minor details was entrusted by me to Major 
Outram ; but instead of meeting Major Outram to enter into 
the discussion of them, the Ameer endeavoured to cut that • 
officer's throat. It was therefore very natural that no atten- 
tion was paid to his questions. 

The Ameer says, " Meer Roostum Khan was sent to 
Hydrabad without asking us or our agents." Meer Roos- 
tum Khan had promised to meet Major Outram at Kyrpoor. 
Major Outram mounted his camel, and went to Kyrpoor, and 
the Ameer mounted his camel and went off the other way to 
Hydrabad— an insult to my Commissioner, and through him 
to me, that I am convinced was concocted by the other 
Ameers, in whose power Jleer Roostum was from first to last. 
The Beloochees of the Murree tribe were seized on the road. 
"These two things," says the Ameer, " exasperated the Be- 
loochees, and the consequence was slaughter and bloodshed." 
The last was quite true: twenty -five Murree chiefs were 
arrested passing near my camp, into which they were brought 
fully armed ; they imagined that I was to be the dupe of a 
got-up story, that they were going to demand payment of 
wages due by the Ameers. They were all chiefs of the 
Murree tribe, and I took the liberty of examining their per- 
sons, as well as of taking away their arms. The chief of the 
Murrees, named Hyat Khan, was one of them. In his 
pocket I found a letter from the Ameers, summoning the 
clan to arms; every male that could muster sword, or 
shield, or spear, or matchlock. They were to meet the 



APPENDIX IX. 



333 



Ameers at Meeanee on the 9th of February ; it was there- 
fore, very natural that I should seize the Murree chiefs ; and 
I then gave orders to my outposts if such parties pre- 
sented themselves, immediately to cut them down. The 
Ameers are much mistaken if they fancy English officers are 
so easily duped ; and nothing but my determination not to 
shed a drop of blood before a declaration of war, prevented 
my ordering these twenty-five Murrees to be cut to pieces, 
for they gave sufficient provocation to have been charged 
by Jacob's horse; but that officer, having my orders, saved 
them. 

The Ameer says he fixed his seal to the new treaty ; 
yes, he did so in the evening of the 14th, and in the morn- 
ing of the 15th, tore it with contumely in open Dhurbar. The 
Ameer says he sent a guard of favourite nobles to protect 
Major Outram— it was very evident that there was no oc- 
casion to murder Major Outram in the evening, when 
they intended to destroy him, and all who were with him, 
next morning. They knew that by murdering him in the 
evening, his party would immediately retreat to the steamers 
and get away, and they would have lost the pleasure of mur- 
dering upwards of 100 Englishmen by the premature assas- 
sination of one. 

But the Ameer at last determined to fight, "having be- 
come indifferent about life ; and he went forth to battle." 
It seems, however, that when he heard the British guns, his 
love of life returned, and, instead of rallying his troops, he 
ran away. 

The Ameer proceeds to say, that he had not more than 
7,000 horse and foot in the battle ; whom they belonged to I 
don't know, but I have the sealed and verified returns in my 
possession of 25,862 fighting men on the field of Meeanee.* 
The words attributed by the Ameer to me, when I returned 
him his sword on the field of battle, are utterly false. The 
Ameer proceeds to say, " as long as Major Outram was there, 
everything went on well ; " as if Major Outram had the power 
in any way to interfere with his treatment. Major Outram 

* There were above 35,000 righting men. 



334 



APPENDIX IX. 



had no power whatever in Scinde, or over the Ameers, and I 
had given the charge of the Ameers to Lieutenant Brown, the 
accusation against whom, together with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pattle and Major McPherson which immediately follows this 
sentence, has already been answered by those gentlemen. 

Meerza Khoosroo Beg was not beaten, nor was anybody 
else ; but, being in a passion, he seized Major McPherson 
(who had neither said nor done anything to him) by the 
throat, and of course, was instantly made a prisoner. 

The following falsehoods are again stated by the Ameer : 
1st, he says the fortress was plundered. It was not plun- 
dered, it was completely protected from plunder. The trea- 
sure it contained was regularly taken possession of for the 
Government by the prize agents. The Ameer is right when 
he says the fort was neither besieged nor taken by storm ; 
but it would have been both, had not the terrors of the battle 
frightened its owners into an unconditional surrender. It 
was not visited under pretence of seeing, it was taken pos- 
session of by right of conquest ; and it was done gradually 
and carefully in order to prevent the ladies of the zenana 
being alarmed or seen by the troops ; but for this delicacy I 
would have entered the fortress at the head of the troops. 

The Ameer again says, " after granting quarter, making 
peace, promising satisfaction, and agreeing to restore the 
fort," &c. That we granted quarter is true, nobody was 
either injured, or even insulted after the fight was over; 
but the " making peace " is a falsehood ; " promising satis- 
faction," another; and " agreeing to restore the fort," a 
third ; what remains of the complaint is an accumulation of 
falsehood. 

(Signed) C. J. Napier. 

Sir C. Napier to the Cfovemor-Gfeneral in Council. 

Kurrachee, October 27, 1843. 

I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship some 
more information relative to the conduct of the ex- Ameers. 
I hope it may not prove unsatisfactory, because the further 
the inquiry is pushed the more will the treachery of the 



APPENDIX IX. 



335 



Ameers become apparent. I could have sent this inform- 
ation last February or March, had I chosen to spend my 
time in the employment suited to a chief of police receiving 
depositions. But at the period in question I had not the 
power of drawing up above 1,500 men in order of battle; 
no reinforcements had yet been received ; 20,000 men under 
Shere Mohamed were within a march of my camp; we 
were in the midst of an insurgent population, warlike and 
well armed ; I had the magazines and hospitals full of 
wounded men to guard on the banks of the Indus. I had 
six sovereign princes in my camp, intriguing as hard as 
they could to arrange an attack upon my camp by over- 
whelming multitudes. I had a large fortress to guard; 
this fortress was three miles from my camp, and I had an 
immense treasure to guard. I was obliged to respect the 
zenana in the fortress, to the hazard of the regiment in the 
fortress (which regiment had suffered greatly in the battle, 
and could not muster above 400 men); for in these ze- 
nanas were about 800 powerful Beloochees, well armed, and 
the zenanas full of arms. I well knew the treachery of the 
Ameers, or I should not have been so unjust as to use the 
terms I applied to them in my despatch after the battle of 
Meeanee. 

Memorandum of a conversation betiveen Meer Crholam Shah, 
Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer Bijjur, and Lieutenant Bathborne, 
relative to the part taken by Meer Shahdad in the attack on 
the Residency, on the Ibth February, 1843. 

Yesterday evening, about half-past five o'clock, I called 
on Meer Gholam Shah at Gholam Hoossein Ka Tanda. He 
and his brother, Fuzzil Ali, received me. I mentioned 
to them that I wished to have some conversation in their 
presence with Meer Bijjur, their cousin, whose house adjoins 
theirs. The Meers, Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali, are 
nephews of the ex- Ameer Meer Mohamed, their mother 
having been his sister ; and Meer Bijjur is brother-in-law of 
the ex- Ameer Meer Shahdad, his sister being Meer Shah- 
dad's wife. 



336 



APPENDIX IX. 



When Meer Bijjur arrived, which was within a few 
minutes, I requested that we might be private, and then 
a conversation took place nearly word for word as follows ; 
the parties present being the above-mentioned Meers, my 
moonshee, Meerza J an, and myself. 

Myself. — Meer Bijjur, you joined in the attack on the 
Residency ; by whose order, or at whose instigation, did 
you do this ? 

Meer Bijjur. — I joined in that attack by order of Meer 
Shah dad. 

Myself. — Have you any objection to stating how that 
business commenced, and what part Meer Shahdad acted 
in it ? 

Meer Bijjur. — I will tell you willingly. The way of it 
was this ; but first I must explain how we three Meers, now 
conversing with you stood. I was in the service of Meer 
Shahdad ; Meer Gholam Shah was in the service of Meer 
Sobdar ; Meer Fuzzil Ali was in the service of Meer Mo- 
hamed. Well, as you know, for some days before the 
attack on the Residency there had been a great deal of 
unpleasant discussion between the Ameers and Major 
Outram ; but at last, on the evening before the attack, 
Meer Nusseer Khan moved out with his forces to Meer 
Futteh Ali's garden, on the road to Meeanee. He moved 
in the evening, the other Ameers remaining in the fort. 
The night he moved out a large assemblage of Belooch 
Sirdars took place at his Dhurbar : but what was done I do 
not know, as I was not there. The next morning, as I was 
going as usual to make my salaam to Meer Shahdad, I saw 
great crowds of Beloochees, and heard they were going to 
attack the Residency. I went on to Meer Shahdad' s. 
On going into the Dhurbar, Mutakum Moonshee also came 
in, and said the Beloochees were ready to start and attack 
the Residency, when Meer Shahdad who was all prepared 
for battle, jumped up and said he would go forthwith and 
head them. He desired me to go with him. I had my 
sword with me as usual, but no shield or matchlock, and 
was quite unprepared for fighting, but of course I obeyed. 
I then learned that Ahmed y Khan Lugaree had been de- 



APPENDIX IX. 



337 



tached with seven or eight thousand men to attack the 
Residency, by orders given him the night before by Meer 
Nusseer Khan. 

Myself. — What ! By order of Meer Nusseer Khan ? 

Meer Bijjur*. — I understood it was by his order, given 
overnight at the garden, but I cannot speak positively as 
I was not there. However, there were the men ready to 
start. Meer Shahdad was proceeding to put himself at 
their head, he ordered me to accompany him, and I did so. 
I had very few men with me, and sent a messenger to Meer 
Gholam Shah, who was with Meer Mohamed Khan, to tell 
him what was going on and beg him to persuade Meer 
Shahdad to desist. Meer Gholam Shah spoke to Meer 
Mohamed, and he sent a confidential servant, who came to 
Meer Shahdad, and told him, that the business he was en- 
gaged in was a mad one, and prayed him over and over 
again to desist. 

Meer Gf-holam Shah. — Yes, I was not in Meer Shahdad's 
service, but living as I did near the Residency, I had had 
much intercourse with the gentlemen there: I had seen 
enough of the English to be pretty sure that they would 
beat us, first or last, if we went to war with them ; and 
I knew, when they did beat us they would deeply revenge 
the murder of their envoy : besides I thought is disgraceful 
to murder defenceless people. I therefore begged Meer 
Mohamed to send an order to stop Meer Shahdad, whose 
hot-headed proceedings would bring eventual destruction 
on us all; a confidential person was then sent to Meer 
Shahdad, but the latter replied, he had sworn to do the 
business and would go on with it. He added that the 
attack was all arranged, and that Ahmed Khan Lugaree 
was going with his followers; that he had sworn to act 
through thick or thin with Ahmed, and would place himself 
at the head of the force. 

Meer Bijjur. — Well, after this there was an end of re- 
monstrance, and Meer Shahdad, with myself and the rest of 
the party, started for the Residency, and when we arrived 
there Ahmed Khan led forward the people to the attack, 
while Meer Shahdad with myself and other attendants re- 

Y 



• 



338 APPENDIX IX. 

mained on horseback under a clump of trees out of reach of 
the fire till all was over : we then returned, and joined Meer 
Nusseer Khan at Meeanee. That is all I know of the matter. 
The truth is, though I was Meer Shahdad's brother-in-law, I 
was never consulted by him— his power was lodged in the 
hands of servants and others. 

Meer Gholam Shah.— Meer Bijjur has given a true state- 
ment of the transaction. 

Meer Fuzzil AIL— Yes, that is all true. 

Meer Gholam Shah.—NL&j I ask why these inquiries are 
now made ? Meer Bijjur has made his salaam, and we hope 
the past, as then promised, is forgiven. 

Myself.— I can have no difficulty in telling you. Meer 
Bijjur has made his salaam and has been forgiven, and there 
is not the slightest intention of molesting him for what is 
past. The cause of my questioning him is this :— Meer 
Shahdad now states that he never headed the party that 
attacked the Residency, that it was the Belooch Sirdars 
who insisted on attacking it, and that the purpose lor 
which he went was to remonstrate with them and save the 
garrison. 

Meer Bijjur.— Why this is notoriously untrue; every 
one who was with the party knows it to be so. What in- 
fluence the boasting of Beloochees may have had m pro- 
curing the order for the attack I know not ; I dare say it 
may have had a good deal, for they talked loudly of what 
they could do : but Meer Shahdad headed the party as I 
have said, voluntarily, against the remonstrances and orders 
of Meer Mohamed; he attended throughout the fight, and 
after driving out the English, rode with us over to Meeanee, 
went up to Meer Nusseer Khan, and saluting him said, 
« Good fortune attend you, I have gained the day." 

Myself— W^t ! said this to Nusseer Khan ? 

Meer Gholam {Shah.— Meer Bijjur speaks truth ; Meer 
Shahdad, on his return from the Residency, rode up, as 
Meer Bijjur says, to Nusseer Khan's tent, and entering it, 
said, " Meer Sahib Moobarick, Meer Futteh KhiaP 

Myself. — I thank you for this explanation. 

Meer Gholam Shah.— We have stated all we know and 



APPENDIX IX. 



339 



this truly. I have never spoken an ill word of the Ameers 
to you, because they were our sovereigns and relations, but 
as you now question us we have spoken the truth. 

Mtjself. — I have also, as you know, avoided a topic which 
I thought must be painful to you, but it was my duty to 
make this inquiry, and I thank you for the readiness with 
which you have answered me. 

After some further short conversation on general subjects 
I took my leave. 

A. B. Rathborne, 
Collector and Magistrate, Hydrabad. 

October 22nd, 1843. 

N.B. — The above conversation took place on the 21st 
inst., I made the original memorandum of it on the 22nd, 
but on reading it over to the moonshee, he differed as to 
one point; this was, whether it had been said that Meer 
Mohamed sent a man to Shahdad to call him, and himself 
remonstrated with him; or, whether the man merely con- 
veyed the remonstrance, as now stated. I sent the moonshee 
to Meer Gholam Shah to ascertain which was the correct 
version, and in his interview he elicited from him the follow- 
ing important additional admission : — 

Meer Gholam Shah, on the morning of the attack, also 
waited on Meer Sobdar, who desired him to join in the attach 
also. Gholam Shah replied, that he was not going to put 
himself under the orders of an inexperienced child like 
Shahdad, especially as he thought the business a bad one ; 
but if Meer Sobdar chose to go himself, he would, as in duty 
bound, accompany him. Meer Sobdar then laughed, and said 
that woidd never do. 

This morning Meer Gholam Shah and Fuzzil Ali called 
upon me, and I took the opportunity of reading over to 
them the above conversation, taken down on the 22nd inst. 
which they said was quite correct : on this occasion the 
moonshee was not present, and on both his aid was not 
required. 

A. B. Rathborne, 

24th October. &C, &C 



340 



APPENDIX IX. 



Evidence given by Peer Budroodeen, Moosahib, or confidential 
servant of the ex- Ameer, Sobdar Khan of Hydrabad. 

Question,— On what day did the army of the Ameers 
leave Hydrabad, and where did it encamp ? 

Answer.— On the 6th of February, 1843, the troop 
under the command of Gholam Mohamed Komriewalla and 
Meer Khan Mohamed Talpoor (Khananie) went out and en- 
camped in the Babool jungle near Meer Futteh Ali Kebah. 
The two chiefs then returned to Hydrabad, and told Nusseer 
to get all in readiness for battle. Afterwards the force col- 
lected there, and chiefs, as they arrived, remained there. 
On the evening of the 14th of February, 1843, Meer 
Eusseer Khan moved out and joined this force. 

Do you know what strength the force was ? 

I did not count them, but it was well known that it 
amounted to 30,000 strong. 

That was on the 14th of February. What did this force 

do next day ? 

In the morning an order was issued to plunder Major 
Outram's dwelling. 

Who gave this order ? 
I know not. 

What number of men went to the agency for that pur- 
pose ? 

Nine or ten thousand men. 

Who commanded this party, and what chiefs accom- 
panied it ? 

Meer Shahdad commanded the party, and by him the 
order was given to plunder the agency. Meer Nusseer of 
Kyrpoor ; Jehan Mohamed ; Meer Khan Mohamed ; Gholam 
Mohamed Komriewalla ; a Nizamanee chief, whose name I 
forget ; Ahmed Khan Lugaree ; Meerza Bakur, and other 
inferior chiefs, accompanied him. 

When this party reached the agency who commanded it, 
and what orders were given by him ? 

Meer Shahdad Khan commanded, and he gave these 



APPENDIX IX. 



341 



orders " if the troops fight kill them, but if they run away 
never mind ? " 

When Major Outram quitted the agency what did the 
Scinde troops do ? 

They plundered all the property left and burnt all the 
buildings. They then joined Meer Nusseer Khan at the 
garden, and Meer Shahdad and the afore-mentioned chiefs 
said, " We have gained a victory ; Major Outram has fled, 
and we have plundered his property ; our party have behaved 
most bravely." Meer Shahdad sent a man, whose name I 
forget, to give the news of his victory to Meer Sobdar Khan 
in the fort, and to inform him that Major Outram had fled. 
Meer Sobdar, on hearing this, answered, " You have done 
ill : if with 8,000 men you have been unable to destroy 100 
men, what will you be able to do in front of the General's 
army ? " 

This was on the 15th of February. What then occurred? 

On the evening of the 15th of February, Meer Nusseer 
Khan moved from his garden and took up a position at Lunar, 
half a coss from it ; on the evening of the 16th he reached 
Meeanee ; next morning the battle took place. 

In the battle of Meeanee what was the strength of the 
Ameers' force ? 

Some say 40,000, and some say 35,000. 

How many of Sobdar' s men were in the battle? 

With Iktyar Lugaree 4000 ; with Mohamed Khan Tora 
300 ; with other chiefs subject to Meer Sobdar Khan there 
were 500 men. 

How many men of Meer Mohaed Khman's were there in 
the battle ? 

I know not, but every soul he could collect was there. 
Was Meer Sobdar in the battle, and what other Ameers 
were there? 

Meers Sobdar and Mohamed Khan were not in the battle. 
Except these two all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Scincle 
were there. 

Such being the strength of the Ameers' force on the 17th 
of February, had the battle been delayed for two or three days 
more, to what extent would they have been reinforced ? 



342 APPENDIX IX. 

It would have increased to 50,000 or 60,000 men. 

Did Meer Sobdar send information to the General that 
troops were collecting at Hydrabad ? 

On the night of the day on which the General reached 
Sukkurunda, Meer Sobdar called me and said, " Take two 
days' food and drink and proceed by the jungle to the Gene- 
ral's camp ; tell him if he comes quickly it is well, but if he 
delays the force here" will greatly increase." Jemada Couza 
said, " Budroodeen is a great. man, if he goes it will be well 
known, and you will get a bad name, it will be better if some 
one else is sent." I afterwards heard that orders were given 
to Syud Abbis Mi Shah, and a Cazee, to proceed to the 
General's camp and beg of him to come quickly.*- 

At this time, the 10th of February, 1843, Meer Sobdar 
was a friend of the British, when did he become hostile ? 

I do not know. 

When did the Ameers commence collecting troops ? 

When Meerza Khoosroo wrote from Nowshera to the 
Ameers, " The General is bent on war, so get ready." When 
the Meerza returned to Hydrabad the order for collecting 

troops was given. 

Had this collection commenced before Major Outram 

reached Hydrabad ? 

The collection of troops had commenced before Major 

Outram reached Hydrabad. 

Had the Ameers gained the victory what would have been 
the fate of the British troops? 

Every soul would have been massacred. 

Budroodeen having read over his evidence, declares it to 
be correctly recorded, and applies his seal to it 22nd Oc- 
tober, 1843. Mohamed Moyadeen is witness that Bud- 
roodeen gave this evidence, and that he declares it to be 

Evidence given in my presence this 22nd day of October, 

1843 - _ -p. 

E. J. Brown. 



* These men never came to me.— C. J. N. 



APPENDIX X. 



343 



X. 

Section 1. 

Reply to the Accusations of the Ameers, Sobdar Khan, 
Nusseer Khan, and Mohamed Khan, by the Officers accused. 

Major McPherson, Prize Agent 

The assertion of the three Ameers, that I entered the 
fort with the view of seeing it, is erroneous on their part. 
I accompanied the troops to take possession of it, and to see 
the British standard hoisted on its tower, which was done on 
the 21st of March, 1843. No outrage was committed, no 
zenana approached, and sentries were placed to prevent any 
one approaching them. Notice was given when the men 
would mount the tower, that the ladies might retire, and not 
he overlooked ; and people were only admitted on the tower 
at a certain time, lest the ladies should be annoyed. During 
that day, as prize agent, I collected treasure to a considerable 
amount, principally in gold. No zenana was ever entered by 
me, or any British officer, during the time they were inha- 
bited by the ladies ; but I have taken treasure from those 
vacated. No female of any description was ever suffered to 
be ill used at any time. As for taking the ladies' jewels from 
them, I positively deny it ; in many instances they were sent 
out for me to take, but I, as well as my colleagues, invariably 
returned them again, as being their personal property. I 
have never heard of any of the ladies of the zenana being ill 
used, or even seen ; and I can safely assert, the complaint 
made is a gross falsehood on the part of the Ameers. That 
we the prize agents took money, jewels, swords, &c. &c. from 
the empty houses is certainly the case. To do so was the 

duty of the prize agents. 

(Signed) P- McPheeson. 

Captain Blenkins, Prize Agent 

After the perusal of three letters respectively from Meer 
Nusseer Khan, Sobdar Khan, and Meer Mohamed, I beg to 



344 



APPENDIX X. 



state that the whole therein contained, as far as I have any 
knowledge, or which relates to myself, or any other of the 
prize agents, is entirely without any foundation. They, the 
Ameers, never experienced anything but the greatest kind- 
ness and consideration from us. They were repeatedly told 
that we did not wish the ornaments of their women to be 
given, or any other property which belonged to them ; and in 
several instances when proffered, I have myself sent them 
back to their owners ; so did the other prize agents : we had 
no idea of intruding on the ladies, nor did we ever intrude 
on their zenanas ; and we had strict orders from the Major- 
General to keep perfectly aloof from the dwellings of the 

women - * W. Blenkins. 

Captain Bazett prize agent, Lieutenant Brown commis- 
sioner, and Major Reid commanding the troops in the Fort, 
made similar statements ; the contradictions are to be found 
in the supplement to the Scinde Parliamentary Papers, toge- 
ther with the Ameers' memorials. 

Sir C. Napier to the G-overnor-Greneral, May 9th, 1843. 

The whole of the women of the Ameers refused to accom- 
pany them, and are here. They say they have no means of 
subsistence. This is said to be untrue. I positively forbade 
their personal ornaments of gold and jewels to be taken from 
them by the prize agents ; but whether they carried out 
treasure or not, I cannot say. 

[They carried away two millions sterling !— W. 1ST.] 

Section 2. 

Contradiction of the falsehoods promulgated by Dr. Buist, 
of the " Bombay Times," 

Sir C. Napier to the Grovernor-Q-eneral, May 16th, 1843. 

An infamous article appeared in the Bombay Times of the 
6th instant. The whole is one lie from beginning to end, 
The officers of this army are extremely indignant. The 
article is headed " The Ladies of the Ameers' Zenana." 



APPENDIX X. 



345 



My reason for troubling your Lordship on the subject is, 
that you might have thought some outrage had been com- 
mitted, and the case amplified. My Lord, there has not 
been a single irregularity ; nor is there a woman, much less 
one of the ladies of the zenana, in any officer's quarter's, nor 
do I believe any one of these ladies has ever been seen by an 
officer of this army. 



At a general meeting of the Officers of the Scinde Field 
Force, stationed at and near Hydrabad, held with sanction of 
His Excellency Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., Governor of Scinde, 
and commanding the forces in Scinde, to take into con- 
sideration the measures that should be adopted to refute a 
certain calumnious article which appeared in the Bombay 
Times newspaper of the 6th May last, headed, " Ladies of 
the Ameers' Zenana," it was unanimously resolved : — 

That an address to His Excellency the Governor of 
Scinde be drawn up and circulated for the signature of the 
officers of this force, expressive of their indignation at the 
unfounded and injurious calumnies contained in the above- 
mentioned article, soliciting the protection of His Excellency, 
and requesting his permission to make their sentiments more 
generally known, by circulating copies of this address to the 
Indian press for publication. 

The following address was then drawn up and agreed to — 

Address of the undersigned Officers of the Scinde Army, sta- 
tioned at or near Hydrabad, to His Excellency Major 
General Sir (7. J. Napier, K.O.B., Governor of, and 
commanding in Scinde, 

Sir, — We, the undersigned officers in the army, serving 
under your Excellency's command, have seen with indigna- 
tion an article in the Bombay Times newspaper of the 6th 
May last, closely affecting our honour, and tending to degrade 
us in the eyes of our friends and country. The article in 
question is headed " The Ladies of the Ameers' Zenana," and 
concludes in the following terms : — ■ 



346 



APPENDIX X. 



" Where are they now ? They, who three months since, 
were sharers of a palace and in the enjoyment of the honours 
of royalty, are the degraded lemans of the Feringhi ! So it is, 
the harem has been denied ; the last drop of bitterness has been 
mingled with the cup of misery we have given the Ameers to 
drink, the heaviest of the insults Mahomedans can endure 
has been heaped upon their grey discrowned heads. Let it 
not be supposed we speak of this in the language of prudish 
sentimentalism ; the officers who have dishonoured the zenana 
of kings have committed great wrong ; but for that, as for 
the evil deeds attending upon so unjust and cruel a conquest, 
the Government which ordained it is responsible. We know 
to our shame and sorrow the evils which flowed from frailties 
such as this permitted in Cabool ; and at Hydrabad we may 
yet discover the heinousness of our sins in the magnitude of 
our punishment. If one thing more than all the other wrongs 
we have inflicted on them could awaken in the bosom of each 
Beloochee chief, the unquenchable thirst of never-dying 
vengeance, it must be to see the sanctities of domestic life 
invaded and violated as they have been; to see the daughters 
of nobles, and wives of kings, living while youth and beauty 
last as the concubines of the infidel, thrown aside when their 
attractions have departed, to perish in their degradation and 
shame. This is the first of the black fruits of invasion for 
which Britons must blush. We have avoided explicitness on 
such a subject : our readers will be at no loss to discover our 
meaning : — the most attractive of the ladies of the zenana 
now share the tents of British officers. A series of acts of 
injustice first introduced to the Scindians the character of 
the British Government : what has just been related will 
afford them an insight into the virtues and blessings they 
may look for from the advance of civilization ; the benefits 
and honours destined them by the most refined people in the 
world. This contrasts well with the reception English ladies 
experienced at Affghan hands." 

We beg to assure your Excellency, from our own know- 
ledge and inquiry as to facts, that the grave charges contained 
in this extract against the officers under your command are 
utterly without foundation, and that not a single instance of 



APPENDIX X. 



347 



ill-treatment or disrespect to the inmates of the Ameers' 
zenana has ever come to our knowledge. Having expressed 
to your Excellency our deliberate conviction that the whole 
of the statements in the extract complained of, are unfounded 
in truth, we respectfully solicit that you will be good enough 
to take such steps as you may deem advisable to clear our 
characters thus aspersed in the eyes of our military superiors 
and comrades, and of our friends and countrymen in India 
and in Europe ; and that, with the same end in view, you 
will kindly permit .us to circulate copies of this address to the 
Indian newspapers for publication. 

We have, &c. 

Hydrabad, 10th May, 1843. 



(Signed.) 

C. Waddington, Comdg.Engr. Bom- 
bay Engrs. 

P. McPherson, Major, M. S. 
Edward Green, Acting Asst. Adjt. 
General. 

E. J. Brown, Lieut. Engrs. and 
Commissioner. 

W. Brown, Fort Major. 
A. Gibbon, Assist. Surgeon, Post 
Master. 

M. McMurdo, Lieut. Acting Asst. 
Qr. Mr. Genl. 

H. J. Pelly, Lieut. Persian Inter- 
preter. 

F. Cristal, Bt. Capt. A. D. Judge 
Advocate General. 

D. Erskine, Lt. Artillery. 
John Lloyd, Major Arty. 

H. Gibberne, Bt. Capt. Arty. 

J. S. Unwin, Bt. Capt. Arty. 

T. F. V. Outlaw, Lt. Madras Sappers 
and Miners. 

J. P. Nixon, Lieut. 25th Kegt. N. I. 

A. Boileau, 2d Lieut. Madras Sap- 
pers and Miners. 

T. Studdert, Lt. Fd. Engr. 

J. A. Wood, Lieut. 20th Begt. N. I. 

D. Carstairs, Capt. 6th Kegt. N. I. 

C. G. Bazett, Capt. 9th Light Ca- 
valry. 

C. P. Leeson, Lieut. 25th Regt.N. I. 

Supt. of Police. 
W. Ward, Assist. Surg. 12th Regt. 

N. I. 

A. B. Eathborne, Lieut. Collector 

and Magistrate. 
W. Blenkins, Capt. 6th Regt. N. I. 



J. P. Leslie, Bt. Major, 1st Troop 
H. A. 

G. Hutt, Capt. Artillery. 

J. G. Petrie, 2d Lieut. Arty. 

D. Gaye, 2d Lieut. Arty. 
A. Rowan, Capt. H. A. 

W. S. Hatch, 2d Lieut. Arty. 
W. J. Whitlie, Capt. Arty. 
W. J. Milford, Bt. Capt. 9th Light 
Cavalry. 

H. C. Plowden, Lieut. Adjt. 9th Lt. 
Cavalry. 

C. Turner, 9th Light Cavalry. 

W. B. Wemyss, Capt. 9th Light 
Cavalry. 

J. R. Snow, Lieut. 9th Cavalry. 

A. T. Wylly, Lieut. 9th Bengal Lt. 
Cavalry. 

J. H. Thomson, Cornet, 9th do. 

M.B. Stone, Cornet, do. 

M. Hyle, Assist. Surgeon. 

H. A. Balmoyn, Cornet, 9th Light 
Cavalry. 

J. H. Firth, Cornet, 9th do. 

P. F. Story, Major, do. 

C. Buckle, 3d Rt. Bombay, Lt. Ca- 
valry. 

M. Stack, Major, do. 

R. R. Younghusband, Lieut. 20th 
Regt. 

W. Collum, Assist. Surg. 3d Light 
Cavalry. 

T. P. Taylor, Lieut. 3d Light Ca- 
valry. 

F. F. Forbes, Lieut. 3d Lt. Cavalry. 
R. B. Moore, Lieut. do. 

E. F. Moore, Cornet, do. 
T. Eyre, Capt. do. 



348 



APPENDIX X. 



C. Delamain, Capt. 3d Lt. Cavalry. 

F. S. Oldfield, Lieut, do. 
H. Mackenzie, Lieut, do. 

C. T. North, Lieut. Bombay Engrs. 

T. Pownall, Lieut. H. A. 

R. Henderson, Bt. Capt. Madras 

Engineers. 
A. Woodburn, Major, 25th Regt. 

G. H. Robertson, Lieut, do. 

G. Mavor, Lieut. do. 
T. Follett, Capt. do. 
J. Jackson, Capt. do. 
A. Wright, Assist. Surg. do. 

H. Grice, Ensign, do. 

E. Glennie, Lieut.- Adjt. 25th Kegt. 

E. Lowrie, Ensign, do. . 

A. J. Thompson, Lieut. Provost- 
Marshal. 
A. P. Barker, Lieut. 21st Regt. 
H. Farrell, Lieut.-Col. do. 
W. C. Wilkinson, Lt.Adjt. do. 

F. S. Stevens, Capt. do. 
E. A. Green, Lieut. do. 
E. S. Leathes, Ensign, do. 
M. J. Battye, Lieut. do. 
W. J. Merewether, Ensign do. 

J. M. Younghusband. Lieut. 8th 
Regt. 

H. Fenning, Lieut. 21st. Regt. 

(True Copy.) 



E. L. Scott, Ensign, 21st Regt. 
J. P. Laurie, Ensign, do. 

G. W. West, Ensign, do. 

H. J. Carter, Assist. Surg. do. 

W. J. Brown, Major, 8th Regt.N. L 

A. Thomas, Capt. do. 

J. McKenzie, Assist. Surg. do. 

A. S. Hawkins, Capt. 8th Regt. 

C. Brasnell, Ensign, do. 

S. J. Dalzell, Ensign, do. 

R. T. Reid, Major, 12th Regt. N. I. 

E. J. Rusell, Lieut. do. 

I. Fisher, Capt. do. 
W. Lodwick, Lieut. do. 
W. T. Holbrow, Ensign, do. 
A. Y. Bease, Ensign, do. 
O. Clarkson, Capt. do. 
Jas. D.B. Forest, Ensign, do 
W. J. Soppitt, Ensign, do. 
J. B. D. Carter, Lieut. do. 

C. M. James, Ensign 6th Regiment 
N. I. 

J. Dalrymple, Surg. 9th Light Cavy. 
W. Ashburner, Lieut. Adj. 3d Lt. 

Cavalry. 
E. G. Malet, Capt. do. 
G. Allender, Staff Surgeon. 
James Down, Lieut. 12th Regt. N.I. 



P. McPherson, Major. 

Military Secretary. 



Hydrabad, July 25th, 1843. 

Gentlemen, — Your address has given me great satisfac- 
tion. I concur in every word, and confirm every statement 
it contains. 

We are accused by Mr. Buist, the Editor of the Bombay 
Times, of disgracing ourselves, our profession, and our 
country, by the most infamous conduct towards the women of 
the zenana ; and I am, personally, held up to public scorn as 
the immediate cause of such scandalous conduct. 

You have protected your character, collectively and in- 
dividually, by exposing this unprovoked and unparalleled 
calumny ; and it is right the public should know that, so far 
from offering these ladies any insult, no officer of this army 
has even seen a lady of the zenana. 

But the officers whom I have the honour to command, are 
of the same class of high-minded gentlemen which compose 



APPENDIX XI. 349 

the rest of the officers of the Queen's and Company's service ; 
the calumny, therefore, applies to the character of the whole 
military profession— all will feel the insult ! 

This calumny is intended to make England look down 
upon her armies with horror and disgust ; and when I con- 
sider the bad climate in which we are now serving; that 
dangers and privations surround us; that we have put 
forth our best energies to serve our sovereign and our 
country, and to gain the approbation of our friends ; that all 
have served with reputation, and some of us grown grey in 
undishonoured arms ; that many of our comrades have lately 
fallen in battle, and by disease, and that all are ready to fall ; 
when I consider these things I say I am at a loss to account 
for the feelings which induced Mr. Buist (if it be true that 
he is an Englishman, deliberately to make the groundless fab- 
rication which he has put forth to the world. 

Gentlemen, your reputation and mine are inseparable, and 
I assure you that my best exertions shall be united with 
yours, to defend our private character as gentlemen, and 
our military character as soldiers. 

I have, &c. (Signed) C. J. Napiek, 

Major-General and Governor of Scinde. 
(True Copy.) P. McPherson, Major, 

Military Secretary. 

[This infamous libel was written by Dr. Buist.] 

XI. 

Names of Officers mentioned in the Despatches as being dis- 
tinguished in the battles of Meeanee and Hydrabad. 

Lieut.-Qolonels. Pennefather. — Pattle. 

Majors. Poole. — Jackson. — Teasdale. — Lloyd. — Mac 
Pherson. — Waddington. — -Wyllie. — Storey.— Stack. — Leslie. 
— Reid. — Brown. — Woodburn. 

Captains. Garrett.— Meade.— Tew.— Cookson. — Tucker. 
— Conway. — Whitlie. — Hutt. — Blenkins. — Henderson. — 
Tait. — Delamain. — Jacob. — Willoughby.— George. — Jack- 
son.— Stevens. — Fisher. 



350 APPENDIX XI. 

Lieutenants. Smith. — Coote. — Wood. — Harding. — 
Phayre.— M'Murdo. — Pelly. — Boileau. — Outlaw. — Thomp- 
son. — Younghusband. — Leeson. — Brennan. — Brown. — Rath- 
borne. — Hill.— North. — Battersby. — Leeson. — Fitzgerald. 

Surgeons. Dalrymple. — Bell. 

Moonshee. Ali Ackbar. 

Names of Officers hilled at Meeanee. 

Majors. Jackson. — Teasdale. 
Captains. Cookson. — Tew. — Meade. 
Lieutenant. Wood. 

Wounded, 

Lieut-Colonel. Pennefather. 
Major. Wyllie. 

Captains. Tucker. — Smith. — Conway. 
Lieutenants. Plowden. — Harding. — Phayre. — Bour- 
dillon. 

Ensigns. Firth. — Pennefather. — Bowden. — Holbrow. 

Officers killed at Hydrahad. 

Captain. Garrett. 
Lieutenant. Smith. 

Wounded. 

Lieutenants. Pownoll. — Tait.— Chute. — Coote. — Evans, 
— Brennan. — Bur. — Wilkinson. — M'Murdo. 
Mnsign. Pennefather. 

Names of men of the 22nd Regiment who concealed their 
wounds, received in the battle of Hydrahad, and marched 
with their Regiment the next day, thinking another battle was 
at hand. 

John Purr. — John Muldowney. — Robert Young. — 
Henry Lines. — Patrick Gill. — James Andrews. Wounds 
not severe. 



APPENDIX XI. 



351 



Sergeant Haney. Wound rather severe. 

Thomas Middleton.— James Mulvey. Severely wounded 

in the legs. 

Silvester Day. Ball in the foot ! 



Report sent hy Sir C. Napier to the Governor-General, of non- 
commissioned Officers and men ivho had particularly dis- 
tinguished themselves at the Battle ofMeeanee. 

From Major-General Sir C. J. Napier, K.C.B., to the 
Right Honourable Lord Ellekborough, Governor-General 
of India, &c. &c. 

Hydrabad, 2nd March, 1843. 

My Lord,— I beg leave to send to your Lordship reports 
made by my order; that while the memory is fresh, dis- 
tinguished deeds maybe put on record. The great results of 
this battle have made me anxious that those who were so 
conspicuous in the hour of trial should be known to your 
Lordship. Their devotion to their duty was very honourable 
to them. 

In the case of the brave drivers of the two batteries I am 
sure your Lordship will do them justice, and I beg especially 
to recommend them to your Lordship's protection. 

I have, &c, 
(Signed) C. J. Napier, Major-General 

From Captain G. Butt, Commanding Field Battery, to the 
Adjutant of Artillery, in Scinde. 

Camp, near Hydrabad, 23rd February, 1843. 

Sir,— With reference to Division After Orders of yester- 
day, I beg permission to bring to the notice of the Major- 
General, the general steadiness and good conduct of the drivers 
of the battery under my command, throughout the action of the 
17th, particularly of three men {Drivers— Uggar Khan, Ba- 



352 



APPENDIX XI. 



hadoor, Mahadoo), who brought up the howitzer first in 
action on the right of the line, under a very heavy and de- 
structive fire, with a degree of coolness and steadiness that 
could not be surpassed, though two of their horses were 
dangerously wounded. 

I would not presume to bring these men to notice were 
they enlisted, or treated as fighting men • but as they are 
still considered as mere followers, men whose families receive 
no pension in the event of their death, or themselves if dis- 
abled by wounds, I beg to submit' the case to the Major- 
General, as a strong argument in favour of those, on whose 
courage and conduct the very existence of the battery must 
often depend. 

I have, &c, 
(Signed) Geo. Hutt, Captain, 

Com dg - Field Battery. 

From Major P. F. Story, Com dg - 9th Light Cavalry, to 
Lieutenant Felly, Assistant Adjutant-Greneral. 

Camp, Hydrabad, 26th February, 1843. 

Sir, — In forwarding the accompanying Roll, for the in- 
formation of the Major-General, I have the honour to request 
you will inform him, that I have had the greatest difficulty 
in selecting these men, where all behaved so gallantly, and 
nearly equally well. 

I have, &c, 
(Signed) P. F. Story, Major, 

(j om dg. Qtfo JjigJit Cavalry. 

Roll of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and 
privates of the 9th Bengal light cavalry, who particularly 
distinguished themselves in action with the enemy, on the 11th 
February, 1843. 

Camp, Hydrabad, February, 1843. 

Subadar. Shaik Bekr Ally — Had his horse severely 
wounded in the chest, led his men in a most gallant manner, 



APPENDIX XI. 



353 



and was very active in re-forming them for a second 
attack. 

Subadar. Shaik Emam Bux — Engaged with two troopers 
in taking a Standard planted near some guns, and which was 
most bravely defended by the enemy. 

Jemadar. Khoman Sing— Carried the Standard of the 
1st squadron (Queen's colour), and was very zealous and ac- 
tive during the whole action. 
• Havildar. Shaik Emam Bux— saved the life of his 
officer, Shaik Emam Bux, (subadar,) and his conduct was 
conspicuous during the day. 

Havildar. Shaik Golam Hussain — Strongly recom- 
mended for great gallantry during the charge. 

Naich. Bucktawer Sing — Behaved most gallantly 
during the whole day. 

Troopers. Birma Deen, Golam Russool — These two men 
were equally engaged with the subadar in taking the 
Standard, which was so nobly defended. 

Trooper. Sewdial Sing — Singly rushed into a walled 
enclosure and killed one of the enemy, who had several times 
fired from it with effect. 

Trooper. Mootee Sing — Saved the life of his officer, 
Captain Garrett. 

Trooper. Gungah Sing — Killed after a long and severe 
personal conflict with one of the enemy, when no assistance 
was at hand. 

Trooper. Beharee Sing — After being severely wounded 
in the wrist, and his horse also in two places, cut down his 
adversary. 

Trooper. Fyzoolla Khan — Behaved gallantly throughout, 
and cut down his enemy after a severe personal conflict. 

Trooper. Hussain Ally — Strongly recommended for great 
gallantry during the charge. 

Trooper. Nasser Ally — Behaved with great gallantry 
during the charge, and was severely wounded. 

(Signed) P. F. Stoky, Major, 

Com dg - 9th Light Cavalry. 

z 



354 



APPENDIX XI. 



From Major J. H. Poole, Commanding 22nd Regiment, to 
the Assistant Adjutant-General, Scinde Field Force. 

Camp, Hydrabad, 24th February, 1843. 

Sir,—In reference to No. 2, After Division Orders of the 
22nd instant, I called upon the captains and officers com- 
manding companies, to furnish me with the names and acts 
of individuals under my command, who had especially dis- 
tinguished themselves in the action of the 17 th instant. 
The officers generally assert that they feel difficulty in 
making selections, where the conduct of every man of the 
companies was so satisfactory. In so general a field of action 
and persevering exertion, I equally feel at a loss, where to 
draw a distinction ; but it may be ' proper to mention the 
names of private James O'Neill, of the light company, who 
took a standard whilst we were actively engaged with the 
enemy, and Drummer Martin Delaney, who shot, bayoneted 
and captured the arms of Meer Whulle Mohamed Khan, who 
was mounted, and directing the enemy in the hottest part of 
the engagement. When all the regiment behaved with 
enduring coolness and intrepidity, I hope the particular 
circumstances of these two cases will exonerate me from the 
imputation of doing injustice to all the brave soldiers of 
the regiment, by particularizing them. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) J. H. Poole, Major, 

Com**- 22nd Begt. 



From Major S. Clibbome, Oom* - 1st G-renadier Begt. KL, 
to Lieutenant Felly, Acting Asst. Adjt.-Genl., Hydrabad. 

Camp, near Hydrabad, 24th February, 1843. 

Sir,--Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, 
I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major-General Sir 
C. J. Napier, K.C.B., the names of the following officers 
and men of the 1st grenadiers, who distinguished themselves 
by zeal and gallantry in the action of the 17 th February. 

Lieutenant Johnstone, who cut down a Beloochee, and 



APPENDIX XI. 



355 



saved the life of a sepoy who had bayoneted this Beloochee, 
but was overpowered in the life struggle. 

Subadar Major Kooshall Sing, and Subadar Esseree 
Pursaud, likewise privates Sunkur Misser and Kadaree 
Powar, who were conspicuous throughout the day for their 
zeal and gallantry. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) S. Clibborne, Major, 

Qom dg - 1st G-renadier Regt. N.I. 



From Major N. R. Reid, Commanding 12th Regt. N. I. 
to the Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Scinde and Beloochistan, 
Hydrabad Fort, 25th February, 1843. 

Sir, — With reference to No. 3 of the Division Orders, 
dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit, for 
the purpose of being laid before the Major- General, a no- 
minal Roll of non-commissioned officers, naicks and privates, 
in the 12th regiment, N. L, who have been reported to me 
by the officers in command, and in charge of the companies 
to which they belong, as having particularly distinguished 
themselves in the action of the 17th instant. 

I take this opportunity of recording the gallant conduct 
of the late Captain and Brevet Major Jackson, who fell at 
the head of the grenadier company, in a personal conflict 
with several of the enemy. The other officers, Lieutenant 
and Brevet Captain Meade and Lieutenant Wood, who were 
killed, were also most conspicuous when they fell, in cheer- 
ing on their men at one of the most critical periods of the 
action. To the other European officers I am also much 
indebted for their gallant conduct and example throughout 
the day ; but to Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Brown, the 
only mounted officer with me in the battle, in a particular 
degree I beg to place on record the deep gratitude I must 
ever feel for the assistance he afforded me, as well as my ad- 
miration at the gallantry he displayed in cheering the men 



356 



APPENDIX XI. 



throughout the conflict, at every part of the line where 
the resistance was most hot and determined. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) N. R. Reid, Major, 

Commanding 12th Regt. JN". I. 



Nominal Roll of those men in the 12th Regiment, JV". who 
distinguished themselves in the action of the 11th Feb. 1843. 

Fort Hydrabad, 25th February, 1843. 

1 Havildar Dutram Tewaree, 

1 Naick Bhowanee Sing, 

2 Naick Allum Sing, 

1 Private Shaik Adjum, 

Wounded, in gallantly defending Capt. and Brevet Major 
Jackson. 

(Sd.) B. D. Carter, Ens. in charge of Gr. Company. 

1 Havildar Oomrow Sing, 
1 Naick Lall Khan, 

1 Private Mathadeen 1st. 

2 „ Booree Aheer, 

3 „ Seetul Lohar. 

I heard these men cheering on their comrades after a 
slight check, and saw them most forward in the action. 

(Sd.) G. Fisher, Capt. Com**- 5th Company. 

1 Havildar Bugwan Sing, 

2 „ Thackoor Ram, 

Behaved gallantly, urging the men on, and foremost in 
the action. 

(Sd.) W. F. Holbrow, Mis. in charge 8th Company. 
(True copy.) (Sd.) W. Brown, Capt. Adjt. 12th Hegt N. I. 
(Sd.) N. R. Reid, Major, Corn**- 12th Regt. K I 



APPENDIX XT. 



357 



From Cajot J. Jackson, Com dg - 25th Regt N.L, to the Assistant 
Adjutant-General, in Scinde and Beloochistan. 

Camp, Hydrabad, 25th February, 1843. 

Sir, — Agreeably to Division Orders of the 22nd instant, 
I beg to bring to the especial notice of Major-General Sir C. 
J. Napier, K.C.B., the following officers of the 25th regi- 
ment, N. I., who particularly distinguished themselves, by 
zeal and gallantry, in the action of the 17th of February, 
1843. 

The whole of the sepoys behaved so well, that I consider 
it would be invidious to make any distinction. 

Lieutenant Marston, grenadier company, who cut down 
two of the enemy, single handed, in front of the line. 

Subadar Major Nund Ram, who, though wounded, re- 
mained with his company throughout the action. 

Subadar Russall Sing, grenadier company, who shot 
three men, and cut down one, and shewed great zeal in 
encouraging and leading on his men. 

Jemedar Bappoo Sawunt, light company, who cut down 
one man. I have, &c. 

(Signed) John Jackson, Captain, 

Com dg - 25th Regt. N. L 



From Captain J. Jacob, Com dg - Scinde Irregidar Horse, 
to the Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Scinde and Beloochistau, 
Camp, near Hydrabad, 23rd February, 1843. 

giy — With reference to Division Orders of the 22nd in- 
stant, I have the honour to request that you will bring to the 
notice of Major-General Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B. com- 
manding in Scinde and Beloochistan, that throughout the 
battle fought on the 17th I received the most essential 
service from my Acting Adjutant, Lieutenant Russell, whose 
steady, cool, and daring conduct on the occasion mainly 



358 



APPENDIX XI. 



contributed to the good behaviour of the corps I have the 
honour to command, especially while it was exposed alone 
for nearly two hours to a heavy fire of artillery, in a most 
trying position for an irregular sepoy corps, which, until a 
few months before that day, had, since it was raised, been 
always dispersed in small detachments, and the men of which 
had, with few exceptions, never been engaged in any but 
skirmishing fights. I am also greatly indebted to this officer 
for the promptness with which he assisted me in the very 
difficult task of reforming, after charging through the 
enemy's camp, when the men were excited to the highest 
pitch, and when their services were required to repel an un- 
expected attack on the rear guard. 

I also request that you will have the kindness to bring 
to the notice of the Major-General, the excellent conduct 
of Russuldar Surferaz Khan, Jemedar Alladad Khan Nawab, 
and Duffadar Mhobut Khan. The good conduct of these 
three native officers was most conspicuous throughout the 
day, and particularly on one occasion, when the regiment 
was moving over ground rendered nearly impassable by 
watercourses, hedges, and deep cuts filled with thorns and 
lined by matchlock-men; in advancing at the gallop over 
these obstacles so many falls took place, that more than 
fifty of our horses were lying on the ground at once ; this 
occurred under a very heavy fire from the village and 
nullahs on the right of the enemy's line, and on this oc- 
casion, the native officers above mentioned, re-formed their 
men, and restored order in a style which was deserving of my 
highest admiration. I do not mention Lieutenant Fitz- 
gerald, my second in command, as I have already brought 
that officer's services to the notice of the General. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) J. Jacob, Qapt. Arty. 

Qom dg - Scinde Irregular Horse. 



APPENDIX XII. 



359 



XII. 

Extract from a private Letter of Sir 0. Napier r touching the 
Operations against Shere Mohamed, in June 1843. 

18th July. 

I am very ill; I had an apoplectic fit, from the sun, 
when out on the 13th of June last. I had before had the 
fever, and was very ill recovered, when I went out, and my 
tent was 132°. The sun struck me down, and I was, I 
believe, the only man of many who were so stricken that was 
not dead within three hours, and most of them in a few 
minutes, The doctor was with me in a minute and bled me, 
put my feet in hot water, wet towels round my head, and so 
I was got right ; but I have never been right since. Such 
terrible weakness that 1 cannot write a letter without lying 
down; a sickening feel comes over me that is quite inde- 
scribable. The doctors tell me I must give myself holidays ! 
I ask them how ? If I take one day's rest, I must work 
double tides the next ! How can I take rest ? That is 
beyond their power to answer ; I know I want it as well as 
they can tell me, but let them tell me who is to answer, per- 
haps, one hundred letters which at times come in at once, from 
Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, or Agra. In short, it is impossible, 
without I quit this for ever, to have rest ; and I feel unable 
to go on. Even this letter to you knocks me up ! Yet 20 
sheets of letters on stupid nonsense await at my elbow ! There 
are two reasons why I cannot get rest. There is no one to do 
the work. 2nd. It is impossible to go away, we are locked 
up for five months by heat and the monsoon. This world is 
one of suffering, and he who believes it to be only a sojourn 
makes up his mind to its roughs and smooths ; besides, who 
is to prophecy ? I may in a week be quite well ! The 
weather is cooling, the peace of Scinde is secure. I yester- 
day heard from the north, and the only chief left in arms 
has fled over the Indus, with a dozen of followers ; and his 
troops dispersed ! I think I feel better already. Tran- 



360 



APPENDIX XH. 



quillity is now certain, the want of that weighed hard 
upon me, as I felt my last point of personal strength 
was to surround Shere Mohamed on the 14th, as I did. 
There he was, and 
though he was a bad 
soldier to let me pin 
him up ; yet like a good 
one, he slapt at Jacob, 
who was the weakest, 
and tried to get to 
the desert, where he 
would not fear me, in- 
deed the few Jacob 
had could hardly find water ; poor Shere Mohamed's men 
would not look us in the face. The 24th March took the 
heart out of the whole of these wild tribes ; and they fled, 
4,000 and three guns, before 900 and two guns ! Jacob did 
not fire a shot but with his cannon. I wanted to go north, 
to rout out Mohamed Ali, but am too weak, and this fretted 
me ; now he is disposed of, and all is quiet, I shall throw as 
much work as I can upon others, which With the cool weather 
will, perhaps, set me up. 

My position w T as a terrible one from 1 7th February to 
22nd March. I had hold of river, fortress, and town, three 
miles off, Ameers prisoners, immense treasure, and 40,000 
men as all accounts stated, gathering upon me; a large 
hospital, and to guard all these 2,500 men at the most, 
including officers ! And besides all this, the anxiety about 
the brigade which I had at all hazards ordered to push 
double marches to Hydrabad from Sukkur ; and to protect 
which, had the enemy ventured to march against it, I must 
have pursued with 2,000 men at most, an awkward number to 
follow 40,000 ! as I heard, and then believed. At last my 
brigade arrived, and at the same time reinforcements from up 
and down the river all arrived on the 23rd and joined. At 7 
in the evening I manoeuvred the whole in divisions, at 2 in 
the morning I dismissed an ambassador who arrived to demand 
my surrender, and told him to make haste home for I would 
be at his heels. I then lay down for two hours, half dead 



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APPENDIX XII. 



361 



with fatigue, marched at 4 with 5,000 men, and gave my 
friend Shere Mohamed such a hiding as he little expected. 
They will never again fight. All their chiefs have come in 
and laid their swords at my feet. The whole country is quiet, 
and rejoicing at being rid of the tyrants. You never saw 
such a magnificent country, but a wilderness. The collectors 
have made the calculation, every cultivator paid two-thirds 
nearly of his produce to the Ameers, rigidly exacted. They 
have held the country fifty-eight years, and it is nearly 

ruined. Do not fancy the Belooch is the Scindian. 

says, " I wish you had not been opposed to people fighting 
for their independence." How they do blunder in England ! 
Oh ! no, we have fought for the liberties of the people I Even 
the Belooch himself is glad, now he finds he is not dispos- 
sessed of his conquest, but has only got a good master for 
bad ones." 



THE END. 



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